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ABSTRACT 
This study offers an overview and critique of the growing movement in American 
evangelicalism of what is popularly known as “inclusivism.”  The mounting uneasiness 
expressed in many evangelical circles in North America concerning the fate of the 
unevangelised, and how that may square with the traditional evangelical view of their 
lostness, has produced a vigorous Soteriology which means to address what is viewed as 
inadequacies in the traditional model of salvation found in the American evangelical 
community. 
 
After an Introduction which defines the terms of the discussion, a systematic presentation of 
the main views of inclusivism is presented, mainly through the eyes of two of its foremost 
proponents, Clark Pinnock and John Sanders (although many others are also referenced).  
Major topics of coverage include the character and nature of God as supremely expressed in 
the teaching of Jesus, the work of the Holy Spirit through non-Christian religions, and how a 
balance between the love of God and human freedom can be maintained.  Inclusivism 
endeavours to distance itself both from modern pluralism and evangelical exclusivism, the 
latter the dominant soteriological position of American evangelicalism for the past several 
generations.  Driven by a strong sense of the love of God, inclusivists contend that God will 
do anything he can to draw people to himself.  While maintaining the particularity of Christ, 
inclusivists nonetheless see a universal outworking of Christ’s salvation, even to those people 
without epistemological awareness of Jesus’ atoning work.  This works out in a greater 
appreciation for the salvific benefits of general revelation and non-Christian religions, 
resulting in a “wider hope” that more of humanity will be saved than is typically expected in 
exclusivism’s “fewness doctrine.” 
 
After a presentation of the main views of inclusivism, a final section of this study is devoted 
to an evangelical evaluation.  Is it an acceptable alternative to the traditional exclusivism of 
American evangelicalism?  A systematic evaluation of the main tenets of inclusivism is 
presented, going through such areas as its Bibliology, Pneumatology, Christology, and 
Hamartiology, with a final look at its soteriological conclusions and the practical effects it 
may have on evangelical world missions.  The main point of departure is seen in the area of 
the judgment of God, and how a “hermeneutic of judgment” is needed to properly 
counterbalance inclusivism’s “hermeneutic of hope.” 
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie studie bied ‘n oorsig en kritiek op die groeiende beweging onder Amerikaanse 
evangelikalisme van wat populêr bekendstaan as “inklusivisme.”  Die groeiende ongemak, 
uitgespreek in talle evangelikale kringe in Noord Amerika oor die toestand van die onge-
evangeliseerdes, en hoe dit vergelyk met die tradisionele evangelikale beskouing oor hulle 
verlorenheid, het ‘n kragtige Soteriologie tot gevolg gehad.  Dit beteken dat dit wat gesien 
word as ontoereikendheid in die tradisionele model van verlossing in die Amerikaanse 
evangelikale gemeenskap, aangespreek sal word. 
 
Ná ‘n inleiding, wat die terminologie van die diskussie definieer, word ‘n sistematiese 
uiteensetting van die hoof-standpunte van die inklusivisme aangebied, hoofsaaklik volgens 
die beskouinge van twee van die hulle sterkste voorstanders, Clark Pinnock en John Sanders 
(hoewel daar ook na baie ander verwys word).  Die belangrikste onderwerpe wat aanbespreek 
word sluit in: die eienskappe en natuur van God, soos hoofsaaklik uitgedruk in die leringe van 
Jesus, die werk van die Heilige Gees deur die nie-Christelike godsdienste, en hoe die ewewig 
tussen God se liefde en menslike vryheid behou kan word.  Die inklusivisme poog om dit te 
distansieer van beide moderne pluralism en evangelikale eksklusivisme, terwyl laasgenoemde 
die oorwegende soteriologiese standpunt in Amerikaanse evangelikale kringe was vir verskeie 
geslagte van evangelikales.  Aangespoor deur ‘n sterk bewustheid van die liefde van God het 
inklusiviste geglo dat God enigiets moontlik sal doen om mense na Hom toe te trek.  Terwyl 
hulle nog vashou aan die uniekheid van Christus, sien inklusiviste nogtans ‘n universele 
uitwerking van Christus se verlossing, selfs aan daardie mense sonder the epitemologiese 
bewustheid van Jesus se versoeningswerk.  Dit mond uit in groter waardering vir die 
verlossingsresultate van die algemene openbaring en nie-Christelike godsdienste, wat uitloop 
in ‘n “breër hoop”, dat ‘n groter deel van die mensdom gered sal word as wat verwag word in 
die “minheid leerstuk” van die eksklusivisme. 
  
Na ‘n aanbieding van die hoof-standpunte van die inklusivisme, volg die laaste afdeling van 
hierdie studie, wat aan ‘n evangelikalistiese evaluering toegewy is.  Is dit ‘n aanvaarbare 
alternatief vir die tradisionele eksklusivisme van Amerikaanse evangelikale teologie?  ‘n 
Sistematiese evaluering van die hoof-standpunte van inklusivisme word aangebied, deur die 
volgende studievelde te vergelyk: Bibliologie, Pneumatologie, Christologie, en Hamartiologie 
(leer oor die sonde), met ‘n laaste beskouing oor die soteriologiese en praktiese resultate en 
effekte op evangelikale wêreldsending.  Die hoof vertrekpunt word gevind rondom die 
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‘oordeel van God’ en hoe ‘n “hermeneutiek van oordeel” nodig is as ‘n volledige teenwig vir 
die “hermeneutiek van hoop” in die inklusiwisme. 
iii  
FOREWORD 
American evangelicalism is a phenomenon of grand proportions.  Its influence is felt not only 
in the United States itself, but in virtually every corner of the globe.  Current missiological 
statistics, for example, show that over half of all missionaries in the world come from the 
United States, and a very large portion of these from evangelical churches and mission 
agencies.  Large sums of American money go to all areas of the world feeding Christian 
enterprises that are largely funded by American evangelicals.   
 
Evangelical colleges and universities abound from the east coast to the west.  In fact, there are 
more evangelical tertiary institutions of learning in America than all the universities of Europe 
combined, so large is the evangelical machinery of the United States.  When evangelical 
publishing houses, companies and corporations are included, the influence of evangelicalism 
in America can hardly be ignored. 
 
The past five American presidents all claimed to be evangelicals in varying degrees, or looked 
to woo the evangelical community, and with good reason.  Some estimates put the number of 
evangelical Christians in the United States close to one hundred million, or nearly one-third of 
the population, and although such statistics are difficult to pin down, lower estimates place the 
figure closer to the fifty million range, still a large figure.  Regardless of the exact number, 
such a block of people wields tremendous influence, not only in the religious sphere, but the 
political as well. 
 
It is not remiss to say that any study of Christianity in America over the past century which 
does not take into consideration evangelicalism, could rightly be said to be an incomplete 
study.  Even major secular magazines such as Time and Newsweek recognise this fact, and 
annually devote several issues to Christian themes.  Over the past several years, Time 
Magazine has had annual articles covering “The Twenty-Five Most Influential Evangelicals” 
and the like. 
 
And yet, evangelicalism is in a crisis. A recent New York Times article covering several 
pages considered the fragmentation that the evangelical movement has begun to experience, 
both in the religious as well as political realm.  Although this may be news to secularists who 
politically follow  evangelicalism, this is hardly news when it comes to the religious sphere of 
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the movement.  For the past two decades if not longer, major theological rifts have occurred 
in American evangelicalism.   
 
This dissertation will cover one of the hotter issues, that concerning the fate of the 
unevangelised.  This debate has far reaching effects, especially in the area of world missions, 
and some have considered it the theological issue which will eventually reshape 
evangelicalism.  American evangelicalism is presently experiencing a paradigm shift in its 
Soteriology, one which may radically change the traditionally negative view evangelicalism 
has had of non-Christian religions, thus reshaping important practical areas such as 
evangelism, missions, and apologetics. 
 
As far reaching as these American developments may have on the rest of the world, the aim of 
this dissertation is not to dissect and digest the various views of God’s judgment and salvation 
outside of North America.  I am an American who has lived in Namibia for the past thirteen 
years.  It is natural that I would pursue a doctorate from a South African institution, even 
though I realise that the views I hold are not altogether embraced by its faculty.  It is also 
natural that I would pursue a doctorate which involves an important issue in my homeland. 
 
It should be clear from the outset, then, that this dissertation is specifically addressing the 
American movement.  Despite the temptation, statements made herein should not be taken out 
of their American context.  The bibliography, for example, makes it clear that this study is 
concentrating on North American authors, not those from elsewhere.  So, for example, despite 
the fact that in Europe the issue of the judgment of God has experienced a sort of renaissance, 
that has not been the case in North America.  It took seven years before Marius Reiser’s 
German work on God’s judgment was translated into English (Jesus and Judgment: The 
Eschatological Proclamation in Its Jewish Context (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), and 
despite the fact that the judgment of God was the theme of the 2007 Annual Meeting of the 
German Society for Evangelical Theology (Gesellschaft für Evangelische Theologie), I doubt 
that it will become the major theme of the Evangelical Theological Society of North America 
any time soon.  Baird’s call over forty years ago for more coverage of this topic appears to 
have fallen on deaf ears in North America.  It has been a topic all-too-often ignored in 
American evangelicalism, one which needs decidedly more press. 
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I have deliberately concentrated on American evangelicalism in this dissertation and have not 
attempted to address the wider, global evangelical community.  Despite the fact that a 
comprehensive doctoral study on the judgment of God has been done on the European 
continent by Gregor Etzelmüller, for example (Zu Richten die Lebendigan und die Toten, 
Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2007), such work, while important, is not yet 
influential in American evangelical circles, nor is it or other non-American work regularly 
cited or used in this dissertation. 
 
I am appreciative of the freedom I have been given by the University of Stellenbosch to 
evaluate this important issue in my home country’s Christian landscape.  I understand that 
many of the conclusions that I make in this dissertation may not correspond with views 
strongly held at the University itself, and I am deeply grateful for the liberty the faculty of 
theology has given me in formulating my ideas, not from a South African point-of-view, but 
from one decidedly American in perspective.  I trust that the quality of my work will be 
acceptable even to those who vehemently disagree with my analysis and conclusion.  I am 
certain that some of the things I say, coming from my American evangelical tradition, may 
sound strange to some readers of this dissertation not accustomed to that tradition.  Yet, I am 
grateful for the academic freedom afforded me by the University of Stellenbosch to pursue 
my studies in this important area for American evangelicalism. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
“Judgment is the obverse of salvation, and its necessary precondition.”1 
Marius Reiser 
 
Back in the early 1990s, I served as the Missions Intern of my church in the States.  My 
church was (and still is) an multi-denominational, evangelical church situated in the suburbs 
of Chicago with about 2000 members.  At that time the church had over 100 “missionary 
units”2 serving on every continent of the globe except for Antarctica.  Today, over a decade 
later, the church has even more missionaries.  One of my tasks as the intern was to read 
through all the missionary correspondence and glean prayer points for various church 
publications.  One story reported by missionaries in Zaire touched me deeply and its image is 
planted firmly in my mind even to this day. 
The story was of a woman refugee fleeing a conflict in her homeland of Rwanda.  Many 
fled to neighbouring countries including what was then known as Zaire (today the Democratic 
Republic of Congo).  The woman was forced to flee her homeland with tens of thousands of 
other refugees, walking hundreds of kilometres to Zaire.  Many died along the way, either by 
starvation or lack of drinkable water.  This particular woman had with her an infant that she 
fed at her breast, but as the woman herself became more and more dehydrated, her breasts 
could no longer produce milk for her baby.  This Rwandan woman, fleeing from war and 
bloodshed in the ethnic conflicts of her country, was now forced to watch her baby die in her 
arms.  The helplessness the woman must have felt is unimaginable.  The individual and 
mostly unknown atrocities caused by the evil of greedy, power-hungry people are also 
unimaginable.  There is no doubt in my mind that if that woman could have given her life for 
her child she would have, but she could not. 
The image in my mind is of a trail of people, walking along a dusty road, weak and 
malnourished, and this woman in particular holding her baby close to her breast.  The baby is 
itself weak and thin, nursing but not finding any milk.  The desperate woman can do nothing 
                                                 
1 Jesus and Judgment: The Eschatological Proclamation in Its Jewish Context (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1997) 316. 
2 A “missionary unit” is either a single missionary, a couple without children, or a missionary family.  Therefore, 
100 missionary units involves easily over 150 adults and, including children, close to 300 people. 
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but continue walking, hoping to find some food or water.  The missionary who reported the 
story noted that several days after the infant died, the woman still carried the child with her. 
No further report was ever given, but one could hazard a fair guess that the woman died 
on that trail as well.  The question that haunted me then – as it still does now – is, “Where is 
God in all of this?”  Similar stories can be multiplied ad infinitum from all around the world, 
people in their misery and pathetic state of existence, who have had lives filled with turmoil 
and distress.  Many were born in poverty and sickness and have only known an existence 
filled with pain and grief.  Years have been spent fleeing from war or fighting diseases, 
watching their loved ones dying, entirely unable to do anything about it.  Then these same 
people who have only known anguish during their years on this planet die – and spend an 
eternity in hell suffering even more anguish – because they never heard the message of Jesus 
and the salvation he brings.  Where is God in all of this? 
Honest Christians must admit that they have struggled with these same issues at some 
point in their lives.  Certainly, there are some Christians who could not care less, or who even 
revel in the fact that people who die apart from knowing Jesus spend an eternity in hell, and 
that is that.  But I hope that those types of Christians are few and far between.  Clearly, some 
theologians believe that “fundamentalist” or “evangelical” camps are littered with such cold-
hearted Christians, but I beg to differ with this all-too-easy-to-make caricature of traditional, 
evangelical beliefs.  Many Christians, and not just from the liberal or mainline churches, but 
from evangelical and fundamentalist churches as well, struggle with these issues.  The volume 
of work produced during the last two decades alone shows that this issue is a hot one in 
American evangelical circles as well as in other Christian traditions. 
If I were to ask the question, “Where will that Rwandan woman be in the final 
consummation of all things?” I can expect to get a plethora of responses.  Some will say that 
she is in heaven because all people go to heaven.  Others will say that she has spent a brief 
time in hell or purgatory to perfect or educate her so that she may then enter heaven.  Still 
others will say that she died not professing Jesus as her personal Lord and Saviour and so is 
currently in hell, where she will spend an eternity “paying for” her sins.  And this does not 
exhaust the options or answers that are given for just such a question.3 
At the heart of the question lies the heart of God.  Does God love this woman?  Does he 
really care what happens to her?  And where do the ministries of Jesus Christ and the Holy 
                                                 
3 Obviously, there are atheistic or secular answers to this question as well, namely, that there is no afterlife and 
all people simply die as part of the evolutionary process.  However, this study intends to deal with the various 
Christian answers to this question and will not address atheism and its claims. 
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Spirit fit in?  Even though this is a soteriological issue, other doctrines quickly come to the 
fore.  Who God is (Theology-proper), what Jesus has done on the cross (Christology), and 
what the Holy Spirit is doing now in the world (Pneumatology), will all play a part in 
answering these difficult questions.  Even a question like, “Is this woman really a sinner 
before God?” (Hamartiology) must also be addressed. 
However, all of these questions must be answered with the full weight of biblical data 
behind them.  A tension often exists between the traditional evangelical, Protestant approach 
of Scripture as the norm, and those approaches which place more emphasis on natural or 
cultural sensibilities.  Evangelicals normally maintain that they cannot pick and choose what 
portions of Scripture suit their answers, and then ignore the rest.  This is particularly true 
when it comes to the judgment passages of Scripture.  Far too often the tendency is to ignore 
these portions, especially when they come from the mouth of Jesus.  But if evangelicals are to 
give good and truthful answers to the very difficult questions above, they must remain true to 
the Word of God in its entirety. 
Much has been made of our pluralistic world.4  We no longer live in isolated units, 
insulated from others coming from far different cultural and religious upbringings.  This 
mixture of peoples and ideas has brought the particularly Western and historically Christian 
nations of Europe and North America into a sort of crisis of faith.  Christianity no longer 
holds sway as it once did.  Christian ideals and principles are frequently if not consistently 
called into question, and the supremacy Christianity once enjoyed in determining the ethical 
and moral character of these nations is no longer present. 
Many Christian theologians and scholars, feeling this pressure, have succumbed to it and 
in so doing have abandoned traditional teachings of the faith in the name of “tolerance” and 
“dialogue.”  “Within today’s global horizon every religion and worldview has as much right 
to answer the basic questions of human existence as any other.”5  In fact, a pluralistic 
worldview is seen by some as the potential “saviour” of the human race because it fosters 
dialogue between the various cultures and religions more than any other worldview.6 
                                                 
4 Pluralism defined:  “A situation in which various religious, philosophical or ideological conceptions live side 
by side and in which none of them holds a privileged status.”  W.A. Visser ‘t Hooft, Pluralism – Temptation or 
Opportunity? (The Ecumenical Review 18, April 1996) 129-149. 
5 David J. Krieger, The New Universalism (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991), back cover. 
6 See The Uniqueness of Jesus: A Dialogue with Paul F. Knitter, Leonard Swidler and Paul Mojzes (eds.), 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997).  Knitter argues that without a pluralistic mindset, world problems such as 
HIV/AIDS, poverty, war, and the potential for nuclear disaster will not be averted (6). 
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There are four main categories of answers when addressing the problem of the Rwandan 
woman and related issues:  universalism, pluralism, inclusivism, and exclusivism.7  These and 
a few other terms will have to be defined shortly. 
Most would agree that exclusivism has maintained the prominent position for most of the 
Church’s history, but that position is quickly fading.  Today, within Christian circles, 
inclusivism is gaining ground fast, and outside Christianity, pluralism seems to hold the 
prominent position.  This dissertation will concentrate on inclusivism, particularly as it relates 
to American evangelicalism, but this cannot be done without at least some interaction with the 
competing views of both pluralism and universalism. 
This dissertation will address the matter of God’s judgment, a teaching that is prominent 
in most exclusivistic systems, but becomes increasingly deficient the further along the 
continuum from inclusivism to universalism, where in some instances the judgment of God 
plays virtually no role at all. 
 
1.1 Definition of Key Terms 
Four competing views vie for the answer to the ultimate fate of humanity:  universalism, 
pluralism, inclusivism, and exclusivism.  Working definitions of the four views are as follows. 
With “universalism” is meant that view whereby all humans are “saved” or attain 
“heaven” or however one may define an afterlife of eternal bliss.  Obviously, various religions 
define this state differently, such as nirvana (Buddhism) or ultimate oneness with Brahman 
(Hinduism), but this dissertation will cover the particularly Christian view of such eternal 
existence. 
There are two basic types of universalists.  The first type are those who do not adhere to 
any Christian dogma and yet believe that Christians are “saved” because, ultimately, all 
people are saved anyway.  The second type are specifically Christian universalists.  The latter 
adhere to some or most of the basic tenets of the Christian faith and also firmly believe that all 
people will ultimately be saved.  This dissertation is addressing more this latter type than the 
                                                 
7 Alan Race’s book, Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1982), made the pluralist, inclusivist, and exclusivist categories the standard 
terminology for this discussion.  Much debate has subsequently ensued over the adequacy of these terms.  For 
example, Terrance Tiessen argues in Who Can Be Saved? Reassessing Salvation in Christ and World Religions 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004) for five categories because he believes there is more nuance 
needed in addressing the various options.  This matter will be covered later in the Introduction, but this 
dissertation will take Race’s three categories as normative, if for no other reason than because most books on the 
topic have used them. 
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former.8  For some Christians, an “ultra-universalism”9 is operative whereby all people attain 
salvation, no matter what their beliefs, in light of the atoning work of Christ for all people.  
General or more commonplace universalism normally has with it some teaching concerning a 
temporary hell or purgatory whereby people do spend a time in punishment for their sins 
before attaining eternal life with God.  Universalism is a shared view by many faiths, not 
simply the Christian one, and is particularly supported in the Eastern religions where 
reincarnation ultimately ensures the salvation of every individual. 
With “pluralism”10 is meant the view whereby all religions are equal and equally 
beneficial or salvific for their adherents.  There are several ways to attain salvation, not 
simply through any one mediator such as Jesus or Mohammed.  God has chosen to reveal 
himself through all the major religions of the world:  to the Europeans mainly through Jesus 
Christ, to the Arab world through Mohammed, to the Asian world through Buddha, and so on.  
Each of these “manifestations” of the will of God are equally valid and equally salvific.  As 
with universalism, this pluralistic view is by no means simply limited to Christians, although 
this dissertation will concentrate on the Christian interpretations of this position.11 
With “inclusivism”12 is mean the view whereby all religions have some beneficial 
components that bring their adherents into fellowship with God, yet Jesus Christ remains the 
only mediator.  This inclusivism recognises that religions have some good and some bad 
elements, rather than considering all religions other than Christianity to be devoid of any 
merit or value in causing their adherents to be approved by God, as does the exclusivist’s 
point of view.  The good elements of the world’s religions help to prepare a person for 
acceptance of Christ.  This view relies heavily on a positive portrayal of natural theology and 
general revelation.  Inclusivism is a Christian position because ultimately Jesus Christ remains 
                                                 
8 The Church Father Origen would be in this second category, whereas most reincarnationists would be in the 
first category.  Origen did teach a sort of reincarnation doctrine but was decidedly Christian in his theology.  It 
seems that a growing number of Christians are willing to incorporate reincarnation into their Christianity, even 
though reincarnation has traditionally been antithetical to the Christian message.  However, Christian 
universalists, by in large, do not need to appeal to reincarnation for their soteriological views. 
9 This term comes from Ernest Cassara, Universalism in America: A Documentary History (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1971). 
10 The word “pluralism” is consistently used in the world today, covering such matters as political pluralism, 
educational pluralism, and a hoard of other topics.  The usage of the term in this dissertation specifically relates 
to religious pluralism. 
11 The main pluralist covered in this study is the British scholar John Hick, but others may be noted as well.  
Hick is a British scholar, but he makes it clear that his time spent in America, teaching at Cornell and Princeton, 
greatly formed his movement from evangelicalism to pluralism (Okholm, Dennis L. and Timothy R. Phillips 
(eds.), Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World [Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1995] 32. 
12 Both the pluralist and inclusivist views have also been labelled “near universalism” by some scholars because 
they support a Soteriology that posits the salvation of the vast majority of humanity. 
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the mediator between God and humankind, albeit the other religions still have value in 
preparing people or pointing them to Christ.   
The recent rise of inclusivism in American evangelicalism is the focus of this study.  The 
main inclusivists covered in this dissertation are the Canadian professor and author, Clark 
Pinnock, and American professor John Sanders, but many others will be noted as well. 
With “exclusivism”13 is mean the traditional Christian view that proclaims Jesus Christ as 
the sole mediator between God and humanity.  There is no other way for the salvation of 
humankind than through the vicarious, atoning work of Christ.  All other religions are merely 
human-made, idolatrous works of sinners in their futile attempt to cause themselves to be 
approved by God, or to raise themselves to the status of a god.  This exclusivism generally 
involves acknowledgment of one’s sins, repentance, and a personal knowledge of the atoning 
work of Jesus on the cross with a placing of one’s faith and trust in that work, a typically 
Protestant emphasis.14  This exclusivism has been the dominant view of the church for nearly 
two thousand years and has only come under severe attack from Christian scholars in the last 
several decades.15 
It should be noted that instead of using the terms exclusivism and restrictivism 
interchangeably, some see a distinction between the two.  John Sanders proposes that 
exclusivism is somewhat broader than restrictivism.  For the latter, “it is necessary to know 
about the work of Christ and exercise faith in Jesus before one dies if one is to be saved.”  For 
the former, some universalists and “post-mortemists” fall under the exclusivist umbrella, 
which says that salvation is only through Christ but may not mean that a person must profess 
                                                 
13 Some do not like the word “exclusivism” as it sounds too negative.  They have opted for words like 
“restrictivism” or “particularism.”  However, there appears to be little difference between “excluding” and 
“restricting” in terms of their negative connotations.  Particularism sounds appealing, but is little used and may 
involve greater confusion since it is used in various other theological debates which have little to do with the 
present discussion.  For this dissertation, exclusivism will be used despite the objections of some to its use. 
14 Various types of exclusivism can be delineated, such that the answer to the question, “What happens to those 
who have never heard about Jesus?” could be answered in several different ways, yet still within the exclusivist 
camp.  Further, a Catholic form of exclusivism could be distinguished from a Protestant one.  Such distinctions 
will be noted later in this study as the need arises. 
15 Certainly, there have been some opponents to exclusivism throughout the centuries, but they have been 
relatively minor and small in number.  Only in the last several decades, particularly since Vatican II, have there 
been so many opponents of this traditional view that one wonders if, in time, the exclusivist’s position will 
become the minority view. Pinnock claims the inclusivist view is already the majority view in ecumenical 
churches (Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 108), while Daniel Clendenin sees exclusivism as the “minority 
position” among scholars of religion (Many Gods, Many Lords [Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1995] 73), and 
pluralism as the “ascendant view among mainstream Western scholars of religion” (90).  Pinnock also refers to 
inclusivism as the view of the “silent majority of Arminian evangelicals” (The Grace of God and the Will of Man 
[Minneapolis: Bethany House Publishers, 1995] 27). 
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personal faith in Jesus in this lifetime in order to be saved.16  Although Sanders’ distinction is 
interesting, the three categories (pluralism, inclusivism and exclusivism) have been the 
standard form used, and to try to introduce new terms now after nearly two and a half decades 
of using those categories would only result in confusion.17  For this study, “exclusivism” will 
be used in its broader and more recognised connotation and “restrictivism” seen as a 
synonym. 
The topic of Open Theism (also known as Free Will Theism)18 will necessarily impinge 
upon this discussion of inclusivism.  The basic goals which formed the inclusivist’s hope of a 
wider salvation have come together to form a more complex system of the nature and 
character of God which make this wider hope possible, known as Open Theism.19  It would 
not be inaccurate to say that most open theists are inclusivists, and vice versa.20  Therefore, at 
times the two terms will be used interchangeably.  However, to avoid confusion, a very brief 
summary of Open Theism is provided here.21 
Open Theism, in a desire to make God’s plan of salvation wider than traditionally 
envisioned by evangelicalism, does so by calling into question such tenets of classical theism 
as the immutability of God and his exhaustive omniscience, especially as the latter relates to 
God’s ability to know the future choices of free-willed beings.  God so much respects the 
freedom to choose which he has given humans that he limits himself so as to not violate it.  
This he does out of supreme love for his creatures.  Open theists also tend to have a more 
positive view of non-Christian religions, seeing them as an integral part of human culture 
which God can use to woo individuals to himself, often combined with prevenient grace and 
                                                 
16 John Sanders (ed.), What about Those Who Have Never Heard? Three Views of the Destiny of the 
Unevangelized (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1995) 12-13.  To label some universalists as “exclusivists” 
seems particularly confusing. 
17 For starters, virtually every source used for this study, except for the more recent ones by Sanders, do not 
make this distinction. 
18 Geisler refers to it as “neotheism” in Creating God in the Image of Man? The New “Open” View of God – 
Neotheism’s Dangerous Drift (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1997), but “Open Theism” is by far the most 
common designation, despite the reasons Geisler provides for why he prefers his own term of neotheism (73-74). 
19 This Okholm and Phillips refer to as a “massive theological shift – a paradigm change – in modern theology” 
(Four Views, 24). 
20 However, many open theists could logically be pluralists as well, but as there are virtually no evangelicals who 
would consider themselves pluralists, this conclusion concerning the relationship between inclusivism and Open 
Theism is a safe one to make. 
21 At times, it will be preferable to use the term inclusivism when specifically discussing soteriological issues, 
and for this study, inclusivism will be recognised as the soteriological arm of Open Theism.  Therefore, when  
discussing the broader theological topics (such as God’s omniscience or the freewill of humans), “Open Theism” 
will be the term of choice.  The main evangelicals used in this study of inclusivism (Pinnock, Sanders, et al) are 
all open theists as well. 
7  
general revelation.  In these ways, then, open theists tend to be strongly opposed to Calvinism 
while maintaining a claim to evangelicalism.22 
The term “evangelical” should be defined, as it appears in the title and often in this 
dissertation.  North American, evangelical Christianity does not embody any one 
denomination but is cross-denominational in nature.  Believers in certain Lutheran, Reformed, 
Baptist, Presbyterian, Independent, and Pentecostal churches, as well as a host of other 
denominations, can fall under this broad category.23  Despite their denominational 
differences, they all adhere to what are traditionally “evangelical” tenets of the faith:  the need 
for a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, the belief in the inerrancy and authority of the 
Word of God, belief that salvation is by faith and not by works, and a belief in the vicarious 
atonement of Jesus, his deity, and his literal, physical resurrection from the dead.24  As can be 
seen, the terms “evangelical,” “conservative,” and “exclusivist” have great similarities.25  
This study comes particularly from an evangelical/exclusivist point of view.26 
                                                
Some may equate this evangelicalism with “fundamentalism,” but such an equation is 
faulty and ignores the historical differences between the two groups as they have developed in 
 
22 They relate themselves more to the tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy, Wesleyanism and Arminianism, per John 
Sanders, et al, “Truth at Risk,” Christianity Today (April 23, 2001) 103. 
23 Some might even be able to claim that there are Catholic and Orthodox evangelicals as well. 
24 In his short book, Evangelicals in America; Who They Are, What They Believe (Nashville, TN: Abingdon 
Press, 1987), professor of philosophy at Reformed Seminary in Orlando, Ronald Nash, gives a good summary of 
how the term should best be understood.  In chapter 3 he notes “Evangelical Roots” and then provides “ten basic 
beliefs” which include the Trinity, deity of Christ, Incarnation, Atonement and Resurrection.  In chapter 8 he 
discusses “Evangelical Pressure Points” and notes the “conflicting evangelical views about the Bible” (97).  
Although a general discussion, it is helpful when using the term.  His working definition:  “One can normally 
expect that anyone who claims to be an evangelical is a Christian believer whose theology is traditional or 
orthodox, who takes the Bible as his or her ultimate authority in matters of faith and practice, who has had a 
religious conversion (is born again), and who is interested in leading others to the same kind of conversion 
experience” (15).  The one drawback may be that his book is now twenty-years old and much has happened on 
the evangelical landscape since that time.  For a more recent, yet similar, understanding of the term 
“evangelical” on the American scene, consult The Barna Group, a research think-tank that surveys religious 
opinions in American evangelicalism (www.barna.org).  See note 25 below for further discussion. 
25 Obviously, not all evangelicals are exclusivists.  If a clear distinction needs to be made between the two terms 
at some point in this study, such a distinction will be provided. 
26 A battle is brewing, particularly in North America, over the term “evangelical” and what it can and cannot 
mean.  Many evangelical theologians are positing doctrines which have characteristically not been considered 
evangelical, particularly in the Open Theism debate.  There is great power in evangelical institutions, especially 
in America, and co-opting such a term would be a major victory for more liberal-minded theologians.  These 
revisionist evangelicals are here to stay, and in time some more conservative evangelicals may begin to distance 
themselves from the term, especially if more and more liberal doctrines are espoused by the revisionists.  See “A 
New Low?” World Magazine (April 6, 2002) 26.  Also see Stanley Grenz, Revisioning Evangelical Theology 
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1993) to see how the term’s definition has been changing (esp. 21-35).  
Erickson goes so far as to call our time “post-conservative evangelicalism” in The Evangelical Left (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Books, 1997) 16-28, where he provides good detail for this shift from traditional evangelicalism.  
John Armstrong asks if, given the current movement of evangelical theology more toward liberalism, “Will the 
term evangelical even have significance?” in The Coming Evangelical Crisis (Chicago: Moody Press, 1996) 18, 
emphasis original.  Michael Horton later comments in the same book that evangelicalism is a theology in 
disarray and the “imprecision is expanding” (258). 
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America.  Fundamentalists generally-speaking believe that people only in their specific 
church or denomination will be saved, whereas evangelicals are more “inter-denominational” 
in flavour.  Further, fundamentalists have been rightly criticised for pulling away from society 
and living with a “holy huddle” mentality.  Such is rarely the case with evangelicals. 
Terms such as “heaven” and “hell” and “God” and other decidedly Christian terms will be 
used throughout this study just to simplify matters.  As world religions are discussed, many 
other terms are used to designate what ultimately is the same thing in some form or another.  
If the need to specify nirvana as opposed to heaven exists, for example, it will be done.  
Otherwise, the Christian terms will be used for discussion purposes. 
During the Reformation and for a fair time afterward, the underlying assumption in 
theological debates between Protestant Christians was the authority and reliability of the 
Scriptures.  That has entirely changed.  In the past, evangelicals could simply begin their 
arguments by quoting Scripture.  Now, however, those who believe in the sole or ultimate 
authority of God’s Word must spend considerable time first refuting the claims of those who 
do not hold such views.  In other words, one must defend one’s Bibliology before espousing 
one’s theological viewpoints.27 
This present work, however, will not do so.28  Because this dissertation deals with issues 
which impinge upon evangelicalism in America, arguments are normally within the 
evangelical camp itself, where biblical authority and reliability are givens.  Suffice it for now 
to say that Scripture is viewed as totally reliable and trustworthy, being so because it has been 
communicated from God via divine inspiration through the Holy Spirit, who preserved fallible 
authors from making errors.29  However, comments will be made on certain bibliological 
matters throughout this study as the need arises.30 
The last term of importance to define is “judgment.”  The title of this dissertation, The 
Judgment of God and the Rise of ‘Inclusivism’ in Contemporary American Evangelicalism, 
                                                 
27 It is noted that often some liberal scholars do not do this but just assume that all bibliological matters are 
closed and won in their favour. 
28 The Protestant canon of Scripture will be used as the basis upon which determinations concerning Christian 
thought and faith will be judged.  This canon, which has been handed down to us and has formed the basis of 
authority for Christianity for many centuries, remains in such a position today.  In other words, this dissertation 
does not intend to excise portions of this recognised canon, but to rather accept it as it has been handed down. 
29 The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy (1978) is a good foundational statement of the position taken by 
this dissertation.  Most American evangelicals would affirm this statement and therefore there will be little 
disagreement with inclusivists over it.  Pluralists would find the statement much more problematic. 
30 To be clear, the generally-accepted approach in theological circles today (ones which are not strictly 
evangelical) is to present bibliological reasons why the passages chosen to support one’s position are authentic.  
This is especially true whenever the Gospels and the sayings of Jesus are concerned.  However, as this 
dissertation is strictly-speaking a Systematic Theology dissertation, a full-blown defence of authenticity, 
something much better placed in a New Testament dissertation, will not be attempted. 
9  
immediately limits the source data and area of study, but it does delineate what “judgment” is 
being considered.  For example, when Jesus tells the Parable of the Unmerciful Servant (Mt. 
18:23-34), that servant is punished for not showing mercy to his fellow servant.  Is this a 
picture of the eternal punishment that awaits all those who are unforgiving, or is it a picture of 
a temporary or temporal punishment that the servant receives, until he sees the error of his 
ways and corrects them? 
In some instances, God’s judgment is meant to reform the individual so that he or she can 
learn from mistakes made and not make them again.  In technical language, this might be 
called “temporal judgment,” one in this life.  Often this is designated as “discipline” from the 
Lord, and it can take several forms, such as loss of health, shame, loss of employment, 
punishment in human courts because of sin, even the gnawing unrest of a guilt-ridden 
conscience. 
On the other hand, a future judgment in the afterlife could be discussed, and in this 
instance “eschatological judgment” is a good term to use.  Coupled with the notion of 
purgatory or a finite hell, this eschatological judgment can also be reformatory and 
disciplinary in nature, although normally when speaking of eschatological judgment, one has 
the final judgment and fate of the individual in mind.  In this present study, it will be using the 
term in that way, pointing to the final, ultimate judgment.  “Temporal” judgment, then, will 
involve discipline or punishment in this life, while “eternal” or “eschatological” judgment will 
indicate the ultimate, last judgment that each individual is subject to.31 
This present study will be looking more for eschatological judgment as it relates to the 
ultimate fate of those who have not heard of Jesus.  Does inclusivism take seriously the 
biblical data in this regard?  This “hermeneutic of judgment” will then be used in the 
systematic analysis of the inclusivist position when it comes to the fate of humanity.32 
 
1.2 The Need for a “Hermeneutic of Judgment” 
The debate which has raged in American evangelical theology for the last two decades 
concerning the fate of those outside of the knowledge of Jesus Christ has been quite 
extensive.  Our pluralistic world has brought more and more Christians in the West into 
contact with people of other faiths.   Several Christian authors and theologians have become 
                                                 
31 Travis calls this “final, eternal, eschatological judgment” (Stephen J. Travis, Christ and the Judgment of God: 
Divine Retribution in the New Testament [London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1986]).  See also Marius Reiser, 
Jesus and Judgment, 6, for a brief definition of similar terms. 
32 The term “hermeneutic of judgment” has been chosen to counterbalance the inclusivist term “hermeneutic of 
hopefulness” (eg., Pinnock, Wideness, 20). 
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increasingly popular in questioning the traditional orthodox understanding of salvation in 
Jesus Christ and him alone.  These pluralist and inclusivist theologians have become highly 
influential and their views are becoming more and more acceptable to everyday Christians.  
But how acceptable are their proposals for conservative believers in American 
evangelicalism?  Do they adequately address biblical teaching and the historic Christian faith, 
or are they merely catering to the modern mindset and popular theology of the day? 
The specific discussion of God’s judgment, particularly as it relates to the teaching of 
Jesus, has gotten very little press.  The German theologian Marius Reiser notes this trend:   
“Judgment is a topic that has been neglected, and even avoided, both by theological 
research and church preaching, for some time.”   
He further notes the “remarkable silence regarding Jesus’ proclamation of judgment.”33 
James Martin shows in his very thorough historical review of the topic, “the Last 
Judgment was rendered dangerously expendable” in Protestant theology.34  As the title of his 
book suggests, Martin gives a survey of Protestant theology up to the time of Albrecht Ritschl 
with special concern for the Last Judgment.  The Protestant emphasis on faith, coupled with 
the Catholic lack of assurance of salvation and fear of the Last Judgment, caused Protestant 
theology to emphasise the present benefits of salvation to the neglect of the negative, 
eschatological judgment.  This moved ultimately to the point where believers undergo no 
judgment whatsoever, as is characterised for example by the non-eschatological theologies of 
Schleiermacher and Ritschl.  He comments: 
“Because the Last Judgment was not necessary for salvation, the way was left 
open for a rationalistic individualism which could speak of ethics and 
salvation and even justification without reference to the Judgment.  In this 
way man became autonomous and ideas arose concerning his destiny which 
had no need of any revelation of the power and glory of God in man’s future.  
Protestant theology became de-eschatologized and in this really lost contact 
with the message of the New Testament” (27). 
In essence, then, “one of the most controversial and difficult themes of modern biblical 
scholarship” (vii) has all but been forgotten. 
This has certainly been evident in the soteriological debates which have marked American 
evangelicalism in the last twenty years.  Still, despite the paucity of discussion on the 
                                                 
33 Marius Reiser, Jesus and Judgment, ix and 2. 
34 James P. Martin, The Last Judgment in Protestant Theology from Orthodoxy to Ritschl (Edinburgh: Oliver & 
Boyd, 1963) 16. 
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judgment of God, and in the light of the plethora of material already produced in this 
pluralism/inclusivism/ exclusivism debate, the question could rightly be asked:  Why is more 
material needed in this area?35 
The vast majority of work from the pluralist and inclusivist positions greatly emphasise 
the “God of Jesus” and his forgiveness, love, and grace.  From this position, the non-Christian 
faiths are then viewed in a positive, even salvific light.  However, this imbalanced view of the 
teaching and ministry of Jesus must be counterbalanced by all the biblical data that concerns 
Jesus and his teaching on the judgment and wrath of the Father.  This is the topic of particular 
interest in this dissertation, an issue that has been virtually ignored by pluralist and inclusivist 
writers.  In this study it is labelled a “hermeneutic of judgment.” 
Although this soteriological issue has always existed in the Church, it has become a hot 
topic in the last twenty years in American evangelicalism and has influenced other systematic 
areas, such as Christology, Theology-proper, Bibliology, and so on. 
Inclusivists make Pneumatology a key platform of their position and conclusions, 
something for which they should be commended.  Clark Pinnock, for example, says that 
anything other than an inclusivist understanding of the gospel limits the power and work of 
the Holy Spirit.  However, certain questions must be asked:  Do the inclusivists appeal to a 
Pneumatology and a working of the Holy Spirit that is at odds with Scripture?  Can scholars 
appeal to the freedom of the Holy Spirit to move wherever he chooses to move and do 
whatever he decides to do, all the while contradicting the very Scripture most inclusivists 
claim the Holy Spirit produced through inspiration?  Where does the judgment via God’s 
Spirit come into play in their position?  Should evangelicals expect the Spirit of God to accept 
any and all religious expressions, or to judge those which are at odds with God’s nature and 
revelation? 
A bibliological consideration is how inclusivists use God’s Word to support their position.  
Is their approach truly in line with traditional evangelical approaches?  This is a question not 
only for Bibliology itself, but for their Christology as well.  Their approach to the person and 
work of Jesus - here accepting his words, there ignoring them - logically yields a negligence 
of the “words and acts of judgment” by Jesus.  Jesus often speaks of punishment, he 
                                                 
35 The November 2002 meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society, held in Toronto, Canada, had as its 
theme, “Christianity and Other Religions.”  The June 2002 edition of the Journal of the Evangelical Theological 
Society had several articles on Open Theism, and the November 2003 meeting (which I personally attended) 
actually had a member-wide vote concerning two Open Theism proponents (Clark Pinnock and John Sanders), 
their view of Scripture, and whether their membership should be allowed to continue in the Society.   The vote 
was 32.9% in favour of removing Pinnock and 62.7% in favour of removing Sanders, neither reaching the 67% 
required for removal.  This matter remains a hot topic, despite (or maybe, because of) the vast amount of 
literature already produced concerning these matters. 
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frequently speaks of hell and torment and judgment, but the pluralists and inclusivists deal 
little if at all with these words. 
This necessarily affects their Christology as it relates to the picture of the character and 
nature of Jesus.  Are inclusivists creating a Jesus in the image of a tolerance-loving Western 
worldview and unwittingly creating a bifurcation between the Old and New Testaments?  By 
ignoring a “hermeneutic of judgment” in their approach to the biblical Jesus are the 
inclusivists creating a new Jesus to fit the times?  One must then question how this recreated 
Jesus can adequately reveal God and his character. 
One’s Theology-proper is also affected by this issue.  Can “God is love” be used to negate 
all teachings concerning the wrath and judgment of God, especially those which come from 
the lips of Jesus?  Inclusivists make a noble attempt at reconciling what has been an 
historically thorny Christian dilemma in their discussions concerning the attributes of God 
and how to properly balance them (eg., love and justice, mercy and wrath), but have they 
gone too far in granting greater weight to those attributes which necessarily support their 
inclusivist conclusions? 
As already noted, many evangelical inclusivists are espousing Open Theism.  This stands 
to reason, since the God of the inclusivist must necessarily be distanced from the classical 
view of God, which more readily supports the exclusivist position.  Therefore, evangelical 
inclusivists such as Pinnock and Sanders are finding themselves more and more comfortable 
with a view of God which looks less and less like the traditional, evangelical portrait of the 
Creator.  This affects Theology-proper and the attributes of God such as immutability, 
omniscience, love, and wrath. 
Soteriologically related to the last point, if God is not portrayed as a God of wrath and 
judgment, but rather of only love and forgiveness, then the notion that this God will eternally 
judge sinners seems to be eliminated.  This leads many inclusivist theologians (and even some 
exclusivist ones) to conclusions such as post-mortem evangelism, “middle knowledge,” and 
annihilationist positions.  The “all religions are basically valid” point-of-view logically leads 
to “all religious people will be saved.” 
A “hermeneutic of judgment” is necessary to counterbalance the current love-affair many 
Christian scholars have with a picture of Jesus and his Father which is solely loving, tolerant, 
and appeasing.  The vast amount of material from the teachings of Jesus concerning the 
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judgment of God must be taken into account before soteriological conclusions can be made, 
especially conclusions as they relate to other religions and their adherents.36 
 
1.3 Are All Inclusivists Alike? 
Although there is great unanimity among American inclusivists when it comes to the 
major tenets of their beliefs, there are nonetheless some slight differences which will be noted 
here.  Terrance Tiessen argues in Who Can Be Saved? for five categories of consideration, not 
the three of exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism.  Two of his categories fall under the more 
general “exclusivism” umbrella (Ecclesiocentrism and Agnosticism), and two under 
“inclusivism” (Accessibilism and Religious Instrumentalism).  The last one is the traditional 
pluralism view (Relativism).  What makes Tiessen’s work all the more interesting is that he is 
one of the rare Calvinist scholars who has opted for an inclusivist position, the Accessibilism 
variety.  His distinction between two types of inclusivism introduces the first delineation in 
the inclusivism camp, that between Protestant and Catholic inclusivism. 
The first difference within inclusivism involves the role non-Christian religions play.  
Perhaps the most famous inclusivist, the German Catholic theologian Karl Rahner, brought 
openness to non-Christian religions to the foreground, not only in Catholicism, but within 
Protestant circles as well.37  His popular term “anonymous Christian” made it clear that non-
Christian religions can be salvific, and Rahner developed an understanding of other faiths as 
open to salvation.   
“We must therefore rid ourselves of the prejudice that we can face a non-
Christian religion with the dilemma that it must either come from God in 
everything it contains and thus correspond to God’s will and positive providence, 
or be simply a purely human construction” (vol. 5:127).   
Once this prejudice is eliminated, “there could be no question of a serious and also actually 
effective salvific design of God for all men, in all ages and places” (128). 
                                                 
36 One interesting question not asked by this study involves Ecclesiology.  Is there any relationship between 
inclusivism and the growing tendency in American churches to avoid church discipline?  Can a link be made 
between a tolerance-loving culture that rarely if ever judges the beliefs or actions of others, and pluralist and 
inclusivist positions which seemingly minimise any real judgment of false religions and false beliefs?  Can it be 
shown that with the relativism that is a necessary byproduct of the pluralist position (and to a lesser extent the 
inclusivist one) comes a church that no longer disciplines its members, and no longer demands holiness from 
them? 
37 Rahner’s works are summarised in the compilation Theological Investigations (London: DLT, 1966), which 
extends to over twenty volumes.  Chapter 6 of volume 5 provides the foundation for his views of Christianity 
and the non-Christian religions. 
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However, this positive view of non-Christian religions as vehicles of salvation is not 
accepted by all inclusivists.  Canadian author, speaker and professor of theology at McMaster 
Divinity College, Clark Pinnock, is perhaps the most prominent of the North American 
inclusivists, and he does not accept it.38  He advocates a “cautious inclusivism” which “stops 
short of saying that the religions themselves as such are vehicles of salvation” (99).39  He also 
notes the difficulty Rahner’s term “anonymous Christian” has received from both Christian 
and non-Christian camps, often the latter finding it offensive (120).40 
The second difference within inclusivism concerns the fate of those who have not heard 
and what evangelicals should believe about it today.  Should evangelicals maintain a 
pessimistic or optimistic view of their destiny?  Alister McGrath is an exclusivist who writes 
in the position of an optimistic view of their destiny in the book Four Views of Salvation in a 
Pluralistic World.  Interestingly, although not in the position of an inclusivist in this book, 
McGrath nonetheless appears much like one according to the editors (24), Pinnock who 
portrays the classic inclusivist position (187, 190), and the authors who portray the exclusivist 
position (197).  In his brief response to Pinnock’s article, McGrath has virtually nothing bad 
to say about it (129-132).  This at least serves as an example of the spectrum that exists 
between inclusivism and exclusivism. 
The third difference concerns the actual state of the afterlife.  Faced with the dilemma of 
what to believe concerning the fate of those who have never heard the gospel, many 
evangelicals have adopted alternative views of hell.  Some, like Andover Newton Theological 
School professor Gabriel Fackre and evangelical writer Donald Bloesch, posit “post-mortem 
evangelism” (also known as “eschatological evangelization”), where people still have the 
opportunity to hear the gospel and make a choice even after they die.41  Others, like Pinnock, 
have changed their position on this issue, something that will be addressed later.  Pinnock 
formerly had advocated post-mortem evangelism but has now come to maintain 
annihilationism, where all people who die apart from Christ simply cease to exist.  
                                                 
38 Okholm and Phillips, Four Views, 24, 99, 199.  “Religions as such do not mediate salvation” (116). 
39 Despite Pinnock’s comments opposing Rahner’s positive view of other religions, to many exclusivists the 
difference is only academic and semantic.  To them there appears to be no difference between “non-Christian 
religions are salvific” and “God is working through the positive elements of non-Christian religions in order to 
save those adherents.”  See one exclusivist’s objections in Ronald Nash, Is Jesus the Only Savior? (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1994) 112-115. 
40 John Hick calls Rahner’s term “an offensive Christian paternalism” (cited in Nash, Only Savior? 111). 
41 John Sanders, No Other Name: An Investigation into the Destiny of the Unevangelized (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992), 189, 197-200. 
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Annihilationism and post-mortem evangelism are the two main options for inclusivists who 
do not believe that unevangelised people automatically go to hell.42 
These differences suggest that inclusivism is by no means monolithic.  However, for all 
the issues that will be addressed in this study, especially as they relate to the judgment of God, 
it will be difficult to find any inclusivists who do not fall within the distinctions that will be 
utilised in evaluating the inclusivist position. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
Americans live in a pluralistic society, where exclusive beliefs held in the religious realm 
are considered intolerable.  Good, honest questions are being asked of the traditional 
exclusivism which has been at the centre of American evangelicalism for generations, an 
exclusivism which has generally been very negative about the fate of those who have never 
heard the gospel of Jesus Christ. 
These very real concerns have bred in American evangelicalism an openness to other 
theologies less conservative and traditional, and more “modern” in their attempts at answering 
these questions.  The current Open Theism debate is just such an example, as are the 
soteriological disputes which have raged for the last two decades over inclusivism and 
pluralism.  This has resulted in a rise in inclusivism within evangelical circles.  Some 
welcome this as a necessary and needed change; others view it as a bane. 
Attention can now be turned to the teachings of the inclusivists which impinge upon an 
understanding of the judgment of God, by first analysing the key tenets of inclusivism.  What 
makes evangelical inclusivism so radically different from traditional evangelicalism, and why 
has it caused such an uproar in American evangelicalism? 
                                                 
42 There is a third evangelical alternative to the view of eternal damnation for the unevangelised, and that is 
middle knowledge.  However, as this involves God’s knowledge of potential future choices of humans, it is not 
advocated by proponents of Open Theism and hence the large majority of inclusivists.  Obviously, some 
evangelicals take an agnostic position on the issue, claiming that Scripture does not provide enough evidence to 
make a definitive conclusion on the matter.  This is Tiessen’s second category of Agnosticism, one of his two 
brands of exclusivism. 
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Chapter 2 
The Theology of Inclusivism 
 
In theology it is sometimes difficult to determine which came first, the chicken or the 
theological egg.  With inclusivists such as Clark Pinnock or John Sanders, at times it may 
appear problematic to determine what is ultimately driving their theology.  In Pinnock’s case 
particularly, what must be determined is what has motivated his move from a typical 
evangelical system to one which is appearing less and less evangelical as the years pass. 
 It is difficult to overestimate the importance of Clark Pinnock on twentieth-century North 
American evangelicalism.  He is considered “perhaps the most significant evangelical 
theologian of the last half of the twentieth century” by Henry H. Knight III of the St. Paul 
School of Theology, and Stanley Grenz thinks similarly when he says, “No twentieth-century 
evangelical thinker has been more controversial than Clark Pinnock.”43 
One way to determine what forms the heart of Pinnock’s inclusivism is to look at the 
chronology of his theological life.  Fortunately, Pinnock provides just such a chronology in 
The Grace of God and the Will of Man, a book in which he serves as general editor, and in the 
last section of the second edition of The Scripture Principle.  Barry Callen also provides an 
intellectual biography of Pinnock in Clark H. Pinnock: Journey Toward Renewal.  The reader 
may also look through the numerous writings of Pinnock both in book and journal media.  For 
the past forty years he has been a prolific author, writing or editing dozens of books and 
articles.  These provide a good overview of what have been the major forces driving his 
theological journey, one which has changed dramatically over the years, producing a “tension 
between openness and evangelical commitment.”44 
In the first chapter of The Grace of God and the Will of Man, “From Augustine to 
Arminius: A Pilgrimage in Theology,” Pinnock recounts how he has steadily moved over the 
past four decades from a theology that was decidedly Calvinistic to one which appears to have 
abandoned every important tenet of that system and in the estimation of some, borders on 
liberalism. 
By his own characterisation, Pinnock speaks of the dominance Calvinism enjoys in North 
American evangelicalism, what he terms a “Calvinistic hegemony” in one section heading of 
his chapter (Grace & Will, 16; all subsequent quotations from the same source until otherwise 
                                                 
43 Both quotations come from Barry L. Callen’s Clark H. Pinnock: Journey Toward Renewal (Nappanee, IN: 
Evangel Publishing House, 2000) back cover. 
44 Philip Meadows, of Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary, quoted on the back cover of Callen’s Journey. 
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noted).  All of his training introduced him to “theologically sound” Christian scholars who 
were almost all “staunchly Calvinistic” (17).  Pinnock notes,  
“Although there is a great and growing diversity theologically and otherwise 
in this [evangelical] coalition, the dominating theology is Reformed or 
Calvinian.  Critics have not exaggerated much when they have wanted to call 
it ‘neo-Calvinism’” (17).   
Pinnock even goes so far as to claim that Calvinist theologians “pretty well control the 
teaching of theology in the large evangelical seminaries; they own and operate the largest 
book-publishing houses; and in large part they manage the inerrancy movement.  This means 
they are strong where it counts – in the area of intellectual leadership and property” (27).   
Yet, despite all this influence, Pinnock can still speak of the “silent majority of Arminian 
evangelicals” (27).  He sees that most laypeople are Arminian in inclination, that the 
“believing masses appear to take for granted a belief in human free will,” and “few have the 
stomach to tolerate Calvinian theology in its logical purity” (26).  It is for these reasons that 
“the laity seem to gravitate happily to Arminians like C. S. Lewis for their intellectual 
understanding” (26-27). 
Pinnock appears to find comfort in this fact, “so I do not think I stand alone” (27).  In 
fact, he apparently sees himself as an individual willing to stand up against a vast, Calvinist 
machine, to speak for the “silent” people unable to speak for themselves, a most noble 
undertaking. 
Although it would be difficult to test his theory concerning Calvinism’s dominance, the 
greater issue is found in Pinnock’s personal perceptions and reasons for moving away from 
Calvinism, than whether or not those perceptions are technically accurate.  In fact, it may be 
for this reason that many evangelicals have perceived Pinnock moving toward liberalism in 
his movement away from Calvinist evangelicalism.  From their perspective, perhaps a 
movement away from Calvinism signals a movement toward liberalism. 
Whatever the case may be, Pinnock himself sees no such threat.  He prefers to 
characterise his personal theological movement away from Calvinism and firmly into the 
Arminian camp, which can hardly be construed as a movement toward liberalism.  He 
endeavours to show that his theology is just another of the many strands of theological 
perspectives which fit into the broad camp of evangelicalism.45 
                                                 
45 Thus Steven Land can characterise Pinnock’s theology as “a confluence of Eastern, Wesleyan and Pentecostal 
streams” (Callen: Journey, back cover). 
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In the introduction to Grace & Will, Pinnock speaks of the broad spectrum which 
evangelical theology encompasses.  He sees no problem in using the word “evangelical” to 
represent all these differences, as long as evangelicals do not forget that there are in fact 
differences.   
“For some purposes it makes sense to call a wide variety of Christians 
“evangelical” to distinguish them from liberal reductionists, for example, but 
it can also be quite misleading to call them by this adjective if the umbrella 
term obscures important differences among them which should not be lost 
sight of” (ix). 
It is exactly these types of “important differences” which this dissertation means to 
address, as was already noted in the Introduction.  Classical, American evangelicalism has 
taught that Jesus is the only way for salvation, yet inclusivists such as Pinnock allow room for 
God to use non-Christian religions to draw individuals to himself.  American evangelicalism 
has traditionally taught that God exhaustively knows the future, but today’s brand of 
inclusivist/open theist believes that God cannot know the future choices free-willed beings 
will make.  Yet all of these Christians call themselves “evangelicals.”  Thus this dissertation 
implicitly agrees with Pinnock when he says that such important differences should not be 
obscured. 
In fact, Pinnock sees some good in these differences.   
“Well-meaning, thoughtful Christians can and do differ in their judgments on 
these important matters.  Therefore, we need to listen to one another, hold 
back the recriminations, and see what we can learn from one another” (16).   
Because no theological system can possibly embody all the truth, a “myth that evangelicals 
often hold” (28), dialogue between these differing camps can only strengthen the overall 
movement broadly known as evangelicalism. 
He also emphasises his desire to not “freeze theological development at some arbitrary 
point in past history” (28).  In fact, as much as he wants to move away from Augustine’s 
brand of theology, he nonetheless sees in himself a similar trait, that of moulding Christian 
theology into the framework of one’s current cultural needs and likes.  “If Augustine had the 
courage to deal with the culture of his day and come up with some dazzling new insights, then 
we can do the same in our own setting” (29).46 
                                                 
46 It appears rather odd that at the end of this chapter, Pinnock would characterise Augustine’s theology as 
“dazzling new insights,” when it was the very system from which he strongly wanted to move away.  In fact, 
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Thus the characterisation of his own theological movement as a “pilgrimage.”  Pinnock 
notes that such a pilgrimage is not only necessary, but is in fact unavoidable.  Because “God 
relates to his human creatures in history” (16), theological change is to be expected.  “One is 
almost certain to change one’s mind several times over a lifetime on mysteries as deep as 
these” (16).  Thus, modern evangelicals should not become unnerved by the theology that 
Pinnock and his ilk are attempting to introduce into North American evangelicalism. 
Such a pilgrimage has the ability to speak to the present culture in new ways, ways which 
the old systems often fail to do.  Pinnock appears worried that previous systems have 
stagnated and can no longer speak to the modern generation.  Thus his characterisation of a 
Calvinism which apparently dominates the Christian academia, yet has no appeal to the 
believing masses.  A ‘pilgrimage’ expresses a movement into territory not previously 
explored, not a nostalgic glance to history gone by.  “Like it or not, we are embarked on a 
pilgrimage in theology and cannot determine exactly where will it lead and how it will end” 
(28). 
The present generation needs biblical truth freshly spoken.  In fact, this is precisely what 
Pinnock has identified as the motivating factor in the need for change in theological thinking.  
Too many evangelicals in his estimation are looking at the past, as if Christian theology were 
cast in stone.  But because God reveals himself in human history, evangelicals should expect a 
theology which changes with the times.   
That is why Pinnock believes, for example, that few Christians today are willing to stand 
up for the theology of Calvin and Luther in all their “rigorous particulars” (26), because such 
theological systems are no longer culturally appealing.  Christians are in need of a “fresh and 
faithful reading of the Bible in dialogue with modern culture, which places emphasis on 
autonomy, temporality, and historical change” (15).  The following quotation perhaps best 
characterises Pinnock’s thinking in this regard: 
“It is in fact an opportunity to be faithful to the Bible in new ways and to state 
the truth of the Christian message creatively for the modern generation” (28). 
Thus modern evangelicals should take heart despite the “dizziness” (28) that is often felt 
when so many traditional truths are called into question.  Pinnock and similar scholars are 
only moulding a Christian theology which is more relevant to modern individuals, and as such 
can be expected to impact modern culture in better ways than the stagnant, old systems. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Pinnock considers the “new insights” that Augustine brought into Christian theology as dismal and damaging, as 
will be seen shortly, much the same attitude that many evangelicals today have about Pinnock’s new insights.  
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Pinnock appears impatient with evangelicals who have no stomach for such a pilgrimage, 
or who find it unnerving or frightening.   
“I have no comfort for those who, afraid of missing eternal truth, choose to 
identify it with some previous theological work and try to impose it 
unchanged on the present generation or desire to speak out of the past and not 
to come into contact with the modern situation” (28). 
This is a harsh indictment of his detractors, who no doubt also intend to make Christian 
doctrine relevant to the modern situation.  It is doubtful that there are evangelicals today who 
say to themselves, “Look, we don’t care if our theology is irrelevant, we are going to keep 
teaching it anyway.”  Yet, Pinnock has a tendency to create straw-men of his detractors, and 
this impatience often characterises his writing.   
Pinnock has a habit of taking backhanded slaps at those with whom he disagrees.  For 
example, evangelicals who believe that modern Christians should not meddle with truths such 
as God’s omniscience or sovereignty are characterised as people who walk by sight and not 
by faith (28).  Those who believe that the truth of Scripture written 2000 years ago still 
applies today are apparently “frightened to think God may have more light to break forth,” 
and those who still believe that Jesus is the only Saviour and that non-Christian religions are 
misleading Pinnock characterises as Pharisees.47  At times he appears most gracious, at other 
times condescending toward those with whom he disagrees. 
Despite this impatience, Pinnock’s overall desire is a noble one.  He hopes to formulate a 
Christian theology which is more culturally aware and relevant than what he perceives in a 
Calvinism that is harsh and unwelcoming.  Thus his pilgrimage. 
However, before looking at the particulars of Pinnock’s pilgrimage, it must be clear from 
what specifically it was that he moved.  Obviously, there are different varieties of 
“Calvinism” and so, to use the term too broadly may yield confusion.  Pinnock makes it clear 
in virtually everything he writes that he is opposed to that type of Calvinism which actually 
finds its root in the teachings of Augustine and has been carried further by Calvin and his 
followers, what he terms “theological determinism.”48 
The title that Pinnock has chosen for his chapter about this theological pilgrimage 
immediately provides a strong insight into his theological drift.  Pinnock makes no secret 
                                                 
47 A Wideness in God’s Mercy: The Finality of Jesus Christ in a World of Religions (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 1992) 41. 
48 It should also be noted that Pinnock characterises his own theological pilgrimage as a movement away from 
rationalistic modernism to post-modern thinking, eg., “Freedom from Rational Epistemology” in The Scripture 
Principle, second edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006) 263, but this will be noted in greater detail 
when his doctrine of Scripture is examined. 
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about his growing dislike of Augustinian theology, especially as it was found in the teaching 
of Calvin.  His characterisation of Augustinian theology is a theology which “denies the 
largeness of salvation, transforms the nature of election, and virtually denies the freedom of 
the will” (Wideness, 182; all subsequent quotations from the same source until otherwise 
noted).  This provides some good insight into the reasons why Pinnock found himself moving 
away from Augustine’s thinking.49 
Of course, this movement away from one thing implies a movement toward something 
else.  What Pinnock himself characterises as a “bold departure” (182) from the typical 
evangelical mode of thinking, has shown a preference, in his opinion, for church fathers and 
scholars which are not so widely respected in Calvinistic circles.  “My position does prefer 
Justin to Augustine, Erasmus to Luther, Wesley to Calvin, and Anderson to Lindsell on all 
these questions” (182-183). 
It is the whole problem of a theological determinism which limits the availability of 
salvation which Pinnock loathes the most.  It is for this reason that he can say, “Something 
ugly entered Christian theology through Augustine,” and that not even the reputations of 
Calvin and Luther can be “rescued” because of their beliefs in it (40).  He uses words like 
“pessimism,” “harden,” “rigor,” and “severity” when characterising the theology of Augustine 
in this vein (37).   
If Christians today, and particularly evangelicals, believe that people outside of 
Christianity are lost, Pinnock lays this unfortunate turn of events squarely at the feet of 
Augustine.   
“Dark thoughts have clouded our minds.  For centuries, thanks largely to the 
Augustinian tradition that has so influenced evangelicals, we have been taught 
that God chooses a few who will be saved and has decided not to save the vast 
majority of humanity” (19).   
This has resulted in a “negative control belief” (19) that has cast a shadow on much 
soteriological thinking in evangelical circles.  “Since Augustine, theology generally has not 
been informed by an optimism of salvation” (36). 
Pinnock characterises Augustine’s thinking as “abysmal” (167), “harsh” (39), a “tragic 
and influential error” (24), bewitching (30), and an “unhappy development” (36) which 
requires a “strong stomach” (38, 167).  The following quote gives a good, overall view of 
                                                 
49 Thus Stanley Grenz can characterise Pinnock as an “anti-Augustinian theological reformist” (Callen: Journey, 
back cover). 
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Pinnock’s opinion of how badly Augustine affected Christian theology, and with what he 
infected it. 
“With Augustine a new and severe paradigm in theology was born, a package 
of dismal beliefs which would eat its way into the consciousness of the 
Western churches and erode the positive biblical spirit in their thinking.  The 
approach is well-known to practically every Christian and non-Christian alike.  
It views every person as totally depraved, guilty for the sin of Adam as well as 
their own sins, completely unable to do anything other than sin, and deserving 
of everlasting conscious punishment in hell.  But Christ, as a kind of third 
party, bore the punishment for those sinners fortunate enough to have been 
predestined to be saved.  Meanwhile, the Spirit exercises God’s power to 
compel them to accept the message by irresistible grace.  Those unlucky 
enough to leave this life without having exercised explicit faith in Jesus Christ 
are almost certain to suffer in hell forever” (39). 
The “harsh notions” which came with Augustine’s theology, and were later to be found in 
Calvin’s, include “soteriological predestination, total depravity, everlasting conscious torment 
in hell, strict limitations on who can be saved . . .  and pessimism for anyone living beyond 
[the borders of the church]” (39). 
Other similar comments could be gleaned from many of the works of Pinnock, but the 
above should suffice to provide a firm understanding of what he means when he speaks of a 
Augustinian or Calvinian theology to which he objects. 
Moving to Pinnock’s theological pilgrimage found in Grace and Will, there is much the 
same rationale used.  In the introduction to the book, the authors note what precisely is the 
cause for their writing, and it is again the theological determinism which Pinnock has 
elsewhere identified as the poison seed from Augustine’s theology. 
“What concerns us is the dual fact that the determinist kind of theology, the 
type that subordinates God’s love to the ideal of absolute power, is both 
highly influential and exceedingly harmful” (xi). 
They recognise that many differences exist between the various evangelical traditions, yet 
on this point they must object. 
Turning to Pinnock’s personal journey, the first link to be broken in Pinnock’s Calvinist 
chain had to do with the perseverance of the saints, what Pinnock considers to be the weakest 
link (Grace & Will, 17; all subsequent quotations from the same source until otherwise 
noted).  He came to believe that this dogma of Calvinism could not stand up to both his 
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exegetical studies of the Book of Hebrews, nor to his own experience of God and the 
“profound mutuality in our dealings with God” (17-19). 
“If in fact believers enjoy the kind of absolute security Calvinism had taught 
me they do, I found I could not make very good sense of the vigorous 
exhortations to persevere (e.g., 3:12) or the awesome warnings not to fall 
away from Christ (e.g., 10:26), which the book addresses to Christians” (17). 
As noted previously, Pinnock identifies in modern culture an emphasis on human 
autonomy, but he now began to see it in Scripture as well, and it appeared to him that 
Calvinism ignored this autonomy and put in its place a “set of premundane, divine decrees” 
(18) which determined everything.  Such an “all-determining fatalistic blueprint for history” 
(18) appeared to negate any true idea of human autonomy, so that Pinnock was left with a 
tension between God’s determining will and human freedom, one which he believed could no 
longer be adequately addressed by a solidly coherent Calvinistic system as commonly 
expressed in American evangelicalism. 
He had become accustomed to a Calvinism which held a compatibilist view of human 
freedom which claimed that human actions could both be determined and free at the same 
time, but this was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in his thinking.  “Sometimes I 
would try to explain it, other times I would give up and call it an antinomy, but deep down I 
knew there was something amiss” (18).  If everything in creation was predetermined by a 
divine blueprint, then it was disingenuous to claim that human actions were indeed “free.” 
Thus, Christians do not persevere in their faith because God had previously decreed that 
they would, but simply because they exercise their human freedom to do so.  This provided 
Pinnock with great relief in his theology, and made more real to him the biblical warnings to 
not abandon the faith. 
This had widespread effects on all areas of his Calvinism.  Pinnock uses many metaphors 
to convey this effect, such as a hole in the dike or pulling on one thread in a garment which 
then unravels (17).  But his clearest metaphor is a musical one.   
“Just as one cannot change the pitch of a single string on the violin without 
adjusting the others, so one cannot introduce a major new insight into a 
coherent system like Calvinian theology without having to reconsider many 
other issues” (18).   
The next string to be retuned was the doctrine of predestination.  Pinnock could no longer 
maintain the “horrible decree” (19) of Calvin, that God had preordained the reprobation of the 
damned, while only saving a relatively few number of the elect.  With this realisation in hand, 
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and coupled with his understanding that God’s dealings with humans is more fluid than 
Calvinism seems to allow, Pinnock was able to rework his understanding of election from an 
individualistic idea to one on a more corporate scale.  Through Christ, God had not simply 
elected individuals for salvation.  Rather, he had elected the whole human race, who could in 
its entirety potentially benefit from the atoning work of Christ.  “Election is a corporate 
category and not oriented to the choice of individuals for salvation” (20).50 
Pinnock is not lax to point out that at the heart of his former errant way of thinking lay an 
Augustinian premise that “God determines all that happens in the world . . . and not all are to 
be saved in the end” (19).  “Calvin’s logic was impeccable as usual: God wills whatever 
happens, so if there are to be lost people, God must have willed it” (19).  However, Pinnock 
considers this idea “morally intolerable” (19).  The way to get around it is to remove the 
theological determinism that lay at the heart of Augustinian and Calvinian thinking.  With 
God not willing everything that happens, it becomes easier to handle why there are people 
who are lost. 
By moving the Calvinist understanding of election from an individualistic one to a 
corporate one, Pinnock was able to come to a theology which “far from arbitrarily excluding 
anybody, encompasses them all potentially” (20).  This is important to note, and it reveals a 
greater Arminian tendency developing in Pinnock’s thinking.  Armed with a predestination 
based on the foreknowledge of God (19), Pinnock was able to see the message of salvation as 
going out to all people, with potentially all people having a chance at salvation.51  This was 
not the case with a Calvinism which limited salvation only to the elect.  But it also comes into 
tension with an evangelicalism which says that Jesus did not just make salvation possible, but 
actually made it effective, a matter to which attention will be turned in later sections of this 
dissertation. 
                                                 
50 Richard Rice echoes this same sentiment about corporate or “group” election in The Openness of God: A 
Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1994) 56.  Rice 
notes that the biblical portrayal of election “primarily” or “fundamentally” or “typically” refers to groups, not 
individuals.  However, he also recognises that at times it does refer to individuals, which then seems to beg the 
question.  The Calvinists with whom inclusivists disagree believe that election involves individuals as well as 
groups.  Inclusivists, though, emphasise the latter more than the former, but since the biblical data can be seen to 
support both individual and corporate election, the entire inclusivist argument for a primary usage of election 
which is corporate loses some of its weight.  If election can indeed be individual, the Calvinist understanding of 
God electing individuals for salvation is not as vulnerable a notion as inclusivists would like to make it out to be. 
51 At this point, Pinnock allowed for both explanations of election, a conditional one based on God’s 
foreknowledge, and a corporate election instead of an individual one, so long as it was not an unconditional 
election as understood by Calvinists.  It is important to note that at this time, Pinnock was not yet an open theist.  
Because Open Theism discards the notion that God can know the future choices free-willed creatures make, they 
do not accept the Arminian understanding of God’s conditional election based on his foreknowledge.  Pinnock 
would later entirely abandon the foreknowledge angle, although at this point in his pilgrimage it was still a real 
option.  However, his understanding of corporate election of the entire human race would remain. 
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Next came human freedom.   
“Having created human beings with relative autonomy alongside himself, God 
voluntarily limits his power to enable them to exist and to share in the divine 
creativity” (21).   
From Pinnock’s viewpoint, Calvinism created an “antimony that required me to believe 
both that God determines all things and that creaturely freedom is real” (21).  It can be seen 
that, starting with his new understanding of perseverance of the saints, Pinnock has placed 
human autonomy at a high value in his theological thinking. 
The question that must be asked at this point is, does this high value on human autonomy 
come from a deeper understanding of Scripture, as Pinnock states, or from cultural pressure?  
Pinnock has noted that modern culture does place a high premium on human autonomy, and 
many of his critics have noted that this, and not biblical considerations, is the real motivating 
factor for why Pinnock abandoned his Calvinism and moved to a theological system more fit 
for the times. 
As already seen, Pinnock does not find the antiquated theological systems of Augustine, 
Calvin, or Luther particularly appealing, either to himself or to the “believing masses.”  From 
whence does this lack of appeal come?  If it is a biblical motivation, it would be difficult to 
substantially prove that the believing masses have solid, biblical justifications for preferring 
C. S. Lewis to Augustine, for example, as Pinnock believes.  Why, then, do they favour 
Arminian systems to Calvinist ones as Pinnock contends? 
Pinnock himself claims biblical and theological motivations for preferring Arminius to 
Augustine, so evangelicals should take him at his word.  But his broader claim about the 
“silent majority of Arminian evangelicals” is quite another matter.  Would it not more 
logically follow that they prefer Arminianism because, as Pinnock has noted, their culture 
prefers it?  Then Pinnock’s readers are at least partly left to wonder about Pinnock’s 
motivations as well. 
In fact, there is an irony present in Pinnock’s use of Augustine.  He notes, “Just as 
Augustine came to terms with ancient Greek thinking, so we are making peace with the 
culture of modernity” (27).  Yet, as will be seen later, Pinnock chastises Augustine and others 
for accommodating Christian theology to Greek thought, especially when it comes to the 
person and nature of God.  An entire chapter in Most Moved Mover is devoted to 
“Overcoming a Pagan Inheritance.”  Augustine is again noted for allowing neo-Platonic 
thinking to cloud his Christian theology, putting God “in a kind of box” and preferring 
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“stability to change and being to becoming” (69).  From this seed came further errors in the 
classical model of theism, errors which open theists like Pinnock hope to correct. 
In fact, as the open theists argue, their view of God is the truly biblical one, not the one of 
Augustine and others who succumbed to Greek philosophical pressures when formulating 
their views on God.  Therefore, it is ironic that Pinnock would find in himself characteristics 
of Augustine which Pinnock then criticises.  Put another way, it is confusing at best that 
Pinnock can both congratulate Augustine for making Christian theology accommodate his 
cultural leanings, while at the same time reprimand him for doing so. 
So which is it?  Should Augustine be applauded for his “dazzling new insights,” or 
chastised for giving in to his neo-Platonic cultural pressures?  Pinnock appears a bit 
inconsistent here.  And his critics, ones which see Pinnock also giving in to cultural pressures 
which place a higher value on human autonomy, appear to have some validity in their 
complaints. 
Moving back to Pinnock’s pilgrimage, considering the “five points” of Calvinism, 
conveniently represented in North America by the acronym TULIP (total depravity, 
unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, and perseverance of the saints), it 
can be seen how Pinnock’s thinking has moved through these major tenets.52  By questioning 
the Calvinist notion of perseverance of the saints, Pinnock came to view God’s will as less 
forceful than this form of Calvinism tends to make it.  Further, he made human will more 
instrumental in the whole salvation process, something that Arminianism naturally does.  
Unconditional election was replaced by a conditional one which was based on the Arminian 
understanding of God’s foreknowledge, (or later in Pinnock’s thinking an individual election 
replaced by a corporate election), and grace was no longer irresistible but resistible (“Grace 
works mightily but does not override”),53 making the biblical warnings against apostasy more 
understandable. 
Pinnock also found benefit in this shift in his thinking when it came to the issue of evil.   
“The logic of consistent Calvinism makes God the author of evil and casts serious 
doubt on his goodness” (Grace & Will, 21). 
The seeds of Open Theism were clearly sown early in this pilgrimage, although Pinnock 
himself would not come to adopt the full-blown system of Open Theism until much later.  
Evil is something which happens because God has created a universe where the possibility 
                                                 
52 Consult Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 1994) for a summary of this TULIP designation (596, n. 35). 
53 Flame of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996) 157. 
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exists for free-willed creatures to go against God’s will.  This “risk” could only be possible 
because God had decided to limit himself.  Otherwise, God would indeed be the author of evil 
as Pinnock sees in Calvinism.  However, to allow for this system to be fully actualised, God 
must be refashioned, thus yielding an Open Theism system that will be investigated later. 
Elsewhere, Pinnock expresses an apologetic benefit to this new theological insight.  He 
believes that it allows for greater self-worth in the human and resonates with the human desire 
and hope that this life is truly worth something. 
“Experience itself demands that beneath our human lives exists a ground in reality 
for confidence in the final worth of our existence.  If there is no such ground, what 
is the point of anything?” (Wideness, 35).   
Conversely, it is Calvinist determinism which kills all hope, for who really can act contrary to 
the way in which God has already preordained? 
If the Calvinist understanding of unconditional election and perseverance of the saints 
was wrongheaded, what about the other three petals of the tulip?  Pinnock realised that the 
notion of irresistible grace would seem to negate the autonomy of humans, but if human 
nature was totally depraved, what other possibility could exist?   
Pinnock became intrigued by Wesley’s idea of prevenient grace, even though “the Bible 
has no developed doctrine of universal prevenient grace, however convenient it would be for 
us if it did” (Grace & Will, 22).  Given this deficiency in the doctrine of prevenient grace, 
Pinnock opted instead to question the notion of total depravity.  Because he found that 
“Scripture appeals to people as those who are able and responsible to answer to God and not 
as those incapable of doing so,” Pinnock abandoned the Calvinist understanding of depravity 
(22).  Humans are “free and responsible agents” (22).54 
When earlier considering an extended quotation about what exactly from Augustine’s 
theology had become part and parcel of North American evangelicalism, this comment from 
Pinnock was seen: 
“It views every person as totally depraved, guilty for the sin of Adam as well as 
their own sins, completely unable to do anything other than sin, and deserving of 
everlasting conscious punishment in hell.” 
                                                 
54 It should be noted here that Pinnock, although moving in the direction of Arminianism in virtually every 
theological step that he took, did not in this one area.  Jacob Arminius would not have agreed with Pinnock’s 
assessment of human depravity.  Here is found more of an Eastern Orthodox influence than Arminian, something 
that will be noted again later.  This type of Wesleyan Arminianism is clearly explained in Stan Gundry (ed.), 
Four Views on Eternal Security (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2002), where J. Steven Harper argues in his 
chapter for the Wesleyan Arminian view.  Stephen M. Ashby argues in chapter 3 for “A Reformed Arminian 
View,” and adeptly shows the differences between Jacob Arminius’ and John Wesley’s brand of Arminianism. 
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There is a tension here in Pinnock’s formulation.  It appears that he finds this teaching 
objectionable, as he includes it in his litany of errors from Augustine which have crept into 
evangelical theology.  Yet this understanding of sin is so widespread in North American 
evangelicalism that to question it would naturally yield the accusation of heresy.   
In spite of this potential problem, Pinnock sees a tension between “total depravity” and 
human autonomy and ability to act.  He finds this as a general failing of evangelical thinking, 
but whereas many evangelicals would rather abandon human autonomy, Pinnock chooses to 
abandon total depravity.  This again brings up the issue of why, and how much is Pinnock 
influenced by cultural preferences for human autonomy.  To speak of human depravity does 
not play as well in modern culture as does human freedom. 
Pinnock works hard to make it appear that his theology has remained strongly 
evangelical.  In Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World, Pinnock attacks John Hick’s 
pluralism with incredible passion, and he gives no ground in many decidedly evangelical 
areas (eg., 60-64).  Pinnock clearly is not interested in succumbing to cultural pressures which 
place a high premium on pluralism, so there should be an expectation that he is not just going 
to give in to cultural pressures when it comes to human autonomy. 
But by not adopting the full-blown Arminianism of Jacob Arminius, and instead moving 
more in favour of that espoused by John Wesley, Pinnock has placed himself in a difficult 
situation.  Now his theology comes under fire from both classical Calvinists and classical 
Arminians. 
Pinnock recognises this dilemma when it comes to the substitutionary atonement of 
Christ.  He appreciates that to claim to be an evangelical and to question the vicarious 
atonement would be a definite problem in North American evangelicalism.   
“Assuming, as any evangelical would, that the Cross involved some kind of 
substitution in which Christ bore the guilt of human sin, where then does the 
human response fit into that?” (Grace & Will, 22).   
With this statement, Pinnock recognises that under the umbrella term “evangelical,” there 
is at least one nonnegotiable, that being the substitutionary atonement of Christ.  In other 
words, a Christian would have no business referring to himself or herself as an “evangelical,” 
without believing in the substitutionary death of Christ. 
This explains why Pinnock does not abandon a substitutionary atonement, even though he 
recognises that such an atoning work has the possibility of violating human autonomy.  As he 
notes, it would logically follow that “all those who were substituted for in the death of Christ 
would necessarily be saved and have the guilt of their sins automatically removed without any 
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action of theirs entering into it” (22).  But Pinnock does not look to abandon substitutionary 
atonement, as have evangelicals such as the prominent Anglican scholar from the United 
Kingdom, Steve Chalke, in whose theology there are otherwise considerable similarities with 
North American open theists.55 
Pinnock asks, “What kind of substitution, if unlimited in scope, does not entail absolute 
universalism in salvation?” (23).  It is important to note that Pinnock does not ask what kind 
of atonement can there be without it being substitutionary.  To do so would most likely 
eliminate any chance he would have of referring to himself as an “evangelical,” at least in 
North America.56 
Many Christians believe that the easiest petal on the tulip of Calvinism to discard is that 
of limited atonement, but Pinnock saw a problem with a too-quick solution.  In his thinking, 
he must maintain a substitutionary atonement, and it must be universal, otherwise a Calvinist 
understanding of election would logically follow.  But a universal atoning work of Christ 
implied a universal salvation, so reasoned Pinnock.  The problem became, then, how to avoid 
a limited atonement without adopting universalism, which Pinnock saw as equally 
problematic (23).57 
This could be done as long as Pinnock “reduce[d] the precision” (23) of what it means for 
Christ to be a substitutionary atonement.   
“Christ’s death on behalf of the race evidently did not automatically secure for 
anyone an actual reconciled relationship with God, but made it possible for 
people to enter into such a relationship by faith” (23).   
This jibes well with Pinnock’s earlier recognition that election could be universal in 
potential, thus encompassing all of humanity, yet in actuality not necessarily saving all of 
humanity. 
Of course, this understanding of Christ’s atonement could potentially yield the salvation 
of no one, a point which Pinnock never addresses specifically as such, but which could be 
                                                 
55 The doctrine of penal substitutionary atonement has been labelled by Chalke as “cosmic child abuse,” and his 
views have caused an uproar within the Evangelical Alliance in the United Kingdom.  Among his writings on 
this topic include “Cross Purposes,” Christianity (September 2004) 44-48, and a book co-authoured with Alan 
Mann, The Lost Message of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2003).  Although not within the scope of this 
dissertation, the argument is of note simply because it involves the matter of God’s judgment.  Chalke and others 
object to penal substitution on several grounds, most notably because the idea of retribution should not be 
attributed to God.  The debate has reached American shores mainly through Professor Joel Green of Asbury 
Theological Seminary in Kentucky, and via a work he co-authoured with Mark Baker, Recovering the Scandal of 
the Cross (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2000). 
56 It would be easier for Pinnock to abandon a substitutionary atoning work of Christ in a cultural environment 
which emphasises human autonomy and pluralism, but Pinnock does not abandon this key evangelical belief. 
57 A universal salvation must also be avoided according to Pinnock because it violates human autonomy. 
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understood within his idea of God taking risks.  Some may be tempted to argue that at least 
with the limited atonement of Calvinism, some of the human race are guaranteed to be saved.  
But Pinnock would find this objectionable, preferring instead a system which allows for the 
potential of salvation, but does not make it certain.  Both a limited and universal salvation 
negate human autonomy, and maintaining human freedom is much preferred to none at all, 
even if it involves greater risk. 
This “reduced precision” in his understanding of the atonement caused Pinnock to gain 
more appreciation for the atonement theories of Anselm and Grotius because they both 
emphasised the atonement more as judicial demonstration than individual substitution (23).  
Pinnock also recognised some similarities between his newly-formed theology and that of 
Karl Barth, at least in the notion of corporate election.  But Barth’s theology leaned too 
heavily toward the objective element of salvation instead of the subjective.  “My main 
hesitation lay in the need to place greater stress on the human appropriation of this saving act” 
(23). 
All of these changes have necessitated a “paradigm shift in [his] biblical hermeneutic” 
(21).  “I am learning to read the Bible from a new point of view” (21).  Pinnock objects to the 
attacks that say he has become more rationalist (18); he believes himself to actually be more 
evangelical as a result of his new theological spectacles (21). 
Thus, in roughly two decades Pinnock had moved from a theological system which was 
strictly Calvinist to one which was thoroughly Arminian.  He fashioned a theology which 
moved from a theological determinism where God predestined all things, to one in which 
humans became “co-workers with God” (20), and able to affect the future apart from pre-
ordained decrees by God. 
Yet, this was not good enough, because even the classical theism of evangelicalism, be it 
the one espoused by Calvinism or the virtually identical theism of Arminianism, had to also 
be altered.  This would involve a reworking of the understanding of God’s immutability, his 
timelessness, and his omniscience.  These specific matters will be dealt with later.58 
This leaves the question of what lay at the heart of Pinnock’s inclusivism.  Pinnock’s 
Theology and Soteriology – how God is in his very nature, and how he relates to his creation 
– seem to have been more motivated by negative factors than positive ones.  Put another way, 
                                                 
58 Interestingly, John Hick also provides a theological pilgrimage for the reasons why he eventually abandoned 
evangelicalism for pluralism (Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 29-32; see also An Interpretation of Religions, 
Yale University Press, 1990).   Although not within the scope of this dissertation, it would be interesting to 
compare the pilgrimages of Hick and Pinnock and see why one ultimately moved from exclusivism to pluralism, 
while the other stopped short at inclusivism. 
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Pinnock’s theological pilgrimage appears to move away from something more than moving 
toward something.  In virtually everything he says about his pilgrimage, it is almost always 
couched in negative language concerning Calvinism and its underlying Augustinianism, as 
opposed to the positive elements of Arminianism which attracted him. 
This is perhaps no more clearly evident than in his view of the typically evangelical 
understanding of the fate of those who have never heard the gospel.  Because this issue affects 
nearly half of the current population of the world, and has certainly affected the majority of 
humanity, it is no small issue.  How one answers the question, “What eternally happens to 
people who have never heard the gospel of Jesus?” will directly impinge upon one’s 
understanding of God. 
Of course, the exact opposite can also be said.  One’s understanding of God will directly 
impinge upon the answer to the question concerning the fate of the unevangelised.  Pinnock 
recognises this intimate relationship between Theology and Soteriology when he asks,  
“What kind of God would send large numbers of men, women, and children to 
hell without the remotest chance of responding to his truth?  This does not sound 
like the God whom Jesus called Father” (Wideness, 154). 
This is the starting point.  According to Pinnock, the historical, evangelical understanding 
of salvation as limited to those who profess faith in Jesus (what has been termed exclusivism) 
is untenable because it does not correspond with the picture of the Father as portrayed in the 
teaching of Jesus. 
John Sanders makes the inclusivist motivations even clearer to see.59  He writes: “What 
happens to people who have never heard the Gospel?” is “far and away . . . the most-asked 
apologetic question on United States college campuses” (Three Views, 7).  He notes three 
main reasons why the question is asked:  1) because if the exclusivist answer is the correct 
one, this makes God out to be evil, 2) simple statistics show that Christianity, although 
growing in numbers is actually decreasing in terms of percentage of the world’s population, 
and 3) more and more Christians are coming into contact with people of other faith (8). 
Therefore, in walking through the main beliefs of inclusivism, the following path will be 
taken.  Inclusivism is clearly driven by its picture of God who is love.  This emphasis drives 
                                                 
59 At the time he wrote the book which made him immediately recognisable in inclusivist circles, No Other 
Name, Sanders was an instructor at Oak Hills Bible College in Minnesota and an adjunct professor of philosophy 
at Bemidji State University.  He received a doctorate from the University of South Africa and his dissertation  
(“Divine Providence as Risk-Taking,” DTh dissertation, University of South Africa, 1996) formed the basis of 
another of his groundbreaking works, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 
1998).  He became professor of philosophy at Huntingdon College in Indiana, a United Brethren institution, 
although his position went under review and was eventually terminated due to the volatility that had been created 
due to his adoption of Open Theism. 
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the inclusivist understanding of the autonomy of humans via the basic understanding that a 
loving God would allow for more human freedom than typically allowed in traditional 
evangelical, and especially Calvinist, systems.  Even the inclusivist view of hell is driven by 
this understanding of human autonomy, so it is here that this study must begin. 
This loving picture of God comes mainly from the teaching of Jesus, as opposed to more 
“cruel and peevish” depictions found elsewhere in the Scriptures, mainly in the Old 
Testament.  Therefore, a survey of the key teachings of Jesus used in this regard must follow. 
An emphasis on the role of the Holy Spirit is fundamental to inclusivism, and Pinnock has 
even espoused a Christology which is more Spirit-centred than Logos-centred.60  From this 
strong Pneumatology comes an openness to other faiths and peoples where Jesus is not 
known, based on the argument that God’s Spirit is nevertheless present.  There is also an 
openness to a natural theology which is more typically found in Catholic than evangelical 
circles, and this again is due to the role that the Spirit plays in God’s creation. 
Some of the main tenets of Open Theism will then be discussed, but only in a way which 
impinges upon the subject of this dissertation.  Specifically, that will involve those attributes 
of God which inclusivists see as misconstrued by typical evangelicals, classical theism’s 
views concerning God’s immutability, timelessness, and omniscience.  In each instance, the 
main issue is whether or not the classical view allows for God to truly interact in a loving way 
with his creatures. 
Then any bibliological factors which play a part in inclusivism will be noted.  What are 
the key texts they use to support their position?  How do they approach Scripture, and is it in a 
way acceptable to the wider evangelical community?  Lastly, consideration will be given for 
the specific soteriological implications of inclusivism, their movement away from the 
traditional view of hell, and their view of Christian missions. 
All of the above yields, but is also driven by, the desire inclusivists have to see more 
people saved than is typically allowed for in evangelicalism. 
 
2.1 Human Freedom and the Love of God 
There is a tendency within inclusivism and Open Theism to make love the most important 
attribute of God, apparently to the exclusion of other, more negative ones such as wrath or 
justice.  For example, Pinnock wants to maintain a “hermeneutic of hopefulness” (Wideness, 
20) whereby Christians read the Bible with eyes for the love of God and not the darker aspects 
                                                 
60 He also suggests that Bibliology should come under Pneumatology (see The Scripture Principle, 255), 
something which will be considered in greater detail later. 
33  
which according to Pinnock have been typically concentrated on by evangelicals.  Professor 
of theology at Loma Linda University, Richard Rice, agrees: “Love is the most important 
quality we attribute to God” (Openness, 15). 
Elsewhere, in Most Moved Mover,61 Pinnock makes this point much more explicitly: 
“Love is more than an attribute; it is God’s very nature” (81). 
“Wrath does not belong to God’s nature in the way that love does” (83). 
“If theologians would restore love to their thinking about God’s nature, the road 
would be open to the open view of God, which is a theology of love” (82). 
Stanley E. Porter comments on his McMaster Divinity College colleague concerning this 
very issue when he writes that Pinnock “constructs an entire theology around this notion” that 
God is love.62 
In Sanders’ redefinition of the attributes of God, wrath does not even feature.  It is, rather, 
an “instrument in the divine hands, not an attribute of God” (Risks, 84).  He also refers to it as 
“secondary” and “not an essential attribute” (84).  “All attempts to balance wrath (or justice) 
with love as equal attributes of God are misplaced” (85). 
Seventh-Day Adventist pastor and theologian Fritz Guy concurs:  “In the reality of God, 
love is more fundamental than, and prior to, justice or power” (Grace & Will, 35).  Also, “In 
the character of God, love is more fundamental than control” (33).  Rice echoes this sentiment 
when he says, “According to the Bible, God is not a center of infinite power who happens to 
be loving, he is loving above all else” (Openness, 21). 
When looking at Clark Pinnock’s theological pilgrimage, implicit in his understanding of 
Calvinist and Augustinian theology was a premium placed on divine sovereignty at the 
expense of divine love.  It was noted by the inclusivist authors of Grace & Will that absolute 
power had somehow been given more importance in evangelical theology than God’s love.  
They believed that a correction was needed. 
Thus, in Pinnock’s reformulated theology, unconditional election was replaced by a 
universal, corporate election.  Although the Calvinist understanding of unconditional election 
still has God’s love as a motivating factor, this is apparently not good enough for inclusivists 
unless that love is shown equally to all people.  The same can be said concerning limited 
atonement, which appears to Pinnock and other inclusivists as narrow and arbitrary.  Only a 
universal atonement rightly portrays God’s love. 
                                                 
61 Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2001). 
62 Noted in Beyond the Bible: Moving from Scripture to Theology by I. Howard Marshall (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 2004) 110, n.31. 
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So it should be understood that “God is love” is not just the definitive understanding that 
is needed, according to inclusivists and open theists.  An exclusivist evangelical will certainly 
speak of “for God so loved the world,” so the problem should not be that inclusivists see in 
exclusivism an entire neglect of the love of God.  Rather, what they see is that not enough 
emphasis is laid on it.  And in their thinking, only when God treats all people equally, with no 
preference given to one over another as appears in unconditional election, can Christians 
properly speak of the love of God. 
Therefore, it is better to speak of God being “more loving” in an inclusivist system, when 
compared with an exclusivist one.  According to Pinnock, then, an Arminian system better 
portrays the love of God than does a Calvinist one. 
Yet, even with a careful reading of inclusivists one does not get this impression entirely.  
It would be helpful to see Pinnock, for example, go through the plethora of material from 
John Calvin which speaks of God’s love, yet he does not do so.  At times it serves his 
purposes better to portray Augustinian and Calvinist theology as rather unloving, even harsh 
and cruel depictions of God, but this is not a particularly fair representation.  Rather than 
coming away with the impression that inclusivism is “more loving” than exclusivism, his 
readers rather come away with the impression that inclusivism is loving and exclusivism is 
not, that Arminianism entirely portrays the love of God and Calvinism does not at all.  This is 
a most unfortunate caricature of the systems which are contra-inclusivism. 
Even the topic of total depravity can be linked to this perspective.  Intimately associated 
with this understanding of love as the supreme attribute or characteristic of God is the 
freedom of humans and the belief that true love cannot be forced or coerced.  A fair 
representation of this position can be seen in this comment by a prominent inclusivist, former 
professor at Gordon College William MacDonald: 
“The divine call was never coercive.  Nowhere in all Jesus’ parables and teaching 
does he portray a God-figure who compels compliance with his wishes, or 
overrides individual freedom to force his good will on anybody.”63 
Interestingly, this is precisely what another prominent inclusivist, Gregory Boyd, 
proclaims.  Boyd is very clear in his pronouncements that “the possibility of love requires 
self-determining freedom” and “love must be freely chosen.”64  Pinnock’s comment is 
similar: “Forced love is a contradiction in terms” (Flame, 75). 
                                                 
63 William G. MacDonald, “The Biblical Doctrine of Election,” in The Grace of God and the Will of Man, 213. 
64 All quotations from Boyd in this section come from Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian 
Warfare Theodicy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001). 
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Boyd sees a dignity in human freedom which God cannot revoke.  “While he detests what 
they choose, he nevertheless continues to love the dignity inherent in these creatures that 
allows them to choose it” (343). 
In Boyd’s apologetic concerning why evil exists in God’s creation, he places in the first 
position of six theses, “love must be freely chosen.”65  Without real freedom, love cannot 
exist.  Therefore, Boyd concludes, God is willing to risk and endure evil in his creation in 
order to possibly yield creatures which love him of their own freewill.  “God cannot avoid the 
possibility of these nightmares without also cancelling out the possibility of love” (215). 
Genuine love cannot be “forced,” and God values love that comes voluntarily from the 
creature.66  Open theists as if with one voice decry the typical Calvinism that has dominated 
much of the Soteriology of American evangelicalism, especially as it relates to the doctrine of 
election.  If God truly elects those who will be saved, and this is done prior to their existence 
and hence ability to make their own choice, this would appear to make their love for God 
forced or coerced.  As inclusivist Vernon White notes, “The highest good includes the free 
repentance of the will of offenders.”67 
In fact, human freedom presupposes a certain limitation on the part of God to act 
unilaterally.  This must be accepted in any inclusivist understanding, but most especially in 
that inclusivism which has blossomed into Open Theism.  Therefore, Richard Rice can say: 
“Where human decision is presupposed, however, God cannot achieve his 
objectives unilaterally.  He requires our cooperation” (Openness, 56). 
Earlier, Rice already stated that God’s divine predestination has the potential of failing, 
even though he does not provide specific examples of this from Scripture.  Rather, he deduces 
it from the fact that the biblical portrait of God is one where “God has often experienced 
frustration and disappointment” (56).  However, there is a big difference between frustration 
and failed predestination, one would think. 
Still, Rice must maintain the possibility of God’s failure if he is to allow human 
autonomy, as inclusivists and open theists intend to do.  This makes sense, though, because 
God does not exhaustively know the future choices of free-willed beings.  Thus, he can be 
wrong. 
                                                 
65 The other five premises are: 2) love entails risk, 3) love entails moral responsibility, 4) moral responsibility is 
proportionate to the potential to influence others, 5) the power to influence is irrevocable, and 6) the power to 
influence is finite. 
66 For similar comments, see Pinnock, Flame, 57, 75. 
67 Atonement and Incarnation: An Essay in Universalism and Particularity (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
68. 
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“Instead of perceiving the entire course of human existence in one timeless 
moment, God comes to know events as they take place.  He learns something 
from what transpires” (16). 
The existence of a “learning God” is necessary for the inclusivist understanding of human 
autonomy.  If God knows everything, then human freedom is a figment and not a reality.  
Therefore, “For God to will something . . . does not make its occurrence inevitable” (26), 
because God has allowed human freedom, in essence, to at times thwart his own wishes and 
desires.  John Sanders calls humans in this regard, “minicreators” (Grace & Will, 176). 
Professor of philosophy at Huntington College, William Hasker, sees in this reality the 
same apologetic benefit that Pinnock saw when it comes to evil.  According to inclusivists, 
Calvinism when logically taken to its final conclusion ultimately makes God the author of 
evil.  Because all events in God’s creation are the result of God’s divine predestination, even 
evil must be said to be according to the will of God. 
But when human autonomy is allowed to exist to the degree that inclusivists believe it 
exists, the problem of evil and God’s will melts away.  As Hasker notes: 
“God does not permit the evil, because God could not prevent the evils from 
occurring” (Openness, 139, emphasis original). 
The teaching of total depravity as typically found in Calvinism, then, would negate this 
necessary human autonomy.  So too would the Calvinist understanding of perseverance of the 
saints and irresistible grace.  Based on these two motivations – the love of God and the 
freewill of humans – Pinnock’s theological pilgrimage eliminated all five petals on the 
Calvinist tulip.  In every objection that he had against Calvinism, either or both of these 
factors is the reason why he abandoned Calvinism for a more-Arminian system. 
It was noted in Pinnock’s pilgrimage that he does not take the final leap to universalism, 
despite his affinity for a universal atonement by Christ.  What is holding him back from 
making such a soteriological decision?  It is Pinnock’s desire to allow room for human 
freedom.  Pinnock’s Arminianism of a decidedly Wesleyan variety becomes very clear when 
considering how exactly salvation is affected in individuals and why he does not ultimately 
embrace universalism.  Several statements from Flame of Love are worth quoting in this 
regard: 
“We have only to accept what has been done and allow the Spirit to conform 
our lives to Christ” (96). 
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“All humanity has the potential to be the children of God, because all were 
included in his representation.  What remains is for everyone to be reconciled to 
God personally and subjectively” (100). 
“In faith we add our yes to God’s prior yes” (109). 
“The cross benefits all those who let themselves be linked with his death through 
baptism” (110). 
Human freedom is the one nonnegotiable in Pinnock’s gambit.  Had God decided to make 
salvation universal, he would have had to ignore the freedom of his creatures to reject it.68  
Had he made it limited, the same would apply.  Therefore, in some way God had to offer 
salvation, not affect it but simply offer it, in order to preserve both his loving character and 
human autonomy. 
Thus even the important evangelical tenet of vicarious atonement had to be reconfigured 
in some fashion to allow for this understanding of human freedom.  As noted earlier, if Jesus 
truly stood in the place of every human being, then their freedom would in some way be 
violated.  Therefore, he could die on the cross only as a potential substitution, but that 
substitution would only be affected once the individual makes the personal choice to 
appropriate it. 
Given these two main foci, the love of God and the freewill of humans, most inclusivists 
have also had to alter the traditional view of hell as a place of eternal, conscious torment.  
This is done because such a place seems to negate a picture of God who is infinitely loving, 
and it violates human freedom by forcing people to endure something they do not want to 
endure.  Inclusivists frequently reference the comment by C. S. Lewis that the doors of hell 
are locked from the inside.69  In other words, those who are in hell are there of their own 
freewill.  In fact, they want to be there and that is why they are the ones who lock the doors. 
Pinnock makes this point clear:   
“How can one reconcile this doctrine [eternal, conscious hell] with the revelation 
of God in Jesus Christ?  Is he not a God of boundless mercy?  How then can we 
project a deity of such cruelty and vindictiveness?  Torturing people without end 
is not the sort of thing the “Abba” Father of Jesus would do” (Four Views on Hell, 
140). 
                                                 
68 See also Wideness, 156.  Alistair McGrath also recognises this:  “Universalism denies humanity the right to 
say no to God” (Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 177). 
69 The Problem of Pain (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962) 128. 
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Reflecting the teaching of C. S. Lewis in The Problem of Pain, Pinnock makes this 
comment:   
“Hell is not the prison from which people are longing to be set free, but a sit-in 
where sinners have barricaded themselves in to keep God out” (Wideness, 180).   
Similarly, Capon states:  “The sole difference, therefore, between Hell and Heaven is 
that in Heaven the forgiveness is accepted and passed along, while in Hell it is rejected 
and blocked” (Parables of Grace, 50).70 
Inclusivists have looked for other options to the traditional view of hell.  The three main 
options are annihilationism, post-mortem evangelism, and “middle knowledge.”71  Pinnock is 
cited as an advocate of post-mortem evangelism in No Other Name (261) and Wideness (168-
175), both published in 1992.  But he states in 1994 to not hold to that position (Okholm & 
Phillips, Four Views, 148), and in Four Views on Hell is the author of the article on 
annihilationism.72  Boyd’s picture of eternal judgment is a modified annihilationism which 
relies heavily on the views of C. S. Lewis.73  And Fackre and Bloesch posit “post-mortem 
evangelism,” where people still have the opportunity to hear the gospel and make a choice 
even after they die.74 
Pinnock’s comment about the traditional view of hell is worth quoting in full: 
“I conclude that the traditional belief that God makes the wicked suffer in an 
unending conscious torment in hell is unbiblical, is fostered by a Hellenistic view 
of human nature, is detrimental to the character of God, is defended on essentially 
pragmatic grounds, and is being rejected by a growing number of biblically 
                                                 
70 Of course, an eternal, conscious hell has not only been objected to by inclusivists.  Consider Baird’s comment 
over forty years ago:  “It has about it a vindictiveness that offends against Jesus’ teaching about the love of 
God,”  The Justice of God in the Teaching of Jesus (London: SCM Press Ltd. 1963) 230. 
71 It should be noted that it is here on the issue of middle knowledge that many inclusivists and open theists part 
ways.  Because open theists do not believe that God can know the future choices of free-willed beings, the 
middle knowledge of God must be excluded as a possibility.  Middle knowledge is the understanding that God 
knows what people would choose when faced with a choice, even if they are never actually faced with that 
choice in reality.  It is then argued that even if people have not heard the gospel, based on God’s middle 
knowledge, he does know what they would have chosen had they heard the gospel, and thus judges them on that 
basis.  This is an unacceptable option for open theists. 
72 More recently, he is listed as an adherent of annihilationism in Roger E. Olson, The Mosaic of Christian 
Belief: Twenty Centuries of Unity & Diversity (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2002) 329. 
73 The final chapter (12) in Satan and the Problem of Evil provides a picture of what Boyd envisions hell to be.  
Therein Boyd quotes Lewis at least a dozen times.  Boyd mentions later in an appendix that he also finds the 
position of post-mortem evangelism appealing (380-385). 
74 Of course, post-mortem evangelism only moves the ultimate question of hell one step further.  Even after 
faced with the post-mortem choice, scholars must decide where people who then reject Christ end up.  Suffice it 
to say that few inclusivists still maintain the traditional view of hell, for reasons given above.  Fackre deals 
extensively with post-mortem evangelism in The Christian Story: A Narrative Interpretation of Basic Christian 
Doctrine, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984) 232-237, and “The Scandals 
of Particularity and Universality,” Midstream 22 (Jan. 1983) 32-52. 
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faithful, contemporary scholars.  I believe that a better case can be made for 
understanding the nature of hell as termination – better biblically, 
anthropologically, morally, judicially, and metaphysically” (Four Views on Hell, 
165).75 
Therefore, it should be recognised that in every important tenet of inclusivist teaching, 
these two theological prongs of motivation exist: the love of God as his attribute par 
excellénce, and a human freedom which cannot be violated without violating this love of God.  
Any critique of inclusivism must deal adequately with these motivations. 
 
2.2 The “God of Jesus” 
Central to the inclusivist arguments about the nature of salvation and the love of God is the 
teaching of Jesus.  Time and time again, the portrayal of the love of the Father by Jesus his 
Son is made supreme in their arguments for a kinder, gentler picture of God and salvation 
than has traditionally been painted by evangelicalism.  Historic exclusivism has been cast as 
harsh and cruel, and entirely at odds with the image Jesus gives of his Father.  Pinnock even 
compares exclusivists to the Pharisees in their unwillingness to allow God’s grace to be 
shown outside their religious and theological circles (Flame, 212-213). 
If the inclusivists are correct at this point, it would go a long way to substantiating their 
position.  Thus it is wise to thoroughly investigate this argument.  A sampling of inclusivist 
statements concerning this issue is helpful. 
“Jesus preached good news and did not come to condemn the world (Jn. 3:18).  
He was not a hellfire preacher, though he spoke of hell.  Our emphasis, like his, 
should be on God’s extravagant love of human beings, not on God’s anger” 
(Flame, 191). 
“My reply is that the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is not a merciless 
God, as they [exclusivists] suggest in their model, and therefore will not behave in 
the severe way they propose” (Four Views, 145). 
“What kind of God would send large numbers of men, women, and children to 
hell without the remotest chance of responding to this truth?  This does not sound 
like the God whom Jesus called Father” (Wideness, 154; also 89, for a similar 
argument by Pinnock for how Jesus’ depiction of God is actually contrary to that 
given in the Old Testament). 
                                                 
75 By “termination” Pinnock means the view commonly referred to in evangelical circles as “annihilationism,” 
i.e., those who die apart from the saving life of Christ cease to exist. 
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The above all come from Pinnock, but other inclusivists express similar sentiments.  John 
Sanders makes the teaching of Jesus central to his inclusivism (God Who Risks, 90), as does 
Fritz Guy (Grace & Will, 33) and in the same book, William MacDonald (212-213).76 
Richard Rice emphasises this point so strongly that he is worth an extended quotation in 
this regard, from The Openness of God: 
“The fundamental claim here is not simply that God revealed himself in Jesus, but 
that God revealed himself in Jesus as nowhere else.  In this specific human life, as 
never before or since, nor anywhere else in the sphere of creaturely existence, God 
expresses his innermost reality.  Accordingly, from a Christian standpoint it is 
appropriate to say not only that Jesus is God, but that God is Jesus.  For 
Christians, Jesus defines the reality of God” (39, emphasis original). 
If humans truly want to know how God would act toward those people who die and never 
hear the gospel, their fundamental investigation should come from Jesus Christ.  That is why 
Rice can later say that the “clearest insights into the nature of God appear in the teachings of 
Jesus about his heavenly Father” (40).  Noting the very strong appeal by inclusivists, then, to 
the revelation of God found in Jesus Christ, later investigation will determine how solid this 
argument is.  Various aspects of the teaching of Jesus will be considered, as each relates to 
key suppositions by inclusivism. 
When looking specifically at the teaching of Jesus, the parables which emphasise the love 
and forgiveness of God are at the forefront of inclusivism’s coverage.  For example, the 
Parable of the Prodigal Son (Lk. 15:11-32) speaks of the love and forgiveness of the Father, 
which in turn produces an “optimism of salvation” for inclusivists, as opposed to what they 
consider to be the typical “fewness doctrine” of traditional evangelicalism (Wideness, 31).   
Even passages which seem to clearly speak of the fewness of those who are ultimately 
saved, such as Jesus’ statement about the wide and narrow paths (Mt. 7:13-14), are explained 
away by inclusivists in their desire to maintain a wide and open path for salvation.  Fritz Guy 
attempts a figurative explanation for this teaching (Grace & Will, 44), and Pinnock says this 
passage has nothing to do with the relative numbers of people spending an eternity in one of 
two places.   
“I do not think that this text about fewness can be used to cancel out the optimism 
of salvation that so many other verses articulate” (Wideness, 154). 
                                                 
76 Pluralist John Hick uses similar arguments (Four Views, 250). 
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Other parables like the Sheep and Goats (Mt. 25:31-46) are used by inclusivists to bolster 
their understanding that explicit knowledge of Jesus Christ is not necessary to be saved by 
him.  Rather, all those who perform good works pleasing to God and his Son can be deemed 
“sheep” in the final separation.  The Sheep and Goats is their primary text for teaching that 
God favours people, regardless of their faith, so long as they act morally.   
Pinnock makes good use of this parable.  In Four Views, he claims that the “seed of faith” 
is evident in those who act like the sheep of this parable (254; also 119).  In Wideness, he 
even goes further and uses this parable as proof of the “salvation of the unevangelized” (163-
165).  They have in essence served Christ through their good deeds, even though they did not 
know him.   
“Those who confess Christ and those who do not are judged alike by the 
extent to which they walk in the way of the Son of Man” (165).   
Sanders notes that this is a shift in Pinnock’s theology, as previously he did not view this 
parable in a quite so optimistic fashion (No Other Name, 259).77 
In Wideness, Pinnock includes his understanding of the Sheep and Goats in a section 
devoted to types of people he believes are saved even though they did not have explicit 
knowledge of Jesus.  These groups include pagan saints both from the Old Testament (161) 
and the New (165), babies who die in infancy and the mentally incompetent (166), and the 
Jews who lived before Jesus (163).  All of these people are examples of unevangelised 
individuals who were nonetheless saved.   
The pagan saints argument will be dealt with extensively later as it forms an integral part 
of inclusivist argumentation.  Considering infants and the mentally incompetent, it is 
interesting to note that Pinnock does not grant them automatic salvation.  This would 
apparently violate their human freedom.  Therefore, he comes up with the rather creative 
suggestion that such people are “given time to grow up and mature, so then a decision could 
be made” post-mortem (168).  He then gives a defence of such post-mortem conversions for 
the better part of five pages. 
This teaching from Jesus of the Sheep and Goats is often coupled with Peter’s comments 
in Acts 10:35, where he says that God “accepts men from every nation who fear him and do 
what is right” (Wideness, 32; Four Views, 254; Grace & Will, 215; Flame, 180, 195, 202).  
                                                 
77 The same argument from morality is used by pluralists as well.  See Paul Knitter’s article, “Toward a 
Liberation Theology” in John Hick and Paul Knitter (eds.), The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a 
Pluralistic Theology of Religions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988).  “Simply stated, from their ethical, 
soteriological fruits we shall know them – we shall be able to judge whether and how much other religious paths 
and their mediators are salvific” (193, emphasis original). 
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Assent to theological propositions is not necessary so long as a person has a “relationship of 
trust in God which manifests itself in godly living” (Flame, 195).  However, such teaching 
has been condemned by critics of inclusivism as sounding too much like a works-
righteousness, one that the Protestant Reformation decidedly denounced. 
There appears to be a confusion between saying, as the inclusivists do, that Jesus is the 
only Saviour of the world, and contending that good, honest people of other faiths are saved 
simply by doing those things which Jesus would have approved, even though they have no 
explicit awareness of Christ and his teaching.  If the Parable of the Sheep and Goats truly does 
teach what inclusivists claim it teaches, how can inclusivists continue to disagree with 
pluralists who say that all religions are equally valid ways to God?  If helping the needy, 
visiting the prisoners, and giving water to the thirsty are acts which give people access to 
heaven – regardless of one’s religious affiliation – how can inclusivists say that non-Christian 
religions are not in themselves salvific?  These important questions will be breached later 
when dealing more specifically with the inclusivist understanding of non-Christian faiths. 
At this point, though, Pinnock appears to foresee such objections.  He prefers not to 
emphasise the good works themselves, but rather the “faith principle” that is involved with the 
unevangelised.  Moral people of other religious traditions can be saved, not simply because 
they did something good, but because they possessed a saving faith, even if not expressly in 
Jesus.  This faith principle, Pinnock contends, has been held by past evangelicals and church 
fathers such as Justin, Clement, Zwingli, and Wesley (Wideness, 158).  Vatican II is also cited 
as holding this position (159). 
This seems to mute those objections against Pinnock and other inclusivists that they are 
simply teaching a works-righteousness which is at odds with traditional Protestant teaching.  
Even if people are “informationally premessianic” (161), they may still respond in faith to the 
light of revelation they have been given by God (158).  Because the redemption of Christ is 
universal, so too must access to it be universal, even if the name of Jesus is not explicitly 
known (159). 
However, is this not simply semantics?  If a person who does not know about Jesus is 
saved because he or she has done good works, how can this be construed as acceptable within 
the wider evangelical understanding of salvation by faith and not by works?  Simply claiming 
a “faith principle” appears to beg the question of what this “faith” is placed in?  If in God, 
then which picture of God?  Can inclusivists truly contend that a Muslim adherent - one who 
denies the Trinity, the incarnation, the crucifixion, the atonement, and the resurrection of 
Jesus - is saved simply by doing good works?  Then what of the Jew, such as Saul of Tarsus?  
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These matters will be revisited later, but for now it appears problematic for inclusivists to 
insist they stand within the stream of evangelicalism, while appearing to approve of a 
soteriological system which teaches the salvation of morally good people on the grounds of 
their good deeds. 
Along similar lines, Jesus’ teaching concerning good and bad trees and their fruit (Mt. 
7:15-20) is also used by inclusivists as a general rule which applies to all people.  Pinnock 
cites this passage when he provides two criteria for recognising truth in non-Christian 
religions (Wideness, 97).  Missionary lecturer and inclusivist Daniel Clendenin also points to 
this passage as support for an inclusivist understanding of people in non-Christian religions 
who pursue righteousness, noting the pagan saints argument (Many Gods, 80-81).  Clendenin 
goes on to say: 
“To inclusivists, when asking about a person’s salvation, the ethical criterion 
of righteousness is as important as the cognitive or epistemological criterion 
of confessing Christ in words” (81). 
But this can be a bit misleading.  When there is no epistemological criterion, the ethical 
criterion is apparently good enough.  This can hardly be construed in the way Clendenin says 
it, “as important as.”  The ethical criterion appears to be all that is needed.  If there is an 
epistemological criterion present, inclusivists still maintain that an ethical criterion must also 
be present.  Some clarity from inclusivists would be helpful here. 
If God did not allow for such a faith principle, one through which salvation can be 
obtained via an ethical criterion when no cognitive criterion is present, then God would not be 
loving, according to inclusivism.  The loving thing to do would be to offer salvation to every 
individual, even if that offer takes decidedly different forms.  To some who have little light, 
God still allows them to exercise human freedom to respond.  To those who have heard 
explicitly about Jesus Christ, they still must positively respond.  This soteriological system 
best corresponds with the teaching of Jesus concerning the Father’s love. 
Thus, Pinnock can say, “The decisive element in Jesus’ teaching and acting was the 
communication of a sense of the boundlessness of God’s grace to sinners” (Wideness, 31).  
This is, again, the control factor in an inclusivist understanding of salvation.  Unconditional 
election, limited atonement, even irresistible grace, are not proper theological vehicles 
through which God’s boundless love should be conveyed. 
It should be noted that inclusivists do not place so much emphasis on other portions of the 
New Testament revelation as they do on the teaching of Jesus.  Certainly, they use the New 
44  
Testament when appropriate, but when attempting to speak of the great love of the Father, the 
teaching of Jesus plays a central and at times almost exclusive role. 
However, Pinnock does attempt to show from the canonical books outside of the gospels 
that there is an optimism of salvation based on the loving reach of the Father in all parts of the 
world and at all times.  But it is hard to see how Pinnock’s arguments specifically support 
inclusivism at the negation of exclusivism.   
For example, Pinnock begins with Paul’s speech at Lystra.  “In the past, he let all nations 
go their own way.  Yet he has not left himself without testimony” (Acts 14:16-17).  This 
Pinnock says “represents a gracious and understanding appreciation of their past and their 
culture” (Wideness, 32), but it is difficult to see how Pinnock can say this.  Unfortunately, that 
is all he says about this passage.  Other references to this biblical passage later in the book 
(eg., 96, 104, 139) do not specifically address this matter again. 
Pinnock then moves to Paul’s speech at Athens, from which he can say, “Evidently Paul 
thought of these people as believers in a certain sense, in a way that could be and should be 
fulfilled in Jesus Christ” (32).  Unfortunately, there is not a more-thorough exegesis of this 
Acts 17 passage provided here, although later Pinnock uses the same argument when he 
speaks of the “evil side” of religious traditions.  There he notes that Paul, when looking at the 
religious idolatry of the Athenians, was greatly troubled (90). 
However, a little later in the same book, Pinnock notes that Paul’s recognition that the 
Athenians were “very religious” was an acknowledgment of the image of God in humanity 
(102).  So Paul apparently was both pleased and distressed by what he saw in the Athenian 
worship.  Exclusivist evangelicalism tends to see only negative in Paul’s encounter with the 
Athenians, and their need to repent and trust in Christ.  But Pinnock sees both good and bad, 
albeit more of the former than the latter.  “Apparently the apostle is open to whatever truth or 
goodness he happens to come across, whatever the context” (33). 
The further examples from Paul’s epistles used by Pinnock to bolster his point of a 
universal optimism of salvation include the fact that Jesus is the cosmic Christ and identified 
with the power of creation (33), that he is represented as the last Adam, the Saviour of the 
world, the one Mediator between God and humankind, and the one through whom God has 
reconciled the whole world (34).   
Yet it is difficult to precisely see how these examples specifically support inclusivism at 
the omission of exclusivism, since exclusivist evangelicals commonly speak of Jesus, for 
example, as the only Saviour and Mediator.  Because Jesus is referred to as the second Adam 
does not automatically bar a Calvinist understanding of limited atonement.  Yet at times 
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Pinnock appears to just assume that these passages must, because he provides little further 
substantiation for his claims. 
What would perhaps be more helpful would be to see Pinnock deal with some of the more 
pessimistic statements of the New Testament, ones which speak of the wrath of God and even 
of the Son, but there is very little coverage of such passages throughout his writings.  He 
prefers these types of quick glances at passages rather than in-depth analysis and reflection.  
For example, it is difficult upon reading the entire passage of Paul’s encounter with the 
Athenians to come away with the notion that the Athenian religious ways were pleasing to 
God, as Pinnock does.   
In fact, Luke notes that once Paul began to speak of the resurrection of Jesus, many of the 
Athenians scoffed at him and left.  But a few people did believe in Paul’s words, and these 
Luke says became believers.  Would it not be best, then, to assume that the ones who did not 
believe in the resurrection did not become followers of Jesus and thus were lost? 
Pinnock’s last example from Paul’s epistles speaks of the resurrection of Jesus.  “For as in 
Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive” (1 Cor. 15:22).  This, Pinnock says, shows 
that “Jesus recapitulates the purpose of God for humankind and reverses the process which 
led to our downfall, opening up the way to new life” (34).  But again, it would be difficult to 
find an exclusivist who would not say the very same thing. 
Pinnock’s last example from the New Testament epistles comes from John’s Revelation 
and the picture of the multitude of believers around the throne, a new heaven, a renewed 
earth, and the new Jerusalem.  God will not be content to “rescue a pathetic remnant” (35; see 
also 20).  God will win a victory over the nations, “not through naked power, but through 
boundless love” (35).  Indeed, John was not a pessimist as many evangelicals apparently are. 
This example, however, only concentrates on a limited portion of Revelation.  It is 
difficult to read the entire book and then to only speak of positive things.  What of the bowls 
of wrath, the scrolls, beasts and angels which all portend God’s displeasure with humanity?  
Pinnock speaks of none of this.  Of the twenty references Pinnock makes from Revelation 
throughout A Wideness in God’s Mercy, only one hints at this negative material in John’s 
oracle. 
Fritz Guy attempts a way around this apparent difficulty with Revelation by suggesting 
that the judgment language of the biblical revelation is “powerful and dramatic symbolic 
exhortation rather than a scenario of future events” (Grace & Will, 44).  But then why believe 
that the biblical language depicting salvation involves an ontological reality, while the 
judgment language does not?  It is because Guy insists that  
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“any consideration of these realities . . . must always occur within the context 
of the ultimate reality of divine love.  Just as it is the divine love that intends 
and wills and works for the salvation of as much of humanity as possible – 
ideally, all of it – so it is the divine love that respects human freedom, even to 
the extent of allowing humanity to be utterly irrational and perverse – that is, 
to reject the love that has created, sustained, and redeemed it” (45). 
Thus, the original premises which drive inclusivism have resurfaced - the love of God and 
his respect for human freedom.  In other words, there is a controlling factor in all inclusivist 
reading of Scripture.  It is to seek optimism, even when pessimism appears apparent.  This 
“hermeneutic of hopefulness” permeates all of Scripture and must be used to negate any 
pessimism of a limited scope of salvation.  God must not appear “stingy” (Wideness, 101), as 
Calvinistic systems apparently do.  Only a soteriological system which expresses an 
inclusivist understanding of universal atonement and universal access to salvation does justice 
to the biblical data, especially that data as found in the teaching of Jesus. 
 
2.3 Inclusivism and the Holy Spirit 
Pneumatology has played a key theological role in the formulation of Christian doctrine and 
statements of faith since the Pentecostal movement exploded on the scene in the first decade 
of the twentieth century.  From a missiological point of view, one would not be too far off to 
label the twentieth century the “Pentecostal Century” in terms of missions and the expansion 
of its brand of Christianity.78  On every continent on the globe, Pentecostalism has rapidly 
advanced over the last one hundred years.  It would stand to reason, then, that any discussion 
concerning pluralism and inclusivism would involve pneumatological concerns. 
Pinnock deals with this important matter in espousing his inclusivism.  He notes with 
approval the numerous statements made by Pope John Paul II concerning the presence and 
activity of the Holy Spirit in non-Christian religions (eg. Flame, 198-199).  He is also critical 
of the traditional view, as he sees it, which places the ministry of the Spirit exclusively within 
the realm of the Church.  In fact, in his very definition of the inclusivism he espouses, 
Pinnock ties it directly to the activity and working of the Spirit:   
                                                 
78 During my ordination council in 1993, Jim Reapsome, founding editor of Pulse Magazine and the Evangelical 
Missions Quarterly, made this point.  Clark Pinnock believes that Pentecostalism is “the most important event in 
modern Christianity” (Flame, 18; see also 240). 
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“Most specifically and crucially, inclusivists believe that the Spirit is everywhere 
at work in advance of the mission to prepare the way for Jesus Christ” (Okholm & 
Phillips, Four Views, 98). 
“The Holy Spirit plays a prominent role in my understanding of inclusivism” 
(106). 
Pinnock’s Pneumatology is closely tied to his Soteriology.  “The world is the arena of 
God’s presence, and the Spirit knocks on every human heart, preparing people for the coming 
of Christ” (Four Views, 104).  Similarly in Flame of Love, “The whole creation is a field of 
the Spirit’s operation and thus sacramental of God’s presence” (63). 
Other inclusivists echo similar sentiments.  Sanders explains: 
“The unevangelized are indeed “unreached” by human messengers with the 
word of Christ, but they are not unreached by the Holy Spirit’s ministry of 
grace” (No Other Name, 237). 
This can be so because, as professor of New Testament at Trinity Evangelical Divinity 
School, Grant R. Osborne, says, the Holy Spirit is Jesus’ representative (Grace & Will, 252).  
Therefore, even though Jesus is not explicitly known, nonetheless a person can be saved by 
him via the work of the Holy Spirit.  D. Bruce Lockerbie speaks of such a person responding 
to “whatever representation of the Holy Spirit they acknowledge.”79 
Ronald Nash identifies a “pivotal inclusivist argument” when he quotes Pinnock: 
“If God really loves the whole world and desires everyone to be saved, it 
follows logically that everyone must have access to salvation.”80 
John Sanders provides a more comprehensive explanation: 
“If the redemption procured by Jesus objectively provides for the salvation of 
every human being, and if God intends this salvation to be genuinely 
universal, then it must be possible for every individual who has ever lived 
personally to receive that salvation regardless of the historical era, geographic 
region, or cultural setting in which these people have lived” (No Other Name, 
216). 
This universal access obviously does not come from each and every person having the 
opportunity to respond to an explicit knowledge of Jesus and his atoning work.  Rather, it 
                                                 
79 The Cosmic Center (Portland, OR: Multnomah Press, 1986) 176. 
80 Ronald Nash, Is Jesus the Only Savior? (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1994) 130, quoting Pinnock from A 
Wideness in God’s Mercy, 157. 
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comes because God through his Spirit has “visited every soul of man whom God has made.”81  
As John Sanders notes, “The Spirit opens the door for humans to respond to whatever 
revelation God has given them” (No Other Name, 237). 
Therefore, the Holy Spirit plays a pivotal role in the inclusivist understanding of 
salvation.  Considering the fact that roughly half of the world’s population has never heard the 
gospel, this makes the Spirit’s role all the more vital.  This would also vitiate the problem 
inclusivists see in an exclusivism particularly of the Calvinist type, wherein billions of people 
have been created with no chance of salvation as unconditional election and limited 
atonement imply.  Such a depiction of God appears grossly unfair and unjust, and simply must 
be abandoned. 
In Flame of Love, Pinnock lays out his comprehensive Pneumatology, which is driven by 
his inclusivist assumptions.  It will be helpful to outline his approach, which yields an 
openness to non-Christian religions which borders on that of pluralism. 
After noting in his introduction that far too often the Holy Spirit has been an 
“afterthought” (10) in Christian theology and liturgy, in chapter 1 Pinnock explains the 
important role of the Spirit in the Trinity.  Pinnock first addresses the obvious question of why 
he begins here.  “I do so because God’s triune identity and the Spirit as the bond of love 
within it underlie so much else that I want to say” (22).  Immediately it is seen the importance 
that love plays in Pinnock’s theology, a motivation that underpins virtually everything that he 
has to say in his defence of inclusivism and Open Theism.  “The primary fruit of the Spirit [is] 
love” (37). 
This will have particularly important ramifications when analysing Pinnock’s positive 
view of non-Christian religions.  For Pinnock, knowledge of Jesus Christ is not the only 
means by which people can come to an understanding of the love of God.  Via the ministry of 
the Holy Spirit, this can also happen even when Jesus is not known by name.  Pinnock notes 
with approval the “non-trinitarian” notion, “God is spirit and that when we encounter spirit we 
encounter God himself” (25). 
This is also important given Pinnock’s emphasis on the relationality that exists within the 
Godhead.  Classical theism suffers from too much philosophy, mainly due to Augustine, and 
not enough reliance on God’s revelation of himself in Scripture.   
“Theology always gets into trouble when its practitioners think they know 
what God is like apart from what revelation says God is like” (33).   
                                                 
81 John Sanders (No Other Name, 237) quoting Edward Pusey from an 1880 work. 
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“Trinitarian insight into the life of God derives from revelation in history, not 
from philosophy” (32). 
The importance of this observation by Pinnock is to recognise that “God is a triadic 
community, not a single, undifferentiated unity” (35).  Dealing with the classic struggle in 
attempting to balance unity and person, ousia and hypostases, Pinnock recognises the error of 
Modalism in the Trinitarianism of such key theologians as Barth, Rahner, and Kűng (33-34).  
This he says is the result of the reluctance by western theologians to recognise the social 
trinity (33).  Pinnock is much more inclined toward Eastern Orthodoxy’s explanations 
concerning the Godhead, where he perceives a “degree of dynamic in God” (31). 
Pinnock returns to the emphasis on God’s love toward the end of the chapter, and it is 
here that he begins to move toward an openness outside of the knowledge of Christ that is 
seen in inclusivism.   
“We may find the Spirit’s face also on those outside the church who give a 
cup of cold water to thirsty ones” (41).   
Recalling the previous discussions concerning Pinnock’s view of the Parable of the Sheep 
and Goats, similar sentiments are seen here.  The Spirit, who is love as God is love (note the 
title Pinnock chose for his book, Flame of Love), can be seen in loving acts done by any 
individual.  As the Spirit tugs at each human heart to respond in a loving way, a way pleasing 
to the Father, so it must be expected that acts done in love via the “faith principle” are actually 
deeds performed via the enabling power of the Holy Spirit. 
Classical theism has erred in its emphasis on an austere and judging God, and this is partly 
to blame for the existence of atheism (42).  Had Western Christianity leaned more toward the 
social trinity, this would not have necessarily been the case.  Pinnock believes that a re-
emphasis on the love of God is the key to regaining a proper depiction of his nature.  The 
following quotations illustrate this desire: 
“The social Trinity depicts God as beautiful and supremely lovable” (42). 
“Theology gains credibility when we have a doctrine of God that one can fall in 
love with” (43). 
“What we see most centrally in God is the shining radiance of love” (44). 
“When we render God in this way, not only atheists might come to love him, but 
even Christians, for we ourselves often lack a sense of God’s beauty and 
adorableness” (48). 
Evangelicals may at first hesitate at the notion that atheism is the result of bad, Christian 
theology, especially since it appears from Scripture that atheism is the result of people 
50  
suppressing the truth (Rom. 1:18-20).  However, Pinnock’s point is not so much to find the 
root of atheism, as to spur Christians on to a more loving (and in his estimation more biblical) 
appreciation of the love of God. 
This is because, just as God exists in a loving, social Trinity, so too he seeks loving 
relationships with his creatures.  He seeks a community of believers who will reflect the 
dynamic love which is the core of his very being. 
With this emphasis on love as the primary fruit of the Spirit, and the dynamic relationality 
within the Godhead, Pinnock is able to move to the next chapter and the Spirit’s role in 
creation.  This is the key to his understanding of the Holy Spirit and how people of other 
faiths can be wooed by God via their non-Christian religions. 
“The Spirit is present in all human experience and beyond it.  There is no 
special sacred realm, no sacred-secular split – practically anything in the 
created order can be sacramental of God’s presence” (62). 
This is a point which needs careful analysis, because if Pinnock is correct, then the claims 
of exclusivism, which maintain that faith in Jesus must be professed in order for a person to 
be saved, can very well be in error.  Pinnock approvingly quotes H. I. Lederle in saying that 
the Spirit is “no ornament of piety” (50, 62).82  In other words, evangelicals should not think 
of the Holy Spirit’s role as limited to the Church or to Christianity. 
John Sanders makes a similar observation:  “Though the church is the recipient of the 
Spirit and salvation . . . it does not and cannot contain the Spirit and salvation. . . . There is no 
salvation outside of Jesus Christ, but there is salvation outside the church” (No Other Name, 
237). 
The entire world, in essence, is the Spirit’s playground and as such, evangelicals should 
expect to see the Spirit moving in all areas of creation, both the secular as well as the sacred, 
“active in natural processes as well as in domains of piety” (66).  Other comments from 
Pinnock relay a similar attitude: 
“The power of love is at work everywhere in the world, not just in the churches” 
(52). 
“Let us stop demoting the Spirit, relegating him to spheres of church and piety” 
(63). 
Such insights by Pinnock under-gird his inclusivism, which holds a more open view of 
those people outside the Church and the reach of missions.  The dynamic social Trinity is at 
                                                 
82 Lederle is the author of Treasures Old and New: Interpretations of Spirit-Baptism in the Charismatic Renewal 
Movement (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1988). 
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work in all corners of the globe, drawing people to God.  Pinnock is unhappy with the darker 
view that historical evangelicalism has had when it comes to areas outside the Church.  His 
view “allows us a broad sympathy for detecting the presence of God everywhere we look and 
fighting off dark thoughts about God’s absence” (53). 
Classical theism has not only erred in its depiction of God in his very nature, but in its 
depiction of his involvement with his creation as well.  Not only is its failure seen in the 
portrayal of a God less than loving, but also in a God whose providence has predestined all 
things to their appointed end. 
“History is not the playing out of a timelessly fixed decree but a theater where the 
divine purposes are being worked out by the resourcefulness of God in dealing 
with the surprises of a significant creation” (56). 
As already noted above, the two emphases in inclusivist theology, that of the love of God 
and his desire to maintain the freewill of humans, should be recognised.  God is dynamic, not 
static as Pinnock feels classical theism teaches.  In fact, this dynamic nature can even allow 
for mistakes to be made by God, but God limits himself in this way so as to allow humans the 
freedom to choose (what Pinnock later refers to as the “risk of freedom,” 74).   
This is because God is motivated supremely by love for his creatures, and rather than 
force himself upon them (something Pinnock sees in Calvinism’s portrayal of God’s 
providence and predestination), he would prefer to lovingly draw them to himself. 
“From this world the Father longs to hear the very yes from the creature that he 
hears eternally from his beloved Son” (56, emphasis original). 
Pinnock’s Pneumatology culminates in an inclusivism that is as far-reaching as it is 
positive.   
“A foundation is laid for universality if indeed the Spirit pervades the world 
and if no region is closed to his influences” (63).   
Evangelicals need not adhere to the dismal thoughts that Augustine once thrust upon the 
Christian psyche, that there are individuals doomed to eternal punishment in accordance with 
the predestining decrees of God.  God wants, and honestly attempts, to save all people – but 
never in violation of their own freedom.  The Spirit is the guarantee of this universal desire. 
Perhaps the best comment by Pinnock in summarising these two important chapters and 
the role of the Spirit in God’s creation is found in the first chapter: 
“God created the world and acts in history to advance the purpose of fostering a 
community of personal relationships, modeled on the social Trinity, where the 
gifts of each person are celebrated and nurtured” (45). 
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The next two chapters of Flame of Love build on this foundation.  In chapter 3, Pinnock 
suggests that evangelicals have a “Spirit Christology” which views Christ’s work as part of 
the Holy Spirit’s work, not vice-versa as has historically been the case in Christian theology.  
For example, Pinnock sides with Eastern Orthodoxy’s contention that the West’s inclusion of 
filioque into the Nicene Creed not only violated ecclesiastical, ecumenical procedure, but also 
made the Spirit’s role appear secondary to that of Christ’s (196-197). 
To suggest that the role of Jesus is somehow part of the work of the Spirit, and not vice-
versa, may appear radical, especially in North American evangelicalism with its emphasis on 
the gospel proclamation of Jesus as Saviour and Lord.  However, the following two 
quotations give good insight into what Pinnock intends when he makes such a suggestion: 
“It was anointing by the Spirit that made Jesus “Christ,” not the hypostatic union, 
and it was the anointing that made him effective in history as the absolute Savior” 
(80). 
“It was by the Spirit that Jesus was conceived, anointed, empowered, 
commissioned, directed and raised up” (81-82). 
These are important considerations and in fact necessary for Pinnock’s inclusivism.  If 
Jesus and his work are made primary in an understanding of the gospel proclamation, then 
exclusivism appears to be at least partly correct in its emphasis on personal knowledge of 
Jesus.  But if emphasis is laid more on the work of the Spirit, an inclusivist understanding of 
universal accessibility to salvation becomes more possible. 
Pinnock goes through major areas of the biblical testimony in this regard, especially in the 
life of Jesus.  The virgin birth was via the power of God’s Spirit, which echoes a similar 
sentiment in the creation narrative of Genesis (86).  Jesus began his ministry being baptised 
by the Spirit (87), and Pinnock contends that this Spirit Christology even makes better sense 
of the warning against the unforgivable sin of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (89).  
However, he also is quick to repudiate the accusation that he is resorting to a kind of 
Adoptionism that was rejected by the early church (91), even while he admits that the term 
“Spirit Christology” may not be the best term to use and may be misleading (92). 
The rest of the chapter is devoted to certain theological implications of this Spirit 
Christology.  Pinnock relates his fondness of Irenaeus’ Recapitulation Theory (93-98), while 
expressing disapproval with Anselm’s Satisfaction Theory of the atonement (102-111).  He 
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prefers movement away from such an emphasis on propitiation and divine wrath, which 
appear to make the Father and the Son at odds with each other.83 
“It makes grace conditional upon penal satisfaction and gives the impression 
that the Father actually hates sinners and cannot love them until his wrath is 
appeased” (107).   
He also believes that Anselm’s theory logically leads to limited atonement, “since presumably 
God does not assault the same person twice” (106).  But why does Pinnock take time to attack 
Anselm’s theory of the atonement in a chapter devoted to Spirit Christology? 
The answer is found in the fact that Pinnock prefers to depict the God-human relationship 
as one of a journey of two partners, not as an appeasing of one by the other.  For Anselm, God 
became human so that the divine wrath could be assuaged.  No human could do that, but the 
God-man could.  For Pinnock, God became human so that a new and more dynamic 
relationship could be developed.  Anselm’s view, and any view which lays emphasis on the 
legal aspect of the atonement, “gives the impression that God values his honor more than he 
values us” (102). 
Pinnock prefers an Eastern Orthodox emphasis – one on death as the primary enemy to be 
routed by Christ – rather than the Western emphasis on sin.  He prefers atonement language 
which is more subjective than objective, more Christus Victor than Satisfaction.  Through the 
Spirit, Jesus became a human so that a relationship between God and humans caught in the 
grip of death could be forged.  Now, a new situation exists in which each human has the 
potential of participating in this new life.  Just as he sees a Trinitarian emphasis on 
relationship, so too he expects the same relational emphasis in any talk of the atonement. 
The subjective element of Pinnock’s Spirit Christology becomes very clear in the 
following comments: 
“We have only to accept what has been done and allow the Spirit to conform our 
lives to Christ” (96). 
“All humanity has the potential to be the children of God, because all were 
included in his representation.  What remains is for everyone to be reconciled to 
God personally and subjectively” (100). 
“The cross benefits all those who let themselves be linked with his death through 
baptism” (110). 
                                                 
83 This theme is taken up by the British opponents of penal substitution alluded to earlier (eg., Chalke).  They 
dispute the traditional understanding of penal substitutionary atonement on the basis that it pits the Father against 
the Son, “the Father as subject, the Son as object.”  Pinnock senses a similar problem with the understanding of 
the atonement found in Anselm’s formulation as propitiation. 
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Chapter 4 continues earlier themes, namely, that the Spirit is not simply limited to the 
Church.  The point need not be laboured again, but it should be noted that Pinnock sees the 
same potential problems in Ecclesiology as he did in Christology. 
“The danger of subordinating the Spirit to the Son in Christology also exists in 
ecclesiology.  This happens when church is seen as the body of Christ to 
which the Spirit is added as a helper.  The fact is that Christ did not first 
establish the church and add the Spirit secondarily.  The Spirit’s role is not a 
junior role.  As Jesus was conceived by the Spirit in Mary and empowered for 
mission in baptism, so the church is born and empowered by the Spirit.  The 
Spirit who filled Jesus empowers the community of disciples to be the vehicle 
of God’s saving activity” (115). 
Pinnock continues in the chapter to speak of how the church should more properly be 
envisioned with this new appreciation for the role of the Spirit, but this does not directly 
impinge upon the needs of this dissertation. 
In the next chapter, Pinnock speaks of salvation as union with God through the Spirit, not 
necessarily assent to propositional truths or even proclamation or knowledge of Christ.  As 
seen earlier, Pinnock had rightly noted in chapter 2 that if no bifurcation between the sacred 
and the secular is allowed, “a foundation is laid for universality.”  Because this chapter 
involves believers and how the Spirit interacts with them in a non-coercive manner, nothing 
further needs to be said. 
However, there is one comment of note that will inform the understanding of Pinnock’s 
view of non-Christian religions.  Borrowing heavily from the Orthodox understanding of 
salvation as theosis, participation in the energy of God and thus becoming like him, Pinnock 
makes this interesting comment: 
“It may be that when we celebrate union with God as the goal of salvation, we 
have something in common not only with the Eastern churches but also with 
non-Christian Eastern religions.  There may be more commonality than we 
thought in this area” (154). 
The arguments of the first five chapters culminate in chapter 6, which is a very intriguing 
chapter indeed.  Here Pinnock argues that the tension in Christian theology between 
particularity and universality can be eased if his view of the Spirit is adopted.  The Spirit is 
universally active in drawing people to God, but it is the particularity of the incarnation, 
crucifixion, and resurrection of Christ which makes reconciliation between God and humans 
possible.   
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“Christ, the only mediator, sustains particularity, while Spirit, the presence of 
God everywhere, safeguards universality” (192).   
For Pinnock, this means that the error of exclusivism is actually a worse error than the error of 
universalism (190-191). 
Pinnock made the same basic point earlier when investigating the interplay between 
Logos Christology and Spirit Christology. 
“My point is that Spirit Christology and Logos Christology are 
complementary, not antithetical.  One complements without replacing the 
other.  Logos Christology is ontologically focused, while a Spirit Christology 
is functionally focused, but the two work together.  Generally speaking, Logos 
addresses the Person of Jesus while Spirit addresses his work” (91). 
The interplay between particularity and universality is what Ronald Nash identifies as the 
“two axioms of inclusivism” (1994:104).  Inclusivists refuse to abandon the particularity of 
Jesus as the only Saviour, as the pluralists do.  But they equally refuse to go the way of the 
exclusivists, at least Calvinistic ones, who apparently abandon the universality of the 
atonement. 
From this vantage point, Pinnock can conclude that explicit knowledge of Jesus and his 
atoning work is actually not necessary for salvation.  Because “no nook or cranny is 
untouched by the finger of God” (Flame, 187), Pinnock can have a more positive view of 
non-Christian religions than typical evangelicalism has had through the centuries.  To bolster 
his argument, Pinnock appeals to the biblical example of “pagan saints,” various elements in 
the teaching of Jesus, and the Wesleyan understanding of prevenient grace. 
Concerning the latter, Pinnock argues the same thing when it comes to grace that he did 
when speaking of the Spirit.   
“We refuse to allow the disjunction between nature and grace or between common 
and saving grace, on the supposition that, if the triune God is present, grace must 
be present too” (Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 98; see also Flame, 199-200).   
If the basic assumptions which Pinnock makes concerning the Spirit’s role in creation are true 
(no sacred/secular split, no common/special grace split), then it would certainly give credence 
to his inclusivism and his positive view of non-Christian religions. 
Concerning a hermeneutic of judgment, questions of exclusivism need to be asked as 
well.  Is the traditional, evangelical view of non-Christian religions as “false” religions 
deserving of God’s wrath a fair analysis of the biblical data?  Is inclusivism’s use of pagan 
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saints a solid reason for concluding that non-Christian faiths are positively used by God to 
draw people to himself?  It is to these specific matters that this study now turns. 
 
2.4 Inclusivism and non-Christian Religions 
Pinnock’s Pneumatology leads him to a positive view of non-Christian religions, although 
how exactly positive he leaves somewhat in question.  It was already noted in the Introduction 
that Pinnock does not agree with Rahner’s84 overly optimistic view of non-Christian religions 
as salvific, but how semantic is Pinnock’s objection?85  Consider the following statements by 
Pinnock: 
“There has been too little openness to the salvific presence of the Spirit in other 
religions” (Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 105).86 
“There are elements of grace found in other religious traditions, and one hopes 
they may mediate God’s presence for people” (Flame, 206). 
“The conviction of inclusivism is that the Christian message is the fulfillment, not 
only of Old Testament religion, but in some way of all religious aspiration and of 
the human quest itself” (Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 115). 
“We approach other faiths as possible sources of truth” (Flame, 217). 
There is a certain confusion in Pinnock’s position.  On the one hand, he objects to Rahner 
saying that other faiths are salvific, yet Pinnock bemoans the traditional evangelical position 
which was not open to the “salvific presence of the Spirit” in other faiths.  He claims 
Christians should recognise elements of grace in non-Christian religions, but just one page 
over he says that it would be unwise to regard religions as vehicles of grace (Flame, 207).   
If consideration is given to what has already been discussed about the beliefs of 
inclusivism, apart from any specific comments made about non-Christian faiths, a general 
estimation about the attitudes of inclusivists regarding the adherents of other faiths could still 
be provided. 
Inclusivists claim that God’s will to save is universal and that he has left no one outside of 
that plan.  Each and every individual has been given enough revelation, albeit in different 
                                                 
84 Rahner: “Non-Christian religions must remain . . . legitimate ways of salvation for the majority of the world’s 
people,” quoted in Francis A. Sullivan, Salvation outside the Church? Tracing the History of the Catholic 
Response (New York: Paulist Press, 1992) 173.  Rahner is not the only Roman Catholic scholar to voice this 
opinion, but he is the most well-known.  For instance, Gavin D’Costa makes similar comments and “affirms the 
salvific presence of God in non-Christian religions,” in Theology and Religious Pluralism (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, Ltd., 1986) 80. 
85 Nash notes that Pinnock’s brand of inclusivism “tends toward the rosy-eyed optimism” of Rahner (Jesus Only 
Savior? 113). 
86 What Alan Race calls “signs of the Spirit” (Christians and Religious Pluralism, 147). 
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forms, to positively respond to God.  The Holy Spirit is present everywhere and tugs on the 
heartstrings of each person.  God does not want anyone to perish, but has allowed them the 
freedom to choose, so that salvation is not coercive.  People who respond “in faith” to this 
light, even though they do not know about Jesus, can be saved.  These people can be 
identified because they perform works which are pleasing to the Father, as Jesus taught. 
It would not be remiss to conclude, then, that inclusivism would have a very positive view 
of non-Christian religions.  In fact, it would stand to reason that an adherent of Islam, or 
Buddhism, or even Wicca, could live a morally upright life and positively respond to the 
Spirit’s prodding.  Because many of these people may not know Jesus or have heard the 
gospel, one could rightly conclude that the “light” they have received has come via their non-
Christian faith.  Therefore, people can be saved by their non-Christian religion. 
But evangelical inclusivists do not go this far.  Roman Catholic inclusivists have done so.  
They have agreed with each tenet as expressed above, and have concluded that non-Christian 
religions must indeed be salvific.87  But evangelical inclusivists have not been willing to 
make this final leap.  The question is, why not? 
                                                
This is made all the more confusing by Pinnock’s analogy of Israel and the religions of 
other peoples.  He argues that just as God was at work “apart from Jesus Christ but leading up 
to him” in the nation of Israel, “By analogy with Israel, we watch for anticipations in other 
faiths to be fulfilled in Christ” (Flame, 208).  Pinnock’s desire to see no difference between 
common and special grace, or the secular and the sacred, appears to cause him to minimise 
the vital role Israel and Old Testament religion played in the coming of the Messiah. 
The inclusivist Anglican priest and theologian Alan Race speaks of an inclusivism which 
“accepts the spiritual power and depth manifest in [other religions], so that they can properly 
be called a locus of divine presence” (1982:38).  Similar comments from other inclusivists 
echo this sentiment: 
“The work of Jesus is ontologically necessary for salvation . . . but not 
epistemologically necessary (one need not be aware of it in order to benefit from 
it)” (John Sanders, No Other Name, 215).   
“Knowledge of the Saviour is not a necessary constituent of being saved: not, that 
is, in this life, and not in the sense that historical knowledge about the events of 
Jesus of Nazareth is required” (Vernon White, Atonement and Incarnation, 112, 
emphasis  original). 
 
87 Karl Rahner is the prime example of this, as mentioned in the Introduction, n. 37. 
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Much of inclusivism hangs on whether or not non-Christian religions should be 
determined to be “false religions.”  By this designation for non-Christian faiths, many 
evangelicals have assumed that all other religions except for Christianity actually turn people 
away from God and are thus “false.”  However, God can use false religions in some sense to 
turn people to Christianity.  One of the attractions of Christianity in the early Church during 
the Roman Empire was its love and graciousness, along with the decency and ethics of those 
who professed faith in Christ.  Many were turned off by the perversion and depravity found in 
the mystery cults.  One could conclude, then, that false religion was used by God to draw 
people to Christ. 
But this does not seem to be the connotation Pinnock and other inclusivists use.  Theirs is 
not a working of the Holy Spirit through the negative aspects of non-Christian religions.  
Theirs is a positive influence.  They seem to be saying that through the noble or good qualities 
found in their religions, as evidenced by the noble lives of their adherents, the Holy Spirit is 
using that as a means of drawing people to Christ.  Pinnock falls short of calling such a 
working a “means of grace,” but it is difficult to see why he would balk at such a definition. 
Inclusivist Gerald McDermott, associate professor of religion and philosophy at Roanoke 
College in Virginia, attempts a way around this apparent dilemma.  He states: 
“I claim that there is revelation of a sort in at least some of the religions – neither 
general nor special revelation but ‘revealed types.’”88 
This appears to be an attempt by an inclusivist to grant non-Christian religions a better 
status than the typical “false” category evangelicals have thrown them into, while at the same 
time not allowing them an equal status with Christianity.  McDermott spends an entire chapter 
showing how Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin “used thinking from outside the church to help 
them understand the revelation of Christ” (2000:15).   
McDermott contends that Christians can actually learn more about Christ by reflecting on 
other religions (16).   
“Perhaps evangelicals may be able to learn from the Buddha – and other great 
religious thinkers and traditions – things that can help them more clearly 
understand God’s revelation in Christ” (12).   
This is certainly going further than many evangelicals would be willing to go.  If the 
assumption among evangelicals is, as Paul says, that in Christ “are hidden all the treasures of 
                                                 
88 Can Evangelicals Learn from World Religions? Jesus, Revelation & Religious Traditions (Downers Grove, 
IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2000) 13. 
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wisdom and knowledge” (Col. 2:3), then why would Christians need to consult non-Christian 
religions to learn more about Christ? 
McDermott uses the typical inclusivist arguments, such as pagan saints, to bolster his 
point, and he agrees with Pinnock’s analogy seen above concerning Israel when he concludes: 
“We can infer that if there were different expectations from Old Testament 
saints under a different dispensation with different degrees of revelation, we 
should not dismiss other religions as completely lacking revelation merely 
because they make different requirements of their adherents” (102). 
But his brand of inclusivism apparently is willing to go a bit further than other inclusivists 
to this date have attempted to go.  Whereas inclusivists are generally agreed that there are 
elements of truth found in non-Christian religions that can lead people to God, McDermott 
looks at the matter from the opposite direction.  If there are truths in other religions, then 
Christians can learn from these as well. 
In endorsing this book, Pinnock congratulates McDermott on his “gracious and open 
spirit” (back cover).  However, as with virtually every other evangelical inclusivist, 
McDermott is not willing to grant that non-Christian religions have a salvific content to their 
revelation, even though he believes the following: 
“My claim is that among the religions are scattered promises of God in Christ 
and that these promises are revealed types planted there by the triune God” 
(114). 
McDermott is unwilling to categorically and clearly state what happens to adherents of 
these religions who never hear the gospel.  In fact, he takes an agnostic view (213).  Albeit, 
his book is not specifically meant to address this issue.  Still, McDermott appears to be 
another example of an evangelical inclusivist who wants to grant a certain revelatory content 
to non-Christian faiths, yet is not willing to grant salvation for adherents of those same 
religions.   
Pinnock asks the important question, “What is the status of other religions, according to 
inclusivism?” (Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 116).  Unfortunately, he fails to answer the 
question directly.  Pinnock’s argument amounts to “God can do what he chooses to do,” or, 
“The Spirit breathes where he chooses to breathe,” but Pinnock otherwise provides no solid 
answer to this question.  This fuzziness concerning non-Christian religions is perhaps the 
most disappointing aspect of evangelical inclusivism, despite the fact that inclusivists have 
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had over twenty years to properly and clearly develop it.89  His argument stems more from a 
logic which runs as such:  Because religion is part of human culture, and because human 
culture is part of creation, and because creation is under the realm of God, God can use 
religion to draw people to himself. 
Pinnock quotes C. S. Lewis positively when Lewis makes this conclusion:  “There are 
people in other religions who are being led by God’s secret influence to concentrate on those 
parts of their religion which are in agreement with Christianity, and who thus belong to Christ 
without knowing it.”90  Pinnock then provides his own, similar belief:   
“All the paths that lead to God end up with Jesus, but they do not all start with him.”91   
Such a statement is difficult to argue with, because it sounds so reasonable.  And the countless 
examples of people who started in non-Christian religions, but ultimately were led to faith in 
Christ, seem to stand in support of such a statement. 
From a traditional evangelical viewpoint, there are two broad options when one is 
considering non-Christian religions.  Either they are false, or they are not.92  What would be 
helpful is to see Pinnock answer the straightforward question, “If a Muslim dies in sincere 
faith in Mohammed and his teachings, will he go to heaven?”  He comes close to answering 
this question but then leaves it for God to decide, a most unsatisfactory answer when that is 
precisely what evangelicals are attempting to determine (Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 
120). 
Pinnock seems to always cling to the notion that non-Christian religions are preparing 
people for Christ, but what if the message of Christ never comes?93  In A Wideness in God’s 
Mercy, Pinnock speaks positively of “post-mortem encounter,” the notion that people have a 
chance to profess faith in Jesus after they die (168-175).  This is perhaps understandable, 
                                                 
89 At least Catholic inclusivism is much clearer on this point. 
90 C.S. Lewis is quoted here from Mere Christianity (New York: Macmillan, 1969) 176. 
91 Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 119; see Flame, 204-205, for similar sentiments. 
92 A third option is the notion that there are some good things in all religions and if people only concentrate on 
those, their religion can be a positive influence.  This is basically what Lewis is saying in the quotation above.  
However, what elements of these non-Christian religions can Lewis be thinking about, when as a whole such 
religions would deny the Christian understanding of the person and work of Christ, how a person is saved, and 
even the nature of God and his existence?  It seems difficult if not impossible to accept the notion that people 
“belong to Christ” when they at best know nothing about him, and at worse profess things entirely contrary to 
the truth about Jesus and his Father. 
93 Pinnock cites missionary and missiologist Don Richardson and the “redemptive analogies” or “bridges” he 
speaks about in his writings and missionary experience, but again this begs the question.  What would have 
happened to those people had the gospel never in actuality come to them? (Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 109 
and 111, and Wideness, 99.  See also Flame, 204 and 208). 
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since he is not willing to really commit himself either way on what happens to a person who 
dies professing the tenets of a non-Christian faith.94 
Pinnock makes this interesting comment:  “Witchcraft and Nazism are not valid responses 
to the divine, according to the gospel” (Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 113).  What, then, 
would he say about Islam, or Hinduism, or Buddhism?  Is a religion which denies the deity of 
Jesus a “valid response to the divine?”  How about a religion which teaches polytheism, or 
which denies the personality of God?95  Are such religions “valid responses?”96 
In Wideness, Pinnock makes some fuller statements about other religions.  He notes two 
basic criteria for recognising a holy pagan:  Does he fear God, and does he pursue 
righteousness?  For the first matter, Pinnock argues as follows:   
“Some intend the same reality Christians intend when they believe in God (as personal, 
good, knowing, kind, strong, etc.).  But others do not.  When Jews and Muslims, for 
example, praise God as the Creator of the world, it is obvious that they are referring to 
the same Being.  There are not two almighty creators of heaven and earth, but only 
one.  We may assume that they are intending to worship the one Creator God that we 
also serve.  The same rule would apply to Africans who recognize a high God, a God 
who sees all, gives gifts to all, who is unchangeable and wise” (96-97). 
Pinnock goes further to add that the “fear of God” criterion does not apply to a Zen 
master “who attempts to place the void over against a theistic belief” (Wideness, 97).  He says 
this because the Zen void cannot be equated with the Christian God, but this unfortunately 
leaves more questions unanswered.  Can the God of Islam truly be equated with the God of 
Christianity, when Islam denies the Trinity?  If the only criterion is whether or not a person 
believes in a Creator, then why spend any time talking about the revelation of the Son of 
God?  To “fear God,” at least in the biblical usage of this phrase, entails far more than a 
simple belief in a Creator Being.  The example of the pagan saint Cornelius investigated later 
will help in clarifying some of these issues. 
                                                 
94 Pinnock even goes so far as to say he is really unsure what happens to people who, “when presented with the 
gospel, still choose to remain within their own faith” (Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 120). 
95 Exclusivist Bruce Demarest briefly investigates this matter in his concluding comments in General Revelation: 
Historical Views and Contemporary Issues (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1982), by showing 
how Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism contradict the gospel at key points, and cannot properly be considered as 
valid responses to God (255-259). 
96 Besides, there are many morally upright people who practice witchcraft.  The general tenet of Wicca, for 
example, that ‘whatever you do to others will come back upon you threefold’ guards many of them against 
performing anything evil on others.  The “noble pagan” designation can indeed apply to people who practice 
witchcraft.  And as heinous as Nazism was, people cannot argue against the fact that many Nazis cared for their 
families and lived otherwise upright, acceptable lives despite their Nazism.  It seems Pinnock chooses these two 
examples of false religions to bolster his point, but it fails to work. 
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Pinnock’s second criterion, that of pursuing righteousness, appears to boil down to a 
works-righteousness theology.  His positive usage of the Roman Catholic pronouncement on 
this score only serves to prove this point (eg., Flame, 198-199).  The well-known statement by 
Vatican II that even atheists can, based on their ethical behaviour, have a right relationship 
with God, even though they deny his existence, is tantamount to saying the same sort of thing 
Lewis said about Christ.  So long as a person performs good works, that person can “belong to 
Christ” even though there is no knowledge of Christ.  The same evidently can happen with an 
atheist.  Even though atheists deny the very existence of God, as long as they are good and 
upright people, they can belong to God, while denying his very existence.  This is precisely 
what Pinnock claims (Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 118-119).97 
This comment by Pinnock was noted earlier when discussing inclusivism and its usage of 
the Parable of the Sheep and Goats.  It has specific importance for consideration now 
concerning non-Christian religions. 
“Those who confess Christ and those who do not are judged alike by the extent to 
which they walk in the way of the Son of Man” (Wideness, 165). 
But how can people who have never heard of Jesus “walk in the way of the Son of Man?”  
One must assume that they learn this “way” via their non-Christian religion.  This being the 
case, it is difficult to see why evangelical inclusivists are unwilling to consider such religions 
as salvific. 
The above is a logical outflow of inclusivism’s position concerning explicit knowledge of 
Christ.  If people can be saved without knowledge of Jesus, what is left for a basis upon which 
they can be saved except that it comes via their good works? 
Pinnock crowns his statements in this section on other religions with this comment:   
“What the Bible tells us about other faiths being sometimes noble and truthful is 
confirmed in experience as well” (Wideness, 99).   
He makes it clear that he disagrees with the historical evangelical position concerning non-
Christian faiths:  
“We should reject the hyper-Protestant position on other religions that claims the 
divine action in Jesus Christ is the only divine action and the only revelation, and 
that religion is nothing but useless human activity” (Wideness, 107).   
                                                 
97 Clendenin makes a similar point:  “Vatican II (1962-65) went even further, declaring that people of other 
religions and even atheists of no religion at all who live up to their consciences can be saved” (Many Gods, 
Many Lords, 30). 
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The main argument used by inclusivists to support such a conclusion is the biblical 
category of “holy pagans” such as Noah, Job, Melchizedek, and others who neither had 
knowledge of Jesus Christ nor were part of the nation of Israel.   
“Even faith-responses can be made in the context of other religion as in the case of 
Melchizedek and Jethro (both pagan priests).  Their religions seem to have been 
vehicles of salvation for them” (Wideness, 107).   
It is to this category that attention is now given. 
 
2.5 Inclusivism and “Pagan Saints” 
It was noted in the previous section that Pinnock lays out a solid argument in Flame of Love 
for why he believes that evangelicals should look more favourably upon non-Christian 
religions than they have traditionally done.  This position rests in large part on Pinnock’s 
biblical proof concerning “pagan saints.” 
“Bewitched by the alien doctrine of double predestination . . . we have ignored the 
tradition of holy pagans” (Wideness, 30). 
If it can be shown that his argument is not sound in this area, his entire inclusivist garment 
could begin to unravel.  Conversely, if his reasoning is solid, it would go a long way to 
proving inclusivism as biblically faithful. 
Inclusivists go to great pains to show from Scripture how God has cared for those people 
traditionally defined as outside his “chosen people.”  The usual conclusion is that God uses 
the pagan religions of these pagan people to draw them to himself.  From Pinnock’s works, 
special attention will be given to Job, Melchizedek, Abimelech, and Cornelius.98  However, 
comments from other inclusivists will be included where appropriate. 
Job.  Pinnock refers to Job as “. . . a pagan believer . . . who had a good will and put his 
trust in God even though inadequately informed doctrinally and morally.”  Pinnock goes on to 
use Job as a model for “holy pagans” at any point in history, but especially for today.   
“A person who is informationally premessianic, whether living in ancient or 
modern times, is in the exact same spiritual situation” (Wideness, 160).99 
                                                 
98 In Wideness (92), Pinnock gives a more exhaustive list of the people he considers to be pagan saints or holy 
pagans.  Among these people he lists Daniel, which is most confusing, as Daniel is clearly labelled an Israelite in 
the opening verses of the biblical book which bears his name. 
99 Pinnock also inserts his pagan saints position at various points in his argumentation in Flame (eg., 82, 198, 
203). 
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Clendenin notes that Gregory the Great considered Job “a just pagan” (1995:53), and 
McDermott provides this extensive comment in a footnote about Augustine’s view concerning 
Job: 
“Augustine tended to exclude pagans from the church, but he left the door open at 
points.  In The City of God, for example, he wrote that the story of Job, who was 
not a Jew, teaches us that ‘it was divinely provided, that from this one case we 
might know that among other nations also there might be men pertaining to the 
spiritual Jerusalem who have lived according to God and have pleased Him’” 
(2000:96). 
Clendenin uses Job several times through Many Gods, Many Lords, arguing that the 
biblical data showing God’s interest in pagan saints should not be limited just to individuals, 
but even to entire pagan nations (134-135).  He also points out that the prophet Ezekiel 
(14:14,20) uses Job, Noah, and Daniel as examples of “the most distinguished saints in all of 
Hebrew history,” even though they all lived in the context of pagan cultures (123).  His final 
use of Job connects Job’s desire to help the poor and needy with the teaching we already 
found in the Parable of the Sheep and Goats.  In essence, Job meets the “eschatological 
standard by which all people will be judged” (138). 
John Sanders includes Job in his list of pagan saints, and he names such varied 
personages as Balaam, the Queen of Sheba, and Naaman in his list (No Other Name, 219-
220).  All of these are Gentiles to whom God showed favour, even though they did not exist 
within the covenant God had with Israel.  According to inclusivists, they are important 
biblical indicators that God will continue to show favour to people today who are not involved 
in the gospel covenant. 
Melchizedek.  Much is made by inclusivists about Melchizedek.  Pinnock says,  
“The story of his [Melchizedek’s] encounter with Abram shows that God was at 
work in the religious sphere of Canaanite culture” (Okholm & Phillips, Four 
Views, 109; see also Flame, 203).   
Pinnock states that two things should be learned from the encounter between Abram and 
Melchizedek:  1) there are believers in other nations, and 2) there are positive contributions to 
be appreciated from Canaanite religion and culture.   
“I think that the compiler of Genesis wants to tell us that, though Abram had a 
special calling from the Lord, he is not to think (and we are not to think) that there 
are no other believers among the nations and no positive contributions to be 
appreciated from non-Israelite religion and culture” (Wideness, 26). 
65  
Another inclusivist, missiologist Don Richardson, pins a great deal on the mysterious 
figure of Melchizedek, to the point of even labelling this phenomenon as the “Melchizedek 
factor.”  Richardson states that Melchizedek “worships the same God as Abraham (14:19) – 
and this evidently without any special revelation from God.”100  It seems that for Richardson, 
Melchizedek serves as the quintessential example of a pagan coming to faith in the one, true 
God via means which are not properly labelled as “special revelation.”101 
Similarly, Clendenin notes that “Yahweh was clearly at work in the lives of some pagan 
people” and he immediately cites the “pagan priest” Melchizedek (1995:133).  McDermott 
states that Melchizedek had true knowledge of God “apart from revelation given through the 
Abrahamic lineage” and worshipped God “under the name of a Canaanite deity” (2000:78).   
He further notes that when Abram pays the tithe to Melchizedek, he utters the words, “I 
have sworn to the LORD [Yahweh], God Most High [El Elyon],” conjoining both the 
designation for God from the Hebrew tradition as well as that from Melchizedek’s pagan 
culture.  This, McDermott contends, is powerful proof that Abram “acknowledged the 
legitimacy of Melchizedek’s priesthood and sanctuary” (2000:78). 
A similar sentiment is expressed by Sanders when he notes: 
“Melchizedek is elevated above Abraham in the Genesis narrative and becomes in 
later biblical history the model of the ideal priesthood (Ps. 110:4; Heb. 7:17)” (No 
Other Name, 219). 
He also cites another pagan priest who played a prominent role in the early history of the 
Israelite nation, noting that, “Remarkably, Scripture ascribes the establishment of Israel’s 
judiciary system to Moses’ father-in-law, the pagan priest Jethro” (219). 
Abimelech.  Pinnock writes that the example of Abimelech ”proves beyond any doubt 
that the fear of the Lord may occur in the hearts of people who live far beyond Israel’s 
Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 98” (Wideness, 94).  This again is used as an example by 
Pinnock because he assumes that Abimelech did not possess special revelation from God such 
as that possessed by Abraham.  Similarly, Clendenin notes that the great patriarch Abraham 
was rebuked by Abimelech (53), and that this pagan king received visions from the Lord 
(133). 
                                                 
100 See Eternity in Their Hearts (New York: Regal Books, 1981).  Sanders cites this quotation in Three Views, 
44. 
101 Richardson was a missionary to Papua New Guinea for several years and is best known for his books Eternity 
in Their Hearts, Peace Child (New York: Regal Books, 1974), and Lords of the Earth (Minneapolis, MN: 
Gospel Light Publications, 1979). 
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Pinnock is fearful that exclusivist thinking blinds Christians to the truth that God is at 
work outside the confines of the church (Four Views, 254).  In this way, then, exclusivists are 
very much like Abraham in his encounter with Abimelech.  Yet, Abraham later discovered 
that “the fear of God was indeed in the man’s house” (111).  In fact, Abimelech acted more 
like a believer than did the patriarch.   
“There is testimony in human experience that God is redemptively at work in 
other religious communities, which confirms what inclusivists expect” (111). 
Cornelius.  The last example comes from the New Testament, the episode involving 
Cornelius.  This incident seems to be most used by inclusivists, perhaps because it comes 
from the New Testament and involves a post-resurrection personage.  Pinnock calls this 
encounter “important evidence of the salvation of the unevangelized” and an example “par 
excellence” of a pagan saint (Wideness, 165).102 
What would have happened to someone like Cornelius had he not heard the gospel?  
Pinnock addresses this matter by stating that he would have been saved.  Cornelius “was a 
believer already and not hellbound” (166).  
“Those like Cornelius, who have responded to God in pagan contexts will 
need to turn to Christ to receive what Jesus alone can give them:  the Holy 
Spirit, a portion in the kingdom of God, and the experience of messianic 
salvation” (179).   
Similarly, people like Job and Melchizedek do not need deliverance from “eschatological 
wrath” but rather need “access to the fuller expression of God’s grace and power, which is in 
Jesus” (179). 
Echoing the sentiments of Pinnock, John Sanders makes this comment after his discussion 
of Cornelius, as well as the Athenians as recounted in Acts 17:   
“Peter and Paul came to the realization that there were Gentiles who worshiped 
the true God despite the fact that some of them had limited knowledge of the Old 
Testament while others remained completely without special revelation” (Three 
Views, 43).   
He makes an even bolder statement:  “Cornelius was already a saved believer before Peter 
arrived, but he was now a Christian believer.”103 
                                                 
102 It is this encounter with Cornelius that Pinnock has used to formulate his two basic criteria for how to 
recognise a holy pagan, as noted in the previous section, “Inclusivism and non-Christian Religions.” 
103 “Is Belief in Christ Necessary for Salvation?” The Evangelical Quarterly 60 (1988) 254. 
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Clendenin sees importance in the fact that “long before he heard the gospel, Cornelius 
was a devout and God-fearing person who prayed to God regularly and gave generously to 
people in need” (1995:81).  That God heard his prayers and responded (53, 81) is further 
proof that pagans who come faithfully to God will not be turned away.  Similarly, McDermott 
notes that the apostle Peter learned something of religious importance from the pagan 
Cornelius.  Even before Cornelius heard the gospel from Peter, he had received some 
revelation from God, while “still in his pre-Christian state” (2000:89).  “A Christian (Peter) 
was learning religious truth from someone who had not yet received the gospel” (89).  Just as 
Jesus had used pagans as examples to teach his would-be disciples about faith, so too Peter 
learned from Cornelius. 
The biblical example of pagan saints is the quintessential inclusivist argument for 
hopefulness when considering the unevangelised.  However, when coupled with their positive 
statements concerning non-Christian religions in general, it is again confusing as to why they 
fail to go completely the way of Catholic inclusivists.  If people like Job, Melchizedek, and 
Cornelius were saved in their pagan contexts, apart from any knowledge of Jesus or 
membership in the chosen nation and her covenant with Yahweh, then why not conclude that 
non-Christian religions are salvific? 
It is mainly from the model of pagan saints found in Scripture that inclusivism builds its 
Pneumatology into a positive portrayal of non-Christian faiths.  This positive portrayal is also 
supported by the inclusivist understanding of general revelation. 
 
2.6 Inclusivism and General Revelation 
Christian scholars have traditionally made a distinction between two kinds of revelation, 
general and special (see Evangelical Dictionary of Theology for this broad distinction).  
General revelation is that information which reveals something about God in a general, or 
broad manner which is equally accessible to all humans.  Special revelation is that 
information which reveals something specially known about God, not inherently accessible to 
all humans.  Because it is not innately known, it must be specially revealed.  From Christian 
doctrines, the existence of God as evidenced through his creation is a classic representation of 
general revelation, while knowing that the Bible is God’s Word, or that Jesus died for the sins 
of humanity, needs to be specially revealed in order to be known. 
A simple example to clarify may help.  Consider a person’s skin colour.  To anyone who 
looks at that person, it is generally known what his or her skin colour is.  However, what is 
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that person’s favourite food or drink?  That is not self-evident but is a fact which must be 
specially revealed in order to be known. 
The same concerns God and his will.  Some characteristics or attributes of God are known 
through what he has made, and as nature is accessible to all humans, so too is this knowledge 
about God generally known.  But with other matters, such as how to live a life pleasing to 
God, this must be specially revealed. 
Although this broad distinction has been generally recognised as valid, the problem rests 
mainly in whether or not the content of general revelation is adequate to save a person.  There 
has been heated debate for centuries on how precisely to answer this question.104 
As already noted, in some ways inclusivists have taken positions which are more akin to 
Catholic understandings than evangelical, and this is similar in the case of general revelation.  
Traditionally, evangelicals have tended toward a negative answer to the question, “Is the 
content of general revelation sufficient for salvation?”  Whereas, Catholic theology has opted 
for a more positive view, culminating in the sweeping conclusions of Vatican II.   
Bruce Demarest, professor of Systematic Theology at Denver Seminary, notes, “Roman 
Catholicism’s current position on the issues of the knowability of God and the validity of the 
non-Christian religions represents a marked if not a radical shift from traditional perspectives 
and commitments” (1982:181).  In short, through Vatican II Catholicism proclaimed that 
salvific knowledge of God through all avenues of revelation, both general and specific, is 
possible for all humanity.  This is evidenced in its positive proclamations concerning non-
Christian religions and even moral atheists.105 
Inclusivist scholars have taken up that lead, and Pinnock for example is quite happy to 
quote the Vatican II conclusions in support of some of his claims.   
“I make no apology as an evangelical in admitting an enormous debt of gratitude 
to the Council for its guidance on this topic” (Four Views, 97, n.4). 
He notes elsewhere:  “We cannot see how any revelation from the God of the gospel can be 
other than saving in its basic significance if it is truly a revelation of God” (Scripture 
Principle, 31).  Yet he blunts this assertion by noting that general revelation “remains rather 
                                                 
104 For a brief yet thorough historical review of this debate, from the Reformation to the present, see Hendrikus 
Berkhof, Christian Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1979) 75-77.  For something 
much more comprehensive in scope, see Bruce Demarest, General Revelation. 
105 The entire corpus of Vatican II documents is conveniently provided in Walter M. Abbott (ed.), The 
Documents of Vatican II (New York: Guild Press, 1966).  Demarest recognises a radical shift in Catholic 
theology to one which more resembles liberal Protestantism in the end:  “Vatican II thus moves in the direction 
of liberal Protestantism” (185) and “Liberal Protestantism scarcely could have written a script more in tune with 
the accommodating mood of the modern world” (188). 
69  
hidden, is relatively unclear, calls for further revelation that is more definitive and out in the 
open (31-32). 
John Sanders also notes how important general revelation is to the inclusivist argument.  
After a discussion concerning “believers” who do not hear about Jesus (versus “Christians” 
who do), he turns to a second theological argument “put forth in support of inclusivism,” 
namely that, “God uses general revelation to mediate his salvific grace” (No Other Name, 
233).  Contra the typical evangelical view that general revelation is only good enough to 
condemn sinners, but not good enough to save them, Sanders quotes inclusivist Dale Moody: 
“It is possible to say that this general revelation of God has only a negative 
function that leaves man without excuse. . . . But what kind of God is he who 
gives man enough knowledge to damn him but not enough to save him?  The 
perception of God in creation has both negative and positive possibilities” 
(233).106 
One somewhat radical shift that Catholicism made which inclusivists pick up is to include 
the religious sphere of humanity in the category of general revelation.  As some critical to 
Vatican II Catholicism have noted, this appears a far cry from Cyprian’s classic proclamation, 
“Outside the Church there is no salvation.”  Similarly, many evangelicals would take issue 
with inclusivism’s more positive portrayal of non-Christian religions, as already noted above. 
But is religion rightly considered an aspect of God’s general revelation?  Inclusivists 
answer a resounding yes.  Some examples from Pinnock should suffice: 
“We have neglected the salvific presence of the Spirit in humanity’s search for 
meaning generally” (Four Views, 105). 
“Why would God, who is present everywhere, absent himself so totally from the 
sphere of religion, the very realm in which people search for ultimate answers?” 
(Wideness, 79). 
“Religion is a central part of human culture and embodies the human search for 
meaning” (Four Views, 116). 
An intimate connection is made between the general work of God’s Spirit in the world, 
prevenient grace from God to move humanity toward God, and humanity’s quest for God via 
religion and culture.   
Prevenient grace is defined by Pinnock as the “universal, gracious operations of the 
Spirit” (Flame, 199).  This grace becomes a means by which God draws people to himself, 
                                                 
106 Moody is quoted from The Word of Truth (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1981) 61. 
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even those people who never hear the gospel.  In support of this understanding of prevenient 
grace, Pinnock uses both John Wesley and Karl Rahner as examples. 
John Sanders recognises this same kind of grace, although he fails to use the term 
“prevenient” to refer to it.  Still, he notes that in inclusivism there exists a grace which knocks 
on every human heart, and this grace comes via the work of the Holy Spirit (No Other Name, 
236-238). 
Pinnock also notes that prevenient grace overcomes the sinfulness of humans and gives them 
the ability to seek God, a doctrine of grace which is very Wesleyan.   
“Apart from divine grace sinners do not have the inclination to seek God, but 
under the influence of prevenient grace they may choose to do so” (Wideness, 
103). 
To say, as traditional evangelicalism has said, that non-Christian religions are “false” and 
do not bring their adherents closer to God, appears to inclusivists to wrongly neglect 
prevenient grace and the benefits of general revelation. 
“The Spirit embodies the prevenient grace of God and puts into effect that 
universal drawing action of Jesus Christ” (Four Views, 104). 
“Religions provide a window of opportunity for the Spirit to engage people, 
because   . . . God is also mysteriously present and working” (Four Views, 116). 
“Revelation is embodied in other religions” (Four Views, 118). 
The example of pagan saints is used primarily to support the claim that God’s Spirit is 
working through non-Christian religions to draw people to himself.   
“God is drawing the nations, and religions supply occasions when people can 
respond to him” (Flame, 201). 
In endnote 32 from chapter 6, Pinnock also notes his disapproval of the contention that non-
Christians cannot possess the Holy Spirit, again noting a pagan saint, Cornelius, as his main 
reason for disagreement. 
Two more statements from separate works of Pinnock will show what role prevenient 
grace plays in his theology. 
“Because of Spirit, everyone has the possibility of encountering him – even those 
who have not heard of Christ may establish a relationship with God through 
prevenient grace” (Flame, 199). 
“World religions reflect to some degree general revelation and prevenient grace” 
(Wideness, 104). 
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To the typical evangelical response that non-Christians are not saved via general 
revelation, John Sanders uses the argument that just because salvation is in Jesus Christ, this 
does not mean that it also is not elsewhere.107  Inclusivists prefer to say that Scripture is silent 
on the issue of the fate of the unevangelised, rather than to make negative conclusions based 
on Scripture’s silence, as they see exclusivists doing. 
Pinnock makes more thorough replies to this objection.  He notes that God is the God of 
both general and special revelation, and it would be absurd to think that he would provide 
only one for salvation, while the other can only damn sinners (Wideness, 104).108  To the 
objection that sinners cannot positively respond to general revelation anyway, Pinnock again 
falls back on his view of pagan saints.  Because pagan saints obviously responded positively 
to general revelation, evangelicals cannot conclude that people today cannot do likewise 
(105).  In essence, general revelation not only can save, but it does save. 
Lastly, Pinnock sees the positive benefits in the world’s religions because humankind is 
made in the image of God.  Because the image is present, humans naturally seek God.   
“It is our nature, made in the image of God, to seek him” (Wideness, 102).   
This can “explain the existence of truth and nobility that sometimes is found in other 
religions” (102).  In short, because of the image of God in humans,  
“All persons know God precognitively, and most acknowledge him cognitively as 
well” (102). 
For the above reasons, inclusivists view general revelation in a highly positive light.  Its 
purpose is to draw people to God, and the image of God in all humans drives them to seek 
him.  Because God wants all people to have a saving knowledge of himself, he does not limit 
this saving knowledge only to the content of special revelation. 
 
2.7 Inclusivism and Classical Theism 
Who is God, and what is he really like?  The answer to this question is at the heart of 
inclusivism.  The typical evangelical response to this question, what Pinnock often refers to as 
“classical theism,” is an answer not comfortable with the Soteriology of inclusivism. 
In answer to the above question, Pinnock asks a counter question:   
                                                 
107 “Is Belief in Christ Necessary for Salvation?”, 246.  See also Pinnock, “Acts 4:12 – No Other Name Under 
Heaven,” Through No Fault of Their Own?  The Fate of Those Who Have Never Heard, Crockett and Sigountos, 
eds. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1991) 107-115, where he also argues that just because profession of 
faith in Christ is effective for salvation, this does not mean it is the only means of salvation.  See also Wideness, 
101-102. 
108 Pinnock quotes Moody to bolster his point further: “What kind of a God is he who gives man enough 
knowledge to damn him but not enough to save him?” (Wideness, 104). 
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“Is he the kind of God who would be capable of sitting by while large numbers 
perish, or the kind to seek them out patiently and tirelessly” (Wideness, 18).   
Obviously, Pinnock opts for the latter.  Contra exclusivism, Pinnock pictures a God who 
“does not want only to rescue a few brands plucked from the burning” (23).  It is from the 
profound commitment to inclusivism that Pinnock and others have adopted a new theism 
commonly known as Open Theism. 
By his own admission, Pinnock sees the theological views of Open Theism as “radical.”  
Open Theism takes traditional Arminianism and “calls for a more radical modification of the 
[traditional view of God]” (Most Moved Mover, 13).  Doctrines such as God’s eternity, 
immutability, and omniscience have all been dramatically altered by open theists.  At the 
heart of these changes lay a Soteriology deeply committed to a “wider hope” than 
traditionally attributed to evangelicalism.  In other words, changes in the Theology of 
inclusivism have become necessary in order to support its Soteriology. 
As fascinating as these changes are, most of them are outside the scope of this 
dissertation.  To be sure, if God’s omniscience is “limited” in the sense that open theists claim 
it is, then that would certainly affect the coming judgment.  Further, if God can change and is 
subject to the temporal, then one would rightly question his ability to enact the final judgment 
that he promises.  One area of Theology cannot be changed, then, without having effects on 
other areas.  Therefore, some comments will be necessary, but a deep, thorough analysis of 
each point of Open Theism is not needed here. 
Clark Pinnock is open to change in evangelical theology.  In fact, he says that  
evangelicals must be open to it if they want to remain relevant theologians today (Most Moved 
Mover, ix, 1).  He is even so bold as to proclaim that it is the traditional evangelicals, the ones 
who maintain the immutability and eternity of God, which are the “liberals” in evangelicalism 
(67).  On the surface this is a rather shocking statement, but what Pinnock aims to point out is 
that traditional evangelicals have adopted a theism which is more influenced by Greek 
philosophy than the Bible (see his section in Most Moved Mover, “Overcoming a Pagan 
Inheritance,” 65-111). 
Pinnock sees much of the dark side of evangelical theology as the fault of Augustine, 
cataloguing a fair amount of his errors (Wideness, 37-40).  It is from Augustine that a 
“package of dismal beliefs” and “harsh notions” (39) was born including, “soteriological 
predestination, total depravity, everlasting conscious torment in hell, strict limitations on who 
can be saved, forbiddingly high ecclesiastical walls, the importance of living within the 
jurisdiction of the Catholic church, and pessimism for anyone living beyond its borders” 
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(39).109  He goes on to further castigate Protestant reformers like Calvin and Luther who 
propagated many of the errors of Augustine (40).110 
In order to maintain a wider hope of salvation for the unevangelised, without falling into 
the errors of pluralism and its abandonment of Christ as the focus of redemption, inclusivists 
have had to alter classical, evangelical theism.  This has occurred in three main areas or 
attributes of God: immutability, eternity, and omniscience. 
Pinnock’s main argument is that classical theism has suffered from too much 
philosophical influence and not enough biblical reliance.  When he asks, “What do we get 
when we subtract the pagan influences?” his answer is Open Theism’s model (Most Moved 
Mover, 79). 
In order to understand the full shock that has hit American evangelicalism with the rise of 
Open Theism, a few select quotations from prominent proponents of this position are 
provided here. 
“The possibility remains that God could be mistaken” (Sanders, Risks, 228). 
“God does not exercise meticulous providence in such a way that the success of 
his project is a foregone conclusion” (Risks, 35). 
“The God of the Bible is relational and changeable in his interaction with his 
creatures” (Pinnock, Grace/Will, 24). 
“Instead of perceiving the entire course of human existence in one timeless 
moment, God comes to know events as they take place.  He learns something from 
what transpires” (Richard Rice, Openness, 16). 
This is indeed a radical departure even from traditional Arminian theism, as Pinnock 
recognises (Most Moved Mover, 106-111).  But in order for open theists to maintain God’s 
relationality with his creation, they feel that they must alter the traditional views of God’s 
unchangeableness, his timelessness, and his ability to know the future.     
As noted above, it is often either stated or implied by supporters of Open Theism that God 
respects the freewill he has given to his creatures and will not violate it.  In fact, it is upon the 
basis of this general presupposition that open theists posit that God cannot know the future 
choices of free-willed beings.  Normally the argument is put forward that if God did know 
those choices in advance of them being performed, this would negate any freedom that the 
                                                 
109 Pinnock further notes that “this very harshness more than anything else propogates [sic] radical pluralism” 
(Wideness, 41). 
110 Many evangelicals share most of the items in this list from Augustine, except obviously the one concerning 
the Catholic church.  However, it is clear from inclusivists that the Calvinist variety of evangelicalism embodies 
virtually all of these “harsh” teachings, as opposed to evangelicals with more Arminian leanings. 
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creature has to act.111  Future choices already known by God preclude freedom by the creature 
to make those choices, so say the open theists, and result in a “theological fatalism.” 
Further, if God is unchanging, then he cannot properly or fully relate to beings who are 
subject to change.  And if God is timeless, he is also unable to relate to or interact with finite, 
time-bound creatures. 
Open theists compensate for these apparent deficiencies by referring to God in other 
ways.  Gregory Boyd (Satan and the Problem of Evil) covers this problem by labelling God 
“omni-resourceful” and “omni-competent.”  In other words, God is able to make sure 
promises despite his inability to exactly know the future.  For example, God’s ability to 
guarantee that Christ will have a bride is based on God’s 1) infinite ability to predict human 
behaviour, which would lead him to believe that at least some humans would positively 
respond to his loving offer of relationship, and 2) because he would not give up until some 
humans have done so (155-158).   
“God is determined . . . there would be a bride, and he will not give up until 
this goal is achieved” (158). 
Inclusivists see God’s ability to accurately guess the future in examples such as his 
promise to build Abraham’s seed into a great nation, and the predictions by Jesus concerning 
Judas’ betrayal and Peter’s denial (Sanders, Risks, 167-168).  However, despite his high 
degree of accuracy, God still can be wrong in his predictions. 
Pinnock believes that God is “voluntarily self-limited” and “takes risks,” yet via the 
“power of persuasion” can still ensure that his plan of salvation comes to pass (Openness, 
115-117).  And yet, “The biblical narrative plainly reveals that God has rivals and has to 
struggle with them” (114).  Further,  
“The fall into sin was against the will of God and proves by itself that God 
does not exercise total control over all events in this world” (115).   
William Hasker also speaks of God’s persuasive power such that he wins via love and not 
coercion (Openness, 142). 
When attention later is turned to critically look at these tenets of Open Theism, only an 
eye as to how they affect a hermeneutic of judgment will be given, despite the fact that other, 
equally fascinating discussions can take place concerning them.  The issue of God’s 
immutability, for example, will have much greater impact on the aim of this dissertation than 
will the issues of his eternity and his omniscience. 
                                                 
111 For example, see William Hasker, “A Philosophical Perspective,” in The Openness of God, 147-150. 
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2.8 Inclusivism and Scripture 
The development of any full-blown doctrine of Scripture has not normally been a major thrust 
of inclusivism or Open Theism.112  This stems mainly from the fact that inclusivists such as 
Clark Pinnock and John Sanders are professed evangelicals, and with that normally comes an 
assumption of inerrancy and infallibility when it comes to God’s Word.  Whereas adherents of 
Open Theism make it plain that they are abandoning some of the classic tenets of evangelical 
theism, they usually do not make such bold comments about Scripture.  One could correctly 
assume that for them to do so would immediately place them outside the bounds of American 
evangelicalism and open to rightly being accused of pluralist if not liberal leanings. 
This is no idle conjecture either.  As noted in the Introduction (see footnote 35), both 
Pinnock and Sanders were openly accused in 2003 in the Evangelical Theological Society of 
violating the inerrancy clause in its statement of faith.  Although exonerated of the charges, 
over 60% of the membership believed Sanders had done so, with one-third believing the same 
about Pinnock.113  In the largest evangelical theological body in North America, this is 
certainly saying something.  Many exclusivists are alarmed by the seeming liberal leanings of 
both of these prominent North American theologians. 
In Pinnock’s debate with Hick in Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World, he 
makes this humorous comment concerning Hick:  “I received the distinct feeling that . . . 
[Hick] wants to make liberals of us all” (60).  In commenting on Hick’s pilgrimage from 
evangelicalism to pluralism, Pinnock notes with sadness, “I contemplate the loss to God’s 
kingdom of a theologian who could be commending God’s plan to save the world through 
Jesus effectively but who has decided not to” (60).  Examples of Pinnock’s opposition toward 
liberalism and pluralism in Christian theology can be multiplied from virtually everything he 
has written.  So it may seem odd, on the surface at least, that some would consider the 
possibility that Pinnock’s inclusivism is leading him down a slippery slope toward liberalism. 
The oddness of this inquiry can be made all the more troubling when considering some 
clear statements Pinnock has made concerning his Bibliology.  For example, in one of his 
earliest publications, A Defense of Biblical Infallibility,114 Pinnock writes:  “The Bible in its 
entirety is God’s written Word to man, free of error in its original autographs, wholly reliable 
in history and doctrine” (1).  And nearly twenty years later, Pinnock made this observation: 
                                                 
112 Clark Pinnock is the only inclusivist who has devoted several books to the topic of Bibliology.  Therefore, 
this section will deal almost exclusively with him. 
113 It also serves notice that this section on Bibliology is actually dealing with the apparently milder Pinnock, if 
the voting of the ETS is any indicator. 
114 Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1967. 
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“Unfortunately, . . . [there is] a major and widespread shift in contemporary 
theology toward seeing the Bible as a fallible testament of human opinion and 
religious experience, not the reliable deposit and canon of normative instruction.  
Although the number of those involved in such a depreciation of the normative 
authority of the Bible is few in relation to the faithful church as a whole, they are 
often influential scholars and teachers whose opinions sway the unwary and 
subvert the faith of those who are weak.”115 
Such statements are solidly evangelical.  So why is it that Clark Pinnock was accused of 
denying the ETS statement of faith concerning biblical inerrancy?116  Perhaps the key 
question to ask is, “Is it inherent in the conclusions made by inclusivism (and Open Theism as 
well) to abandon an historically evangelical view of Scripture?”117 
Some early hints of a turning away from traditional evangelical Bibliology by Pinnock 
can be found.  Consider these comments made in the first edition of The Scripture Principle: 
“This leaves us with the question, Does the New Testament, did Jesus, teach the 
perfect errorlessness of the Scriptures?  No, not in plain terms” (57). 
“Why, then, do scholars insist that the Bible does claim total inerrancy?  I can 
only answer for myself, as one who argued in this way a few years ago.  I claimed 
that the Bible taught total inerrancy because I hoped that it did – I wanted it to” 
(58). 
The second comment hints at a change in Pinnock’s thinking sometime in the early 1980s.  
The following opinions, also from the same book, show his views to be decidedly different 
than traditional evangelicalism: 
                                                 
115 The Scripture Principle (San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1984) vii.  Pinnock also made the 
following statements in the same book and, ironically, twenty years later was called to task for evidently doing 
the same thing that he warned against two decades earlier.  “The idea that human beings must approach God on 
his terms, implied by the second commandment, not in ways they themselves define, is simply unacceptable to 
the autonomous people of today” (24).  And in speaking of the common viewpoint among humanistic liberals, 
Pinnock stated:  “The idea that the Bible has the right to limit human freedom of thought and action is a hated 
idea that must be crushed and eliminated” (25).  The irony is that the Open Theism Pinnock came to embrace 
makes the same objection, namely, that human freedom cannot be violated. 
116 Lest anyone think that biblical inerrancy is not a key tenet of North American evangelicalism, it should be 
noted that the only two theological matters potential members of the Evangelical Theological Society must 
adhere to in signing their name on the membership application and subsequent statement of faith are the doctrine 
of the Trinity and a belief in the inerrancy of Scripture. 
117 It should be noted that there were several angles taken against Pinnock and Sanders when it came to 
complaints about their view of biblical inerrancy.  Many of those complaints addressed the tenets of Open 
Theism, such as God’s inability to know the future choices of free agents and how that jibes with God making 
predictions about the future, and so on.  For now, though, attention will be solely given to outright statements 
concerning Pinnock’s view of inerrancy, not issues which involve “implied inerrancy.” 
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“What God aims to do through inspiration is to stir up faith in the gospel through 
the Word of Scripture, which remains a human text beset by normal weaknesses 
[which includes errors]” (99-100). 
“What the Scriptures do is to present a sound and reliable testimony [not an 
inerrant one] to who he is and what God has done for us” (100). 
Pinnock goes on to advocate a “dynamic theory of inspiration” as opposed to the classic, 
evangelical position of “verbal, plenary inspiration.”  In the dynamic theory, room can be 
made for myth and legend (i.e, things reported as historical fact which were not), scientific 
and historical error, and failed prophecy.  For the latter, the most famous issue of Pinnock’s 
understanding of failed prophecy involves Jesus’ prediction (Mt. 24:2) that no stones would 
be left unturned in the destroyed temple.  “Despite Jesus, in the destruction of the temple, 
some stones would be left one on the other” (Most Moved Mover,51).118 
A more recent statement of Pinnock sums up his position concerning the Bible: 
“The writings contain a long and complex search for the mind of God and in this 
struggle various points of view compete and interact. In constructing a doctrinal 
model, therefore, it is important to remember that the Bible is a complex work by 
many authors whose views may vary and that the text is open to various plausible 
interpretations” (Most Moved Mover, 21). 
The above provides enough information to query how different Pinnock’s view is from 
traditional evangelicalism.  However, attention should first be given to a statement from 
Pinnock that more concerns the specifics of this present study. 
In A Wideness in God’s Mercy, Pinnock discusses the pros and cons of religion.  Not 
wanting to be overly optimistic of non-Christian religions, Pinnock advocates more prudence 
in this regard.119  However, in a discussion concerning the downside of religions and religious 
practices, Pinnock turns his attention to the Old Testament and “Israelitism” as an example of 
“bad religion” (88).  Pinnock queries, could this bad religion have been the cause for what is, 
at times, an Old Testament portrayal of God as “cruel and peevish?” (88).  He continues: 
“Does this stem from the human side of Scripture?  Two factors make that seem 
possible. . . . It appears that the Old Testament did not always capture the divine 
nature with full accuracy” (89). 
                                                 
118 Pinnock also advocates a view of the Bible more in line with Barth (“a distance between the Word of God and 
the text of the Bible” (Principle, 99) than Warfield’s total inerrancy position (75). 
119 Pinnock does believe, though, that despite Jesus being the “definitive revelation of God” Christians can still 
learn from other religions, hoping to “sharpen our understanding of what God is intending in the Bible” (45). 
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One of Pinnock’s arguments here is that the Old Testament depiction of a “cruel and 
peevish” God does not mesh with God as revealed by Jesus, something already noted.  
However, Pinnock does not provide any criteria on which to determine the trustworthiness of 
the New Testament canon versus the Old.  In other words, why should evangelicals believe 
that the New Testament provides a faithful picture of the character and nature of God, when 
the Old Testament has deficiencies in this regard? 
Coming from an evangelical, the above comment is a surprising assertion.  Pinnock is 
saying in a very clear statement that the Old Testament could be wrong in its depiction of the 
nature of God (whereas if evangelicals ever do admit error in Scripture, it is almost always 
pertaining to some minor point or flaw, such as an error in reporting a scientific or historical 
fact, not in a major tenet of the faith like the person or character of God).  The reason why 
Pinnock can make such a bold proclamation is because the Old Testament often portrays God 
in an incredibly stark light.  Examples such as his command for Israel to entirely wipe out the 
inhabitants of Ai – men, women, children, infants, and even animals – strike many as entirely 
contrary to the God revealed by Jesus.  Pinnock’s apparent move from the traditional 
evangelical position concerning biblical inerrancy is precipitated by his dislike of God’s 
judgment.120 
This is, however, understandable.  God’s judgment will be a necessary problem for 
Pinnock and his inclusivism.  Although perhaps not as thorny of a problem for Pinnock as for 
a universalist, God’s judgment is problematic nonetheless.  A wider hope of salvation must 
necessarily minimise the judgment of God, at least in comparison with traditional 
exclusivism.  Is it truly possible for evangelical inclusivists to provide salvation for non-
Christians and even those opposed to Christianity while at the same time falling short of 
pluralism’s approach to other faiths, and liberalism’s approach to Scripture? 
The way that Pinnock apparently can get around evangelical complaints of liberalism 
creeping into his theology is to use the same words that have been traditionally used by 
evangelicals, only filling them with new meaning.  For example, Pinnock continues to use the 
word “inerrancy,” yet not with the same meaning traditionally used by American 
evangelicals.  In the second edition of The Scripture Principle, virtually all of the original 
material written in the first edition over twenty years earlier remained intact.  Yet, there had 
                                                 
120 Interestingly, in the second edition of The Scripture Principle, Pinnock deals with exactly this issue, yet 
provides three arguments for why evangelicals should not “put this down to human sinfulness and deny the 
teaching of the Bible at this point” (139).  He keeps this comment exactly as it was in the first edition, even 
though it appears to contradict his comments quoted above in Wideness, a book which came in between these 
two editions. 
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been over two decades of attacks on Pinnock’s view of Scripture coming from more 
traditional or conservative evangelical scholars, and still, Pinnock stubbornly held to key 
terms like infallibility and inerrancy.  Why? 
In one sense, because Pinnock is still very much an evangelical at heart.  In the second 
edition of The Scripture Principle, he continues the frontal assault of liberalism that has 
always been a mainstay of his theology.  In his “defense of the full authority and 
trustworthiness of the Bible,” Pinnock consistently takes aim at a view of the Bible which is 
nothing more than “a fallible testament of human opinion and religious experience.”121  This 
“decline in respect for the Bible” (8) coincides with a general “age of theological decline” (8) 
against which Pinnock hopes to provide a renewed “evangelical confidence in the Bible” (9). 
Yet, along with his attack of liberalism’s far too human view of Scripture comes 
Pinnock’s attack of conservativism’s far too divine view.  So, even though evangelicals face a 
“rebelliousness in the modern period” (16-17) among liberal scholars of whom “the Bible 
lacks credibility in the eyes of those taught to prize human autonomy and self-sufficiency” (a 
trend among liberals that Pinnock says can be traced back to Schleiermacher) (16), Pinnock 
also aims at conservative evangelicals who cause even greater problems by “exaggerating the 
absolute perfection of the biblical text” (17).  He bemoans “the tendency among conservatives 
to exaggerate the absolute perfection of the biblical text” and their unwillingness “to admit 
any less-than-ideal elements in the orthodox view of the Bible” (14).  This Pinnock calls “the 
conservative burden” (17), and it must be eliminated. 
Thus the “Scripture principle” attempts to straddle these two poles, what Pinnock 
characterises as a “potentially awkward and certainly controversial middle position” (261).  
On the one hand, it hopes to guard against a “neo-Christianity” which is slipping into “open-
ended pluralism” (18).  This is done when the full authority of the Scriptures is recognised, a 
principle that has existed from the very early stages of the Church (“Theology in the 
premodern period was always done on the assumption that the Bible was the written Word of 
God” (12)).  The authority of the Bible is both a soteriological as well as epistemological 
belief that is indispensable (13).  Pinnock admits that he has “harsh criticism” for liberalism’s 
view of the Bible as nothing more than a “retreat from the notion that God’s revelation 
involves necessary and trustworthy content” (51).122 
                                                 
121 The Scripture Principle, 8.  All quotations in this section come from the second edition of this work. 
122 “For the humanistic liberals, it is subjective revelation or no revelation at all.  The objective content is not 
simply overlooked and omitted, but despised and rejected” (Scripture Principle, 50). 
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On the other hand, lest traditional evangelicals believe that Pinnock is for their side in the 
epic struggle against liberalism, he takes his battle to a second front.  “The old view of the 
Bible that we treasure is not biblical and serviceable in every detail today” (15).  This old 
view encompasses the notion that the Bible has perfect errorlessness, a “technical and strict” 
inerrancy (101).  Even though Christians should expect “a high degree of ordinary reliability 
from the Bible” (103), they should not expect absolute perfection as traditional evangelicalism 
has maintained in its usage of the term “inerrancy.”123  Pinnock expresses this thought in 
many different ways: 
“The Bible did not fall from heaven. . . . Inspiration did not make the writers 
superhuman.  It did not cancel out their historicity and weaknesses” (127). 
“A higher degree of perfection would no doubt require a Calvinistic cosmology 
and a material dictation, but this is not something the Bible aspires to” (131). 
“We in the West are schooled to look for exact information and factual accuracy, 
so when we read the Bible, we expect the same thing” (145). 
“Let us not try to be more evangelical than the New Testament” (154). 
“The Bible seldom addresses its authority and says nothing about its inerrancy” 
(266). 
Thus Pinnock lays the axe to the roots of two trees.  Liberalism views the Bible as too 
human of a product and thus entirely subjectively (he is contra this neo-Christianity).  Yet, 
traditional evangelicalism has made the opposite error, attributing too much divine control 
over the production of the Scripture, and not allowing for the human dimension, an emphasis 
on its objective nature over the subjective (he is for a neo-evangelicalism which 
counterbalances this error).  This is the precarious “middle ground” (263) Pinnock tries to 
maintain. 
This error of evangelicalism has resulted in two main problems.  To begin with, it 
damages Pneumatology and does not allow the freedom necessary for the Spirit to move and 
work in the modern era.  “My core conviction had become one of certainty of truth arising 
more from the work of the Spirit through the biblical text than from a tight rationalism rooted 
in the supposed human theory of biblical errorlessness of the text per se” (267).  Pinnock 
prefers a living word as opposed to the dead text of rationalistic evangelicalism.  “Through 
the Spirit, the text comes alive and becomes contemporary to us” (182). 
                                                 
123 Even here Pinnock finds the soiled fingerprints of Augustine: “This is the danger reflected in Augustine’s 
expression ‘What the Bible says God says’” (Scripture Principle, 114, 264). 
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The second problem is that it also creates atheists.  This “quest for an errorless Bible” 
(125) has “disordered priorities” (125) which result in “the kind of theology that makes 
atheists” (129).  “It is not logical to say that God is in total control of the Bible’s composition 
and also that there was genuine human authorship” (129-130).  Here again Pinnock’s 
assertion of genuine human freedom is instrumental in his “neo-evangelical” (258) theology. 
The human dimension is clear enough according to Pinnock.  Traditional evangelicals 
have bent over backward to make errors disappear and seeming contradictions appear like no 
contradictions at all.  This he contends is a mistake.  Evangelicals can affirm both the hand of 
God in the production of the Bible, and human weakness and error.  The latter does not negate 
the former according to Pinnock, no matter how much evangelicals have suggested otherwise.  
They should not insist on “ a degree of technical accuracy that is foreign to Scripture” (272) 
when it is clear that there are “scores of minor flaws” (272) in the text.  Pinnock goes through 
a fair amount of examples in this regard, especially looking at the discrepancies between the 
four Gospels (“these texts were not written to satisfy modern historians or to conform to our 
current standards of historiography,” 147), as well as the categories of legend and myth often 
misunderstood by evangelical scholars (142-152). 
Yet Pinnock continues to confound his critics by “intentionally” (257) using the term 
“inerrancy” to describe his view.  This irritates the conservatives who have used it almost 
exclusively up to this point with their own connotation.  It also vexes the liberals who would 
like to see the term discarded entirely.  But what does Pinnock mean when he uses the word?  
Each year he signs with a clear conscience the Evangelical Theological Society’s statement of 
faith on inerrancy, yet this “revised inerrancy position” (265) causes other evangelicals to 
object.124 
For Pinnock, “inerrancy” is not strict errorlessness.  If the “Scripture principle” is that 
“the Bible is the primary and fully trustworthy canon of Christian revelation” (11), inerrancy 
simply means that the Bible “never leads one astray in regard to what it intentionally teaches” 
(11).  It is an inerrancy that is “ less rationalistic . . . less strict and more nuanced” (261).  This 
“modified” (260) view of inerrancy has more to do with meaning than with words (“the 
                                                 
124 Pinnock notes the comments he received from a fellow evangelical, Henry Holloman, in the Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society, who first applauded Pinnock for his criticism of liberalism, and then chastised 
him for a “very lenient view of inerrancy” (Scripture Principle, 256).  However, Pinnock found an ally in 
Donald Bloesch when the latter wrote that “the perfect accuracy of the letter or text of Scripture is not an integral 
part of Christian faith” (264, n. 35).  He is also comfortable with Millard Erickson’s definition of inerrancy 
(104).  Still, the general feeling among evangelicals is probably best verbalised by one of the “founding fathers” 
of the modern American evangelical movement, Carl F. H. Henry, when he said in his review of the first edition 
of The Scripture Principle, Pinnock “retains inerrancy as a concept, but seems to thin it out almost to the 
breaking point” (261). 
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meanings, not the words, of biblical passages are authoritative” (267, emphasis original)), 
more with purpose and intention than with the absolute accuracy of everything written 
therein.  “The Bible may contain errors of incidental kinds, but it teaches none” (264).  This 
Pinnock labels an “inerrancy of purpose” (263). 
Thus, the problem becomes determining what exactly the Bible intends to teach.  “Both 
early and late in my personal journey, I have believed the Bible to be inerrant in all that it 
intentionally affirms.  What changed in my view is the identification of exactly what the Bible 
affirms” (264).  Thus Pinnock could continue to use the word “inerrancy” so long as it was 
understood with its new meaning, not “a kind of rational certainty based upon equating the 
words of the Bible and the words of God” (170), but rather a certainty of purpose and 
intention.  Inerrancy is a “metaphor for the determination to trust God’s Word completely” 
(261), “in the effectiveness of the Bible to mediate to us salvation in Christ” (171). 
If the Bible so clearly does not teach its own inerrancy in the strict evangelical sense, then 
why have evangelicals traditionally taught this belief, even to the point of making it a 
fundamental tenet of the faith?  Pinnock explains: 
“A desire for religious certainty, the need for solid defenses, the logic of 
inspiration, the experience of God’s reliability in the Bible – all of these move 
many to tighten up the doctrine of Scripture beyond what is seen in the text and 
claimed by the text” (85).125 
Part of Pinnock’s argument stems from the fact that strict inerrancy is not taught in the 
text, yet evangelicals are traditionally driven by the text when it comes to developing their 
theology.  So, for example, he takes great pains to point out how the New Testament authors 
used the Old Testament, and how this does not imply a strict view of inerrancy held by 
traditional evangelicalism (eg., 8, 63, 154, 201).  Also, Paul’s view of his own writings should 
cause evangelicals to rethink their understanding of biblical inerrancy (“The epistles of Paul 
do not resemble Scriptures sent directly from heaven but are more human than that” (76)).  
When evangelicals attempt to apply strict inerrancy to the Bible, contrary to the biblical 
teaching itself, it makes them appear to be Pharisees in their approach to God’s Word (63), 
                                                 
125 Ray Roennfeldt sees a connection between the traditional Calvinism which Pinnock abhors and this strict 
inerrancy he also has come to reject:  “It is his [Pinnock’s] contention that a strict belief in biblical inerrancy is 
incompatible with anything less than belief in Calvinistic determinism,” in Clark H. Pinnock on Biblical 
Authority (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1993) 364.  As Pinnock notes, much of this problem 
with absolute inerrancy “stems from the Calvinistic orthodoxy underlying so much of the current evangelical 
movement” (128). 
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placing a human-developed standard above the Bible.126  Thus Pinnock can say that the 
traditional evangelical view of strict inerrancy is a “theory . . . not well supported 
exegetically” (85), “lacks exegetical foundations” (85), and makes evangelicals “sitting 
ducks” (86) for liberal attacks.  “All of us live with uncertainty, so why even give the 
impression that some proven defect could bring the whole house of authority down?” (86). 
What is not clear is when exactly according to Pinnock this perfect idea of inerrancy 
developed in the Church’s history.  On the one hand, he seems to affirm that from the very 
earliest of times the Church has made the mistake of placing too much of an emphasis on the 
divine dimension of Scripture (15, 96).  Yet, modernity is often the bogeyman for Pinnock in 
this debate, “the assumption of scientific precision and accuracy” (260).  “The Bible, not 
modernity, is normative” (261). 
Lastly, faith is not damaged by affirming that the Bible is God’s Word, yet also 
recognising that it contains errors.  “If we come to know God in the Bible, they [the errors] 
will appear to be relatively unimportant” (154).  And in a poetic concluding comment on the 
last page of this important book (obviously made before the advent of compact disks!), 
Pinnock notes:  “Is it not true that in the Bible we hear the Master’s voice in spite of scratches 
of the needle on the record?” (272). 
In closing, although Bibliology has been left as the last systematic area for investigation, 
it is by no means the least important.  In Barry Callen’s theological biography of Pinnock, he 
notes that the first major step in Pinnock’s reworked theology came in his doctrine of 
Scripture.  Callen titles the third chapter “Revising Inerrancy” for this very reason.  Three of 
the first writings from Pinnock in his theological career specifically concerned the doctrine of 
Scripture (A Defense of Biblical Infallibility, Biblical Revelation, and The Scripture 
Principle).  For the latter, Pinnock felt it necessary over twenty years later to release a second 
edition.  This hints that, although Bibliology has not been a major theological area of 
treatment by inclusivists and open theists (as compared with the coverage they give to areas 
like Soteriology, Pneumatology, and Theology-proper), it is nonetheless an important area to 
consider. 
2.9 Inclusivism and the Fate of the Unevangelised 
The specific Soteriological conclusions of inclusivism can now be addressed.  Of course, 
much of what has already been said can rightly be considered Soteriology, but this section 
deals very specifically with the fate of those outside the reach of the gospel. 
                                                 
126 “Naïve rhetoric about biblical infallibility could easily lead to a tragic Judaizing of the Christian faith” 
(Scripture Principle, 89). 
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 The Christian idea of an eternal place of torment, normally called hell, has been labelled 
“the most disturbing concept in Christian tradition.”127  That is putting it mildly.  Note a 
comment by Oxford philosopher Richard Robinson: 
“If it really were probable that we should burn eternally, or not burn eternally, 
according as we disobeyed or obeyed a certain set of moral laws, that would, 
indeed, be an excellent reason for obeying them.  But . . . it would be a poor 
reason for respecting them. . . . On the contrary, they and the god who imposed 
them on us in this unbelievably brutal way, could only be regarded as beneath 
contempt.”128 
Pluralist John Hick is just as blunt in his assessment:  the doctrine of eternal hell “renders any 
coherent Christian Theodicy impossible by giving the evils of sin and suffering an eternal 
lodgment within God’s creation.”129 
The expectation is that inclusivists would respond similarly.  Along with the comment 
already noted by Pinnock in the discussion of the nature of the “God of Jesus” comes this one 
in a book which explores four differing views of the concept of hell.   
“How can one reconcile this doctrine [eternal, conscious hell] with the revelation 
of God in Jesus Christ?  Is he not a God of boundless mercy?  How then can we 
project a deity of such cruelty and vindictiveness?  Torturing people without end 
is not the sort of thing the “Abba” Father of Jesus would do” (Crockett, Four 
Views, 140). 
In his critique of the literal view of hell, Pinnock speaks of the traditional doctrine as “sadism 
raised to new levels of finesse” (38), while picking up a common theme in inclusivist 
teaching:  “the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is not the kind of deity who tortures 
people (even the worse of sinners) in this way” (38).  Such a view of hell and the God who 
sends people there makes God “morally worse than Hitler” (38) according to Pinnock.130  It is 
“an action easier to associate with Satan than with God” (Four Views on Hell, 140), one “out 
of keeping with the love of God revealed in the gospel” (153). 
It would be difficult to determine the precise view of every inclusivist on this topic, but it 
is reasonable to assume that inclusivists would have a difficult time maintaining an eternal 
                                                 
127 William Crockett (ed.) Four Views on Hell (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996) 7. 
128 Quoted in Travis, Christ and the Judgment, 1. 
129 Death and Eternal Life (London: MacMillan, 1990) 201. 
130 Objections to an eternal hell are nothing new.  John Sanders notes that the father of modern liberalism, 
Schleiermacher, also objected to the notion.  He argued that if eternal hell existed, then eternal bliss could not, 
“since the awareness of those suffering in hell would ruin the blessedness of those in heaven” (No Other Name, 
97).  Pinnock notes that as far back as the Didache, the view of annihilationism was proposed (Four Views on 
Hell, 138; although Crockett rebuts that this belief has no merit, 172). 
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view of hell within their theological assumptions.131  For example, John Sanders used to 
believe in hell as eternal (No Other Name, 96-97) but later altered his view, as did Pinnock.132 
This change appears necessary.133  As inclusivists have given greater and greater emphasis in 
their elevation of the love of God and the freewill of humanity, hell as an eternal place of 
conscious torment no longer fits the system.  One would like to believe that their theological 
shift was the result of careful exegesis, but it appears more a theological necessity than a 
biblical product. 
 Consider the matter of human freedom.  Pinnock makes it clear that universalism is out as 
an option simply because it would violate human choice.  If God saved everyone, then surely 
he must coerce at least some people who did not want to be saved.  Thus, the controlling 
factor is human freedom.134  Coupled with an inclusivist understanding of “God is love,” 
(what Pinnock terms “love in relation to freedom,” Four Views on Hell, 130), this makes the 
traditional view of hell all the more troublesome, one which “does not cohere well with the 
character of God disclosed in the gospel” (149) .  Pinnock refers to this view as one of the 
“dark notions” that have been held in the Church’s history, along with double predestination 
and the fewness doctrine (135).  It “offends my conviction about God’s love” (164). 
 Pinnock proposes a “more scriptural, theologically coherent, and practical” option, for 
fear that those who are appalled by the traditional view of hell may be tempted to adopt 
universalism (137).  Annihilationism portrays a God who is “morally justified in destroying 
the wicked because he respects their human choices” (151).  “To affirm hell means accepting 
human significance” (151), a sentiment seen earlier voiced by another inclusivist, Gregory 
Boyd.  Because God respects human freedom, he will not “force his friendship upon anyone” 
(151). 
                                                 
131 Three alternatives to the traditional view present themselves regularly in evangelical writings today: post-
mortem evangelism, wherein people who die not hearing the gospel have a chance after death to hear and make a 
decision, middle knowledge, whereby God determines who to save based on what they would have decided had 
they heard the gospel (a view not popular among open theists who believe God cannot know such things), and 
annihilationism, which is apparently the most popular view among inclusivists, although still quite the minority 
view among evangelicals in general (Pinnock, Four Views on Hell, 161).  This dissertation will only investigate 
this third option in detail. 
132 Roger Olson, The Mosaic of Christian Belief, 329. 
133 In fact, nearly forty years ago Joseph Dabney Bettis recognised that evangelicals were beginning to lean 
toward annihilationism in “A Critique of the Doctrine of Universal Salvation,” Religious Studies 6 (Dec. 1970) 
329-344. 
134 Pinnock further notes that those who hold to predestination are not consistent unless they adopt full-blown 
universalism (Four Views on Hell, 128, 141-142).  One has to admire Pinnock’s tenacity when it comes to his 
relentless attacks on Calvinist theology, as well as on Augustine.  He also finds Augustine’s teaching on hell as 
“overwhelming” and the primary reason why the traditional view held traction for so long (139).  Lastly, he sees 
a Hellenistic influence on Christian doctrine, one which teaches the immortality of the soul (147-149). 
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An obvious practical consideration is the issue of missions, something quite prominent in 
evangelical theology.  In fact, much of the modern missions movement has been fuelled by 
the notion that those who do not hear the gospel are eternally condemned to a literal hell.  
Thus, once the traditional view of hell is called to task, it stands to reason that missions as one 
of the practical matters will soon follow in the debate.  To put it succinctly, if inclusivists no 
longer adopt the traditional view of hell, and if they are more open to non-Christian faiths 
than evangelicals have historically been, where does that put missions in their thinking?  
Should evangelicalism adopt the proposals of inclusivism, is it not a logical consequence of 
these changes that missions will no longer be emphasised as strongly as it once was?  It is 
what Ronald Nash has termed “the pesky problem of missions” (Nash, 1994: 165).135 
These are fair questions to ask, and inclusivists are certainly not ignorant of them.  
Pinnock, for example, does note that died-in-the-wool exclusivists such as John Stott and 
Michael Green have adopted annihilationism yet still maintain a strong stance on world 
missions (Four Views on Hell, 150-151).  He also believes that the traditional view of hell 
actually works counter to the gospel message, turning people away from faith (39).  But this 
still does not address the wider dilemma, that of the positive view inclusivists take of non-
Christian religions. 
John Sanders addresses this issue directly and provides three inclusivist rebuttals to the 
claim that exclusivism better motivates people for missions (No Other Name, 266-267; also 
284-285).  First, there have been people in the past who have not been exclusivists, yet who 
have pushed for greater expansion in missions.  Sanders names Erasmus (whom he 
anachronistically labels an inclusivist) in this regard.  Second, unevangelised unbelievers may 
indeed have salvation, but are not experiencing the “fullness of salvation in Christ.”  This is a 
theme also seen in Pinnock’s “full-strength salvation” notion (Wideness, 105).  Third, a view 
of missions which primarily imparts new information to the unreached is not a proper view of 
missions.  “The principle problem is will, not ignorance” (267).  Therefore, the primary goal 
of missions is to give people an opportunity to respond.  In this sense, then, the missions 
endeavour is not at all minimised by inclusivism when its purpose is properly understood.  
Professor of philosophy at Roberts Wesleyan College, David Basinger, can even say that the 
inclusivist understanding of missions has “the most significant impact on whether others will 
                                                 
135 D.A. Carson sees the doctrine of annihilationism as detrimental to the cause of world missions in The 
Gagging of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996) 536, as does Robert Peterson in “Fallacies in the 
Annihilationism Debate: A Response to Glenn Peoples,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society (June, 
2007) 355. 
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develop their relationship with God” (Openness, 175), although he does not precisely explain 
how this is so. 
Pinnock takes up this theme with vigour.  He believes that a missionary zeal should be 
“natural and spontaneous” within every Christian (Flame, 142).  Missions is not just taking 
the goods news to the ends of the earth and leaving it at that.  Rather, missions is part and 
parcel of an act of discipleship (142), with the ultimate goal of world transformation (147).  
This guards from a “one-sided” view of missions (240).  Because inclusivists believe that God 
has already gone before them, this can actually improve their motivation and enhance their 
hope in missions (Four Views on Salvation, 120).  Even though through general revelation or 
another religious tradition a person knows God and has a relationship with him, missions can 
bring that person into the “fullness of salvation,” “higher up and deeper in, to know God 
better and love God more” (120). 
Pinnock does ask a hard question.  What happens if a person, upon hearing the message 
of Christ, still prefers his or her non-Christian faith?  Pinnock, however, does not directly 
answer his own question.  Instead, he prefers to leave it “with the grace of God,” who knows 
best how to handle such a situation (120).  This is not the most satisfying answer, because it 
would serve as a good test question for the validity of the inclusivist model. 
There is a growing trend within inter-faith discussions to reformulate missions as 
verbalised better in the language of “dialogue.”  This has become a key word in the discussion 
of the purpose of Christian missions since the World Council of Churches New Delhi 
conference of 1961.  Dialogue has now become the primary goal of missions, with 
evangelism taking a secondary role.136  Previously, Christian missions was too arrogant and 
imperialistic.  This attitude is verbalised clearly by David Paton: “Christian missions are a 
part of the total imperialist aggression of the West.”137  Rather than a monologue, where the 
missionary goes to a people and speaks in a one-way manner, much like a sermon, missions 
should resemble a dialogue, a two-way give-and-take between equals.138 
                                                 
136 South African professor Piet Meiring prefers the term “trilogue,” recognising the Holy Spirit’s role in such 
matters, who “performs a wonderful convincing work in both the hearts of the other two” (A World of Religions: 
A South African Perspective (Pretoria: Kagiso Publishers, 1996) 56.  
137 Christian Missions and the Judgment of God (London: SCM Press LTD, 1953) 35. 
138 A recent example of such a movement is found in the Reformed Ecumenical Council.  In their regular 
publication New Exchange (Vol. 42, No. 8-9, August-September, 2005), an article (“Assembly Adopts Statement 
on Religious Pluralism”) about multi-religious dialogue summarises the work of ten years.  The REC Assembly, 
involving 34 member churches and 112 delegates now recognises three levels or stages of interaction between 
Christianity and other religions, with the highest being “complete harmony and cooperation.”  An inter-religious 
dialogue committee was soon to be established according to the report. 
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Pinnock sees great promise in dialoguing with adherents of other faiths.  Based on his 
understanding of general revelation, which was already considered in detail, Pinnock believes 
there is truth to be found in non-Christian religions and that Christians can learn from them 
(Wideness, 132).  McDermott gives an emphatic yes to the question posed in his book, Can 
Evangelicals Learn from World Religions?, and Daniel Clendenin sees positives in dialoguing 
with those of other faiths, even where disagreement exists (1995:113-115). 
Yet, inclusivists do not go as far as pluralists on the matter.  Whereas pluralists believe 
that all the truth claims of all the religions are valid, inclusivists hesitate at such a notion.  
Pinnock notes that “relativism threatens and does not enhance dialogue” (Wideness, 134); 
therefore evangelicals must not water-down the Christian message simply to gain mutual 
appreciation.  In fact, “truth-seeking encounters” must have three basic elements (138-143): a 
willingness to appreciate other religions and to learn from them, taking globalisation 
seriously, and asking critical questions of each other. 
It is this third element that most resembles traditional missions and evangelism.  Pinnock 
contends that true love warns of impending danger.  It does not simply coddle differences, but 
where those differences are of a crucial or life-threatening nature, it may be necessary to press 
issues further than is comfortable.  “Love has the courage to confront. . . . Truth matters.  
Ideas have consequences” (142). 
What is the bottom line?  What happens to people who die never hearing the gospel?  Hell 
as a place of eternal, conscious torment has fallen out of favour with many inclusivists, and 
non-Christian religions are now more highly esteemed.  This yields a “wider hope” that is 
meant to create greater appreciation for the love of God and his willingness to allow humans 
freedom of choice.  When Pinnock agrees with the Vatican II notion that even an atheist can 
be saved when he “responds positively [to God] implicitly by acts of love shown to the 
neighbor” (Wideness, 98), a clue is provided as to what he would say about religious people in 
general.  Inclusivists do not call it a wider hope for nothing.  Theirs is a hope that salvation 
will bring in vastly more people than traditional evangelicalism has credited.   
This brings back a common theme among inclusivists:  “Knowledge of the Saviour is not 
a necessary constituent of being saved: not, that is, in this life, and not in the sense that 
historical knowledge about the events of Jesus of Nazareth is required” (White, 1991:112; 
emphasis original).  “Each person’s destiny will ultimately be determined by God on the basis 
of the ‘light’ available to him or her (or by other criteria)” (Basinger, Openness, 175).  Even 
one who rejects the very concept of God can be saved in this scheme.  Given such an 
89  
understanding, it is no wonder why many exclusivists see inclusivism rapidly sliding toward 
pluralism and hence liberalism. 
 
2.10 Summary of Inclusivism and Its Views 
The heart of inclusivism can be found in its commitment to God as supremely love.  It is here 
that the fundamental assumptions are made concerning God and his dealings with all people, 
especially as they relate to human freedom and autonomy.  Because God exists in a dynamic, 
social Trinity, with the Holy Spirit as the “bond of love,” a recognition of God’s presence in 
his creation should not only be sought, but should be expected, in all corners of the globe.  
The typical evangelical approach to non-Christian religions, which is to consider them false 
means to approaching God and attaining salvation, must be rethought.  God through his Spirit 
is at work in all areas of his creation, and this especially in the religious arena.  He is not 
solely limited to the sphere of Christianity and the Church, as the biblical example of pagan 
saints teaches. 
From this can be seen why inclusivists have a wider hope of salvation.  Contra traditional 
evangelicalism, inclusivism envisions a world where God’s Spirit is salvifically active in all 
spheres.  The dismal understanding of a Calvinism expressed in American TULIP language - 
that God has predetermined the salvation of a relatively few number of people, while passing 
over the rest - is replaced by an Arminian hermeneutic of optimism whereby God’s saving 
presence is active in the natural world as well as in human culture.  The classical theism of 
evangelicalism is replaced by a radical formulation which works to preserve humanity’s free 
response to God’s universal love, while not falling into the error of a full-blown universalism. 
The result is an evangelical theological system which at times appears less than 
evangelical, yet can be said to possess the true heart of evangelicalism, namely, the salvation 
of humanity from the grip of darkness.  Whether or not inclusivism can honestly accomplish 
this noble goal is left to be evaluated in the next section. 
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Chapter 3 
 
An Evangelical Evaluation of Inclusivism via an Application of a 
Hermeneutic of Judgment 
 
A presentation of the main tenets of evangelical inclusivism followed a logical progression 
through the beliefs of that system.  The goal was to see what lay at the heart of inclusivism’s 
theology and why it can make conclusions which appear contrary to traditional 
evangelicalism. 
The starting point was God’s nature as the epitome of love, a love which respects the 
dignity and freewill of his creatures.  This image of God as supremely loving is built upon the 
inclusivist understanding of the teaching of Jesus, which became the next step.  Then 
followed the third person of the Godhead, the Holy Spirit, who as the bond of love is seen 
moving throughout God’s creation and especially within the religious sphere of humanity.  
This has resulted in a greater openness to non-Christian religions by inclusivists, including a 
new understanding of the purpose of missions and a reformulation of the reality of hell.  Only 
near the end of the summary was the inclusivist view of Scripture detailed. 
However, with the evaluation of inclusivism, the doctrine of Scripture must come first.  
This is done because there exists a suspicion that everything inclusivists conclude is based on 
a faulty reading of the Bible.  Benefit of the doubt should be given to the inclusivists when 
they say that God’s Word is of supreme importance to them.  Yet, some of their statements 
concerning Scripture sound dangerously close to liberalism, not evangelicalism. 
Therefore, the systematic analysis of key tenets of inclusivism begins by discussing 
certain bibliological matters which impinge upon an evangelical evaluation of God’s 
judgment.  Because the answers the inclusivist often gives when addressing the fate of the 
non-Christian are radically different from those of traditional evangelicalism, investigation is 
necessary to determine if this is due to any difference in approach to or view of Scripture by 
the inclusivist. 
Next will come a study of the importance Pneumatology plays in inclusivism, testing the 
relationship between an inclusivist’s Bibliology and Pneumatology, and analysing the positive 
view inclusivism has of non-Christian religions.  This is because of the intimate link between 
God’s Word and God’s Spirit, the latter inspiring and authoring the former. 
The study will continue with the Godhead, first with an eye to the Son.  Inclusivists have 
made “the God of Jesus” a big part of their argument, so the teaching of Jesus with respect to 
the judgment of God will be investigated.  This will have some effect on the evangelical view 
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of the Trinity, the continuity between the Old and New Testaments, and how in the person of 
Jesus Christ, the judgment of God is presented, both in word and in action. 
From here comes Theology-proper.  Inclusivism is the soteriological arm of Open 
Theism, the latter producing some radical deviations from historic, orthodox Christianity 
when it comes to the nature of God.  Does a more “open” view of God mute a starker view of 
his judgment? 
The final two systematic considerations will involve Hamartiology and Soteriology.  Can 
it rightly be said that the positive view inclusivism has for general revelation and non-
Christian religions is a result of a Hamartiology which is not nearly so pessimistic as 
evangelicalism has typically made it out to be?  What role does the imago Dei have in all of 
this? 
Lastly, Soteriology and the fate of the unevangelized will be covered.  Here consideration 
will be given to the main alterative to the traditional view of hell, annihilationism, and how 
this view if adopted by the wider evangelical community might affect world missions. 
The above course may at first appear a bit unorthodox.  Normally, a systematic approach 
to the Godhead will start with the Father and end with the Holy Spirit.  But the theological 
construction of inclusivism and Open Theism is quite pneumatological.  Consider their very 
positive view of non-Christian religions, which is only so positive because of their view of the 
role of the Spirit in the lives of non-Christians.  Therefore, it makes good sense to start with 
the Third Person of the Trinity and work backward, as it were. 
It should also be noted that not all the matters discussed in this dissertation can be neatly 
pigeonholed into any one systematic area.  For example, where is the best place to put a 
discussion about the inclusivist view of non-Christian religions, in Pneumatology or 
Soteriology?  The former has been chosen, but that does not mean the topic could not equally 
be placed in the latter.  There will be some necessary overlap of the categories and topics, but 
an attempt will be made to reduce any redundancy to its bare minimum. 
 
3.1 How Evangelical Is Inclusivism’s Bibliology? 
A Bibliological Reflection on Judgment 
When starting with a bibliological evaluation of inclusivism, several questions need to be 
asked.  Clearly, there were many people within the Evangelical Theological Society’s 
membership who thought that the views of Pinnock and Sanders were less than evangelical 
when it came to their beliefs concerning Scripture and inerrancy.  Even though the final vote 
on the matter exonerated both men, as Norman Geisler noted in a paper circulated at the ETS 
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annual meeting in 2003, it was no “tempest in a tea pot” (“A Response to the ETS Executive 
Committee’s Decisions on Clark Pinnock and John Sanders,” 2).  There were very real 
concerns by a large number of the membership, such that formal proceedings took place with 
the possibility that both men would be removed.  Such proceedings do not happen that often 
within ETS, and so it must be asked, how much validity was there to the allegations?139 
In light of what has already been noted in the Introduction, some have expressed alarm at 
the seeming liberalism that has crept into Open Theism, especially as it relates to its language 
and methodology.  Throughout the whole proceedings, the views of John Sanders were clearly 
seen as more against the ETS ethos of inerrancy than those of Pinnock, such that when it 
came time for a final recommendation by the ETS Executive Committee (October 24, 2003), 
the nine-member panel recommended unanimously not to expel Pinnock, but by a vote of 7-2 
they recommended that Sanders be expelled.140 
It is the intention of this bibliological section to investigate the allegations against 
Pinnock.141  Is his view of Scripture as solidly evangelical as he says, or is it as liberal as 
some alarmist exclusivists have made it out to be? 
It has already been seen that Pinnock’s view of Scripture has changed over the decades.  
Pinnock maintained a solidly evangelical point-of-view when he wrote A Defense of Biblical 
Infallibility in 1967, but by the time he penned The Scripture Principle in 1984, he had begun 
to question the traditional evangelical understanding of inerrancy, a major misstep in 
contemporary American evangelicalism.  Pinnock’s doctrine of Scripture began to appear 
more in line with neo-orthodoxy’s understanding of partial inspiration than the verbal, plenary 
inspiration of evangelicalism.  This enabled Pinnock to adopt a view which allows the Bible 
to make errors in ancillary elements such as historical or scientific reporting, while still 
maintaining the spiritual truths contained therein. 
It should be noted that “inerrancy” is not a magical term somehow dreamed up by 
evangelicals or conservative scholars.  It simply means what the Bible elsewhere says when it 
                                                 
139 A plethora of material on the entire proceedings, including not only the original briefs filed against Pinnock 
and Sanders, but also official documents of the ETS Executive Committee, comments made by other members, 
and the final vote tallies can be found from the hotlink on the homepage of www.etsjets.org. 
140 Pinnock agreed at the last hour to retract some statements that he had made in his publications, which 
appeased the Executive Committee.  Sanders also retracted one key comment made in The God Who Risks: A 
Theology of Providence (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1998) that the Bible was “mistaken,” but this was not enough 
to mollify other concerns the Committee had.  The only two votes to not expel Sanders were the result of 
committee members who felt that the ETS had not thoroughly enough defined what it meant by inerrancy in its 
statement of faith and as such, it could not be used against Sanders.  Since the final vote, the ETS has revised its 
statement on biblical inerrancy and made it somewhat more thorough.  Sanders himself went under review at 
Huntington College, the institution where he had taught for the past seven years 
(http://www.christianitytoday.com/ ct/2004/151/32.0.html).  He was ultimately given leave from his post. 
141 The milder inclusivist view of the two men in question has been chosen for this particular section. 
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calls God’s words “perfect” (eg., Ps. 19:7) or “truth” (eg., Jn. 17:17).  Therefore, Pinnock’s 
comment, “Looking at the actual biblical evidence . . . the case for total inerrancy just is not 
there” (Scripture Principle, 85; all subsequent quotations in this section come from this work 
unless otherwise noted), is a bit misleading.  To be sure, the word “inerrancy” is not present 
anymore than the word “Trinity” is, yet the concept is there.   
Inerrancy is rooted in God’s nature.  Because evangelicals believe God to be without 
error, they believe that his Word is also without error.142  Pinnock begins to address this 
matter (83) but never actually concludes it.  His discussion in this section is less than 
satisfactory, as his argument basically boils down to a “God has decided to give us a text with 
errors, therefore we have a text with errors” argument.  He prefers to consider the Bible 
“generally reliable” (84) and those who consider it inerrant in the strict sense to be “elevating 
reason over Scripture” (85).  However, is this charge fair? 
Pinnock appears unclear on a minor point about the origin of the inerrancy issue, but this 
exposes a larger problem in his reasoning.  As noted earlier, he lays the blame for inerrancy 
first at the feet of modernity, but later he considers it a problem that has existed even from the 
Patristic period.  This confusion is problematic for his basic thesis that traditional evangelicals 
have abandoned a biblical view of Scripture for one that is rationalistic.  If the inerrancy 
doctrine is truly a post-Enlightenment creation, then perhaps his thesis has some merit.  But 
once it can be found in the teaching of Calvin or Luther, or Augustine (as Pinnock also hints 
at several times), or all the way back to the Apostolic Fathers, his argument folds.143  More 
clarity is needed from Pinnock before evangelicals can wholeheartedly endorse his contention 
that his fellow inerrancy evangelicals are really rationalists influenced more by modernity 
than Scripture. 
Is God capable of inspiring an errorless text and maintaining human freedom while doing 
so?  Apparently not according to Pinnock.  But why not?  Why is an infinite, all-wise God not 
able to do this?  Apparently because this would negate human freedom.  Pinnock does not 
                                                 
142 Some have argued that the doctrine of inerrancy is a new creation, but this is certainly an error.  The bare 
word is relatively recent, but it is simply theological shorthand for what Scripture itself teaches about God’s 
words, and what theologians like Luther and Calvin, and all the way back to the early Church fathers, taught 
concerning God’s Word.  The belief that the Word of God is without error is something attested by the fathers 
from the earliest of days (as even Pinnock recognises), even though they did not have the theological shorthand 
of “inerrancy” to use to describe it. 
143 It is recognised that “inerrancy” is a term loaded with meaning, depending to whom one is talking.  
Traditional evangelicals have used the term to speak of the Bible as being free from error in the original, inspired 
manuscripts.  Even though the Word of God has played varying roles throughout the Church’s history, 
traditional evangelicals contend that this idea of inerrancy has existed throughout that time, and is not simply a 
product of post-Enlightenment evangelicalism.  Pinnock appears to agree with this recognition, yet also believes 
not only that modern evangelicals are wrong about it, but so were others in the past such as Augustine and the 
Patristic Fathers, who treated the Bible as too perfect. 
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care for the technical accuracy of modernism when it comes to the Bible, yet is this not 
precisely what he is aiming for?  He claims that a strict inerrancy is not compatible with 
human autonomy, but why not?  Only in a strict, rationalistic system are they incompatible.  
In a post-modern system which values ambiguity surely these two can remain in tension.  On 
this precise area, Pinnock appears much more modern than post-modern. 
Turning to the matter of cultural influence, Pinnock has placed himself in a difficult 
position.  On the one hand, he rejects modernity’s influence on the evangelical doctrine of the 
Bible.  Yet, he also does not want to adopt an entirely post-modern view of Scripture, one 
which makes the meaning of its narratives change like the wind, a hermeneutic “subject to the 
reader’s whims and desires” (230).  Yet Pinnock can still characterise his own Bibliology as 
reflecting “a postmodern lack of anxiety . . . content with soft rather than hard rational 
supports” (257).  It is the “ability to live with ambiguity” (258) inherent more in a post-
modern than modern worldview. 
Whereas Pinnock says that evangelicals (and particularly those with Calvinist leanings) 
are more influenced by modernity than Scripture when it comes to their doctrine of the Bible, 
does Pinnock not make a similar mistake?  Is he more influenced by post-modernity than 
Scripture?  Or is that question too simplistic, and he is influenced equally by both?  One 
theologian has noted that the general move from the traditional evangelical view of inspiration 
to one that is more “dynamic” and akin to Pinnock’s view is the result of a larger paradigm 
shift from theological determinism to free-will theism (Roennfeldt, 349-361).  If this is true, 
then Pinnock’s conclusions about inerrancy may simply be the shifting tide of culture and not 
due to a careful consideration of Scripture. 
Clark Pinnock has categorically stated that both God’s Word and God himself can make 
errors.  For many American evangelicals, this fact alone seals the deal, and they would not 
even bother with a further evaluation of Pinnock’s teaching.  If you say the Bible contains 
errors, for them you have de facto lost the right to call yourself an evangelical. 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Pinnock’s comments on his view of Scripture is 
found in his view of the Old Testament portrayal of God as “cruel and peevish” and therefore 
at odds with the “God of Jesus.”  “It appears that the Old Testament did not always capture 
the divine nature with full accuracy” (Wideness, 89). 
Earlier it was asked, “Is it inherent in the conclusions made by inclusivism (and Open 
Theism as well) to abandon an historically evangelical view of Scripture?”144  It is here that a 
                                                 
144 Ronald Nash thinks so, and he sees a “disturbing similarity” in the way inclusivists and pluralists approach 
the Bible (1994:171-172). 
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hermeneutic of judgment helps.  Clark Pinnock is a self-confessed evangelical, and as such he 
believes in the Bible as God’s holy Word.  Therein believers find God speaking to them 
directly, without muddled voice or muffled meaning.  What is read there is what God says, 
clearly, openly, unswervingly.  As an evangelical, Pinnock also believes in Jesus Christ as the 
only Mediator between God and humanity.  There are no other rivals to God incarnating, 
becoming a human in one unique individual and historical moment.  What can be said about 
Jesus in this regard can be said about no one else. 
Given the above, it is rather surprising to see Pinnock disregard what amounts to nearly 
half of everything Jesus said.  He cannot disregard certain words from the mouth of Jesus 
found in the Gospels as if they were later creations by the early church, or fabrications 
concocted in a pre-scientific, pre-tolerance-loving age.  The things liberal scholars find 
unappealing in the Gospels can be discarded because they have a view of Scripture which 
allows them this freedom, but Pinnock works from a different paradigm.  When he sees Jesus 
speaking and acting in the Gospels, he believes as most evangelicals do that this is precisely 
what Jesus said and did.  So how then can he go and ignore a large portion of the Gospels for 
the sake of his inclusivism? 
An interesting question to ask is, “Was Jesus an inclusivist?”  Indeed, if Jesus were an 
inclusivist as Pinnock is, then there should be little to no talk of judgment and God’s wrath, 
which is precisely what is found with Pinnock’s and other inclusivists’ writings.  Pinnock the 
inclusivist speaks very little about God’s holy wrath against and judgment of sin.  If Jesus 
were an inclusivist, should there not be similar behaviour?  Rather, Jesus consistently speaks 
about God’s judgment (this will be seen later in the Christological section of the evaluation).  
Pinnock takes the words of mercy and grace which fall from the lips of Jesus and he plays 
them against the words of wrath and judgment, making the latter virtually disappear.  From an 
inclusivist perspective, this can be expected.  Why is Jesus not found doing the same thing?  
Could it be because he was not a prophet of inclusivism?145 
There is a certain selectivity which characterises the approach to Scripture many 
inclusivists take, and a main tactic of that selectivity is to ignore or dismiss those passages 
which speak about the judgment of God.  This is particularly true when it comes to the 
teaching of Jesus, who otherwise plays a big role in the inclusivist position.  This 
methodology is alarmingly similar to that used by pluralists like John Hick, and if the 
                                                 
145 Nash has an interesting section in his book, Is Jesus the Only Savior, in which he attempts to read the Book of 
Acts through inclusivist eyes (172-174).  His conclusion is, if Peter and Paul were inclusivists, they would not 
have talked nor acted the way they did as recorded by Luke.  Although the idea is a bit anachronistic, it still is 
interesting nonetheless. 
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methodology is similar, is it not to be expected that many of the conclusions will also be 
similar?  Put another way, can the positive view that inclusivists have of non-Christian 
religions be the result of a Bibliology that is less than evangelical? 
For now, it must be recognised that inclusivism’s view of Scripture, as embodied in two 
of its most prominent representatives, is closer to a pluralist position than to an exclusivist 
one.  That is cause for some concern, and as the evaluation of inclusivist theology continues, 
this must be kept in mind.  Much of the ethos of both inclusivism and pluralism involves a 
reading of Scripture that is anti-judgmental, a “hermeneutic of hope” which all but eliminates 
a “hermeneutic of judgment.”  However, should a proper balance not be sought between the 
two, given the biblical data? 
 
3.1.1 Wrongly Dividing the Word of Truth 
Part of the problem appears to be an apparent bifurcation by inclusivists between the Old 
Testament and the New.  For example, Pinnock plays an Old Testament picture of the nature 
of God against one found in the teaching of Jesus.  This false dichotomy can have some 
negative consequences as already seen. 
In one of John Sanders’ key contributions to this debate, No Other Name, he has a section 
devoted to universalism and specifically the key biblical texts in support of this soteriological 
position (83-89).  This is now considered because it impinges upon inclusivism’s positive 
view of other faiths, which in turn is driven by inclusivism’s view of the Father as portrayed 
by the Son, a view of universal love.  He states that the universalistic passages fall under five 
categories: 
1. Those which affirm God’s desire to save all people; 
2. Those which proclaim the universal atonement of Christ; 
3. Those which articulate the implications of the universal atoning work of Christ; 
4. Those which refer to the consummation of God’s plan of salvation in which all people 
are finally redeemed; and  
5. Those which refer to damnation and separation. 
In the first four categories above, one would expect to find a considerable amount of 
universalistic teaching coming from the Gospels.  However, the exact opposite is the case.  
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Sanders lists seven key texts for the first two categories, and none of them come from the 
Gospels.146 
The first text from the Gospels comes in category three, “and I, if I be lifted up from the 
earth, will draw all men to myself” (John 12:32).147  All other passages come from the pen of 
Paul.  Category four is entirely devoted to the teaching of Paul, and Sanders notes here:  
“Universalists usually cite Paul as the New Testament writer who saw most clearly the 
salvation of all people in the consummation” (84).  However, there are certainly many 
passages from Paul’s epistles which also support eternal damnation.148 
This will impinge upon this study of inclusivism, which builds largely upon the love and 
forgiveness of God as seen through and taught by his Son.  There is an inconsistent 
hermeneutic utilised by many inclusivists, and this is no more clearly seen than in their 
coverage of the judgment of God. 
There are virtually no statements from the mouth of Jesus which support universalism.  
Yet, the vast amount of material from Jesus which supports an exclusivist position is virtually 
ignored by most inclusivists, and that may be putting things gently.  Every author of the New 
Testament has something to say about the wrath and judgment of God, as did Jesus, but it 
plays little to no role in the theology of inclusivism. 
“It is the first business of an interpreter to let the author say what he does say, instead of 
attributing to him what we think he ought to say.”149  The same holds true when it comes to 
the words of Jesus.  Do evangelicals really want to be accused of excising certain statements 
of Jesus because they do not like them?  From a conservative point of view, it looks very 
much to be arbitrary at best the approach that some scholars take to the teaching of Jesus and 
the Gospel accounts.  Those who do not take a conservative position on this matter seemingly 
do so with little to no basis.  An imbalanced hermeneutic is often used which is tilted in 
favour of the preconceptions of the particular scholar. 
Without wandering into a full-blown analysis of the Gospels, it need only be noted that 
exclusivism does not have the problems which some inclusivists have when it comes to 
                                                 
146 Here are the passages:  category 1 – 1 Tim. 2:4; 4:10; 2 Pet. 3:9; and category 2 – 1 John 2:2; Heb. 2:9; Tit. 
2:11; 2 Cor. 5:19.  Interestingly, three of these passages come from the Pastoral Epistles, letters characteristically 
claimed by liberal scholars to not have come from Paul but rather from a Pauline pretender. 
147 Sanders also refers to John 10:16, but this passage about other sheep knowing the voice of Jesus need not 
imply a universal atoning work. 
148 Interestingly, in an earlier section in the book, Sanders notes that “we discover a wide array of texts that may 
be called exclusive.”  Here he provides five texts, three from the mouth of Jesus, two from the Book of 
Ephesians (28). 
149 John Calvin, quoted in Virkler, Henry A. Hermeneutics:  Principles and Processes of Biblical Interpretation 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981) 67. 
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approaching the narratives concerning Jesus.  This flows from an exclusivist understanding of 
inerrancy in which all the material of the Gospels is reliable and authoritative, an inerrancy 
which Pinnock and Sanders have questioned.  Once the foundations of inerrancy are eroded, it 
becomes easier to excise those portions of Scripture which do not correspond nicely to one’s 
theological constructs, even if some of those portions come from the lips of Jesus (the very 
type of deductive approach that Pinnock abhors). 
Three other matters need brief comment.  First, in Pinnock’s redefinition of the term 
“inerrancy,” he prefers to think of it as an inerrancy of purpose.  In other words, the Bible is 
only error-free in those things it intends to teach.  All other areas can potentially contain error.   
Several questions need to be considered here.  What does the Bible “intentionally teach?”  
Upon what basis does one choose which passage is intentional and which unintentional?  If 
the words of the Bible cannot be equated with the words of God, how can evangelicals be 
certain that the Bible truly is inerrant in its purpose and message of salvation in Jesus Christ? 
It has already been seen that Pinnock considers at least one characterisation of God found 
in the Old Testament to be the product of bad religion and not an accurate portrayal of God’s 
nature.  But when all the passages in the Old Testament which speak of God in such 
“peevish” ways are considered, they amount to a consider portion of the testament.  Were all 
these unintentional teachings that can be ignored? 
Second, how can the words of the text not be important, but the overall meaning is?  Is the 
meaning not found in the words themselves?  (Pinnock: “the meanings, not the words, of 
biblical passages are authoritative,” Scripture Principle, 267, emphasis original).  Can it 
rightly be said that an automobile can be entirely comprised of aeroplane parts, yet still be an 
automobile?  To what extent can the whole be defined while ignoring the parts?  Henry’s 
critique of Pinnock earlier noted (p. 82, n. 82) seems justified.  At what point can someone 
redefine a word and still attempt to maintain its usage in the same circles, without creating 
mass confusion? 
Third, why does Pinnock still use the term “inerrancy?”  As one critic sarcastically 
suggested, perhaps he still uses the word “to placate a constituency” that wants to see the 
proper “password.”150  Whatever the case, once the term has been emptied of most of its 
                                                 
150 Randy Maddox, Wesleyan Theological Journal 21, nos. 1-2 [Spring-Fall 1986] 206.  Erickson quotes John 
Randall as noting that when liberal theologians use the same terms but with different meanings, normally 
unbeknownst to laypeople who may read their works, they are acting hypocritically (Evangelical Left, 15).  He 
later quotes William Hordern with a similar sentiment, “To both the fundamentalist and the nonconservative, it 
often seems that the new conservative is trying to say, ‘The Bible is inerrant, but of course this does not mean it 
is without errors’” (28). 
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traditional meaning, there seems little reason to keep it.  The “reliability” of God’s Word 
seems far better. 
 
3.1.2 Liberal Disdain for Judgment 
Labels are helpful when attempting to define and explain theological categories.  However, 
they can also be abused by those bent on tearing down their enemies.  The term “liberal” is 
just such a label.  Some evangelicals have used it to describe inclusivist and open theist 
teachings because it is immediately received negatively by evangelicals. 
 However, Clark Pinnock is also fond of using it, and as noted several times, he attacks 
liberalism with an energy unmatched by many of the very evangelicals who would call 
Pinnock a liberal.  Still, how justified is the fear that many evangelicals share that Pinnock has 
gone too far in his theology?  In evaluating this charge, Pinnock’s own understanding of what 
constitutes a liberal approach to God’s Word will be used. 
 In The Scripture Principle, Pinnock sets down several descriptions of what constitutes a 
liberal approach to Scripture.  A dislike for authority, especially of a religious nature, is 
something that characterises liberalism (16).  It begins by questioning God’s Word and ends 
with viewing it as a “fallible testament” (8).  The resulting subjective approach to the Bible 
ultimately spawns an “open-ended pluralism” and the ability to make the Bible say whatever 
someone wants it to say (18).  The error in “nonconservative modern theology” is the “retreat 
from content-full revelation” as Pinnock shows through a brief historical review (46-49).  He 
continues with a harsh critique of liberalism’s movement away from the idea that God’s 
revelation is trustworthy (51), labelling such people as those who “refuse to submit to the 
text” (92).  He agrees with Packer’s assessment that before the nineteenth century, no 
significant Christian thinker questioned the authority of the Bible.  Now, however, liberal 
Christian scholars have made the Bible nothing more than a “human religious document” 
(230).  This opposition to Scripture ultimately results in heresy (237). 
 If only Pinnock would remain here, in his vehement opposition to liberalism, he would be 
the darling of all evangelicalism.  But many see in his theology some of the very things he 
criticises in others.  For example, has Pinnock not also watered-down the trustworthiness of 
God’s Word by introducing the belief that it contains scores of errors?  Although liberalism 
rejects all of the Bible according to Pinnock, does he not at least discard some of it, the 
portions that he finds most at odds with his inclusivism and Open Theism?  Pinnock fears that 
heresy can creep in, taking advantage of people less trained to recognise it.  But once he has 
told the masses that the Bible has scores of errors, has he not undermined the entire endeavour 
100  
he claimed he was undertaking, namely, to recapture an “evangelical confidence in the Bible” 
(9)?  Is it wrong to expect typical Christians with a Bible in their hand, wondering out loud 
which portions they are allowed to ignore? 
 Clearly Pinnock is not a full-blown liberal, but he has suggested that at least some of the 
Old Testament depictions of God’s character are fallible, as well as at least one prediction of 
Jesus.  His apparent dislike for the judgment of God, even when found in the teaching of 
Jesus, is yet another concern.  Just as much as supernatural miracles, for example, are 
problematic for liberals who come from modernist presuppositions, it appears that Pinnock’s 
post-modern presuppositions cause him difficulty when considering the judgment of God, 
especially on those outside the present or past reach of the gospel. 
 That is why he is an inclusivist, and one gets the impression that he is not an inclusivist 
because he first studied Scripture and found it there (as his theological pilgrimage suggests, 
one which did not begin with a careful review of Scripture, but rather with a theological 
review of his presuppositions).  Rather, he is an inclusivist who then went to Scripture to find 
support for it. 
 
3.1.3 Conclusion to Bibliological Evaluation 
There are some good reasons why inclusivist evangelicals have been called to task by other 
evangelicals when it comes to their approach to Scripture.  Inclusivists like Clark Pinnock 
have slowly but surely slid from the traditionally high view of Scripture found in American 
evangelicalism, to one which is more suspect and appears to maintain more affinity with the 
Bibliology of pluralist and liberal scholars.  Pinnock’s movement in this way can be 
attributed, at least in part, to his dislike of certain portrayals of God which appear too austere 
and judgmental.  This works itself out in his treatment of the teaching of Jesus, which have 
been hinted at so far, but which will be covered in more detail later.  A hermeneutic of 
judgment needs to be infused into the growing inclusivism of American evangelicalism lest it 
continue its slide into liberalism. 
Because there is such an intimate link between Bibliology and Pneumatology, this study 
will briefly return to Bibliology after the inclusivist doctrine of the Holy Spirit has been 
evaluated. 
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3.2 Are non-Christian Religions a Vehicle through Which God Draws Humans to 
Himself? 
A Pneumatological Reflection on Judgment 
This study will continue to concentrate on Pinnock’s inclusivism, in order to keep the material 
to a reasonable and workable level.  However, the views of other inclusivists will be noted as 
the need arises.  It is recognised, though, that Pinnock appears at the forefront of inclusivism’s 
development of Pneumatology.  He is the only inclusivist who has devoted an entire book 
solely to the subject. 
To begin with, Pinnock should be applauded for his comprehensive treatment of the 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit.  In the debates which have marked the past two decades in 
American evangelicalism, there have been few, thorough theological treatises such as Flame 
of Love.  Pinnock insightfully looks for connections between his Pneumatology and all other 
areas of doctrine in an attempt to tie any loose ends that had previously existed in his 
inclusivism. 
The difficulty, though, is not so much in Pinnock’s methodology, which appears solid, but 
in his initial assumptions.  Working from these assumptions, Pinnock’s reasoning is mostly 
consistent and logical, but because he starts on the wrong path, all that he does is to continue, 
logically and reasonably, down the same wrong path.151 
Pinnock’s Pneumatology will be evaluated along three main lines, those taken from 
Pinnock’s argumentation. 
 
3.2.1 The Sacred and Secular Split 
As noted earlier, Pinnock concludes that, because God is omnipresent, his Spirit must be 
soteriologically at work everywhere as well.  However, this conclusion is questionable.  Just 
because the Spirit is present everywhere, this does not mean that the Spirit is working in the 
heart of each and every person to bring that person to salvation. 
Pinnock does not seem to make the necessary distinction between simple presence and 
soteriological presence.  In other words, just because God is present, this does not mean he is 
necessarily exercising his saving grace there.  The existence of hell would seem to necessitate 
such a delineation between the simple presence of God and his soteriological presence.152 
                                                 
151  As Calvin rightly notes, “For the more strenuously anyone runs who is off the path, the farther he gets from 
his goal, and the more pitiable he therefore becomes” (Institutes, 3.14.4). 
152 “What then is the single greatest factor that makes hell to be hell?  The answer is the presence of God” (John 
Blanchard, Whatever Happened to Hell? [Durham, NC: Evangelical Press, 1993] 159, emphasis original).  
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Pneumatologically, the same could be said concerning the distinction between believers 
and non-believers.  The Holy Spirit indwells believers, but given the omnipresence of God 
and his Spirit, one might be tempted to make the false conclusion that the Holy Spirit also 
indwells unbelievers.  Similarly, when Jesus says, “Whenever two or more of you are 
gathered in my name, there am I in your midst” (Matt. 18:20), is this not redundant because 
God is everywhere?  When two or more Satanists are gathered, is not God present there as 
well?  Given his omnipresence, of course God is present there.153 
Thus is the fallacy of not making a distinction between the general presence of God, and 
his special presence.  Jesus is present in some special manner when believers are gathered in 
his name, even though, given his deity, he is present everywhere at all times anyway.  The 
same can be said concerning God’s Spirit.  Certainly the Holy Spirit is present everywhere, 
but should evangelicals really conclude that he is working in the hearts of Satanists when they 
meet for worship?  How about Buddhists?  Muslims?  At what point is the line drawn?154 
The same could be said about Pinnock’s statement, “We refuse to allow the disjunction 
between . . . common and saving grace” (Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 98).  Traditionally, 
common grace has been thought of as that grace which God shows equally to all people, while 
saving grace is that special grace which brings people to salvation.155  It is this distinction that 
actually serves as a safeguard from believing that only a portion of God’s creation 
experiences his grace, while the rest experiences absolutely none of it.  It also serves as a 
balancing factor when it comes to the sin and depravity of humankind.  Without the common 
grace of God, humanity would move much more quickly into the downward spiral of 
degeneration. 
If Pinnock sees no “disjunction” between common and saving grace, the assumption is he 
means he sees no basic difference between them.  This may in fact be part and parcel of his 
disdain for any Calvinist definition of election, because in such a definition, God is seen as 
treating people differently.  For Pinnock, who is strongly influenced by Arminian theology, 
such discrimination by God cannot be tolerated.  No doubt this goes hand-in-hand with 
                                                                                                                                                        
However, most inclusivists alter the traditional view of hell as a place of everlasting, conscious torment (see the 
section on Soteriology). 
153 Pinnock’s view of the presence and role of the Holy Spirit also implies that there is no special difference 
between the Spirit’s presence in the Body of Christ, the Church, and in the world in general. 
154 Pinnock argues for criteria by which Christians can judge where to draw the line (Flame, 208-211), but it 
appears that his criteria boil down to finding good works and moral attitudes in people of other faiths.  More will 
be mentioned concerning this fact when analysing the category of pagan saints. 
155 “Special grace is the grace by which God redeems, sanctifies, and glorifies his people.  Unlike common grace, 
which is universally given, special grace is bestowed only on those whom God elects to eternal life through faith 
in his Son, our Savior Jesus Christ” (Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Walter Elwell, ed., second edition 
[Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001] 520). 
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Pinnock’s assertion that the Holy Spirit “knocks on every human heart.”  If the Spirit chose to 
not knock on just one heart, but to allow it to remain as it were, this sort of discrimination 
(election, in essence) is wholly objectionable according to Pinnock and his inclusivist kin. 
But just as a distinction must be made between God’s simple or general presence, based 
on his attribute of omnipresence, and his special or soteriological presence, so too must a 
distinction be made between common grace and saving grace.  Simply put, God does not treat 
all people the same way.  To conclude otherwise would be to flatly ignore the clear facts of 
history, let alone the biblical data.  For example, Israel, as God’s chosen people, was given 
special treatment from all other nations around her.  She was shown a special grace which 
none of the other nations could claim.  If not, it would make little sense to call Israel God’s 
“chosen” nation.156 
The same can be said on an individual basis.  Abraham, out of all the people who 
inhabited Ur of the Chaldees, was given special revelation by God to move to a new land.  He 
was treated wholly differently than others around him.  The same can be said about many 
others in Scripture, such as Noah, whom God chose to preserve through the Great Flood.  God 
did not come to others and tell them to build an ark too.  And why was Noah commanded to 
build an ark?  So that he and his family could be saved.  In essence, then, God did not give 
others during the time of Noah the opportunity for equal salvation.157 
 
3.2.2 Inclusivism and non-Christian Religions 
The positive view of non-Christian religions found in inclusivism is decidedly different than 
that traditionally espoused by evangelicals.  For one thing, much of the modern missionary 
movement has been fuelled by the belief that if people did not hear the gospel, they would be 
lost.  In other words, their religious faith and traditions were soteriologically worthless apart 
from a knowledge of Christ.  To find evangelical inclusivists, then, who not only do not view 
                                                 
156 Pinnock glosses over this point (Flame, 83, 200, 217) in his misuse of Amos 9:7.  Pinnock evidently reads 
this passage to mean that there was no soteriological difference between Israel and the nations around her, hardly 
a proper interpretation of this passage given the entire Old Testament context. 
157 It should be noted that some translations call Noah a “preacher of righteousness” (2 Pet. 2:5).  This may 
intimate that, while Noah was building the ark for what most believe to be 120 years (Gen. 6:3), he preached a 
message of impending doom to his contemporaries, who obviously ignored his warnings.  However, some 
translations call Noah a “herald of righteousness” (eg., ESV) and as such, a herald need not actually speak or 
preach, but could merely “declare” via his actions (Vine’s Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words, 481-
482).  The author of Hebrews says that Noah in building the ark “by this . . . condemned the world” (Heb. 11:7).  
He mentions nothing about Noah preaching, but rather intimates that by the action of building the ark, Noah was 
condemning his generation and its godlessness.   This would also make better sense of Jesus’ comment about the 
flood victims who “knew nothing about what would happen until the flood came and took them all away” (Matt. 
24:39).  But whether or not Noah preached, the original point still remains:  God only came to Noah about 
building an ark.  He did not equally approach each and every other individual and tell them to build an ark too. 
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non-Christian religions negatively, but even positively believe they can contribute to an 
individual’s salvation, is to find an anomaly in evangelicalism.  As positive as this view is, it 
must be made certain that it is biblical and not simply a modern creation.  Put another way, it 
should be done what Pinnock himself wants as noted earlier, to allow God to speak for 
himself on these matters, and to not put words in his mouth. 
However, there exists a seeming confusion on the part of evangelical inclusivists when it 
comes to other religious traditions.  Pinnock disagrees with Rahner’s optimistic and highly 
positive view of other faiths, but this disagreement seems short-lived when one considers how 
positively Pinnock also views these religions. 
Exclusivists rightly see little difference in saying that adherents of non-Christian religions 
experience the divine presence of God, that the Holy Spirit is present in them, and that 
elements of grace are experienced via them (as evangelical inclusivists say), versus saying 
that non-Christian religions are salvific (as pluralists and Catholic inclusivists say).  Pinnock, 
for example, cannot have it both ways.  He cannot say there is no disjunction between 
common and special grace, and then claim that non-Christian religions which have elements 
of grace are not salvific.  Similarly, he cannot say there is no divergence between secular and 
sacred when it comes to the work of the Spirit, and then object that other inclusivists conclude 
that the Spirit works salvifically in non-Christian faiths.  Couple this with inclusivism’s claim 
that explicit knowledge of Christ is not even necessary, and it is no wonder that many 
exclusivists see little practical difference between pluralism’s positive view of non-Christian 
religions and that of evangelical inclusivists.   
In Pinnock’s evaluation of non-Christian traditions, he uses two main criteria in testing 
these traditions: does the adherent fear God, and is this person pursuing righteousness?  
Pinnock then concludes that if these two criteria are present, the person is on the road to 
salvation.  Along the lines of C. S. Lewis and others, he reasons that the positive aspects of 
any religious tradition can potentially be used by God to draw people into a salvific 
relationship of grace with him, despite the contradictions that may exist between that religious 
tradition and the tenets of the Christian faith. 
Pinnock argues that the “interpretive lens” for determining such matters is Jesus Christ, 
and exclusivists heartily agree.  However, this interpretive lens comes through the work of the 
Holy Spirit, who inspired God’s holy Word with the express intention of pointing to Christ.  
Clearly, the interpretive lens should be Jesus Christ, but that means that those religions which 
do not honour Christ cannot be seen as part of the work of the Spirit, anymore than the 
worship of Baal or Molech could have been seen as a “taster” for the worship of Jehovah. 
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As noted earlier, Pinnock states:  “The same rule would apply to Africans who recognize 
a high God, a God who sees all, gives gifts to all, who is unchangeable and wise” (Wideness, 
96-97).  But it is not obvious that just because an African believes in a Creator of the world, 
that he de facto is worshiping the God of Jesus Christ.158  There is much more needed before 
one could conclude such a thing.159  Much of African Traditional Religions posit what 
amounts to the God of Deism, a distant, aloof Being who does not bother himself with his 
creation.  That is left to the ancestral spirits as the mediators between the physical and 
spiritual realms.  In short, just because a person claims to believe in a Supreme Being, this 
does not mean that person is worshiping the God of the Bible.160  Pinnock seems to forget that 
humans constantly create God in their own image, regardless of whether or not they call him 
the creator and assign monotheism to their belief system.161 
Perhaps Pinnock would prefer to comment on something closer to home, Christian cults 
such as Mormonism or the Jehovah’s Witnesses for example?  They claim to believe in a 
Creator as well.  Is Pinnock comfortable in concluding similarly, that such adherents in 
Christian cults can be thought of as worshiping the one, true God?  Or do they not rather 
construct their own god and worship him instead?  Both can fairly be considered to “fear 
God” and to pursue righteousness.162 
The overwhelming evidence from Scripture is exactly the opposite, that God disdains 
these human-made religions as false and idolatrous.  There is God’s way, and all other ways.  
Even in the case of Israel, God was not pleased with all of them, and they sat in a privileged 
position of having the special revelation of God revealed through the Law.  This idea that 
positive elements of a non-Christian religion can be concentrated on for their salvific benefit 
                                                 
158 In fact, could the same thing not be said about Egypt and Babylonia in the Old Testament times?  They also 
had beliefs in one, supreme creator, yet their religions were consistently condemned by Jehovah. 
159 Further, it is by no means clear that belief in a supreme God existed in African Traditional Religions before 
their contact with the monotheism of Christianity and Islam. 
160 Another matter as to how one should worship this Creator must also come into play.  “It would be a tragic 
mistake to think that people can seek God in any way that they choose or worship him in just any manner.  
Nothing could be more false” (Daniel Clendenin, 1995:157).  In Africa, the belief that some have in one Creator 
leads them to various forms of idolatry, not unlike the pagan religions in Canaan during the Old Testament 
Israelite occupation. 
161 In an introductory course I teach on Apologetics, we note that theistic claims for the existence of God only 
prove that an “Unmoved Mover” or “Moral Guarantor” exists, but that such proofs do not as such prove the 
existence of the Christian God.  Is this Unmoved Mover a conscious being?  Is he finite or infinite?  Does he 
even involve himself with his creation?  Is he singular or plural?  So many questions remain open for debate, and 
the ultimate Christian apologetic will be found in the revelation of Jesus Christ.  Therefore, it is simply not good 
enough to conclude that because someone believes in a Creator, that person must believe in the God of Jesus 
Christ. 
162 In fact, with their belief in the potential for every man to become a god of his own planet, Mormonism 
espouses a subtle polytheism in its theology.  They may speak about “one” God, but he is only the god of this 
planet earth.  There are other planets with other gods. 
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appears biblically questionable.  Rather, the Bible consistently proclaims that if a person 
professes faith in someone other than Christ, that person is lost. 
 
3.2.3 Biblical References to Religions outside the Judeo-Christian Tradition 
There is a familiar analogy often used by pluralists (and to a lesser extent inclusivists) when 
discussing world religions and the nature of God.  It involves a king who has placed an 
elephant in a room with five blind men.  Each man is given the task of determining what he is 
investigating, through the sense of touch. 
As one man gropes around the side of the beast, he feels a large panel of rough skin and 
coarse hair.  Another investigates the tail and backside, while a third the tusks.  Each man will 
have his own perspective as to what constitutes an elephant, and all are partially right and 
partially wrong.  If one of the blind men is dogmatic that the essence of an elephant is only to 
be found in having large ears, the pluralists says he is acting like an exclusivist. 
The point of the analogy is clear.  Humanity, in its attempt to discern God and his nature, 
is only seeing part of the picture.  Each religious tradition has some perspective on the 
elephant, albeit an incomplete one.  What needs to be done is to humbly recognise the 
limitations of one’s own religious tradition and be open to learning from the traditions of 
others.  Conversely, anyone who says their religious tradition embodies all of the truth is like 
the blind man who clutches a leg and thinks he has grasped the whole elephant. 
This is quite an appealing analogy, but how valid is it?  In the analogy, the king is the 
only person who knows entirely what the whole elephant looks like, which implies that there 
is an elephant.  In other words, there is an objective truth which constitutes the elephant.  
Certainly, someone who only apprehends the trunk still knows, at least in part, what 
constitutes an elephant.  But if one of the blind men were to say that he feels smooth skin, or 
determines that the beast stands upright on two legs, would he be talking about the same 
elephant? 
Much is made by pluralists and inclusivists about the good qualities of the non-Christian 
faiths.  John Hick, for example, goes through great detail in proving his point that all of the 
great world religions basically boil down to the same, common characteristics, hopes, and 
morals.163   
                                                 
163 See A Christian Theology of Religions (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995) and God Has 
Many Names (London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1980), the latter in which Hick approvingly quotes the 
Bhagavad Gita, IV, 11: “Howsoever men may approach me, ever so do I accept them; for, on all sides, whatever 
path they may choose is mine” (58).  In A Christian Theology he agrees with Mahatma Gandhi: “We are all 
children of the same God” (34). 
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“There is but one God, who is maker and lord of all; that in his infinite fullness 
and richness of being he exceeds all our human attempts to grasp him in thought; 
and that the devout in the various great world religions are in fact worshipping 
that one God, but through different, overlapping concepts or mental icons of him” 
(God Has Many Names, 48-49). 
Inclusivists do not agree with the distillation of all religions down to common elements, 
but they do agree in principle that God can use those religions to draw people to himself, as 
noted previously in greater detail.  The common mistake both the pluralist and inclusivist 
make is to only concentrate on those elements in the religions which are in common, or those 
elements in non-Christian religions which reflect Christian principles and practises, but is this 
a sound methodology?  Should the differences not also be considered?164 
If a BMW and a Volkswagen Beetle were to stand side-by-side, is justice done to the 
superiority of the BMW by simply boiling down both vehicles to each having four tyres, a 
steering wheel, and an internal combustion engine?  Is it not the differences between the two 
which allow one to obtain a hefty price tag, while the other not?165 
Lists can be made of the similarities between Islam and Christianity, for example, and 
claim that they are saying much the same thing, but only if the weighty matters of Trinity and 
incarnation, atonement and resurrection are ignored.166  Judaism and Christianity have much 
in common, but the Apostle Paul, who converted from the former to the latter, considered his 
previous ways “dung” (Phil. 3:8) in comparison to his life in Christ.167  If there is biblical 
                                                 
164 Martin Goldsmith (What about Other Faiths? London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989) summarises the views of 
pluralist Paul Knitter in determining what the attitude should be toward non-Christian religions (103-106).  
Knitter sees three main attitudes which compete with exclusivism in churches today.  1) All religions are relative 
(Knitter uses Ernst Troeltsch as his case study), 2) All religions are essentially the same (using Arnold Toynbee 
as his example), and 3) All religions share a common psychological origin (using the work of Swiss psychologist 
Carl Jung). 
165 Christianity is unique in its teaching concerning the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus, and in its doctrine 
of sin and its effect and cure.  The Christian Scriptures are also unique in their teaching concerning something as 
fundamental as the existence of the universe, time, and space (J. P. Moreland, ed., The Creation Hypothesis: 
Scientific Evidence for an Intelligent Designer [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994] 153). 
166 After his evaluation of the differences between Islam and Christianity, Hendrik Kraemer notes, “the 
hypothesis of an identical final goal is precarious in the extreme” (Why Christianity of All Religions [London: 
Lutterworth Press, 1962] 62).  In fact, the greatest sin in Islam, shirk, is precisely what the doctrine of the Trinity 
teaches. 
167 The large amount of commonality between Judaism and Christianity is obvious, especially when it comes to 
the attributes of God and the ethics of his people.  The crucial and perhaps only difference of importance is 
found in the person of Jesus.  This is the case when comparing Christianity to all other religions as well.  As 
Kraemer observes, the central issue of Christianity “is neither a doctrine nor a principle.  It is the Person of Jesus 
Christ” (Why Christianity, 72).  However, see pluralist John B. Cobb, Jr., who believes that a synthesis between 
Islam and Christianity is possible (Postmodernism and Public Policy (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 2002).  “Trinitarian thought, also, need not involve truth claims that contradict the faithful Jewish 
and Muslim affirmations of God’s unity” (37).  Cobb argues elsewhere that Buddhism and Christianity can also 
be synthesised, in Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism 
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support for the need for conversion from Judaism to Christianity, should the same not be 
expected when moving from a religion considerably different from that founded by Christ? 
The fate of those who have not heard the gospel is no small issue in contemporary 
evangelical debates.168  However, rather than being moved by emotional arguments, 
evangelicals need to be convinced by Scripture.  Back to the analogy of the elephant, those 
who claim to perceive a beast with smooth skin and two legs are not studying an elephant, but 
some other creature.  Should the possibility not also be considered that non-Christian religions 
are human-made inventions, innovations developed by sinful humans who do not want to 
submit to the one true God?  Are exclusivists really wrong when they read the Bible as if it 
condemns and judges other religions outside the Judeo-Christian tradition? 
The following study is by no means exhaustive, but it will hopefully shed some light on 
the disagreement between inclusivists and exclusivists on the role of non-Christian religions.  
A detailed analysis of each and every piece of data cannot be performed, but only brief 
comments will be given as the need arises.  Scripture is certainly not ignorant of religions 
outside its self-profession of faith in Jehovah, and there is much to work with on this score. 
The natural place to begin is in the Old Testament and the Garden of Eden.  The Serpent 
in the Garden is paradigmatic of evil opposition to the Creator.  By twisting the words of God 
(Gen. 3:1-5) he is able to deceive Eve and then Adam.  Paul’s comment in 2 Cor. 4:4 that 
unbelievers are blinded by the “god of this age” reflects the age-old battle.  Spiritual forces 
are at work (Eph. 6:12), and evangelicals would be negligent if they did not attempt to 
recognise their activity even in the religious sphere. 
Early in the Genesis account Abel’s unfaithful brother Cain is introduced (Gen. 4), who 
becomes a type of all those who take a path contrary to God’s prescribed course (1 Jn. 3:12; 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), and along with Christopher Ives (eds.), that the two can find common 
ground with Judaism, in The Emptying God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1991).  Raimundo Panikkar, in The Unknown Christ of Hinduism (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 
1981), attempts to bring the Christian concept of Christ and the Hindu concept of Ishvara together, in what 
amounts to a pluralistic reconstruction of the two religions, looking for a “functional equivalence.”  “A Christian 
will not fully understand Hinduism if he is not, in one way or another, converted to Hinduism.  Nor will a Hindu 
ever fully understand Christianity unless he, in one way or another, becomes a Christian” (43).   
168 “In large measure the future of evangelical theology and world missions will be shaped by its outcome” 
(introductory comments by the editors, Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 12).  However, we must not think that 
this issue is new.  Consider the following comment by Sebastian Franck, a sixteenth-century Spiritualist: 
“Consider as thy brothers all Turks and heathen, wherever they be, who fear God and work righteousness, 
instructed by God and inwardly drawn by him, even though they have never heard of baptism, indeed, of Christ 
himself, neither of his story or scripture, but only of his power through the inner Word perceived within and 
made fruitful. . . . I hold that just as there are many Adams who do not know there was one Adam, so also there 
are many Christians who have never heard Christ’s name,” quoted in Williams, George H. and Mergal, Angel, 
M. (eds.), Spiritual and Anabaptist Writers (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957) 156.  St. Augustine also 
records that the third-century critic of Christianity, Porphyry (d. 304), used the fate of the unevangelised as a 
point against the religion of Christ in his fifteen-volume diatribe. 
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Jude 11; Heb. 11:4).  The Flood during Noah’s time speaks volumes concerning God’s 
judgment, in this case falling upon the entire world and only preserving eight people.  At bare 
minimum it speaks against the notion that God must save the vast majority of humanity in 
order to be considered fair and loving, something Pinnock and others echo when speaking 
against the “fewness doctrine” (Wideness, 17, 19, 186).  The Tower of Babel incident (Gen. 
11:1-9) also bespeaks a judgment against religious arrogance.  Many commentators on the ten 
plagues on Egypt at the time of Moses note that these plagues served a double purpose: to 
move Pharaoh to let the Israelites go, and to condemn the false gods of Egypt.169 
Substantial ground concerning pagan saints will be dealt with shortly and need not be 
repeated here.  However, it should be noted that God’s command to wipe out entire peoples in 
Canaan should cause some hesitation to praise Canaanite religion.  It seems that God’s design 
was to protect his chosen people from the despicable practises and gods of the Canaanite 
peoples, but the Israelites disobeyed him and did not drive out all the people from the 
Promised Land (Jdgs. 2:1-3).  The entire book of Judges is an account of the Israelites 
consistently falling into the worship of the false Canaanite gods.170   
It should be noted further that not only was the who of Jewish religious practise 
prescribed by God, but so too the how.  This serves the double purpose of condemning all 
other gods, while also condemning all other religious practises.  The Jews consistently 
attempted to incorporate the religious practises of the peoples around them into their Judaism, 
but God was never pleased with this.  In a fascinating biblical example of syncretism (2 Kgs. 
17), comes this enigmatic statement:  “Even while these people were worshiping the LORD, 
they were serving their idols” (vs. 41; cf. vs. 33).  This shows that religious practise cannot be 
divorced from religious content, and seems to speak against the inclusivist notion that in non-
Christian religions God is using their positive elements to draw people to himself.  From the 
golden calf in the desert onward, God vehemently opposed any incorporation of the pagan 
practises of the religions around Israel into her true worship of Yahweh. 
                                                 
169 See Ex. 12:12, also Alan R. Cole, Exodus: Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries (Leicester: InterVarsity 
Press, 1973) 108. 
170 One could argue that the sin of the Israelites was not so much worshipping Molech or Ashtoreth or Baal as it 
was forsaking Jehovah.  In other words, worshipping these other gods was quite acceptable as far as the 
Canaanites were concerned, but not acceptable for a people who had a covenant with Jehovah to only serve him.  
This argument, while tempting, fails to take seriously the fact that God consistently judges not only his chosen 
people, but the peoples around them as well, for their idolatry and false ways.  Again, destroying entire cities and 
tribes cannot be ignored when making a determination about God’s view of the religions outside Judaism.  
Rahab stands as an example of a person who professed faith in Jehovah and was saved, while her entire city 
crumbled to the ground.  It is difficult at best to read anything positive out of the story of Jericho when it comes 
to the religious traditions of its inhabitants. 
110  
Two further interactions between Jehovah and the gods of the pagan nations provide more 
insight.  First Samuel 4 records the Philistine capture of the ark of the covenant.  The 
Philistines moved the ark to Ashdod, where they placed it in the temple of Dagon, the chief 
Philistine deity (ch. 5).  They later found the statue of Dagon falling prostrate before the ark, 
with its hands and head broken off from the torso.  Clearly this is portrayed by the author as a 
judgment by God.171 
The second incident involves the commander of the army of the king of Aram, Naaman, 
who was healed of leprosy by the prophet Elisha (2 Kgs. 5).  Naaman asks to be forgiven for a 
seeming religious indiscretion, namely, that when he returns home to his master and worships 
in the temple, as his king leans on his arm to bow down, Naaman must also do so (vs. 18).  
Naaman’s request for grace only makes sense within the context of God’s condemnation of 
the religion of Aram, not his approval of it. 
The remainder of Old Testament history until the Babylonian captivity is one long 
chronicle of disobedience by God’s people, a religious disobedience that a jealous God could 
not stomach.  Even someone as great as King Solomon was not immune to it, being led astray 
by his numerous foreign wives to follow false gods (1 Kgs. 11).  The account of Elijah on 
Mount Carmel with the prophets of Baal (1 Kgs. 18) proves the impotence of the false gods of 
non-Jewish peoples.172  It can hardly be understood in an inclusivist manner, namely, that 
God was using the worship of Baal to actually draw people to himself.  Rather, it is the entire 
condemnation of Baal worship and the extermination of its 450 prophets that speaks 
judgment, not a hopeful optimism that God really does approve of these religions.  Later, 
Elijah is reminded that God has reserved for himself “seven thousand in Israel – all whose 
knees have not bowed down to Baal” (1 Kgs. 19:18).  It seems that even within the 
community of God’s chosen people, only a relative few had not committed apostasy. 
During the exile in Babylon, there are numerous instances where Jehovah was proven the 
one true God to the exclusion of all others.  The accounts of Nebuchadnezzar (Dan. 4:28-37) 
and Daniel in the lion’s den (Dan. 6) not only serve as examples of God’s faithfulness to his 
chosen people, but also serve to condemn the gods of the nations around Israel. 
The inclusivist has quite a dilemma when faced with the above data.  Attempting to 
conclude that God did not condemn the religions and religious practises of the nations 
                                                 
171 This interpretation makes sense within the context of the Old Testament and in light of such clear statements 
as 1 Chr. 16:26: “For all the gods of the nations are idols, but the LORD made the heavens.”  “’Idolatry’ is the 
term the Bible uses to label any system of ideas or practices that trades divine truth for a false alternative (see 
Rom. 1:22-25; 1 Cor. 8:4-7; 1 Jn. 5:19-21)” (Geivett/Phillips in Four Views, 134). 
172 In Jonah 1:5, there is another example where the gods of the nations outside Israel are portrayed as impotent 
when compared to Jehovah. 
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surrounding Israel, in light of the plethora of information to the contrary, but that he instead 
looked upon them as means of grace or even salvific, is quite a tall order.  At least as concerns 
the Old Testament biblical data, keeping in mind that an evaluation of the category of pagan 
saints is yet to come, the exclusivist position appears for the moment to be more tenable than 
that of the inclusivist. 
When coming to the New Testament, there is not find nearly the same amount of 
interaction with religions outside the Judeo-Christian tradition as found in the Old Testament, 
but there is enough to examine nonetheless. 
The book of Acts is often the first place inclusivists go when looking to defend their 
positive view of non-Christian religions.  It was already noted the prominent role that the 
conversion of Cornelius plays in this regard, but Paul’s encounter with the Athenians in Acts 
17 is also one of the key texts used by inclusivists.  Pinnock sees in Paul’s Athenian speech an 
explicit connection between Greek worship and the knowledge of the true God.  “God is 
drawing the nations, and religions supply occasions when people can respond to him” (Flame, 
201).  McDermott affirms the same conviction, that God’s revelation has not been limited 
solely to the Judeo-Christian sphere, but has been mediated also by “non-Christian and non-
Jewish faith communities (religions).”173 
Clearly, Paul used the religious context of the Athenians in order to introduce the gospel, 
but this does not necessarily mean that Paul believed that their religious traditions were in 
some way salvific or a means of salvation.  If this had been the case, perhaps Paul could have 
ended his speech without reference to Jesus.  In fact, it is only once he referred to the 
resurrection of the crucified Jew that most of the Athenians quickly lost interest (vss. 31-33).   
Paul’s speech contained a clear condemnation of idolatry, which formed the heart of the 
Athenian worship (vs. 29-30).  It also contained a strongly exclusivist statement about Jesus: 
“For he has set a day when he will judge the world with justice by the man he has appointed.  
He has given proof of this to all men by raising him from the dead” (vs. 31).  Thus it is wiser 
to conclude from Acts 17 that Paul is not commending the religions of the Athenians, but is 
rather countering their false notions with the truth found only in Christ.  That he uses their 
religious traditions as a springboard for introducing the gospel should not be misconstrued as 
approval of their religious traditions. 
Two chapters later Paul’s experiences in the city of Ephesus are recounted, the heart of 
pagan worship in Asia Minor and the home of the Temple of Artemis.  Luke’s portrayal of the 
                                                 
173 Gerald R. McDermott, 2000:110-111, emphasis original. 
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events in Ephesus sets up a “power encounter” between those who worshiped Artemis and her 
image, and those who would see Christ proclaimed.  The burning of the elements of sorcery 
(vs. 19) and the ensuing riot all point to a disjuncture between Christian faith and the religious 
traditions of the Ephesians, not a semblance or continuity between them.  Paul’s message is 
portrayed as one of animosity toward those religious traditions, not acceptance (“He says that 
man-made gods are no gods at all,” vs. 26b). 
In fact, whereas inclusivists find much support for their position in Acts 17, they are 
virtually silent on Acts 19.  This is surprising, since there are great similarities between the 
religious traditions of the Athenians and the Ephesians.  The events in Ephesus must also be 
studied along with Paul’s comments in his Ephesian epistle.  There he notes that apart from 
Christ, people are dead in their sins and following the ways of Satan (2:1-2), “without hope 
and without God in the world” (2:12).  This rather bald statement should be taken at face 
value, as opposed to attempting to read things into narratives such as Acts 17 and coming 
away with more positivistic interpretations. 
John’s closing prohibition in his first epistle (“Dear children, keep yourselves from idols,” 
5:21), should be understood in the whole context of the view of idols in the New Testament 
writings.  Prohibitions against idolatry could very well exclude every other religion 
throughout the Roman Empire save for Judaism.  In fact, Paul can speak in very broad terms 
about the sacrifices of pagans as “offered to demons” (1 Cor. 10:20).  He can also refer to 
“things taught by demons” (1 Tim. 4:1), and it is not difficult to see the two statements as 
aspects of the same reality.  When Paul warns that Satan masquerades as an angel of light (2 
Cor. 11:14), could it not also be rightly concluded that this can involve the religious sphere?  
In what other area would this make sense, if not in the area of the religious? 
Lastly, if any religious tradition outside of Christianity could be said to enjoy the favour 
of God, Judaism would certainly have to be near or at the top of that list.  Yet, Jews like the 
Apostle Paul, Pharisees such as Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea, and all of the disciples 
of Jesus found it necessary to depart from the Jewish religious tradition.  For example, there 
would have been no need for Peter’s Pentecostal speech of Acts 2, nor the conversion of 3000 
Jews, had Judaism in and of itself been an adequate expression of faith in God.  The fact that 
adherents to the Old Testament religious revelation needed to convert to the Christian faith 
speaks volumes, and should cause circumspection when evaluating religious traditions further 
down the spectrum from Christianity.  Recalling the issue of pagan saints, there would have 
been no need for Peter to bring the gospel to Cornelius, for example, had he already possessed 
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salvation.  This stands to reason if even the Jewish faithful needed to change religious 
adherence. 
Given the entire breadth and tenor of the Old and New Testament Scriptures, there 
appears little warrant to maintain that religions outside of the Jewish and Christian traditions 
are positively viewed by God.  The pluralist’s contention that they are indeed salvific simply 
lacks any biblical basis whatsoever, but even the evangelical inclusivist’s conviction that God 
positively uses them to draw people to himself (or to Christ) appears unfounded.174  The 
exclusivist position, namely, that non-Christian religions are “false” religions and draw people 
away from the one, true God, not only has historical precedence in its favour, but the biblical 
data also seems to favour it as well.175 
 
3.2.4 The Examples of Pagan Saints 
The third thrust of Pinnock’s Pneumatology involves pagan saints.  Evangelical inclusivists 
appeal to Scripture as God’s Word.  It is God-breathed and as such, it can be fully trusted, or 
to put it another way, trusted fully.  Fellow evangelicals need not waste time bickering over 
this or that statement of Jesus as authentic or inauthentic, for example, because they believe 
the Word to be fully from God. 
So then, given this important, common ground, how can evangelicals find themselves at 
odds with each other on such a vital issue as the extent of the atoning work of Christ?  Or 
more specifically, how can an exclusivist view Christ’s atoning work, particularly when it 
comes to the existence and efficacy of other world religions, in such a negative light, while 
the inclusivist can be so positive and hopeful?  Is the Bible so unclear as to leave an 
unbridgeable and unexplainable gap as this? 
God’s Spirit can do anything he chooses to do, a confession which flows from the belief 
that God is the omnipotent, sovereign Lord over all.  However, if an a priori supposition 
which excludes a hermeneutic of judgment is used, will this not consequently create a more 
                                                 
174 To be fair, Pinnock does indeed recognise religion’s “bad side” (Wideness, 88-89), but he still maintains a 
positive view of religious traditions in general, something that Scripture seems to not support. 
175 This study has been concentrating on those individuals who have a religious tradition, but estimates of world 
demographics place atheists and a-religious people at nearly 20% of the population (see www.adherents.com).  
As noted earlier, Pinnock approves of the Catholic notion that even an atheist can ultimately be saved without 
ever professing Christ.  But the Psalmist says plainly, “The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God.’” (Ps. 14:1).  
Nowhere in all the Wisdom literature can one positive statement about a fool be found, unless it is said 
sarcastically (such as in Ecclesiastes).  A fool is a person who is morally deficient (see NIV Study Bible [Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1985] footnote for Psalm 14:1), and as such, it is a contradiction in terms to speak of a 
holy pagan atheist.  Such designations are biblically incoherent. 
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positive feeling toward other faiths?  To put this another way, a Spirit who negatively judges a 
large portion of humanity will not be tolerated any more than will a Jesus who does similarly. 
The entire openness that inclusivists believe God has for non-Christian religions is 
founded on their biblical exposition of pagan saints.  A close look at their treatment of this 
category is needed to see if there is any validity to the inclusivist claims.  The four pagan 
saints used when evaluating inclusivist comments on the subject will be considered. 
Job.  Pinnock refers to Job as “. . . a pagan believer . . . who had a good will and put his 
trust in God even though inadequately informed doctrinally and morally.”  This is a fairly 
incredible statement about Job given what God himself said about the man.  “There is no one 
on earth like him; he is blameless and upright, a man who fears God and shuns evil” (Job 1:8).  
Pinnock further notes, “A person who is informationally premessianic, whether living in 
ancient or modern times, is in the exact same spiritual situation” (Wideness, 160).  This is an 
equally incredible statement, again given what God said about Job.  Does Professor Pinnock 
honestly believe that “pagan saints” today could be spoken of in the same way as God spoke 
about Job? 
Putting that question aside for the moment, it is not clear how Job got to where he was 
spiritually.  The nature of the revelation he received from God is not given in the text, 
although he does say at the end of the book, “My ears had heard of you but now my eyes have 
seen you” (Job 42:5), so perhaps he had faith by hearing, as Paul says faith can come (Rom. 
10:17).  Job had heard of the one, true God and had devoted his life to serving him.  This is 
nothing different than sharing the gospel about Jesus and someone reacting similarly.  Job did 
not come to his conclusions about Jehovah by looking at a tree or river, or through casting an 
idol, but in some way came to faith in Jehovah because of what he heard about him.  
Whatever the actual case, it is a wild conclusion to make that “holy pagans” today are in the 
“same spiritual situation” as was Job. 
Nash makes a similar point when he asks:  “How can Old Testament believers who had a 
significant relationship to special revelation and whose faith was tied to symbols and practices 
that looked forward to Christ provide warrant for treating unevangelized moderns as saved 
believers?” (1994:127).  Simply put, the inclusivist argument that Old Testament pagan saints 
are in the same spiritual situation as people today who have yet to hear about Jesus is an 
untenable argument. 
Melchizedek.  That Melchizedek is a mysterious personage in the Bible cannot be denied.  
The comments that the author of the Book of Hebrews makes about him can come only from 
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divine inspiration.  His conclusions are not readily made otherwise.176  However, to conclude 
from Melchizedek that readers must appreciate Canaanite religion is too much to ask, 
especially considering how God dealt with the Canaanites.177 
Further, there is less information about Melchizedek’s interaction with Jehovah than with 
Job.  For example, the text does not state how Melchizedek came to become a priest, or how 
he encountered Yahweh previously.  Pinnock’s first point that there are genuine believers in 
nations outside of Israel is not denied, but in most biblical instances of such, those people 
came to faith in Yahweh because they heard about him, not via their pagan culture and 
religion.178  No matter how much Richardson makes of the “Melchizedek factor,” Scripture is 
silent on how Melchizedek came to know Yahweh, and arguing from this silence is 
dangerous, especially if it yields conclusions which are at odds with the overall tenor of 
Scripture when it comes to how people come to faith in God. 
If God wanted to show that there are “positive contributions to be appreciated from non-
Israelite religion and culture,” it seems hardly instructive to command the Israelites to wipe 
out all those people.  Why, if the pagan Canaanite religions were so helpful in drawing men to 
God, did God consistently object when the Israelites attempted to incorporate Canaanite 
culture and religious practise into their worship?  “The tragedies of the Assyrian and 
Babylonian captivities are specifically attributed to Israel’s idolatrous perversions (2 Kings 
17; 2 Chr. 28:22-23; 36:11-21)” (Clendenin, 1995:130).  Canaanite religion in the Old 
Testament is consistently and unequivocally represented and regarded as reprehensible in the 
eyes of Yahweh, not instructive and to be appreciated. 
Abimelech.  Pinnock comments that the example of Abimelech, ”proves beyond any 
doubt that the fear of the Lord may occur in the hearts of people who live far beyond Israel’s 
borders” (Wideness, 94), but this is not the point to which exclusivists object when it comes to 
the examples of holy pagans in the Old Testament.  That God is interested in all peoples is not 
questioned.  His promise to Abraham stated that he would be a blessing to all nations (Gen. 
12:3), and the picture in Revelation of people from “every tribe and language and people and 
                                                 
176 Concerning who exactly Melchizedek was, some scholars have concluded that he was either a theophany, a 
pre-existent being, or a pre-incarnate appearance of Christ (Nash, Jesus Only Savior?, 128, and Donald Guthrie, 
The Letter to the Hebrews (Leicester: InterVarsity Press, 1989) 157. 
177 Clendenin refers to God’s merciless dealing with the Canaanite people as evidence of the “particularity of 
God’s self-revelation” (1995:129). 
178 Nash makes the point that Melchizedek should not even be labelled a “pagan.”  “Melchizedek worshiped and 
served Yahweh as certainly as Abram did.  Melchizedek fails as an example of genuine piety among pagans” 
(1994:128). 
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nation” (5:9; 7:9; 14:6) worshiping God and the Lamb is a sure sign that this promise will be 
fulfilled.179 
In the case of Abimelech, Genesis 20 says that God came to Abimelech in a dream, 
therefore establishing direct contact with the king.  Abimelech was not led to belief in God 
through his pagan religion, and the passage says nothing of the sort.  In fact, at the end of the 
story it says that Abraham prayed to God so that Abimelech could be healed (20:17).  This 
hardly portrays Abimelech as a devout follower of Jehovah, and in fact may point to a 
deficiency on the part of Abimelech’s religion in approaching Jehovah, as it was necessary for 
Abraham to intercede for him. 
Cornelius.  The example of Cornelius is the most important, because it involves a post-
Easter individual.  Acts 10:2 states that Cornelius “and all his family were devout and God-
fearing; he gave generously to those in need and prayed to God regularly.”  The obvious 
question in all of this is how did Cornelius come to be a God-fearer in the first place?  Was it 
through the mystery cults, or State religion, or the worship of the Roman gods or some other 
pagan system?  Or was it more plausibly through contact with Jews and coming to recognise 
that their God was the one, true God?  Scripture does not specify, but from elsewhere in the 
Book of Acts it can see how Luke uses this term, “God-fearing.”   
In Acts 2:5, it is used of Jews who have come to Jerusalem to celebrate Pentecost.  In 
13:26, it is used of Gentiles who have come to the synagogue, obviously attracted to the 
teachings of Judaism.  In fact, it is used twice more in a similar context (17:4, 17), when Paul 
went to Thessalonica and to Athens and again, both times while in a synagogue, “God-fearing 
Greeks” were present.180  The pattern is unmistakable.  Luke uses this term almost exclusively 
when he refers to people who have come into contact with Judaism and its teachings about 
God, but who have yet to convert fully to Judaism.  In Acts 13:43 he speaks of “devout 
converts to Judaism.”  From this it may be concluded, along with the NIV Study Bible, that 
“God-fearing” refers to “one who was not a full Jewish proselyte but who believed in one 
God and respected the moral and ethical teachings of the Jews” (footnote, Acts 10:2). 
It is best to allow the author of Acts to state how the term should be understood, and not 
to jump to false conclusions about it as inclusivists seem to do.  Cornelius came to fear God 
because of his contact with the teachings of Judaism.  The same could be said about Peter, 
Paul, and the rest of the apostles.  Their understanding of God did not come from paganism, 
                                                 
179 It should be noted in these pictures in Revelation that not “every person” is there, but people from every tribe, 
nation, language, and people is noted.  It is a representative redemption, not a universal one. 
180 The only other usage of the term is found in Acts 13:50, referring to “God-fearing women of high standing” 
who helped in expelling Paul and Barnabas from the city. 
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but from contact with the teachings of Judaism.  “God-fearers” frequently came to the 
synagogue to learn more about the God of the Jews, and Paul often encountered them there.  
However, if they decided to convert fully to the Jewish faith, Luke designates them differently 
as seen in Acts 13:43. 
The example of Cornelius does not teach, therefore, that people can come to faith in the 
one true God through questionable religions.  Instead, it teaches that people from all nations 
and all tribes can come to God when they come into contact with a religion which truly 
teaches about him.  From the biblical record, that is limited to Judaism and Christianity.181 
Pinnock notes:  “Those like Cornelius, who have responded to God in pagan contexts will 
need to turn to Christ to receive what Jesus alone can give them:  the Holy Spirit, a portion in 
the kingdom of God, and the experience of messianic salvation” (Wideness, 179).  No 
bickering is necessary over whether or not a person who does not have the Holy Spirit, a 
portion in the kingdom of God, and the experience of messianic salvation can be properly 
considered to be saved, but one wonders why, if the pagan religions of people like Cornelius 
were so good, that they needed to come to Christ at all.  Given the understanding of 
progressive revelation, evangelicals do not disagree that in Jesus Christ the fullness of the 
revelation of God has come.   
However, Pinnock believes that Cornelius came to faith in his “pagan context.”  If by 
saying this he only means that a pagan came to faith in Jesus, then that is no difficulty.  Many 
people do.  However, if Pinnock believes that it was because of his pagan context that 
Cornelius came to faith in the one, true God, and this can be suspected given Pinnock’s 
inclusivism, then he is just simply wrong.  Cornelius serves as an example of someone who 
came to faith despite his paganism, because he had contact with God’s chosen people, the 
Jews, and their teaching. 
The main point of Peter’s encounter with Cornelius, including the vision Peter had about 
the sheet with unclean food, was given by Luke near the conclusion of the story:  “Then Peter 
began to speak:  ‘I now realize how true it is that God does not show favouritism, but accepts 
men from every nation who fear him and do what is right’” (Acts 10:34-35).  The lesson was 
given to Peter so that he would learn that God is not just the God of the Jews, but he is the 
God of all peoples.  God does not show favouritism, he does not care about nationality or 
status.  If a person has faith, that person will be accepted, whether they are a Jew or a Gentile. 
                                                 
181 The NIV Study Bible also sees a clue in 10:3 when it says that Cornelius prayed regularly and that a vision 
from God came to him “about three in the afternoon.”  This was a Jewish hour of prayer, and could possibly 
serve as another proof that Cornelius followed Jewish religious practises. 
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These verses are often used by inclusivists to bolster their claim that explicit knowledge 
of Jesus is not necessary, only that an individual does what is morally right (eg., Flame, 180, 
195, 202).  But this fails to take into consideration the full context of the Cornelius episode, 
especially verse 43: “everyone who believes in him receives forgiveness of sins through his 
name.”  This is Peter’s conclusion to the Cornelius incident, and it is not surprising that, 
whereas Pinnock quotes verses 35-36 three times in his book, he does not reference verse 43 
even once.  The Cornelius account does not teach salvation for people who do not profess 
faith in Jesus but who are simply “God-fearing,” moral people.  It teaches the exact opposite, 
namely, that salvation came to Cornelius via a profession of epistemological faith in Christ.  
What this story does not teach is that God respects pagan religions and uses them to draw 
people to Christ.  Cornelius became a God-fearer because of his encounter with the God of 
Judaism.  God heard his prayers, because Cornelius was praying to Jehovah (Acts 10:31).  He 
was not on his knees praying to the Emperor, or Zeus, or Apollo, or Mithras.  Cornelius was 
praying to Jehovah, the God of the Jews. 
John Sanders similarly uses Cornelius in a wrong fashion when he states, “Peter and Paul 
came to the realization that there were Gentiles who worshiped the true God despite the fact 
that some of them had limited knowledge of the Old Testament while others remained 
completely without special revelation” (Three Views, 43).  Concerning Cornelius, a few 
questions should help determine if Sanders’ conclusions are accurate.  How much is known 
about Cornelius and his past?  Did he become a God-fearer through the veneration of idols?  
How much prior contact did he have with the Jews and the revelation of the Torah and other 
Jewish Scriptures? 
As already noted, when Luke refers to Cornelius as a “God-fearer” this is filled with 
content which makes it virtually certain that Cornelius did in fact have contact with the 
special revelation of God as found in the Jewish Scriptures.  One gets the strong impression 
that inclusivists believe that the Jews who rejected Jesus as the Messiah could still, by 
sincerely striving for righteousness through the Law, be saved (see Race quotation on page 
120 below for an example).  How else can the account of Cornelius be understood as used by 
inclusivist scholars?  Can any God-fearing Jew, who was sincerely trying to please God 
through his moral and ethical code, also be considered as one who is not under eschatological 
judgment? 
In actuality, the only way that Cornelius can be used in support of inclusivism is if he did 
not come to faith in Jesus, yet was clearly shown in Scripture to be saved.  However, this is 
simply not the case, any more than it was in the case of another God-fearing man whose 
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conversion is recorded in Acts, Saul of Tarsus.  If ever there was a man who feared God and 
sincerely attempted to follow the Creator’s will it was Saul of Tarsus.  Yet by his own 
reckoning, the man who would become the Apostle Paul considered everything before his 
profession of faith in Christ to be “dung” (Phil. 3:8).  Race’s assessment of Paul’s situation 
pre-conversion appears false:  “If he had never been converted, his faith would surely have 
saved him” (Christians and Religious Pluralism, 148).  This seems at odds with the Apostle’s 
own admission. 
What else does the story of Cornelius teach?  It seems clear that Cornelius’ status as a 
“God-fearer” was not good enough.  A similar thing could be said about the Apostle Paul, or 
any of the disciples of Jesus for that matter.  Simply having faith in God, in light of the first 
advent of the Christ, was not sufficient.  The time of the Christ had now come.  Faith in Jesus 
Christ was now necessary, otherwise Cornelius could have been left alone.  As the Apostle 
Paul told the Athenians, the sovereign Lord, who “determined the times set for [men] and the 
exact places where they should live” (Acts 17:26), had in the past “overlooked such 
ignorance, but now . . . commands all people everywhere to repent.  For he has set a day when 
he will judge the world with justice by the man he has appointed.  He has given proof of this 
to all men by raising him from the dead” (Acts 17:30-31).  From the whole scope of the Book 
of Acts, it is best to conclude that, had Cornelius not come to faith in Jesus Christ, he would 
not have been saved. 
This is not just unsubstantiated conjecture either.  As often happens with the biblical 
accounts, the answer to the question concerning Cornelius and his salvation prior to the arrival 
of Peter is found right in the account by Luke.  In chapter 11, Peter is back in Jerusalem 
explaining to the “circumcised believers” why he had the audacity to go into a house of 
uncircumcised men and share a meal with them.  As Peter explains his vision of the sheet with 
unclean food, he further recounts the messengers sent by Cornelius and the message they had 
for Peter.  Specifically, the angel sent by God to Cornelius said this:  “He [Peter] will bring 
you a message through which you and all your household will be saved” (11:14). 
The chronology is crucial.  Cornelius and his household will be saved through a message 
that Cornelius had yet to hear.  His salvation did not come prior to Peter’s arrival, but only 
after it.  Cornelius’ account should not be understood as bestowing upon him certain blessings 
through Christ on top of a salvation he already possessed, as the inclusivists errantly maintain 
(what Pinnock calls “full-strength salvation,” Wideness, 105).  Rather, had Cornelius not 
received the message of Peter concerning faith in Christ, he would not have received 
salvation. 
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It is crucial to understand what happened in the case of Cornelius.  Here is a man who 
most likely was a “pagan” by all accounts, but who through his interaction with the Jews 
came to respect their traditions.  He became intrigued with their teaching concerning the one, 
true God, and so he began to attend their services.  He prayed to this God regularly and gave 
generously to the poor.  For this, Luke refers to him as a “God-fearer.”  Yet, up to this point 
Luke does not reckon him with the saved.  This only happens after Cornelius heard Peter’s 
message and responded favourably to it. 
In all of this there is not a hint that Cornelius’ pagan religion or beliefs had anything to do 
with garnering favour with God, or in bringing him to salvation.  Cornelius serves as the 
quintessential example of the need for evangelism and taking the gospel to those who do not 
know it.  Even a generous, prayerful, “God-fearing” man needed to hear the gospel and have 
faith in Christ before he could be saved. 
 
3.2.5 Summary Concerning Pagan Saints 
In summary, Cornelius does not serve as an example of a New Testament-era “pagan saint” as 
understood by inclusivists, but rather as more proof of the exclusivist’s position, namely, that 
a profession of faith in Jesus Christ is required for a person to be saved.  “God-fearing” men 
such as Cornelius and Saul of Tarsus needed to move to faith in Jesus Christ if they were to 
escape eschatological judgment. 
Pinnock concludes that a mistake is made when looking at these holy pagans as “rare 
exceptions rather than as a sign of hope” (Wideness, 99).  But was Melchizedek truly a sign of 
hope, or was he rather a rare exception in Canaan?  After all, what did God command Joshua 
to do to the people of Canaan?  Would it not have made more sense to command Joshua to 
evangelise these holy pagans rather than to slaughter them completely?  If God were truly “at 
work in the religious sphere of Canaanite culture,” it hardly makes good sense that God 
commanded the Israelites to kill all of them.  In fact, is it not exactly because of Canaanite 
religion and culture that God wanted the Jews to wipe out the Canaanites, and that he was 
bitterly angry when the Israelites refused to do so?  The opening chapters of the Book of 
Judges teach this lesson.  Because the Israelites did not obey God and entirely wipe out the 
Canaanites, they fell into false worship of the very religions and gods of the Canaanite people.  
This is hardly support for the inclusivist’s claim about God and his supposed respect for 
Canaanite religion and culture. 
Pinnock has made a non sequitur here.  That God chose to save people other than Jews 
cannot be questioned, but this should not lead to the conclusion that the religions of the non-
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Jews were the reason for their salvation.  Similarly, it is one thing to say that God saves 
people who do not know Christ, but it is quite another to say that they never know about 
Christ and are still saved. 
In some missiological instances, Muslims have claimed that God came in a dream and 
told them to speak to someone in their area who was a Christian.182  This is certainly an 
example of God’s concern for people outside traditionally Christian nations, but it is not an 
example of how God used Islam to bring a person to redemption.  The two are entirely 
different matters. 
Both pluralists and to a lesser extent inclusivists use their experience of contact with 
moral or ethical people from other religious traditions as an argument to either base their 
pluralism or bolster their inclusivism.183  However, do they truly know the heart of anybody, 
including themselves?  It is one thing to recognise charitableness in a person; it is quite 
another matter to determine why that person is being charitable.  Perhaps the person is 
looking to gain the favour of men, much like the hypocrites did during the time of Jesus.  No 
doubt many people considered the Pharisees to be devout and righteous men.  After all, they 
prayed several times a day, fasted several times a week, and gave to the poor.  Would Hick or 
Pinnock have recognised their hypocrisy, or would they have been duped as seemingly the 
vast majority of Jews during that time were?  In any event, arguing from the morality of 
people is not an adequate basis from which to conclude that God approves of non-Christian 
religions, or uses them to draw people to Christ. 
“Holy pagans” such as Enoch, Abel, Rahab, Jethro, Job, Abimelech, Melchizedek, and 
others heard about the God of the Bible, and through this hearing about him put their faith in 
him.  Pinnock is using poor examples to prove his inclusivist’s point about the redemption of 
people in lands who have not heard about Jesus.  Jethro knew about Yahweh because of his 
relationship with Moses (Ex. 18:1, 10-11).  Rahab hid the spies because she had heard about 
the mighty deeds of the God of the Jews (Josh. 2:10).  Job was a righteous man because he 
heard about God.  Enoch is said to have “walked with God” (Gen. 5:24).  For most of the 
examples usually used to support the pagan saints argument, these people knew Yahweh or 
had heard of his mighty deeds.  Their faith was not mediated by their false religion.  Their 
faith was a result of their knowledge of God.  For some other examples, such as the case with 
Melchizedek, it is not entirely clear how they came to know about Jehovah, so to jump to 
false conclusions that it was because of their pagan religion would be a grave error to make. 
                                                 
182 Alister McGrath points this out in Okholm & Phillips, Four Views, 179. 
183 See Hick, Four Views, 39f, and Pinnock, Four Views, 102. 
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How do people come to faith in Jesus Christ?  Paul writes, “faith comes from hearing the 
message, and the message is heard through the word of Christ” (Rom. 10:17).184  The 
examples of holy pagans cannot be used to teach that God uses non-Christian religions to 
draw men to Christ.  Quite the contrary.  The examples of pagan saints confirm what is 
already known to be the case concerning the gospel.  People who hear about Jesus can then 
confess him and declare their faith in him.  Muslims through their honest and sincere devotion 
to Islam cannot come to saving faith in Jesus Christ without hearing the gospel, nor will they 
gain God’s approval apart from it.  African Traditional Religions do not lead people to Christ, 
but rather foster fear of retribution from the ancestral spirits, and work to hold people captive 
to Satan.  The polytheism of Hinduism and Buddhism only serves to drive people away from 
the one, true God, not draw them to him. 
Job, Rahab, Abimelech, Cornelius, and others did not come to faith through their pagan 
religions, which only served to lead them away from God.  They came to faith through 
contact with the one true God, via contact with Judaism (Naaman, Ruth, Queen of Sheba, 
Daniel, Cornelius), God’s people (Abimelech, Lot, Jethro, Rahab), or directly with God 
himself such as in the cases of Enoch and Noah.  When coming to people like Melchizedek 
(or possibly Abel, although it is hardly a stretch to believe that Abel learned about God from 
his father Adam), when Scripture does not state how that person originally came to believe in 
the one, true God, false conclusions should not be made that it must have been via pagan 
religion or culture.  The vast majority of pagan saints in the Bible came to faith in God 
because they had some contact with him or his people.  With Melchizedek, it simply is not 
stated and it should be left at that.  However, it would not be too much speculation to consider 
the possibility that he came to faith in God in a way similar to other pagan saints in the Old 
Testament, and there is not one example of a pagan saint in the category listed by Pinnock 
coming to faith in Jehovah via the worship of false gods, be they Baal, Molech, or the 
numerous gods of Egypt or Babylon or Canaan.185 
 
                                                 
184 Interestingly, Paul then moves to an argument from what is normally considered general revelation, namely, 
the creation as witness to God, by quoting Psalm 19:4.  He then moves to special revelation by quoting Moses 
and the prophet Isaiah, all to prove that Israel in fact did hear, and yet chose to rebel against God’s revelation.  
The rejection of both general and special revelation, then, are noted as bases for the condemnation of God. 
185 According to Genesis chapter 11, Abraham is the tenth generation from Noah.  It is not hard to imagine 
people by that time who knew God and worshiped him.  Melchizedek could very well have come to know God 
much like Rahab or Job knew him, by word of mouth.  This is quite similar to a Christian missionary today 
taking the gospel to an unreached people. 
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3.2.6 “The Sword of the Spirit” 
Pneumatology is concluded by returning to a bibliological matter.  Pinnock makes this 
promising statement: “What the Spirit says and does cannot be opposed to revelation in 
Christ, because Spirit is bound to the Word of God” (Flame, 209).  This is purely an 
evangelical statement that reflects the loyalty to God’s Word that Pinnock feels as an 
evangelical.  But Pinnock and other inclusivists do not seem to be able to adequately balance 
their inclusivism with an evangelical view of Scripture.186 
Evangelical inclusivists have placed themselves in a bind.  While attempting to maintain 
their orthodox view of Scripture in their Bibliology, they have unwittingly jeopardised it in 
their Pneumatology.  To maintain the evangelical view of Scripture, they must agree with 
Paul who states, “All Scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching, rebuking, 
correcting and training in righteousness, so that the man of God may be thoroughly equipped 
for every good work” (2 Tim. 3:15-17).  Furthermore, Paul refers to the Word of God as “the 
sword of the Spirit” (Eph. 6:17) and from this can be seen the intimate relationship between 
Bibliology and Pneumatology.187 
It is precisely at this point that the inclusivist fails.  An evangelical understanding of 
inspiration and illumination builds an intimate link between what is said about the Bible and 
what is said about the Holy Spirit.  Note that the Word is the “sword of the Spirit.”  The Word 
and the Spirit go hand in hand.  One is not found without the other.  The Holy Spirit is 
involved in complementing, not contradicting, what he has already inspired in his holy Word. 
Hear the words of John Calvin on this matter:  “The Spirit, promised to us, has not the 
task of inventing new and unheard-of revelations, or of forging a new kind of doctrine, to lead 
us away from the received doctrine of the gospel, but of sealing our minds with that very 
doctrine which is commended by the gospel” (Institutes, 1.9.1).  The Holy Spirit is recognised 
in his agreement with God’s Word.  The work of the Spirit and God’s Word are 
complementary, not contradictory.  Where the Spirit is, so also is his sword.  One senses that 
evangelical inclusivists would agree with such sentiments, but various statements they make 
call this into question.  It is one thing to say that the Spirit must agree with the Word, as 
                                                 
186 In his final chapter in Flame, Pinnock discusses bibliological views in greater detail and, while often 
sounding like an evangelical, most evangelicals will be disappointed to see him lean more heavily toward an 
Orthodox and Catholic understanding of the authority of tradition. 
187 Stanley Grenz, another contemporary evangelical who has pushed the boundaries of evangelicalism at times, 
agrees that there is a strong need for a Bibliology and Pneumatology that are intimately linked (Revisioning 
Evangelical Theology, 113-115, 125-128).  He too questions the traditional evangelical view of biblical 
inerrancy and inspiration, and has tried to de-emphasise their importance, not dealing with Bibliology until 
nearly two-thirds of the way through his systematics, and then only under Pneumatology. 
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Pinnock does in his quotation above.  It is quite another to maintain a theology which indeed 
supports it. 
This is precisely where many theologians fail today.  Again, this does not refer to liberals 
who have all but abandoned the orthodox view of Scripture.  This refers to evangelicals of the 
inclusivist variety, those who proclaim their belief in the Bible as the Word of God and all 
that that entails.  However, they also claim that the Holy Spirit today is working contrary to 
the very Word he inspired. 
It is this sort of divergence that lies at the heart of many errors today.  When the ministry 
of the Word is separated from the ministry of the Holy Spirit, two main faults can occur.   
First, there are those who claim the Holy Spirit is working here or there, but what is seen 
is in direct conflict with God’s Word.  Where the Spirit is there also is his sword.  God’s 
Spirit will not be found working in a way that contradicts God’s Word.  Many Christians who 
are interested in a “spiritual experience” and seek some emotional verifications of their beliefs 
commonly fall into this error.  It is the main error of some in the Pentecostal movement and 
those influenced by it.  A certain anti-intellectualism pervades because, as is sometimes 
expressed, “I have the Holy Spirit living in me.  Why do I need to study the Bible?  The Spirit 
will guide me into all truth.”  What such people fail to grasp, though, is that the Holy Spirit is 
not given to make Bible study needless, but to make it effective. 
Inclusivists are making the same mistake.  They are attributing a contradictory work to 
the Holy Spirit, one which does not jibe with the holy Word.  They are in essence telling 
people the Scripture is not necessary, because the Spirit is working, even in traditions and 
religions which are contrary to God’s Word.  They are ignoring the very words of Jesus, the 
one to whom the Spirit is meant to draw people.  It is illogical to say the Spirit is drawing 
people to Christ, while at the same time implying that the words of Christ can be ignored. 
The other error is the exact opposite, to have so much “head knowledge” of the Word that 
contact with God’s Spirit is lost.  The Word is viewed as a book filled with theological facts, 
and the lives of believers are devoid of any of the life and vibrancy of the Spirit.  Their heads 
are in the right place, but their hearts are empty.  Salvation is viewed solely as mental assent 
to propositional truths and not also as life given by the indwelling of God’s Spirit.  God’s 
Spirit is limited to his activity in the “apostolic age” and believers live as if he has nothing to 
do in this day and age. 
For this error Pinnock suggests powerful correctives (esp. in Flame), but in bemoaning an 
evangelicalism which leans toward the one error, Pinnock unwittingly proposes one which 
leans too much toward the other.  Pinnock’s Pneumatology suffers from his weak Bibliology. 
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Twentieth-century evangelical pastor and theologian A. W. Tozer emphasised a balance 
between the two when he said: "The great need of the hour among persons spiritually hungry 
is two fold:  First, to know the Scriptures, apart from which no saving truth will be 
vouchsafed by our Lord; the second, to be enlightened by the Spirit, apart from whom the 
Scriptures will not be understood."188  Where the Spirit is, so also is his sword. 
Again, the words of Calvin are helpful.  “For as God alone is a fit witness of himself in 
his Word, so also the Word will not find acceptance in men’s hearts before it is sealed by the 
inward testimony of the Spirit” (Institutes, 1.7.4).  This is understandable because the Holy 
Spirit is the author of the revelation (2 Pet. 1:21-22; 2 Sam. 23:2; Ezk. 2:2; Mic. 3:8; Matt. 
22:43; Acts 1:16; 4:25). 
This topic is characteristically labelled illumination.  It is the understanding that the 
Scriptures are not able to be entirely understood apart from the work of the Holy Spirit who 
enlightens or illumines the reader.  Reformed author and professor at Trinity Divinity School, 
Wayne Grudem, has this to say on the matter:  “Scripture is able to be understood by all 
unbelievers who will read it sincerely seeking salvation, and by all believers who will read it 
while seeking God’s help in understanding it.  This is because in both cases the Holy Spirit is 
at work overcoming the effects of sin, which otherwise will make the truth appear to be 
foolish (1 Cor. 2:14; 1:18-25; James 1:5-6, 22-25)” (1994:107-108). 
 In its first chapter, the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647) covers the Scriptures and 
has this to say: 
“We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to a high and 
reverent esteem of the holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the 
efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the 
scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes 
of the only way of man’s salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, 
and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly 
evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion 
and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the 
inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our 
hearts.” 
In short, a proper Bibliology cannot exist without a proper Pneumatology.  Inclusivists 
believe that God’s Spirit is, through non-Christian religions, wooing people to Christ.  But 
                                                 
188  The Best of A. W. Tozer (Grand Rapids: Baker Publishing Group, 1991) 131. 
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could that argument have been used on Moses, say, during the golden calf incident?  “But 
Moses, we are merely using an Egyptian-like idol to show our tribute to Jehovah.”  God’s 
Spirit through the prophet Elijah condemned the prophets of Baal and Baal himself as a false 
god, but inclusivists believe that today, God’s Spirit is using similar false religions to draw 
people to Christ.189 
Evangelical theology has traditionally ascribed to what is called verbal, plenary 
inspiration of the Scriptures.  This is in contradiction to other theories such as natural 
inspiration, partial inspiration, mystical inspiration, and the mechanical/dictation theory of 
inspiration.  Verbal, plenary inspiration affirms that the very words (verbal) and all of them 
(plenary) were inspired by God.  A good working definition of “inspiration” is:  God’s 
superintending of human authors so that, using their own individual personalities, they 
composed and recorded without error the revelation of God to humans in the words of the 
original autographs.  “God completely adapted His inspiring activity to the cast of mind, 
outlook, temperament, interests, literary habits, and stylistic idiosyncrasies of each writer.”190  
This theory of inspiration affirms both the human and divine elements of the Bible. 
The common objection that humans are flawed and everything they write will necessarily 
be flawed ignores the ministry of the Holy Spirit when it comes to the production of God’s 
Word.191  The doctrine of verbal, plenary inspiration guards from the error that inevitably 
ensues in subscribing to other theories of inspiration.  For instance, in any of the partial 
theories of inspiration, one is not sure which parts of the Bible are free from error and which 
are not.192  Trust in the Scriptures is minimised if not entirely destroyed.  Who knows if this is 
really God speaking or just a fallible person?  Verbal, plenary inspiration affirms that all of 
the words have come from God, while still maintaining the distinct personality of each author.  
“What is overcome or overridden by inspiration is not human personality, style or literary 
structure, but human tendencies to distortion, falsehood and error.”193  It is the secular, 
humanist viewpoint that first denies the existence of God, or at minimum his involvement in 
                                                 
189 Which falls in line with Pinnock’s positive statements about Canaanite culture and religion. 
190 J. I. Packer, as quoted in René Pache, The Inspiration & Authority of Scripture (Salem, WI: Sheffield 
Publishing Company, 1980) 68. 
191 As high of a regard as Pinnock has for the Holy Spirit, he falls short of granting the Spirit the ability to 
infallibly and inerrantly inspire authors in their composition of Scripture. 
192 Normally, some external-to-the-Word authority is used, such as in neo-orthodox approaches, in order to 
determine which portions of Scripture are trustworthy and which are not.  This understandably yields a variety of 
competing systems and authorities, and is wholly unsatisfactory to an evangelical position which views Scripture 
as the supreme authority. 
193 R. C. Sproul, Explaining Inerrancy (Oakland, CA: International Council on Biblical Inerrancy, 1980) 20. 
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his creation, ultimately concluding that an infallible, albeit human-produced, revelation from 
God in written form could not be produced.194 
Proof for such a view is found from Scripture itself.195 
• “The Bible constantly affirms that it is the very Word of the Lord” - see Ex. 17:14; Jer. 
30:2; and “God said” passages such as Matt. 15:4 and Acts 28:25; 3808 times the Old 
Testament authors claim to be transmitting the very words of God. 
• “Christ and the Apostles confirm the testimony of the Old Testament” - see Jesus’ use of 
the Scriptures, like Matt. 5:17-18 and John 10:35. 
• “Even Christ’s preaching and that of the Apostles was called ‘the Word of God’” - parts 
of the New Testament assert that other parts of the New Testament are Scripture (1 Tim. 
5:18; 2 Pet. 3:16). 
• “In drawing up the New Testament, the Apostles were fully conscious that they were 
writing ‘the Word of God’” - see 1 Cor. 2:13; 1 Pet. 1:11-12. 
The doctrine of verbal, plenary inspiration only echoes what Scripture itself says about 
God’s words:  “Every word of God is flawless; he is a shield to those who take refuge in him” 
(Prov. 30:5).  The only reason God can be trusted is because his words are without error.  In 
the long discourse by Jesus in John’s Gospel, chapters 14 to 17, no less than ten times Jesus 
mentions truth, in many instances referring to the Holy Spirit as the “Spirit of truth” (14:17; 
15:26; 16:13).  Near the end of his prayer for the disciples, Jesus says that “your [God’s] word 
is truth” (John 17:17).  It is no accident that Jesus refers to the Holy Spirit and God’s Word as 
truth.196 
Perhaps it seems strange to spend so much time on material that would seem better placed 
in the Bibliology section.  However, inspiration and illumination are ministries of God’s Spirit 
and views concerning these doctrines will affect Bibliology, either positively or negatively.  
Negatively, a doctrine of inspiration that does not recognise the work of the Holy Spirit will 
                                                 
194 As an aside, because humans are fallible it must not automatically be concluded that everything they do is 
fallible.  Fallibility on the part of humans only ensures the potential for failure, not that humans are constantly 
failing.  Put another way, it is not logical to conclude that the Bible must have errors because humans make 
errors.  Humans can do things without errors and do so all the time.  However, the doctrine of verbal, plenary 
inspiration is intended to guard against even the notion that the biblical authors made errors.  Further, it would be 
a rather unsatisfactory theology which would conclude that God could not inspire men to record his revelation 
without errors. 
195 Taken from Pache The Inspiration & Authority of Scripture (Salem, WI: Sheffield Publishing Company, 
1980), the items in quotation marks are chapter headings.  Much more could obviously be said about this matter. 
196 Jesus believed the Old Testament to be divinely inspired, the very words and will of God the Father.  This 
should be the cause for some reflection on the part of those who find the Old Testament so distasteful, especially 
as it portrays God and his judgment. 
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demean the value of God’s Word.197  Constant references to the fallibility of men only works 
to undermine the authority of Scripture, as well as to secondarily call into question the ability 
of God to do such things as guard human authors from error.  It is somewhat ironic that some 
scholars call people to trust God, but also do not believe God could even inspire fallible 
humans to infallibly record his will.198 
Which brings back the original point.  Evangelical inclusivists like Clark Pinnock seem to 
unwittingly posit a faulty Pneumatology.  What is the Holy Spirit doing in the world today?  
Well, from their point of view, it seems he is contradicting his own Word.  In his Word he 
tells people to shun false religions, but in reality, he is using those false religions to draw 
people to God. 
 
3.2.7 Conclusion to Pneumatological Evaluation 
Is God using non-Christian religions as vehicles of salvation (Catholic inclusivists) or as 
means of grace through which he draws people to himself (evangelical inclusivists)?  Is the 
Holy Spirit truly working through these areas of human culture, making the offer of salvation 
via prevenient grace truly a universal offer? 
Inclusivism’s positive portrayal of non-Christian religions and God’s utilisation of them 
to draw people to himself appears to lack support either in the biblical data or by the 
theological arguments mainly used by inclusivists, as seen above.  The overwhelming witness 
of Scripture is that God is not pleased with non-Judeo-Christian religions, let alone viewing 
them as vehicles of salvation or means by which he draws individuals to himself.  Much of 
inclusivism’s positive portrayal of these faiths is based on a faulty reading of Scripture, 
coupled with a misunderstanding of the ministry of the Holy Spirit.  This has resulted because 
of inclusivism’s radical bifurcation between God’s Word and God’s Spirit. 
 
                                                 
197 “Inspiration is the determining influence exercised by the Holy Spirit on the writers of the Old and New 
Testaments in order that they might proclaim and set down in an exact and authentic way the message as 
received from God” (Pache, 45). 
198 In Paul’s comments in First Corinthians about the Gospel as “foolishness” to those who desire miracles 
(Jews) or wisdom (Greeks), his solution to this apparent dilemma is not to change the gospel to make it more 
palatable, as if more signs could be produced, or to hammer out a more rationally-acceptable message.  Paul’s 
solution lies in Pneumatology and the ministry of the Holy Spirit.  His discussion for the rest of chapter 1 and 
through much of the next chapter concerns the ministry of God’s Spirit, culminating in 2:14: “The man without 
the Spirit does not accept the things that come from the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him, and he 
cannot understand them, because they are spiritually discerned.”  Paul’s solution to the gospel as unacceptable, 
offensive, or unreasonable is not to be found in the Church’s improved marketing or packaging of the message.  
Paul lays the entire responsibility for solving this dilemma at the feet of the Holy Spirit. 
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3.3 What Is the Character of the Father, According to Jesus? 
A Christological Reflection on Judgment 
Jesus Christ stands at the centre of Christianity, and rightly so.  The entire Old Testament 
looked forward to his first advent, and in the “last days” we have looked back to it.  The 
incarnation of the God-man is the pivotal point of history, not just of salvation history, but of 
human history. 
Pluralist John Hick has famously proposed a Copernican Revolution whereby Christ is 
removed from the centre of Christian theology and God placed there instead.  This is his 
attempt to make Christianity more in line with other world religions, by removing the offence 
of Christ’s particularity.  Inclusivist Clark Pinnock has produced a similar suggestion in his 
Spirit Christology, as already noted.  While retaining the cardinal doctrines of Trinity and 
incarnation, Pinnock has nonetheless removed Christ as the focal point of Christian 
Soteriology. 
In this section, a hermeneutic of judgment will be used in order to test the propositions of 
inclusivism, specifically as they relate to the person and teaching of Jesus. 
 
3.3.1 Trinitarian Considerations 
Who is Jesus?  That question occupied the early Church for centuries and resulted in various 
conclusions, chief among them the decisions of the Councils of Nicaea and Chalcedon.  And 
although the question of who Jesus is is never ultimately or experientially exhausted, it 
seemed that the conclusions of the early councils had closed the case on the matter.199 
Inclusivists make it a point to refer to the “God of Jesus,” but the “God of Jesus” is none 
other than the God revealed in the Old Testament.  In other words, evangelicals who want 
these two things - to move away from the “vindictive” God of the Old Testament, and to 
concentrate on the “God of Jesus” - have a serious problem to deal with, because the “God of 
Jesus” is that very same vindictive, wrathful God they so much disdain from the Old 
Testament.  There is no difference in his character and nature.  The Old Testament God and 
the God revealed by Jesus Christ are one and the same Being. 
In fact, a Trinitarian dogma determines a more intimate conclusion than even this.  Not 
only is the God revealed by Jesus Christ and the God revealed in the Old Testament the same 
Being, but Trinitarianism also insists that the character of God’s Son, who is homoousios with 
                                                 
199 This is not meant to grossly simplify what was and still is a difficult issue, and certainly after Chalcedon, 
debates still existed as to the interaction of the natures and wills of Jesus and whether he truly was one person.  
Still, major conclusions as to his deity and the incarnation were open and shut cases for the orthodox church.  
That occasional people and movements questioned these conclusions is an obvious fact of history. 
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the Father, is the very same character of the Father who sent him, the God of the Old 
Testament.  There can be no iota of a difference between the character and nature of God’s 
Son and that of the Old Testament God who, for example, spoke to Moses, dealt with King 
David and King Saul, or who played a “cosmic bet” with Satan over the loyalty of Job.  The 
“meek and mild” Saviour has the exact same character and nature as the God who destroyed 
Sodom and Gomorrah; the angry man who cleared the temple of the traders and hawkers has 
the exact same character and nature as the “slow to anger, abounding in love” Yahweh of the 
Old Testament.  To say anything different is to deny the foundation of the Trinitarian dogma, 
a bedrock of Christian theological understanding for centuries. 
The God that Jesus Christ prayed to in the Garden of Gethsemane is the same God who 
banished Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden.  The God who providentially protected 
Moses during the slaughter of the Israelite baby boys in Egypt is the same God who 
providentially protected the boy Jesus when Herod commanded the baby boys of Israel to be 
murdered.  A false dichotomy between the God of wrath in the Old Testament and the God of 
love in the New cannot be maintained.200  Such latent Gnosticism must be discarded. 
Even further, the God who parted the Red Sea for Moses and the fleeing Israelites has the 
same character as the Son of Man who calmed the stormy sea for the fearful disciples.  The 
character of the one who was transfigured on Mount Hermon is the same in character to the 
one who was revealed on Mount Sinai.  Jesus is understood to fully reveal the character and 
nature of the Father because his character and nature are the same as the Father’s. 
Returning to the original objective, an evaluation of the typical inclusivist approach to the 
teaching of Jesus is needed.  Is the traditional evangelical view of God’s judgment really out 
of line with the portrayal of the Father by the Son? 
 
3.3.2 The Judgment of God in the Teaching of Jesus 
In the following sections, the teaching of Jesus as found in the four Gospels will be 
investigated specifically as it relates to the wrath and judgment of God, which has particular 
significance for the topic of this dissertation.  Areas such as the parables, Jesus’ dealings with 
the scribes and Pharisees, and so on, will be discussed. 
 
                                                 
200 As noted previously, Pinnock unfortunately does precisely this. 
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3.3.2.1 Jesus and the Pharisees201 
Pinnock compares exclusivists to the Pharisees (Flame, 212-213), who begrudged God’s 
grace shown to others outside their little community, but is this a fair accusation to make?  If 
true, then exclusivists should have major cause for alarm, because Jesus consistently 
condemned the Pharisees.  The study begins here, then, because what is said by Jesus about 
the Pharisees can potentially yield great fruit in the debate between exclusivism and 
inclusivism, especially as it relates to God’s judgment. 
The Pharisees were a common whipping boy of the Son of Man, so why spend time on 
them?  Virtually all will agree that in this case, Jesus did indeed have strong words of 
judgment against them, and rightly so.  For the Pharisees were the quintessential hypocrites, 
saying one thing but doing another.   
However, this is not the only reason why Jesus chastised the Pharisees.  The situation is 
much more nuanced than the simplistic understanding that the criticism Jesus levelled at the 
Pharisees was only because they were hypocritical religious leaders.  Certainly, he criticised 
their hypocrisy particularly as it related to their public displays of worship, but Jesus also 
attacked the Pharisees because they believed themselves to be approved by God, and this 
mainly by their religious practises and human-made traditions.  It would help to dwell on this 
matter because in today’s pluralistic age, many people are doing the very same things the 
Pharisees were doing – worshiping God via their self-made traditions.  Such notions of 
justification before God via one’s own works of righteousness were reprehensible to Jesus.   
The temptation, then, to limit the judgment statements by Jesus concerning the Pharisees 
to just religious leaders, thus skirting any weight those words might have when directed 
toward someone not in a position of religious leadership, fails to recognise the impact the 
words of Jesus have on all people.  The criticism Jesus had for the Pharisees is more far-
reaching than most people recognise and goes beyond simply those who are hypocritical in 
their religious leadership.  In fact, there were three main reasons why Jesus opposed the 
Pharisees and their practises.202 
                                                 
201 It should be noted that “the Pharisees” is used here as a catch-all phrase for those religious leaders who were 
condemned by Jesus, such as the scribes, teachers of the law, and so on.  Because what is said in this section is 
applied in a more general way, it matters little if in one instance Jesus is talking to the Pharisees, and in another 
more specifically to the teachers of the law, who may or may not have been Pharisees. 
202 It should be noted that the interaction between Jesus and the Pharisees did not only comprise opposition.  In 
fact, in some instances Pharisees 1) warning Jesus about a plot against his life (Luke 13:31), 2) inviting Jesus for 
meals (Luke 7:36-50; 14:1), and 3) who were, such as Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea, secretly disciples of 
him (John 3:1f; 19:38).  “However, Pharisaic opposition to Jesus is a persistent theme in all four Gospels” 
(Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 914).  Whether this opposition was for political or religious reasons, or a 
combination of the two, is also up for debate. 
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The first concerned their public acts of righteousness, and the remarks of Jesus directed at 
the Pharisees in the Sermon on the Mount are telling.  Today, it is not uncommon for a public 
figure or person with a high level of notoriety or fame to call a press conference to declare his 
or her generosity in giving an amount of money to some charitable organisation.  The 
Pharisees were the same, making public pronouncements concerning their vigilance in various 
acts of righteousness.  They performed these acts before others, to be seen by them and hence 
to receive their praise.  In the well-known passage in the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus deals 
with such hypocrites and three particular acts of righteousness:  almsgiving, prayer, and 
fasting. 
The acts of almsgiving, prayer, and fasting are just a microcosm of a whole horde of 
righteous activities often performed to garner the praise of men.  In short, there are dozens of 
good things that can be done, at least in part, to bolster our own egos and profiles in the eyes 
of others.  When positively speaking about the morality of peoples of other faiths, a little 
more caution in praising them may be needed than inclusivists exercise. 
Another reason why Jesus publicly condemned the Pharisees was because they served as 
improper religious leaders for the people, what Jesus called “blind guides” (Matt. 15:14; 
23:16,24).  They were misleading the people through their false teaching.  The whole while 
considering themselves to be experts in the law, they strained out gnats but swallowed camels 
(Matt. 23:24).203  Appearing in all three Synoptic Gospels, the Parable of the Wicked Tenants 
(Matt. 21:33-46, Mark 12:1-12, Luke 20:9-19) speaks directly to this improper leadership.  
The clear allusion for the wicked tenants of the parable is the Pharisees and religious leaders 
of the day.  In fact, once they heard this teaching by Jesus, the Gospels say that they looked 
for a way to have him arrested. 
The chastisement Jesus reserved for the Jewish religious leaders took various forms.  One 
way was to question their knowledge of the Scriptures.  By using phrases such as, “Haven’t 
you read?” (Matt. 12:5; 19:4) or, “You are in error because you do not know the Scriptures” 
(Matt. 22:29), Jesus meant to expose the ignorance of the teachers and experts in the law.  It 
was from this basic ignorance of God’s Word that all their other problems flowed.204 
                                                 
203 In a desire to follow the law perfectly, but ultimately legalistically, the Pharisees would strain their drinking 
water through a cloth to be sure not to swallow a gnat, the smallest of unclean animals.  But, figuratively, Jesus 
is saying that they are swallowing something much larger that was also considered unclean. 
204 In a related sense, the confrontations Jesus had with the Pharisees concerning Sabbath observance also 
questioned the authority of the religious leaders and exposed their misunderstanding of the Scriptures (for 
example, Matt. 12:1f [parallel Mark 2:23f; Luke 6:1f];  Mark 1:21f [parallel Luke 4:31f]; 3:1f; Luke 13:10f; 
14:1f; John 5:1f; 7:21f; 9:13f). 
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Similarly, Jesus warned people about the yeast of the Pharisees.  Used positively, the 
imagery of yeast was used by Jesus to signify the growth of the kingdom of God, but used 
negatively, it was meant to show how dangerous the teaching of the Pharisees could be.  “Be 
on your guard against the yeast of the Pharisees and Sadducees” (Matt. 16:6, 11-12; also Luke 
12:1).  Like yeast, their teaching could quickly spread and infect the thinking of others around 
them.205 
Along related lines, Jesus says that the Pharisees “do not practise what they preach” 
(Matt. 23:3).  This is perhaps the most recognisable form of hypocrisy.  In the case of the 
Pharisees, Jesus states, “They tie up heavy loads and put them on men’s shoulders, but they 
themselves are not willing to lift a finger to move them” (vs. 4). 
Which leads to another way in which Jesus attempted to expose the inadequacy of the 
religious leaders of his day.  Not only did they act improperly, but they also taught what 
should not have been taught.  Instead of teaching the Word of God, these experts in the law 
foisted their own, human-made laws upon the people.  In Matthew 15 and the parallel passage 
in Mark 7, Jesus is questioned by some Pharisees and teachers of the law as to why his 
disciples break the tradition of the elders by not washing their hands before eating (Matt. 
15:3f, Mark 7:3f).206  Jesus took this opportunity to expose yet another failing in the 
leadership of the Pharisees.  “You have let go of the commands of God and are holding on to 
the traditions of men” (Mark 7:8).  In so doing, they are said to “nullify the word of God” 
(Matt. 7:6) and are “setting aside the commands of God in order to observe your own 
traditions” (Mark 7:9).  In both accounts Jesus quotes from Isaiah 29:13 which ends with this 
condemnation:  “Their teachings are but rules taught by men.” 
It would help to pause here and reflect on this message from the mouth of the Saviour.  
What is done in churches that are simply human-made traditions and not commands from God 
and Scripture, yet are demanded that members obey these rules and regulations?  How much 
of theology and dogma today would be condemned by Jesus himself as the “traditions of 
men,” ultimately nullifying the words and commands of God? 
All three types of criticism of these “blind guides” are tied together.  The Pharisees did 
not know the Scriptures, they demanded that others live holy lives while they lived 
hypocritical ones, and they replaced the commands of God with their own human-made 
                                                 
205 “In the Bible yeast often represents evil (e.g., Ex. 12:15; Lev. 2:11; 6:17; 10:12; Matt. 16:6, 11-12; Mark 
8:15; Luke 12:1; 1 Cor. 5:7-8; Gal. 5:8-9)” (Walvoord, John F., and Zuck, Roy B., The Bible Knowledge 
Commentary, [Wheaton, Illinois: Scripture Press Publications, Inc., 1983] 195). 
206 In Mark’s account further states that “they observe many other traditions, such as the washing of cups, 
pitchers and kettles” (Mark 7:4). 
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traditions.  From an ignorance of Scripture comes all sorts of distortions.  As Jesus said, “If a 
blind man leads a blind man both will fall into a pit” (Matt. 15:14b). 
Jesus compared these religious leaders to thieves and wolves (John 10:7-13), he called 
them snakes and a brood of vipers (Matt. 23:33, see similarly John the Baptist, Matt. 3:7), and 
he warned the people to beware of these teachers who would be punished most severely (Luke 
20:46; Mark 12:40).  In the well-known confrontation between the Pharisees and Jesus over 
paying taxes to Caesar, Jesus once again called them hypocrites (Matt. 22:18).  It is passages 
such as these that are most recalled when thinking of the condemnation Jesus had for the 
Pharisees, normally making them the whole story.  In other words, the other reasons why 
Jesus condemned these hypocritical religious leaders are ignored.   
Many act as if the criticism Jesus reserved for the Pharisees had only to do with religious 
leaders, and as the majority of believers are not religious leaders, his judgment words to them 
have little bearing on their lives.  But as has been noted earlier, many religious people (and 
non-religious for that matter) are guilty of doing righteous deeds to gain the accolades of men, 
or creating human-made traditions and pretending they have come from God.  As seen with 
the next point, other habits frequently performed by the Pharisees can also be seen today. 
“Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you hypocrites!  You travel over the land 
and sea to win a single convert, and when he becomes one, you make him twice as much a 
son of hell as you are”  (Matt. 23:15).  This horribly damning statement strikes at the heart of 
what the Pharisees were and believed.  They believed themselves to be righteous before God 
because they performed righteous acts.  Their zealousness for ritual purification fostered pride 
and false security in their own righteousness, and they made their converts equally arrogant 
and insecure.  One need only review the autobiography of the Apostle Paul, a Pharisee of 
Pharisees, to recognise how before his conversion he mistook his own zealousness for 
personal salvation and holiness (Phil. 3:4b-6). 
  Jesus claims that the Pharisees “justify [themselves] in the eyes of men” (Lk.16:15).  He 
then notes, “What is highly valued among men is detestable in God’s sight.”  Jesus loathed 
this type of self-justification and self-righteousness. 
“Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you hypocrites!  You are like 
white washed tombs, which look beautiful on the outside but on the inside are full 
of dead men’s bones and everything unclean.  In the same way, on the outside 
you appear to people as righteous but on the inside you are full of hypocrisy and 
wickedness” (Matt. 23:27-28). 
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What of the world’s great religions?  So many human-made traditions and practises, all 
supposedly bringing people closer to God.  Did the Pharisees not also have the same fanciful 
systems, and what was Jesus’ response to them?  Jesus chastised the Pharisees for nullifying 
the Word of God for the sake of their traditions.  He then called them hypocrites.   
The difficulty for inclusivists who make positive statements about the morality of the 
adherents of non-Christian religions is that they simply cannot know if such adherents are 
secretly acting like Pharisees.  By either ignoring the condemnatory words of Jesus directed at 
the Pharisees, or by limiting their application only to religious leaders, the mistake of missing 
their wider application occurs.  Can there seriously be an expectation that the message of 
Jesus is one of salvation for each and every individual, even those individuals whom Jesus 
himself condemned?  How logical is it to say people are following Jesus, or supporting his 
teaching, when they flatly ignore what he said? 
 
3.3.2.2 Jesus and the Parables 
Many of the parables are among the favourite and most cherished words from the mouth of 
Jesus.207  The Parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk. 10:25-37) and the Parable of the Prodigal 
Son (Lk. 15:11-32) probably top the list as most read, most frequently preached parables from 
the teachings of Jesus.208  In this section some key parables used by inclusivists in support of 
their soteriological conclusions will be evaluated, but also with an eye to those which they 
tend to ignore. 
At times the inclusivist usage of the parables can appear arbitrary.  Pinnock, for example, 
uses the Prodigal Son (eg., Wideness, 103) as the quintessential parable of God’s love, to the 
exclusion of any notion of God’s wrath or judgment, but is this a fair reckoning?  Two issues 
immediately present themselves in this regard: Are those parables typically used by 
inclusivists solely devoted to God’s loving-kindness, or do they not also have elements of 
judgment, and can the parables of grace be used to somehow offset the other parables with far 
more elements of doom and judgment? 
                                                 
207 They are also noted to be the favourite form of teaching by Jesus found in the Synoptic Gospels.  “Parables 
make up about sixteen per cent of Mark, about twenty-nine per cent of Q, about forty-three per cent of M and 
about fifty-two per cent of L” (Joel Green and Scot McKnight, (eds.), Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels 
[Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992] 594).  Note Mark 4: 33-34:  “With many similar parables Jesus 
spoke the word to them, as much as they could understand.  He did not say anything to them without using a 
parable.”  See also Matt. 13:34. 
208 “Some scholars count a total of sixty parables and parabolic sayings in the Synoptic Gospels” (Evangelical 
Dictionary of Theology, 824).  “An exact number of the parables cannot be given since there is no agreement 
among scholars as to which forms should be classified as a parable” (Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels, 595-
596).  The latter source notes that some take the counting as high as sixty-five parables. 
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As inclusivism’s coverage of parables is investigated, the teaching of Jesus concerning 
judgment and the wrath of God, a hermeneutic of judgment, will particularly be sought.  This 
means elements of judgment will be sought, not necessarily parables that speak only about 
judgment or wrath.   
For example, in Capon’s series on parables his second volume deals with the parables of 
grace, as he defines them, but many of these parables have elements of judgment as well.  
Note for example that Capon covers in his parables of grace:  the Unforgiving (Unmerciful) 
Servant, the Rich Fool, the Watchful Servants, the Barren Fig Tree, the Great Banquet, the 
Rich Man and Lazarus, and the Narrow Door.  All of these parables have strong elements of 
judgment.  Capon even notes that the parable of the Good Samaritan is “apparently 
judgmental” (Grace, 108).  This study will be concerned more with the elements of judgment 
found therein, not whether one parable or another can be entirely considered a parable of 
grace or judgment. 
The parables that seem most memorable are the parables of grace, the sentimental 
parables that speak of God’s undying love for the lost.209  Human beings have a tendency to 
remember the parables that produce good feelings, while forgetting or outright ignoring the 
ones that have a harsher tone.  But many of the parables have strong elements of judgment 
and convey the wrath of both the Father and the Son.  Examples include The Wheat and 
Tares, Wedding Banquet, Sheep and Goats, Barren Fig Tree, Wicked Tenants, and Narrow 
Door. 
Before looking at specific passages, a general observation can first be made.  The vast 
majority of the parables of Jesus have something to say about judgment.  The notion that 
Jesus was “love, love, love” and nothing more is a falsehood.  This will be important to 
remember because inclusivists seem to concentrate only on the positive elements of the 
parables, while ignoring the negative ones. 
 
3.3.2.2.1 Judgment as Separation 
One of the stronger, more prominent teachings of Jesus concerned the separation of peoples.  
There are only two types of people in the reckoning of Jesus.  Some are like bad fish, weeds, 
goats, and ungrateful guests, while others are like good fish, wheat, sheep, and grateful guests.  
There seems to be no “fence sitters,” no people who do not properly fall into either of these 
                                                 
209 Jeremias referred to the Prodigal Son as the “Parable of the Father’s Love” (The Parables of Jesus [New 
York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1963] 128).  This is an example perhaps of poisoning the well, so to speak, 
because the entire purpose of the parable is now assumed in its title.  Consequently, any elements of judgment 
may potentially be ignored or missed. 
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two categories.  This is made all the more stark with the Parable of the Narrow Door, which 
speaks of only two doors and two roads.  One road leads to life, the other to destruction.  
Again, there is no third category, the “undecideds,” but rather, only two roads and two types 
of people characterised by the road they choose to tread.  All people have their feet firmly 
planted on one of these two paths.210 
Many Christian scholars today deny such a teaching.  For the universalist, no such system 
of paths can exist.  There is only one road and it leads to eternal life.211  For the pluralist, one 
is hard pressed to find any appeal to the “road that leads to destruction” in their writings.  On 
the contrary, everything spoken by them about the world’s great religions is only positive.  
Inclusivism appears in many respects similar to pluralism on this matter.  However, according 
to Jesus, a time is coming when all people will be separated.  Those who are “bad fish” will 
be “thrown into the fiery furnace, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth” (Matt. 
13:50).  Similarly, weeds will be uprooted and burned.  The Parable of the Weeds is one of 
the few parables where Jesus gives a detailed explanation of its meaning.  The weeds, he says, 
are the sons of the evil one (Matt. 13:38) and they are later described as those who cause sin 
and do evil (vs. 41). 
Both parables of the Net and Weeds speak of a time to come, the Second Coming of the 
Son of Man, when these events will take place.  It should be briefly noted that the title, Son of 
Man, is the most frequently used title in the Gospels by Jesus in referring to himself (used 82 
times throughout the four Gospels).  The term itself is laden with eschatological weight and 
should not be ignored when investigating Jesus’ teaching on the judgment of God.  Jesus is 
unique in his usage of this image from Daniel, and many of the parables involving separation 
at the Last Day have the figure of the Son of Man as the primary Separator (see Evangelical 
Dictionary of Theology, 1127-1129).212 
How frequently do Pinnock and Sanders speak about this aspect of the teaching of Jesus?  
To ignore these teachings of Jesus is not to ignore a small, insignificant fraction of his words.  
It is to ignore a large, central portion of his teachings.  Christian theologians, pastors, church 
leaders, and scholars who choose to not share this with the Christian public are acting like 
modern-day Pharisees, nullifying the word of God and replacing it with their own human-
made traditions and teachings.  If a person is standing on the railroad tracks and a train is fast 
                                                 
210 This is reminiscent of the teaching of the Didache, the “Two Ways,” one of life and the other death. 
211 “In a universe of love there can be no Heaven which tolerates a chamber of horrors” (J.A.T. Robinson, cited 
in Sanders, No Other Name, 106). 
212 “The Second Coming of Christ is one of the most pervasive doctrines on the pages of the New Testament.  It 
is mentioned over three hundred times, an average of once for every thirteen verses from Matthew to 
Revelation” (Blanchard, Hell, 91). 
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approaching, how loving is it to ignore the train and not warn the person of his or her 
impending doom?  Jesus frequently warned his listeners of the judgment to come; 
evangelicals today should do likewise.  It is, in fact, the loving thing to do. 
The Net and the Weeds parables both end with harsh words from Jesus.  The bad fish and 
the worthless weeds will be destroyed and it is here that the first sight of Jesus’ 
characterisation of this judgment as a “fiery furnace” is seen, where there will be “weeping 
and gnashing of teeth” (Matt. 13:42, 50).  Jesus does not mince words when speaking of this 
impending judgment.  In both instances, Jesus speaks of the “end of the age” and that is a clue 
in determining what type of judgment Jesus is referring to here, clearly an eschatological one. 
 
3.3.2.2.2 The Parable of the Sheep and Goats in Its Context 
The Parable of the Sheep and Goats is another eschatological parable concerning the end 
times and is more expanded than either the Net or the Weeds.  This parable stands at the end 
of Matthew’s Olivet Discourse (Mt. 24-25) and as such takes a special place in this 
eschatological message of Jesus.  In fact, it is the last of four parables in this section.  On the 
surface this parable appears to be strongly in favour of the inclusivist position, and therefore 
considerable time will be spent on it. 
In this parable, Jesus develops the explanation of why some people are considered goats 
and others sheep, and it impinges directly on what they did.  The Shepherd gathers the nations 
before him and separates them into two types of people, sheep and goats.  It seems that the 
righteous people, the sheep, do not even know they are sheep.  Perhaps they are “anonymous 
Christians” to use a phrase by a famous inclusivist.  They have simply done that which is 
good in the eyes of the Great Separator and so are rewarded with eternal life for what they 
have done. 
This is a tempting interpretation, but it ignores something of paramount importance in the 
passage.  These acts of kindness – the giving of food to the hungry and water to the thirsty, 
clothing the naked, helping the strangers and the sick, and visiting the incarcerated – are all 
acts of kindness done to the “brothers” of Jesus (Matt. 25:40).  These are not just random acts 
of kindness; they are acts of mercy to the children of God, those who stand in this privileged 
position by their faith in God’s Son (John 1:12).213 
                                                 
213 Note the similar teaching in Mark 9:41:  “I tell you the truth, anyone who gives you a cup of water in my 
name because you belong to Christ will certainly not lose his reward.”  The act of kindness is done in the name 
of the Lord and is not simply a random act of kindness. 
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Pinnock actually recognises the possibility of this interpretation, noting that he used to 
hold to it himself (Wideness, 203, n. 33; also 164).  This interpretation takes into account the 
wider context of Matthew, especially as it relates to the emissaries of Christ.  “He who 
receives you receives me” (10:40).  This reasonable understanding of the parable, then, 
appears to be rejected by Pinnock not for exegetical reasons but for theological ones.  Is this 
justified? 
Recognising the context of this parable is a key to understanding its meaning.  After 
general statements made to the crowds (Matt. 23:1), Jesus turns his attention to private 
comments for his disciples.  “The disciples came to him privately” (Matt. 24:3) begins a 
different discussion by Jesus, one which continues through chapter 24 and 25.  At the 
beginning of chapter 26, Jesus makes his concluding comments to his disciples before 
Matthew shifts to a different scene, that of the chief priests and elders conspiring to arrest and 
kill Jesus. 
Recognition of this immediate context – private comments to the disciples – is paramount 
if an understanding is expected not only of what Jesus is saying in this discourse, but also why 
he is saying it.  This is not a general teaching to all people, supporting the notion that people 
will be rewarded by their random acts of kindness as if they are some sort of “anonymous” 
Christians.  In fact, all four of the concluding parables in the Olivet Discourse presuppose an 
audience of disciples or followers of Jesus [parables of the Wise Servant (24:45-51), Ten 
Virgins (25:1-13), Talents (25:14-30), and Sheep and Goats (25:31-46)]. 
In the wider context of Matthew’s Gospel, these end-times statements of Jesus should be 
understood in light of the warnings at the end of the Sermon on the Mount, the teaching of 
Jesus concerning the relationship of God’s kingdom to the person of the Christ, and the cost 
of discipleship (eg., let the dead bury their dead, hand to the plough, and carry your cross 
statements).  A hermeneutic of judgment makes this context more understandable.  It is a 
sifting message, a message of judgment.  If people think they are safe, if they believe 
themselves to be true followers of Jesus Christ, then think again. 
When attempting to understand the Sheep and Goats in this wider context, there are two 
choices.  Either Jesus is saying that all that is required for membership into the kingdom of 
God is random acts of kindness; or the parable is teaching one aspect or characteristic of the 
members of the kingdom.  In the immediate context of the Olivet Discourse and the four 
parables found therein, it is seen that members of the kingdom of heaven are faithful (The 
Wise Servant), watchful (The Ten Virgins), good stewards (The Talents), and benevolent 
(The Sheep and Goats).  If the Sheep and Goats is understood the way that inclusivists use it, 
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it must be presupposed that all people are “brothers” of Jesus, but this can hardly be supported 
from the rest of Scripture, let alone from the words of Jesus (see esp. Lk. 8:21). 
The four parables in the Olivet Discourse must be understood in the context of 
relationship.  Simply obeying the propositional truths found in the teaching of Jesus is not the 
point.  One must be found in relationship with Jesus.   Empty words will not suffice when the 
final sifting is performed.  “Lord, Lord” will sound a hollow echo when it has not been 
accompanied with fruit signifying genuine faith.  Jesus is not stating how a person will enter 
the kingdom of heaven, but rather what the characteristics of its members are. 
In the Parable of the Talents, the third servant does not really know the master.  The first 
two faithful servants are told to “enter into the joy of your master” (Mt. 25:21, 23), signifying 
a relationship.  But the third servant is shown to not know the master, as he mischaracterises 
his nature (25:24, 26 – see the ESV, where vs. 26 is posed in the form of a question and does 
not imply that the master actually agrees with the assessment of his character by the servant).  
In the Parable of the Ten Virgins, there is a similar context.  The bridegroom’s final response 
to the five unprepared virgins is, “Truly, I say to you, I do not know you” (Mt. 25:12b).  
Clearly the issue in all four parables is relationship, not simply raw deeds divorced from any 
knowledge of the Master. 
Further, this one parable should not be taken and played against all the other teaching of 
Jesus (e.g., teaching which emphasises belief in him) or the teaching found in the rest of 
Scripture.  Certainly, good works are important, but if the Parable of the Sheep and Goats is 
read and it is concluded that people will be justified by their good works, the parable has been 
misread.  What underlies these acts of kindness is that these people showed them to the family 
of God, the brothers of Jesus, the faithful.  In other words, they cared about God’s children 
and his kingdom. 
R. T. France brings this point home in his commentary on Matthew, and it is worth 
quoting his comments in full: 
“Until fairly recently it was generally assumed that this passage grounded eternal 
salvation on works of kindness to all in need, and that therefore its message was a 
sort of humanitarian ethic, with no specifically Christian content.  As such, it was 
an embarrassment to those who based their understanding of the gospel on Paul’s 
teaching that one is justified by faith in Christ and not by ‘good works’.  Was 
Matthew (or Jesus?) then against Paul? 
   More recent interpreters have insisted, however, that such an interpretation does 
not do justice to the description of those in need as Jesus’ brothers . . . It is 
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therefore increasingly accepted that the criterion of judgment is not kindness to 
the needy in general, but the response of the nations to disciples in need. . . . the 
criterion of judgment becomes not mere philanthropy, but men’s response to the 
kingdom of Heaven as it is presented to them in the person of Jesus’ ‘brothers’.214 
In short, it would be difficult to appeal to this passage in order to support a pluralist or 
inclusivist position that equates doing random acts of kindness as “knowing Jesus” and hence 
warranting salvation. 
Having said that, evangelicals should not turn around and ignore the significance acts of 
kindness play in the population of the kingdom of God.  People who do not do them for the 
brothers of Jesus are “goats.”  Far too many evangelical Christians, in rightly emphasising 
that justification is by faith and not by works, then go right ahead and ignore works, as if they 
are of no importance.  Such a Soteriology, one which is only “other worldly” and not “this 
worldly” plays faith against good works.  As John Calvin said, believers are justified by faith 
and not by works, but not by a faith without works.  Or as James states, “faith without works 
is dead” (Jms. 2:26). 
The last point to make concerning the Parable of the Sheep and Goats is that Jesus ends it 
with a comment about eternal punishment (vs. 46).  This picture of the last judgment is an 
ominous one.  The goats will go to the “eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels” (vs. 
41).  The sheep are placed on the right-hand side of the Shepherd, the place of honour and 
privilege, while the goats are placed on the left-hand side, the place of shame and dishonour 
(vs. 33).  Again, it must be noted that there are only two classes of people.  This is true 
separation. 
As concerns the Parable of the Wise Servant, the final judgment is forceful to say the 
least:  “[He] will be cut to pieces and put…with the hypocrites.  In that place there will be 
weeping and gnashing of teeth.” (24:51)  Three elements of this statement carry the force of 
weighty judgment, i.e., being cut to pieces, being reckoned with the hypocrites, and a place of 
weeping and gnashing of teeth. 
With the Parable of the Ten Virgins, the phraseology is not nearly so forceful yet readers 
must not be deceived into thinking it is somehow less condemning or damning.  The five 
unprepared virgins find themselves shut out of the marriage feast, and from the imagery of a 
                                                 
214 R.T. France, Matthew: Tyndale New Testament Commentaries (Leister: InterVarsity Press, Leicester, 1985) 
355.  Note also Herbert Lockyer’s commentary, All the Parables of the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan 
Publishing House, 1963), on this specific issue:  “This is to be the question for the nations.  ‘What are they doing 
with Jesus?  What are they doing with His message?  What are they doing with His messengers?  What are they 
doing with all the spiritual forces and moral powers that he has set at liberty, and which are to work through His 
people in the age?  Upon the basis of that, His judgment will be found for, or against them’” (250). 
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marriage feast used elsewhere by Jesus, it is hard to understand this as anything other than 
being shut out of eternal salvation.  With the Parable of the Talents, the terminology is similar 
to that used with the faithful servant, including being cast in the outer darkness, being 
reckoned as a worthless servant, and again a place of weeping and gnashing of teeth.  The 
Sheep and Goats concludes this section with a reference to “eternal punishment” and “eternal 
life.”215 
 
3.3.2.2.3 Jesus Knows His Sheep 
Rather than this parable being an account of how Jesus will judge every individual based on 
his good works, it is instead an account of how Jesus identifies with his people.  At the heart 
of the disagreement between differing interpretations of this passage rests an understanding of 
who represents the “children of God.”  Generally speaking, pluralists and to a lesser extent 
inclusivists see all people as having the right to claim this title, “children of God,” by reason 
of the fact that all people are descendants of Adam, who was created by God.  Those who 
support this position would see the reference to “the least of these brothers of mine” as 
referring to anybody, regardless of their faith or religion or creed, an argument which makes 
no basic distinction between the brotherhood of mankind in general versus the brotherhood of 
followers of Jesus. 
On the other hand, as already noted, “brother” can have a more specific meaning referring 
not generally to any one individual, but more precisely to those who follow Jesus and his 
teaching.  In fact, this is exactly how Jesus uses the term in Mark 3:35 where he says, 
“Whoever does God’s will is my brother and sister and mother.”  There is a special 
relationship here, one that evidently supersedes one based on paternal descent or physical 
reproduction. 
In fact, it is precisely of this type of relationship of which John speaks when he states: 
“Yet to all who received him, to those who believed in his name, he gave the right to become 
children of God – children born not of natural descent, nor of human decision or a husband’s 
will, but born of God” (John 1:12-13).  This special relationship is not simply the product of a 
physical descent which runs all the way from Adam to all of humanity.  Rather, it is a 
relationship which has as its basis faith in the Second Adam, the Logos incarnate, Jesus 
Christ.  From John’s Gospel it is clear that physical birth and membership into humanity do 
                                                 
215 The Greek word RzHP (kolasis) is also translated “punishment,” but as Vine’s notes this 
word “as being disciplinary . . .  cannot be maintained in the Koinē Greek of N.T. times” (231).  It is used in the 
Parable of the Sheep and Goats, where it is translated as “eternal punishment” (Mt. 25:46).  As the verse 
juxtaposes “eternal punishment” with “eternal life,” this term should be understood as eschatological judgment. 
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not produce the “right” that is necessary to be called children of God.  As Jesus tells 
Nicodemus, rebirth is necessary in order to become a member of the kingdom of God (John 
3:3f), and without this rebirth, the wrath of God remains upon those who do not believe in the 
Son (John 3:18, 36).  Individuals are not naturally or physically born into the family of God, 
they are supernaturally and spiritually reborn into it. 
Given this understanding it is wrongheaded to attempt to make the meaning of the Sheep 
and Goats as a general teaching on good works and an individual’s entrance in the kingdom 
based solely on this criterion.  Such an understanding does injustice to the special use of 
“brother” by Jesus, as well as the entire context of the teaching of Jesus, both as it refers to the 
use of this term, and in a broader sense as it refers to the requirements for entrance into the 
kingdom of heaven. 
What is seen in this teaching is Jesus identifying with his disciples, those who have 
chosen to follow him.  As seen in the Good Shepherd passage of John 10, the true sheep of 
Jesus know his voice, and he gladly lays down his life for them.  “I know my sheep and my 
sheep know me” (vs. 14b) signifies a special relationship between the sheep and the shepherd, 
a relationship that echoes the relationship between the Son and the Father (“just as the Father 
knows me and I know the Father,” vs. 15). 
Similarly, this identification between Jesus and his followers is found in Matthew 18:20:  
“For where two or three come together in my name, there am I with them.”  This appears to 
be a redundant statement by Jesus, given the biblical understanding of his deity, because he 
would certainly be there among them given the fact that he is omnipresent.  However, no 
redundancy is meant here, but rather a signification of intimacy and identity is intended.  In 
other words, Jesus is telling his followers that when they come together – “in my name,” 
which is the key to understanding this passage – he will be with them in a special presence. 
A powerful indication of this special relationship and identity of Christ with his people – 
the sheep who know his voice – is found in the Pharisee Saul turned Apostle Paul’s Damascus 
Road encounter.  Acts 9 is the first recounting of this experience as Saul was on his way to 
persecute the believers in Damascus.  Luke says that Saul intended to take any believers 
found in Damascus and transport them to prison in Jerusalem (9:2).  On his way, Paul is 
confronted by Christ himself, who asks this question:  “Saul, Saul, why do you persecute 
me?” (vs. 4).  When the soon-to-be-renamed Saul asks who it is speaking to him, the reply is 
telling:  “I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting” (vs. 5). 
Note that Jesus does not say that Saul is persecuting the church, or believers, which would 
certainly have been true.  Rather, he chooses to identify himself with those who are 
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persecuted in his name.  This echoes the statement by Jesus found at the end of the so-called 
Beatitudes:  “Blessed are you when people insult you, persecute you and falsely say all kinds 
of evil against you because of me” (Matt. 5:11).  There is a special relationship, one between 
Jesus and those who trust him, who know his voice, who gather together in his name, and who 
are persecuted because of their faith in him. 
The Parable of the Sheep and Goats must be understood in the context of this special 
identification between Jesus and his followers.  Matthew records a similar statement earlier in 
his Gospel when he recounts Jesus sending out the twelve disciples into the towns of Israel.  
There Jesus tells them, “If anyone gives even a cup of cold water to one of these little ones 
because he is my disciple, I tell you the truth, he will certainly not lose his reward” (10:42).  
Mark records a similar statement in 9:41 with this difference, “anyone who gives a cup of 
water in my name.”  Again, this is phraseology that signifies a special relationship.  It is not 
merely speaking of random acts of kindness, no matter how important they may be in the 
Christian ethic. 
It would be wrong to make the teaching found in the Sheep and Goats to apply to random 
acts of kindness performed by anyone, let alone to stretch the teaching to include a statement 
on how salvation is earned based on these random acts.  Such an interpretation not only 
ignores the special significance of the terminology of relationship found therein, but it also 
ignores the overall scope of the teaching of Jesus. 
 
3.3.2.2.4 Is Ignorance an Excuse? 
“That servant who knows his master’s will and does not get ready or does not 
do what his master wants will be beaten with many blows.  But the one who 
does not know and does things deserving punishment will be beaten with few 
blows” (Luke 12:47-48a). 
What do pluralists and inclusivists make of this teaching from the Parable of the Wicked 
Servant?  Their arguments have always been that a direct knowledge, a cognitive awareness 
of Jesus, is not necessary for a person to live a reconciled and pleasing life before God.  
Putting aside whether this is biblically solid or not, it does seem clear from the above teaching 
of Jesus that people can be judged for things they do not even know.  If they have, in essence, 
participated in “things deserving punishment” and did not believe those activities to be evil or 
wrong, they may still be judged for said actions.  All of the servants are beaten in the parable, 
and knowledge does account for something, as the ones who knew what they did was wrong 
were beaten more severely than the ones who did not know. 
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Conversely, this parable could be argued as a positive point for those who support the 
notion that cognitive awareness of Jesus is unnecessary.  If God will punish people for things 
they did wrong and did not know it, surely he will reward people for things they did right, 
even when they did not know they were the right things to do.  Tying this argument in with 
the Parable of the Sheep and Goats, where people of the nations are rewarded for acts of 
kindness they did even when they did not realise they were being credited with them, seems to 
make a rock solid argument in the favour of the pluralist and inclusivist. 
Or does it?  To begin with, the current parable says nothing about being rewarded for 
things done in ignorance that were positive and good.  In other words, just because it teaches 
that ignorance is no excuse when it comes to doing punishable acts, it cannot be stretched to 
conclude the converse, that ignorance when good things are done will be credited as 
righteousness.  The parable simply does not teach that.  And it has already been noted with the 
Sheep and Goats that how one acts with regard to the children of the kingdom of God is the 
point there, not just random acts of kindness.  In short, it would be a false conclusion to take 
these two parables and state that people who do not know Jesus or have any cognitive 
awareness of his teachings and his work on the cross will earn salvation by simply doing good 
works.  The pluralist and the inclusivist stretch the teaching found in these parables too far 
when they make such conclusions.216 
 
3.3.2.2.5 The Narrow and Wide Roads 
“Enter through the narrow gate.  For wide is the gate and broad is the road that 
leads to destruction, and many enter through it.  But small is the gate and narrow 
the road that leads to life, and only a few find it” (Matt. 7:13-14). 
 There may be no single more ignored statement by pluralists and inclusivists than this 
statement by Jesus.  The Parable of the Narrow Door is one of the stronger passages in the 
Gospels in support of an exclusivist position.217  One of the frequent arguments used against 
exclusivists is that their soteriological point-of-view is too narrow and limiting.  They are told 
that God is a God of love and forgiveness and grace, and that the door to salvation must be 
broad and wide.  Anything less than a salvation that is virtually universal in scope and 
                                                 
216 Sanders (Three Views, 143) comments on this passage: “God holds people accountable for what they have 
been given, not for what they have failed to hear (Lk. 12:48).”  However, it is difficult to see how Sanders has 
adequately dealt with this passage.  The servants who did not know were still punished.  That is the clear 
teaching in this parable. 
217 Incredibly, in the very thorough treatment of four views concerning salvation (Okholm and Phillips), neither 
Matthew’s nor Luke’s account of this parable is mentioned anywhere. 
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outcome is demeaning not only to well-meaning, sincere people of other faiths, but more 
dramatically, demeaning to God himself. 
However appealing a “wide road to life” may be to many Christians, it is difficult to 
reconcile with the above words of Jesus.  The literal meaning of the above words is 
impossible to escape; to attempt some figurative meaning only muddies the waters.218  A 
plain reading of Jesus’ words yields a rather simple picture:  there are two gates and two roads 
that are contrasted.  For each gate and accompanying road, there is a destination and there are 
travellers.  For the destination that is destruction, the gate is wide and the road broad, and 
many travel via that way.  For the destination that is life, the gate is small and the road 
narrow, and few travel via that way. 
Much of the benefit of the teaching style of Jesus is that it is so easy to conjure up images 
of the teaching.  In this particular instance, the picture is easy to visualise.  The teaching is 
straightforward and uncluttered.  From the very mouth of the one who came to die for the sins 
of the world, only a few are reckoned to have been saved.  The contrast between the “many” 
and the “few” is unmistakable.  So why are so many theologians so willing to ignore this 
simple teaching? 
For example, in Sanders’ extensive work and his subsequent support of inclusivism, he 
only provides a passing reference to this passage in his exclusivism section (No Other Name, 
41).  There is no interaction with this passage when it comes to his personal support of 
inclusivism.  Similarly, Clark Pinnock does not even mention the passage in The Openness of 
God, a book where it should naturally be addressed.  To be fair, Pinnock does mention it 
elsewhere, albeit again giving the passage rather short shrift.  In A Wideness in God’s Mercy, 
Pinnock says this passage has nothing to do with the relative numbers of people spending an 
eternity in one of two places.  Rather, “Jesus is warning the disciples away from speculation 
and urging them to choose the hard and unpopular path” (154).  He then says this statement 
was made by Jesus when his disciples were few in number and “the conditions were arduous.”   
In concluding his brief comments about the passage, Pinnock says:  “I do not think that 
this text about fewness can be used to cancel out the optimism of salvation that so many other 
verses articulate” (154).  In essence, then, he decides to sweep the passage aside because “so 
many other verses” seem to contradict it.  However, “so many other verses” from the mouth 
of Jesus speak about God’s judgment, so even the basis of Pinnock’s conclusion, i.e., number 
of optimistic passages versus pessimistic ones, is questionable.  
                                                 
218 For example, see Fritz Guy in The Grace of God and the Will of Man, 44. 
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This seems to be a somewhat familiar tack taken by non-exclusivists when it comes to 
Matthew 7:13-14.  Reformed pastor Neal Punt favourably quotes Lorraine Boettner, a post-
millennialist, when Boettner states that “there is no more reason to conclude from the parable 
of the Two Ways that the saved shall be few compared to the lost than to suppose that the 
parable of the Ten Virgins teaches that they shall be precisely equal in number.”  On the same 
page, Punt himself notes that the statement “’those who find it are few’ is not a numerical 
calculation of the extent of the atonement.  It is an exhortation: to covet salvation as a rare, 
invaluable treasure; to forsake all other interests in order to attain the desired end.”219  In 
other words, a saying from Jesus that speaks about the few and the many really is not talking 
about the few and the many. 
                                                
What about Luke 13:22-30?  Here is another “narrow door” statement by Jesus, but this 
time it is in direct response to the question, “Lord, are only a few people going to be saved?” 
(vs. 23).  Punt notes that Jesus never answered the question.  “Nothing is gained by 
speculating about “few” and “many.”  Jesus himself refused to be drawn into a discussion 
about this” (28).220  However, if Punt is correct, then Jesus basically just ignored the question 
altogether if the following verses are not intended to be an answer to the question.  Rather, 
Jesus mentions the narrow door and even notes that “many . . . will try to enter and will not be 
able to” (vs. 24).  Is this not an answer to the question?221 
At the heart of Jesus’ response lies an absence of relationship on the part of the people 
who do not make it through the narrow door.  A time is coming when the door will be closed, 
and no matter how hard the people knock, they will not be allowed to get in.  Twice the owner 
of the house tells the shut-out knockers, “I don’t know you” (vss. 25, 27), and once these 
people have missed their opportunity to pass through the narrow door, they are reckoned with 
the “evildoers” (vs. 27).  All attempts to keep this parable at arm’s length and not interpret it 
as dealing with the very question originally asked of Jesus are impotent answers. 
Clearly, the question, “Are only a few people going to be saved?” is a difficult one.  
However, here is right in the Gospels a direct answer to the question, from the Lord Jesus 
 
219 Neal Punt, Unconditional Good News: Toward an Understanding of Biblical Universalism (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1980) 29. 
220 Universalist J.A.T. Robinson concluded similarly.  “When the Lord Jesus was asked whether only a few are 
saved, he did not answer the question but instead called for a faith decision on the part of the audience (Luke 
13:23-24)” (No Other Name, 105). 
221 Interestingly, Pinnock looks at this passage briefly but only comments on the last two verses.  “People will 
come from east and west and north and south, and will take their places at the feast in the kingdom of God” (vs. 
29) is taken to show the “optimism of salvation” present in the Gospels (Wideness, 153).  Incredibly, Pinnock 
ignores the full context of this statement, concentrating on any optimistic note he can find, while ignoring the 
pessimistic qualities. 
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himself, and still inclusivists are asking the question as if it has not been answered.  One is 
hard pressed to find any satisfactory answer from universalists, pluralists, or inclusivists when 
it comes to the exclusivist’s use of this passage and his teaching that few, indeed, will be 
saved.  Taking these two Narrow Door statements together, they seem to indeed involve 
numbers.  It should be agreed with Punt that speculating about these things is not fruitful, but 
it is not speculating when the words of the Saviour are so clear.  There are two gates and two 
roads, and all people travel one or the other.  To attempt to fix numerical values on “few” and 
“many” is indeed fruitless, but to note that one road is much more travelled than the other is 
reasonable to conclude from the passages. 
What should be made of Boettner’s statement, “There is no more reason to conclude from 
the parable of the Two Ways that the saved shall be few compared to the lost than to suppose 
that the parable of the Ten Virgins teaches that they shall be precisely equal in number?”  The 
problem is, in a nutshell, that the Parable of the Ten Virgins is not speaking about the same 
thing as the Narrow Door statements.  With the Ten Virgins, Jesus is talking about 
preparedness.  With the Narrow Door, he answers a specific question about relative numbers 
of the saved and the damned. 
This can be put another way.  If the vast majority of humanity were to end up in heaven, 
as say the universalists, pluralists, and inclusivists, would the Narrow Door statements make 
any sense?  Could Jesus say that narrow is the road that leads to destruction and that many 
travel that road, when in actuality the vast majority of humans are saved?  It would be much 
better for their case if the Matthew passage read as follows:  “For wide is the gate and broad is 
the road that leads to destruction, and few enter through it.  But small is the gate and narrow 
the road that leads to life, and many find it.”222   
Of course, the statement does not say this at all, but precisely the opposite is said.  There 
is simply no way around it, when Jesus combines narrow and small with fewness, he is 
meaning to convey the message of restriction.  It is no wonder that those who disagree with 
exclusivism ignore this passage or give a quick nod and an equally quick answer for it.  The 
juxtaposition of “small, narrow, and few” with “wide, broad, and many” does indeed convey 
the feeling of relative numbers.  To then conclude that it does not, or to somehow ignore these 
                                                 
222 The words “few” and “many” have been interchanged in the verses but the narrow and broad references have 
been left intact.  However, as can be easily seen, doing so leaves the passage with a bit of “poetic” imbalance.  
To have many people travelling a narrow road and few people on a broad one leaves the statement 
disproportioned.  It would be better to either make the road to destruction similarly narrow, or to leave it broad 
and say “but few…” instead of “and few…,” if a balanced picture is maintained.  In other words, the most 
natural reading of the statement by Jesus combines a narrowness with fewness. 
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words and swallow them up with “optimistic” passages does not do justice to the words of 
Christ. 
A theologian who states “few will enter heaven, but many will enter hell” is doing 
nothing more than repeating what Jesus has already said.  Theologians who state “many will 
enter heaven and few will enter hell” are only twisting the words of Jesus to suit their own 
presuppositions and preconceptions.  Scripture has little good to say about such teachers. 
Luke’s account ends with the stark teaching that many who believed themselves to be in 
the favour of God will stand by and watch others pass them by.  Jesus combines three familiar 
elements from his judgment teachings in his concluding remarks to this parable.  Firstly, there 
will be “weeping and gnashing of teeth,” a sure sign of conscious suffering on the part of 
those who have been shut out.  Secondly, the imagery of a feast is used to convey the 
understanding that those who have passed through the narrow door will, along with the great 
Old Testament patriarchs and benefactors of the covenant, enjoy a great celebration with the 
owner of the house, while those who are shut out, while thinking themselves to be firmly in 
the covenantal people of God, will find themselves “feastless.”  Thirdly, “those who are last 
will be first, and the first will be last” (what Travis calls “eschatological reversal,” 1986:131) 
includes another popular expression of Jesus to signify a humbling aspect to this judgment. 
The Parable of the Narrow Door, then, stands as one of the bedrock exclusivist passages.  
The separation into only two types of people – those who enter the narrow door and those 
who are eventually shut out – is a frequent teaching of Jesus.  But with this parable, Jesus 
provides a glimpse into how this separation will appear in terms of number.  With the Parable 
of the Sheep and Goats, it states why they are separated.  With the Narrow Gate, it states the 
relative number of the separation and no matter how difficult to accept (as much of the 
teaching of Jesus is), he states that only a “few” enter the narrow door, whereas “many” are 
shut out. 
 
3.3.2.2.6 Summary for the Parables 
In the parables, Jesus spends a fair amount of time speaking about positive things, like the 
wonderful qualities of the kingdom of God, or the persistent love of the Father for the lost.  
But he also spends a large amount of time concentrating on negative matters, like unfaithful 
stewardship or selfish and self-righteous attitudes, and how these will be judged.  Both 
elements of love and mercy, along with elements of wrath and judgment, play an integral part 
in the parables of Jesus.   
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The aim has been to show that, contrary to popular opinion, Jesus did not only speak 
about the positive, the touchy-feely elements of love and forgiveness that many take to mean 
people should feel good about themselves.  Rather, Jesus spoke at length about the scary, the 
awful, the ominous, and he did this in one of his favourite forms of teaching, parables.  And 
he did this over the entire time of his ministry, from the beginning to the end of it.223 
There is no question that such teaching was important to Jesus, and it should likewise be 
important to modern readers.  To speak of such judgment is to not attempt to “scare people 
into the kingdom,” but rather to tell them the simple reality of things.  Modern statements 
concerning the teaching of Jesus should contain this element.  If they do not, then the message 
is not being faithful to the words of Jesus Christ. 
When Jesus is pictured as the Great Shepherd, often what is seen is him caring for his 
sheep, not separating the sheep from the goats for judgment.  The common Medieval portrait 
of Jesus was that of Judge, coming with his angels to exact wrath and justice upon sinful 
humans.  That image is appalling to most sensitive consciences today.  Perhaps, in reaction to 
such depictions of Jesus, some have tended to emphasise his loving-kindness, his mercy and 
forgiveness, as if some false dichotomy exists between a Shepherd who cares for his sheep 
and one who separates sheep from goats, or a harvester who grows wheat as opposed to one 
who destroys the weeds in the process, or a fisherman who picks through the fish and keeps 
the good ones, necessarily discarding the ones he finds unacceptable.   
But there need be no false dichotomy, no playing of one portrait against the other.  This 
is, after all, what good shepherds, farmers, and fishermen do, they discern between the good 
and the bad of their produce and make judgments of separation.  What needs to be taught is 
not the Medieval portrait of Jesus as Righteous and Angry Judge to the exclusion of the Good 
Shepherd who loves and cares for his flock, nor is it the modern picture of Jesus as meek and 
mild teacher who never harmed a fly, to the exclusion of the Son of Man who will come on 
the clouds and judge the nations.  What is needed is both portraits because both are given in 
Scripture, particularly from the very teaching of Jesus about himself.  The condemnation of 
Jesus against the Pharisees as blind guides and wicked tenants turns against those who do not 
proclaim the full, complete portrait of Jesus as found in the Scriptures.224 
                                                 
223 “Nothing is more plainly taught in Scripture than that there will be a final and universal judgment” 
(Blanchard, Hell, 102).  He then notes that two-thirds of the parables of Jesus relate to the subject.  J. I Packer 
notes in Knowing God, “The entire New Testament is overshadowed by the certainty of a coming day of 
judgment” (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1973) 155. 
224 "Surely it is not the business of the Church to adapt Christ to men, but to adapt men to Christ" (Dorothy 
Sayers, Creed or Chaos, Sophia Institute, 1974, 25).  This same sentiment was echoed nearly 200 years ago by 
Claus Harms, “When our Lord and Master Jesus Christ says, Do penance, He wills that men should conform to 
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3.3.2.3 Other Select Teachings of Jesus 
The remainder of time will be spent on miscellaneous, yet important, teachings from Jesus as 
they relate to inclusivism and its portrayal of the teaching of Christ. 
 
3.3.2.3.1 The Good and Bad Trees 
“Watch out for false prophets.  They come to you in sheep’s clothing, but 
inwardly they are ferocious wolves.  By their fruit you will recognise them.  Do 
people pick grapes from thornbushes, or figs from thistles?  Likewise every good 
tree bears good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad fruit.  A good tree cannot bear bad 
fruit, and a bad tree cannot bear good fruit.  Every tree that does not bear good 
fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire.  Thus, by their fruit you will recognise 
them” (Matt. 7:15-20; see also Matt. 12:33; Luke 6:43-45). 
Jesus again makes a distinction between two classes or types of people.  As he did earlier 
with the sheep and goats, or the good fish and bad fish, or the wheat and weeds, now he 
categorises people either as good trees or bad trees.  In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus 
provides this categorisation, in context, as a test for false prophets, but in Luke’s account, 
which actually conflates the separate teachings found in Matthew, the good and bad trees are 
used in the context of judging others. 
It would be tempting to make this statement in the Sermon a general rule which would 
apply to the salvation of individuals.  In fact, Pinnock cites this passage when he provides two 
criteria for recognising truth in non-Christian religions (Wideness, 97).  However, this 
appropriation of the text seems misplaced, since Jesus is using the good trees and bad trees 
metaphor to expose false prophets.  He is not using it as a rule to determine who among the 
religions of the world are approved in the eyes of God.  “By their fruit you will recognise 
them” refers to false prophets in context.225 
Nor should this passage be taken and played against other statements made by Jesus, or 
elsewhere in Scripture.  Jesus is not implying that a person’s fruit is all that ultimately 
matters, as if what a person actually believes or professes is of no consequence.  This seems to 
be how inclusivists use this passage, but that would be a mistake.  Elsewhere in the Gospels 
                                                                                                                                                        
His doctrine; He does not conform the doctrine according to men, as they do now according to the spirit of the 
age.”  Quoted in James Martin, The Last Judgment, 163. 
225 Nineteenth-century, Anglican minister J. C. Ryle sees an intimate connection between this passage and the 
one preceding it, the “narrow and wide gates” passage.  He notes that one way to avoid the wide road is to avoid 
false teachers.  “There are thousands who seem ready to believe anything in religion if they hear it from an 
ordained minister. . . . What is the best safeguard against false teaching?  Beyond all doubt the regular study of 
the Word of God, with prayer for the teaching of the Holy Spirit” (Matthew, J. I. Packer and Alister McGrath 
(eds.) [Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1993] 52). 
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and New Testament epistles criteria for recognising false teachers is found which involve not 
only behaviour but doctrine as well.  The ethical test, then, should never be played against a 
doctrinal one, as if the former is all that really matters. 
Jesus’ argument seems to be that false prophets, “wolves in sheep’s clothing,” will 
ultimately be exposed by their actions.  They may be able to fake genuine repentance and 
belief, but in time, “what a man really is will inevitably show itself by the way he lives” 
(France, 1985:147).  Many will come and lead people away from Christ, and one way – not 
the only way, but one way – to judge them is based on their fruit.  Although Jesus does not 
provide more specifics about this fruit, some conclusions from his broader teaching can be 
made, such as a forgiving heart, care for the poor and downtrodden, and belief “in spirit and 
in truth” of the one, true God.226 
However, must the usage of this passage only be limited to false prophets?  Is there not 
something that can be gleaned from the text to apply more generally to all people?  It seems 
that there is, but this passage must not be wrenched from its context, no matter how tempting.  
Again, the passage is not stating that people will be justified in the eyes of God by producing 
good fruit, anymore than it can be pressed to say that a bad person must always be bad and 
can have no hope of repentance and forgiveness.227  It is merely stating that one test of a 
person and his or her faith is evidence of ethical behaviour.  That test can indeed apply more 
broadly to all people. 
Christian profession is for all intents and purposes much easier than Christian living.  In 
fact, Jesus moves from this passage in the Sermon to the “Lord, Lord” passage which proves 
that professed discipleship will not be enough.  James makes a similar argument when he 
asks, “What good is it, my brothers, if a man claims to have faith but has no deeds? . . . Show 
me your faith without deeds, and I will show you my faith by what I do” (Jms. 2:14, 18b).  
Believers who mouth empty words of supposed profession are exposed by how they actually 
live.  Again, this does not say that they are justified by how they live, but rather, the 
genuineness of their profession of faith is either proved or disproved by their actions.  True 
faith yields true works of righteousness, “faith without works is dead” (Jms. 2:17). 
Again, the negative use of this principle is far different than the positive one.  Is a 
person’s profession of faith is genuine?  Look at that person’s works.  There should be some 
                                                 
226 In fact, the definition of this “fruit” would go a long way in determining how to apply this passage.  Pluralists 
and inclusivists tend to narrow it down to “good works,” whatever that may be given a certain religion and its 
definition, thus justifying their conclusion that non-Christian religions can either be salvific, or lead people to 
faith in Christ.  But this is only filling the term “fruit” with meaning that may in fact be foreign to the meaning of 
Jesus. 
227 After all, there is no statement here by Jesus that a bad tree can ever become a good tree, or vice versa. 
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correlation between faith and works.  Those who do not have genuine faith will ultimately be 
exposed by their lack of good works.  This is the negative use of the principle, the way Jesus 
is actually using it. 
However, some people take this argument and turn it on its head.  They say if you look at 
a person who produces good works, then that person must have genuine faith.  But this is not 
what Jesus is saying, and it would be wise to not apply it in this reverse manner.  This is how 
pluralists and inclusivists generally use this passage.  Again, Jesus is using this principle to 
expose false prophets, not necessarily to prove genuine faith, and most definitely not to prove 
that people in other religions are justified by their good works. 
Lastly, as it relates specifically to the matter of Jesus and his teaching concerning the 
judgment of God, the bad trees are burned.  His words echo verbatim those of John the Baptist 
earlier in the Gospel, “every tree that does not produce good fruit will be cut down and 
thrown into the fire” (Matt. 3:10).  A time of judgment is coming, and bad trees will be cut 
down and burned.  John the Baptist attacked superficial repentance, and Jesus does much the 
same thing. 
The basis of this “burning” is that the tree does not produce any good fruit.  This teaching 
is similar to the Parable of the Barren Fig Tree, as well as the acted-out parable of Jesus and 
the withering fig tree, to which will be seen shortly.  An unproductive tree is wasting soil, and 
the owner of the orchard does not tolerate such trees for too long.  However, in context, it 
must not be forgotten that this lack of productivity is concerning someone who has professed 
faith (in this specific case, a false prophet), or in the broader sense given the exact words of 
John the Baptist, a person who has a false repentance.  Profession and production are 
intimately linked here and should not be separated. 
 
3.3.2.3.2 Who Will Jesus Disown before the Father? 
“Whoever acknowledges me before men, I will also acknowledge him before 
my Father in heaven.  But whoever disowns me before men, I will disown him 
before my Father in heaven.  Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to 
the earth.  I did not come to bring peace, but a sword.  For I have come to turn a 
man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter-in-law against 
her mother-in-law – a man’s enemies will be the members of his own 
household” (Matt. 10:32-36, see also Luke 12:8-9, 49-53). 
Here is yet another statement of judgment from Jesus.  The one pictured standing with open 
arms, ready to accept each and every one no matter whether they like it or not, speaks of 
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actually disowning people before the Father in heaven.  Again, as in other instances, the issue 
is an acknowledgement of his person.  It is not that Jesus speaks about the wrath of the Father 
that is amazing, but that this judgment is directly tied to the person of Jesus himself.  The 
Father certainly will judge the adulterer, the murderer, and the liar, but he will equally judge 
the individual who rejects his Son. 
The sword Jesus pictures hear is a figurative portrayal of cutting, splitting, division.228  
Jesus knew what his message would bring, and still he delivered it.  The message of the Son 
of Man was not one that would unite all of humanity into a sort of global group hug.  Rather, 
it would divide people, even in individual households.  The message of Christ brings with it 
crucial finality and a need to make a decision.  It is an either/or message.  To attempt to ignore 
it is itself a decision to choose condemnation.  Each and every person not only must make 
such a decision, but has already made one.   
There is no neutrality in the message of Christ.  Each human being stands at a crossroads 
at the centre of which is Jesus, and he is pointing to the way of life.  Judgment falls not only 
upon those who choose the wrong path, but it even falls upon those who attempt to stand in 
one place and not choose.  The verdict of acceptance or rejection rises and falls with the 
person of Jesus Christ and what is made of that person.  He who has an intimate relationship 
with the Father is entrusted with such a judgment, to either recommend or oppose the 
travellers on the two roads. 
The question that needs to be answered, then, is if individuals are “acknowledging” 
(Greek: homologeō; KJV has “confess”) Jesus.  Vine’s Expository Dictionary (120) gives a 
more thorough understanding of how this word is used specifically in the Matthew and Luke 
passages in question:   
“In Matt. 10:32 and Luke 12:8 the construction of this verb with en, “in,” 
followed by the dative case of the personal pronoun, has a special significance, 
namely, to “confess” in a person’s name, the nature of the “confession” being 
determined by the context, the suggestion being to make a public “confession.”  
Thus the statement, “every one . . . who shall confess Me (lit., “in Me,” i.e., in 
My case) before men, him (lit., “in him,” i.e., in his case) will I also confess 
before My Father . . . ,” conveys the thought of “confessing” allegiance to Christ 
as one’s Master and Lord, and, on the other hand, of acknowledgment, on His 
                                                 
228 The parallel passage in Luke 12:51-52 bears this out:  “Do you think I came to bring peace on earth?  No, I 
tell you, but division.  From now on there will be five in one family divided against each other, three against two 
and two against three.” 
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part, of the faithful one as being His worshipper and servant, His loyal follower; 
this is appropriate to the original idea in homologeō of being identified in thought 
or language.” 
Jesus promises to acknowledge to the Father those who have faithfully followed him, 
whereas he warns of denying or not acknowledging those who have not faithfully followed 
him.  In light of this fact, it would seem highly tenuous for one to claim to be acknowledging 
Jesus while at the same time rejecting a large portion of his teaching, as many inclusivists 
appear to do. 
The very judgment of God rests upon the person of Jesus.  Heaven and hell lay in the 
balance, and the ultimate destiny of each individual is to be determined by his 
acknowledgement or rejection of the person of Jesus.  This is much more than many Christian 
scholars are willing to admit when it comes to the person of Jesus.  For them, Jesus is only a 
good man or a wise teacher.  He is not an individual upon whom eternal fates ultimately rest, 
let alone the “Lord of glory” (1 Cor. 2:8).  He is simply a good man with good teachings, a 
moral pointer showing a superior way of life, an ethical figure emulating a charitable way to 
behave.  Eternal destinies no more rise and fall with him than they would with any individual 
bent on teaching some simple, spiritual truths by which to live.  To embrace him personally is 
to embrace his teaching; to embrace his teaching is to embrace him personally.  A person 
cannot do one to the exclusion of the other, nor can an individual ignore one and assume that 
the other is valid.  Jesus does not say “if you acknowledge my teaching,” but “if you 
acknowledge me.”  An acceptance of his personal claims about himself lies at the heart of his 
recommendation to the Father of particular individuals.   
It should also be noted that the two statements stand in corollary to each other.  It cannot 
be concluded that Jesus is only talking about the acknowledgement of his teachings anymore 
than it could be concluded by him denying someone that he is only denying that individual’s 
teaching but not his very person.  This would also make sense of the fact that Jesus remarks 
that “no one knows the Father except the Son and those to whom the Son chooses to reveal 
him” (Matt. 11:27).  For someone to know the Father, that person must know the Son.  For 
someone to have a relationship with the Father, that person must have a relationship with the 
Son.229 
This has intimate application for the inclusivist understanding that explicit knowledge of 
Jesus is unnecessary in order to receive his benefits.  There is a qualitative difference between 
                                                 
229 Such a teaching not only contradicts the pluralist’s contentions about the person of Jesus, it also contradicts 
the inclusivist’s idea of “anonymous Christians.” 
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what Jesus professes about salvation and knowledge of his person, and what the great leaders 
of other world religions have professed.  It appears, then, that the inclusivist understanding 
concerning salvation and the person of Jesus is untenable given the teaching that Jesus 
himself provides. 
 
3.3.2.4 Jesus and His Actions 
Many if not the majority of studies concerning the life of Jesus really do not concern his “life” 
at all, but concentrate more on his sayings.  However, it is one thing to say that Jesus spoke 
about the wrath and judgment of God, but quite another to show that he also acted it out in 
certain instances.  New Testament scholar John Meier is correct when he states, “The ‘Quest’ 
must encompass not only the words of Jesus but his works as well” (Marginal, vol. 1, 168, n. 
8).  This is certainly a valid point to make. 
For this study, two key actions by Jesus that communicate the judgment of God will be 
considered:  the cleansing of the temple and the cursing of the fig tree. 
 
3.3.2.4.1 The Cleansing of the Temple 
(Matt. 21:12-16; Mark 11:15-18; Luke 19:45-47; John 2:13-16) 
It is not within the scope of this study to consider the arguments for whether there are two 
temple cleansing incidents in the life of Jesus, or just one.  The fact still remains that there is 
at least one such incident.230  For many, the picture of the meek and mild Saviour taking up 
cords and whipping people, or upturning their tables and showing little regard for their private 
property, goes completely against their accepted portrait of Jesus.  For many, Jesus never 
condemned, he never mistreated, he never judged, but always tolerated and accepted and 
loved.  The temple cleansing is yet another blight on their tolerance-loving portrayal of Jesus. 
Such righteous anger coming from the Lord, though, is completely in line with his 
teaching and his life in general.  He has come to the temple in Jerusalem to worship, and there 
he finds the temple has become a marketplace.  In both the Synoptic accounts and John’s, 
Jesus has come to Jerusalem to celebrate the Passover.  This solemn day stood at the pinnacle 
of the Jewish religious calendar.  But what does Jesus find when he comes to the temple?  He 
finds that it has been overrun by bankers and cattle herders.  Certainly there was a need for the 
                                                 
230 All three Synoptic Gospels have the temple cleansing at the end of Jesus’ ministry, during the last week.  
Only John puts it at the beginning.  This has left some to conclude that there are two separate yet similar 
incidents, while others simply conclude that, although the temple cleansing occurred in the last week of Jesus’ 
ministry, John places it at the beginning for theological reasons.  Certain differences within the two accounts also 
lead some to look for two separate incidents. 
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selling of sacrificial animals to those Jews who had travelled far distances for the Passover, as 
there was a need for the exchanging of foreign currency into the local one.  However, this 
should not have been done in the outer court of the temple, but should have been handled 
outside the temple altogether.  That the house of the Lord had been overrun by these 
marketers was too much for Jesus to bear. 
His outburst seems almost too violent.  Would it not have been better or more appropriate 
for Jesus to reason with the people, or to make a public declaration of his contempt for the 
practise, than to become physically agitated and create the possibility for physical harm to 
befall those in the temple?  Evidently not.  What Jesus saw warranted such action because it 
was the very character of God that was at stake.231  “How dare you turn my Father’s house 
into a market?” (John 2:16).  A place meant to bring glory to God was only bringing profit to 
the hawkers.  Such practises are perhaps one of the many reasons why, as Paul says in quoting 
the prophets, “God’s name is blasphemed among the Gentiles because of you” (Rom. 2:24). 
In his commentary on the Gospel of John, R.V.G. Tasker notes:  “It would seem very 
inadequate to regard the action of Jesus on this occasion as something which any zealous 
prophet eager to reform the worship of his day might have felt moved to do.”232  He then 
notes that John couples this event with the prediction of Jesus raising up his “temple” in three 
days after its destruction.  The cleansing of the temple is meant to convey the intention of 
Jesus when it comes to the entire sacrificial system.  The Jews demand a sign of his authority 
to cleanse the temple, and the sign Jesus offers them is nothing less than his resurrection to 
come.  So this temple cleansing is a sign of judgment upon the faulty sacrificial system of his 
day, replete with hypocritical money-makers serving as religious authorities. 
But this cleansing also prefigures what Jesus will do in the future.  “Let us see in our 
Lord’s conduct on this occasion a striking picture of what he will do when he comes again the 
second time.  He will purify his visible church as he purified the temple; he will cleanse it 
from everything that defiles and works iniquity, and drive out everyone who claims to be a 
Christian but is still of the world” (Ryle, Matthew, 194).  Many will come to him at that time 
and expect to be welcomed with open arms, but their cries of “Lord, Lord” will be met with 
righteous judgment.  As they nonchalantly swagger into the temple, they will be met with 
whips on their backs. 
                                                 
231 “When an essential truth of God is on the line, Jesus takes off the kid gloves and speaks very directly” (John 
Armstrong (ed.) The Coming Evangelical Crisis [Chicago: Moody Press, 1996] 108). 
232 John (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, Leicester, 1968) 62.  Jesus “regarded all belief in Him as superficial 
which does not have as its most essential elements the consciousness of the need for forgiveness and the 
conviction that He alone is the Mediator of that forgiveness” (65). 
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There seem to be two competing images when it comes to portrayals of the character of 
Jesus.  One is a lamb, the other a lion.  Universalists and pluralists tend to disregard the image 
of the Christ as a lion, inclusivists tend to give it little to no sway, while exclusivists appear to 
emphasise it at times to the exclusion of the lamb figure.  Both images, though, must be given 
their just due.  In a similar way, the disciples emphasised the Messianic Davidic King figure 
while completely ignoring the Suffering Servant image.  The whole time they looked for Jesus 
to overthrow the Roman oppression, they missed his teaching that he must die first.  In Peter’s 
confession of Jesus as the Christ, Matthew follows up that account with Peter’s objection to 
Jesus’ claim that he must first die (Matt. 16:21f).  Peter could not envision the Messiah 
suffering and dying.  He expected the Davidic King, not the Suffering Servant.  He looked for 
the lion and missed the lamb. 
Many Christian scholars today do exactly the opposite.  They look for the lamb and miss 
the lion.  They speak of the loving-kindness of Jesus, his tolerant gentleness and care for 
sinners, and rightly so.  But they deny that he is also a righteous judge.  The lamb who had 
come to take away the sins of the world is also the Lion of the tribe of Judah.  The two images 
correspond with the two advents of the Christ.  In the first advent he came as a lamb and laid 
his life down as an atoning sacrifice for sins.  During the second advent he will come as a lion 
to judge the world.233 
How can the lamb topple tables and act like a madman?234  Because he is consumed with 
zeal for God’s holiness.  Jesus was obsessed with it, and he still is.  Everything deemed 
unclean and unworthy will be cast out.  John the Baptist foretold of one who was coming who 
would “baptise with fire” (Matt. 3:10-12; Luke 3:16-17) and Jesus is that person.  The 
incident of the temple cleansing, then, is not an anomaly in the life of Jesus, an abnormal state 
of behaviour in an otherwise calm and cool demeanour.  The temple cleansing is indicative of 
the ministry of Jesus and what he came to do.  It is a defining moment of his ministry.  He 
came to deal with sin, either by laying his life down as a lamb, or by judging it as a lion.  In 
both ways he will deal with sin.  To cause one image to consume the other is a gross error.  
Both images have their place in the ministry of the Messiah. 
 
 
 
                                                 
233 Revelation 6:16 warns of the wrath of the lamb, a rather paradoxical picture. 
234 John Hick actually uses this event as one of several examples for why he believes Jesus to not be sinless 
(Metaphor, 77). 
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3.3.2.4.2 The Cursing of the Fig Tree 
(Matt. 21:18-22; Mark 11:12-14, 20-24) 
Directly following the account of the temple cleansing is what is commonly called the cursing 
of the fig tree.  The well-known twentieth-century atheist Bertrand Russell noted this incident 
and cited it as one reason why he believed the teaching of Jesus to be flawed and to point to a 
certain moral defect in his character.  To curse a tree that could not bear fruit is “curious” 
according to Russell, who obviously missed the whole point of the account.235  And it is no 
wonder.  The atheist Russell would have no concern or conception of what it means to be 
zealous for the holiness of God.236 
Jesus, however, knew precisely what it meant to be zealous for the Lord.  In stark contrast 
lay the religious leaders and teachers of the law who were more concerned for their own 
interests.  The incident of the cursing of the fig tree, when coupled with the temple cleansing 
and found in the context of Jesus’ judgment of Jerusalem (see Luke 19:41-44), makes 
perfectly good sense when understood as an acted-out parable concerning the judgment of 
Israel.237  The Messiah has come to Israel and has expected fruit.  The people of God, 
however, are more concerned with their own interests. 
The image of Israel as a fig tree comes from the Old Testament (eg., Hos. 9:10, Nah. 
3:12, and Mic. 7:1).  In Mark’s account, the cleansing of the temple is sandwiched between 
the two parts of the account of the fig tree.  Both accounts are meant to portray judgment.  
“The tree gave outward promise of fruit but disappointed the Lord; so its punishment was to 
remain eternally fruitless – in a sense this was but a perpetuation of its present condition” 
(Cole, 176).  Just as Jesus came to the temple and found no fruit, so too with the fig tree.  
Both are symbols of the judgment of Israel. 
The temptation will again be to limit the application of these accounts to Israel, or to the 
hypocritical religious leaders of Jesus’ day, and to not extend the application to the modern-
day generation.  This would be a fatal mistake.  As the interaction between Jesus and the 
Pharisees showed, much that Jesus had to say in condemnation of the Pharisees sticks to 
                                                 
235 Russell’s conclusion about the moral character of Jesus:  “I cannot myself feel that either in the matter of 
wisdom or in the matter of virtue Christ stands quite as high as some other people known to history.  I think I 
should put Buddha and Socrates above Him in those respects.”  He also cites the Gadarene demoniac incident, 
where Jesus sends the demons into the herd of pigs, as another example of the morally defective character of 
Christ (Why I am Not a Christian, electronic colophon, http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/whynot.html). 
236 “In the age of Greenpeace and animal rights the idea that Jesus of Nazareth sentenced two thousand pigs, one 
of the more intelligent mammals, to death by drowning by allowing demons to invade and terrorize them raises 
problems for most readers” (Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., Peter Davids, F. F. Bruce, and Manfred T. Brauch, [Hard 
Sayings of the Bible, Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996] 372). 
237 “If this is seen as an acted parable with reference to Israel, it drops into place at once” (Alan R. Cole, Mark 
[Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1989] 180). 
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people today as well.  Similarly, when Jesus warns of the plight of fruitless trees, whether in 
an acted parable such as this one, or in a direct teaching as found in the Sermon on the Mount, 
close notice should be given.  The image of a tree and its fruit or lack thereof was a common 
teaching by Jesus.  Such trees are uprooted and burned and are of no use to the master. 
Likewise, when Jesus comes to the temple that is the human heart, those things which he 
does not find comely to such a temple will be driven out.  Israel had the impression of great 
religious concern with outward profession of faith in God.  But inside she was foul and 
unclean.  The fig tree appeared from a distance to be fruitful, but upon closer inspection it 
bore no fruit.  Jesus cursed such a tree, and he can be expected to do the same today. 
Those who might object to the moral implications of the “non-environmentalist attitude” 
of Jesus cursing a tree have missed the point of the acted parable.  After all, what is a tree 
when compared to the holiness of the divine tree maker?  The withering of the fig tree points 
to the withering of Jerusalem, who was about to reject her Messiah.  The account is followed 
by the Parable of the Two Sons, the Parable of the Wicked Tenants, and the Parable of the 
Wedding Banquet in Matthew’s Gospel, all strongly judgmental parables.  Mark also follows 
it with the Parable of the Wicked Tenants.  At the heart of the judgment of Israel and her 
religious establishment is her rejection of the Messiah.  The two go hand in hand.  The 
rejection of the person of Jesus earns banishment to hell.  Therefore, to limit these judgment 
teachings to the first-century would be to make a fundamental mistake.  A rejection of the 
Messiah, whether in the first century or twenty centuries later, will yield the same result. 
 
3.3.3 Judgment in the Person of Jesus 
It may be surprising to some who read the Gospels that many Christian scholars debate 
whether or not Jesus expected a coming judgment or end time.238  A simple reading of the 
Gospels reveals that he did indeed expect some cataclysmic end of the world.239  Whether this 
was to be imminent or in the future is up for debate,240 but that he expected it should not be 
                                                 
238 In quoting M. J. Borg, Reiser notes that “only a minority of Jesus scholars active in North America believes 
that Jesus was eschatological” (1997:3).  But as Reiser himself notes, “The noneschatological Jesus is a phantom 
and a product of wishful thinking” (6). 
239 “The strongest support for the doctrine of Endless Punishment is the teaching of Christ, the Redeemer of man. 
. . . The mere perusal of Christ’s words when he was upon earth, without comment upon them, will convince the 
unprejudiced that the Redeemer of sinners knew and believed that for impenitent men and devils there is an 
endless punishment” (William Shedd, The Doctrine of Endless Punishment [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1897] 12). 
240 While John Meier in A Marginal Jew maintains that Jesus did expect a coming end to the age, he argues that 
the ‘imminent’ eschatological passages such as Matt. 10:23, Mark 9:1 and 13:30 were creations by the early 
church and that Jesus looked to a judgment in the distant future (Doubleday, vol. 2, 347).  However, why would 
the early church create words for Jesus that make him appear in error? 
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denied, although many scholars do precisely that.241  This point is beyond the scope of this 
work.  However, New Testament scholar John Meier in his three-volume magnum opus, A 
Marginal Jew, studies the matter extensively in his second volume.  His conclusion is:  “A 
completely un-eschatological Jesus, a Jesus totally shorn of all apocalyptic traits, is simply not 
the historical Jesus, however compatible he might be to modern tastes, at least in middle-class 
American academia” (317).242 
The reason why many scholars do not believe Jesus spoke with apocalyptic expectations 
is because people tend to equate lunatics with someone who articulates a coming, cataclysmic 
catastrophe of cosmic proportions.  Madmen stand on the street corner and proclaim the world 
is ending soon.  Such a picture of the good teacher or godly religious figure of Jesus does not 
jibe well with these conceptions of doomsday preachers.  However, as Meier notes, there is 
simply too much data in the Gospels to explain away the fact that Jesus spoke of a coming 
judgment, an end times. 
The “day of judgment” (for example, Matt. 10:15; 11:22, 24; 12:36, plus other statements 
by Jesus simply referring to “the judgment”) is a prominent phrase in the teaching of Jesus 
and points to this eschatological awareness by him.  A time is coming, so expects Jesus, when 
everything and everyone will be judged.  Even the most seemingly insignificant matter will be 
judged.  “But I tell you that men will have to give account on the day of judgment for every 
careless word they have spoken” (Matt. 12:36).  If this statement is taken at all seriously, most 
people should shudder at the thought.  And the use of “careless” by Jesus connotes a negative, 
not a positive, judgment at that time.   
Over forty years ago Baird lamented about the paucity of talk about judgment when 
speaking about Jesus:  “A rediscovery of the prophetic doctrine of God as revealed in the life 
and words of Jesus . . . is the greatest single need in the field of modern theology” (1963:13).  
Unfortunately, modern theology has continued to ignore this important aspect of the teaching 
of Jesus. 
Another familiar statement by Jesus concerns his judgment of those cities who, upon 
seeing his many miracles, still refused to follow him or to welcome his disciples.  Jesus says 
that those towns or villages that do not welcome the disciples can expect judgment, even 
greater than that experienced by Sodom and Gomorrah (Matt. 10:11-15).   
                                                 
241 Baird notes in his comments about the “de-eschatologizing of the gospel” that from the time of Schweitzer’s 
“Quest” (1906) two opposite extremes have competed on this plane.  The one, following Schweitzer, removes all 
eschatological framework from the teaching of Jesus by saying it was a later fabrication by the early church, 
while the other extreme following C. H. Dodd’s “realised eschatology” says that the eschaton has already come. 
242 Meier covers the Lord’s Supper, the Lord’s Prayer, and the Beatitudes among what amounts to nearly 300 
pages (237-506) of eschatological coverage. 
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In a fuller, yet similar statement later in Matthew’s Gospel, this account is given: 
“Then Jesus began to denounce the cities in which most of his miracles had been 
performed, because they did not repent.  “Woe to you, Korazin!  Woe to you, 
Bethsaida!  If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in 
Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.  But I 
tell you, it will be more bearable for Tyre and Sidon on the day of judgment than 
for you.  And you, Capernaum, will you be lifted up to the skies?  No, you will go 
down to the depths.  If the miracles that were performed in you had been 
performed in Sodom, it would have remained to this day.  But I tell you that it 
will be more bearable for Sodom on the day of judgment than for you” (Matt. 
11:20-24). 
This is a striking statement, especially given the fact that Sodom and Gomorrah are 
referred to more often throughout the Scriptures for their judgment than any other cities in the 
entire Bible.243  Jesus makes similar condemnations on the cities of Korazin and Bethsaida (in 
comparison to Tyre and Sidon), and Capernaum, and in a later, more general statement, Jesus 
condemns his current generation as a whole, while favourably mentioning Nineveh and the 
Queen of the South (Matt. 12:41-42).  So why all this judgment, and why will it be even more 
severe than for godless cities such as Sodom and Gomorrah? 
Jesus says in Matthew 12:42:  “Now one greater than Solomon is here.”  A rejection of 
his ministry and person will bring horrible judgment.  He had gone through the cities of 
Korazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum and performed great miracles.  These signs attested to his 
ministry as coming from God, but the people did not heed the signs.  They rejected God’s 
Anointed One, and therefore, they incurred God’s judgment.  In fact, despite the great sins of 
Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom, those cities will have a judgment more bearable than the cities of 
Judea which rejected the Christ.  Nineveh only had the prophet Jonah come and warn them of 
God’s wrath and they repented.  Now the Messiah comes and stands before the people, and 
they have not heeded God’s messenger.  In fact, Jesus notes that had Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom 
seen the miracles that Korazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum had seen, they would have 
repented. 
                                                 
243 Outside the Book of Genesis, references to Sodom and Gomorrah and their judgment by God are found in 
Deut. 29:23; 32:32; Isa. 1:9-10; 3:9; 13:19; Jer. 23:14; 49:18; 50:40; Lam 4:6; Exe. 16:49; Amos 4:11; and Zep. 
2:9.  Jesus notes the cities in Luke 17:29, and several times in the New Testament epistles Sodom and Gomorrah 
are used as examples of God’s judgment, for example 2 Pet. 2:6, Jude 7, and Rev. 11:8.  In some instances, only 
Sodom is mentioned, but the understanding that it included Gomorrah in the judgment is always assumed. 
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The issue is the person of the Messiah.  “One greater than Solomon” has come onto 
humanity’s scene.  Jesus is none other than the long-awaited Christ, God’s Anointed One, but 
his message has not been received.  Already seen in the discussion of the “those who disown 
me I will disown to the Father” passage was that rejection of the person of Christ is subject to 
eternal judgment.  The teachings of Jesus cannot be separated from his person, as if the two 
stand apart.  As Travis notes, “Both in Paul and in the gospels one’s relationship to Christ (or 
to God through Christ) is the criterion of judgment; and the ultimate outcome of the judgment 
is conceived in terms of relationship to Christ” (1986:167).244 
Those theologians who boil down Jesus to a few ethical teachings which can be followed 
by anybody – and are for the most part taught by any religion – then conclude that a person 
need not profess faith in Jesus Christ to in fact belong to him.  One need not even know Jesus 
to follow his teachings.  This is one reason why typically “liberal” scholars go to great pains 
to empty Jesus of any and all supernatural qualities, particularly as they relate to his claims 
about his person.  If Jesus is indeed God in the flesh, then his person is just as important as his 
teaching.  However, Jesus can be emptied of all deity, his teaching will fall in line with the 
teaching of any “moral man,” no matter what doctrinal content may be involved. 
However, “one greater than Solomon” has come, not one “equal to Solomon.”  The 
question that begs to be answered is, Will people today who reject the Messiah be similarly 
condemned?  And what does it mean to reject the Messiah?  Today, there are millions of 
people who know the teachings of Jesus and choose to reject them, either in part or in full.  As 
it were, they stand in a position similar to Korazin and Bethsaida.  They have seen Jesus, his 
works and his teaching, and they choose to reject him.  Why, for example, does Clark Pinnock 
hesitate to say what will happen to such people, when the teaching of Jesus concerning those 
who reject him is so clear? 
Note that the issue is repentance.  The miracles of Jesus were meant, among other things, 
to cause the people to repent.  Jesus claims that even Sodom would have remained to this day 
had its inhabitants been shown the miracles Jesus performed in Capernaum.  But how could 
Sodom repent if it were not shown the miracles?  The answer is obvious:  Sodom did not 
repent, it was not given any special revelation by God to do so, and it stands to this day as an 
example of God’s judgment of the ungodly.  It may also stand as an example contra 
inclusivism’s and specifically Pinnock’s contention that God will go to any lengths to save 
people and will not cease pursuing them. 
                                                 
244 Reiser concurs, the person of Jesus Christ is the key in the coming eschatological judgment (1997:198, 201). 
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A rejection of the person and work of Jesus is a sin in need of repentance and forgiveness, 
and subject to condemnation if the former two actions are not performed.  A distinction can be 
made between a failure to recognise who Jesus is, and a rejection of him once recognised.  
This passage seems clearly to involve the latter, not the former. 
 
3.3.4 The Flood of Noah as a Type of Divine Judgment 
The Olivet Discourse is the quintessential, eschatological sermon of Jesus in the Gospels 
(Matt. 24-25; Mark 13:3-37; Luke 21:5-37).  Some portions of it have already been seen when 
the Parables of the Wise Servant, Ten Virgins, Talents, and Sheep and Goats were considered.  
This sermon is placed near the end of the ministry of Jesus in all three Synoptic Gospels and 
as such, forms the final warnings about the end times from the lips of Jesus before his 
crucifixion.  Three major themes run through this discourse:  the description of the end of the 
age, the destruction of Jerusalem, and the coming of the Christ. 
After providing apocalyptic signs by which to recognise the end of the age, Jesus moves 
through a description of the destruction of Jerusalem to his warnings about false christs and 
false prophets.  Then comes this passage: 
“As it was in the days of Noah, so it will be at the coming of the Son of Man.  
For in the days before the flood, people were eating and drinking, marrying and 
giving in marriage, up to the day Noah entered the ark; and they knew nothing 
about what would happen until the flood came and took them all away.  That is 
how it will be at the coming of the Son of Man” (Matt. 24:37-39). 
In the comments concerning the Parable of the Ten Virgins, it was noted that one 
characteristic of the true followers of Jesus is preparedness.  In the passage above, this 
characteristic is again noted, albeit in a negative sense.  Those who are not prepared will 
suffer great personal loss.  Jesus uses the truth that existed at the time of Noah regarding 
humanity and its relative malaise concerning the requirements of God to describe a society 
similarly oblivious to the judgment of God, only this time at the end of the age. 
Jesus uses this Old Testament instance of the judgment of God which stands in stark 
contrast to the conclusions of the universalist, pluralist, and inclusivist.  During the time of 
Noah, the vast majority of humanity was swept away.  Granted, the point that Jesus is trying 
to make is not that a similar percentage of humanity will also perish at the end times, but 
rather that, like in Noah’s time, many people could not care less about God and his judgment.  
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However, does the use of the Great Flood jibe well with the idea of the vast majority of 
humanity being saved in the last days? 
Pinnock sees in Noah’s account nothing but positive things, even going so far as to 
partially root his positive view of non-Christian religions in the “global covenant with Noah” 
(Wideness, 25).  He sees three covenants through which humans may relate to God, the 
Noahic covenant, the Abrahamic covenant, and the new covenant through Jesus (105).  
“Insofar as salvation connotes a relationship with God, there is salvation for people in all 
three of the covenants” (105).  Even the teaching of Jesus concerning the sheep and the goats 
should be understood “in the spirit of the Noahic covenant” (164).  And the working of God 
through pagan saints is also “rooted in the covenant with the race through Noah” (93). 
Incredibly, Pinnock’s initial discussion concerning a “hermeneutic of hopefulness” and 
his comment about God’s nature as not indicative of one who would sit by “while large 
numbers perish” (or who does not want to rescue only a few brands plucked from the fire) are 
introduced within his positive comments concerning Noah and the flood (18-25).  It is almost 
as if Pinnock’s control suppositions are so strong (eg., God wants to save the vast majority of 
humanity), that he cannot read Scripture without seeing it everywhere, even in a dismal 
passage such as the Great Flood.  Whereas Jesus uses the example of Noah and the flood in 
negative terms, Pinnock only uses it positively.  This should send up alarm flags concerning 
Pinnock’s understanding of the event. 
Note also that this judgment comes with the advent of the Son of Man.  As Jesus will note 
at the end of this discourse with four successive parables, a time of separation is coming.  Just 
as in the days of the flood, once that time comes, there will be no turning back.  So often 
conservative pastors and theologians are derided for warning people of the impending 
judgment to come.  However, Jesus warns similarly.   
After this discourse, the events of his life move quickly to his crucifixion.  When little 
time remained to say much, Jesus took the time to warn of the judgment that is to come when 
the Son of Man makes his return.  This warning should be heeded, or some will be deemed 
unprepared as were the people at the time of Noah.  Once the rains fell, how many of those 
people began to clamber toward the ark and seek asylum therein?  Such a pathetic picture of 
apathy and indifference turned to cold realisation will also be seen in the last days. 
166  
3.3.5  A Closing Bibliological Observation 
There is a tremendous amount of material in the Gospels and specifically from the mouth of 
Jesus that speaks of the judgment and wrath of God.245  There is simply no getting around this 
fact.  At this point, one’s Bibliology becomes very important.  If evangelicals believe the 
Bible to be the Word of God – God speaking to them – then they must pay attention to this 
large amount of material.  Evangelicals cannot at one and the same time say they believe the 
Bible to be God’s Word, and say Jesus did not speak all that much about God’s judgment. 
Of course, the other position is to regard the Bible as any other book, whether religious or 
secular, created from the fertile minds of humans.  The obvious ancillary to this hypothesis is 
that it then contains errors, contradictions, and falsehoods.  From this one can simply pick and 
choose what to keep while discarding the rest.  If, for example, the portrait of Jesus that 
depicts him as ultra-tolerant is preferred, then all data contrary to this portrait will be 
discarded.  If belief in the supernatural is lacking, then discard all the miracles of Jesus.  In 
short, some scholars have a tendency to dismiss as “inauthentic” the very sayings and actions 
of Jesus which contradict their desired portrait of him. 
If this is indeed the preferred approach, let it be known that some are discarding what 
amounts to nearly half of everything Jesus said in the Gospels.  This bibliological approach 
has little regard for the actual Gospels themselves, and is more concerned with what is 
preferred, than what the material actually says.  It is amazing that the Quest for the Historical 
Jesus has almost always yielded a portrait of Jesus which perfectly jibes with the “Quester’s” 
preconceptions about him.  As Meier sarcastically notes, the many reconstructions of Jesus 
look “suspiciously like a professor in a Religious Studies Department at some American 
university” (Marginal, vol. 2, 837). 
One’s Bibliology is instrumental to one’s accepted portrait of Jesus.  In the Parable of the 
Wise and Foolish Builders (Matt. 7:24-27), Jesus talks specifically about his teachings.  Like 
the wise builder who builds his house upon the rock, those people who hear the teachings of 
Jesus and put them into practise can weather the storms of life.  But those people who hear 
these teachings and ignore them will suffer loss when the wind and the waves come crashing 
upon them. 
But what teachings is Jesus referring to?  All of them it would seem.  He makes no 
distinction.  He does not tell his listeners to just consider his teachings on forgiveness and the 
love of the Father, but ignore or discard the teachings about his wrath and coming judgment.  
                                                 
245 “By actual count, the Synoptics record Jesus saying well over twice as much about the wrath of God as he 
ever did about his love” (Baird, 1963:72). 
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The Wise Builder adheres to all the teachings of Jesus, not just some of them.  It would be 
supremely foolish to pick and choose what teachings to follow of Jesus and which ones to 
ignore. 
 
3.3.6 Conclusion to Christological Evaluation 
At the beginning of this section on Christology an investigation was begun to see if the 
inclusivist portrayal of the teaching of Jesus is biblically founded.  Specifically, a hermeneutic 
of judgment concerning the person and teaching of Jesus was used in order to determine if 
inclusivism’s wider hope, as opposed to the more restricted exclusivism of traditional 
evangelicalism, has any support from the ministry of Jesus.  Some tentative conclusions can 
now be made in this regard. 
Of first note is the sheer volume of teaching from the mouth of Jesus concerning the 
judgment of God.  This fact alone should cause evangelicals to be cautious about 
inclusivism’s tendency to portray Jesus as a messenger of the love of God, with little to no 
mind for his message of judgment.  Any theological system which is willing to ignore what 
amounts to nearly half of the teaching of Jesus, all the while claiming to be faithful to his 
teaching, needs to be viewed with a wary eye. 
The survey of the teaching of Jesus as regards the parables touched upon all the major 
parables commonly used by inclusivists in support of their soteriological optimism.  A few 
parables where little to no coverage by inclusivists is offered were also covered..  Two basic 
emphases in these passages were identified.  Firstly, Jesus has a strong emphasis on judgment 
as separation.  Whether it is fish, weeds, trees, or paths, Jesus envisions all people in two, 
broad categories: the damned and the saved.  Secondly, this emphasis on separation finds its 
heart in what people not only do with the teaching of Jesus, but with his person as well. 
Some inclusivists have famously proposed the idea that people can be genuine followers 
of Jesus without actually knowing him.  This is in opposition to the historic evangelical 
position that an individual must have cognitive awareness of Christ in order to be his disciple.  
From the above study of the pertinent parables, the exclusivist position appears to have much 
greater support than either the inclusivism of Rahner (Catholic) or Pinnock (evangelical).  An 
inclusivist optimism either in regards to large numbers of people being saved (the extent of 
salvation) or a wider hope of salvation for those who do not know Jesus cognitively (the 
access to salvation) seems unjustified.  Errant inclusivist conclusions have been produced 
mainly by a faulty hermeneutic which is more concerned with theological integrity than 
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exegetical reliability, but once the latter is abandoned, little hope of attaining the former can 
be countenanced. 
Lastly, it was recognised that if Jesus explicitly condemned certain beliefs or people, 
evangelicals should be willing to do the same.  This was particularly evident with respect to 
the interaction between Jesus and the Pharisees.  Many of the same errors the Pharisees made, 
and for which Jesus vehemently condemned them, seem to be continued in certain Christian 
circles today.  Evangelicals cannot proclaim the salvation of those people which Jesus 
specifically condemned. 
The message of judgment found in the words of Jesus is in actuality a message of grace.  
When God warns that sin will be dealt with, he is being gracious, for a warning is a blessing, 
not a curse.  Suppose a person were sick and went to the doctor, only to be told that he or she 
was completely healthy.  Is the doctor doing any favours by not telling the truth of the 
condition?  Suppose a father does not tell his child that, if the child touches the hot stove, that 
child’s hand will be burned.  Is the parent doing the child a favour by not warning of the 
possible danger? 
When the prophet Jonah was commanded to go to Nineveh and preach against its sin, he 
fled in the opposite direction to Tarshish.  Jonah gives the reason why he did not want to go 
and preach to that city, and it was because he knew that in his preaching of judgment, there 
was a possibility of repentance on the part of the Ninevites, and mercy from God.  “O, LORD, 
is this not what I said when I was still at home?  That is why I was so quick to flee to 
Tarshish.  I knew that you are a gracious and compassionate God, slow to anger and 
abounding in love, a God who relents from sending calamity” (4:2).  Jonah had realised that 
in his warning to the Assyrians, there was the potential for mercy and grace.   
"Those who perceive only the love of God avert their eyes from the uncongenial 
doctrine of the wrath of God.  But in eliminating the wrath or disgrace of God they 
have also eliminated the grace of God.  Where there is no fear there can be no 
rescue.  Where there is no condemnation there can be no acquittal."246 
The same is the case with the judgment words of Jesus.  Jesus does not tell these horrible 
things because in some sick way he enjoys it, or because he simply wants to scare people, or 
because he was a fear monger.  The reason is much more transparent and gracious than that.  
Jesus knows that the Father is holy and that he must, in being true to his holy nature, deal with 
sin.  He cannot simply overlook it or ignore it.  Being a holy God of justice, he must and will 
                                                 
246 F. C. Synge as quoted in Ajith Fernando, Crucial Questions about Hell (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 
1991) 112. 
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handle the problem of sin and rebellion in his creation.  Jesus is doing nothing more than 
speaking the truth.  Some may not like hearing the truth, but that matters little.  For Jesus to 
be a true messenger of God – to be a prophet with integrity – he must speak the truth.  "The 
vague and tenuous hope that God is too kind to punish the ungodly has become a deadly 
opiate to the consciences of millions."247 
One need only look to the cross to see the God of Jesus doing what Jesus numerous times 
warned about.  At the cross, the wrath of God was poured out on sin.  Jesus knew full well 
what the penalty for sin is and, despite that knowledge, became sin for humanity anyway.  
Jesus had intimate understanding of what it means to deal with a holy God and, despite that 
knowledge, became unholy so that sinners might live.  When Jesus asked that the cup be 
taken from him, he was asking that he would not have to partake of God’s wrath, “yet not my 
will but thine be done.”  “The cup is a metaphorical expression referring to the judgment of 
God as it is expressed in the pouring out of His wrath upon sinful nations and people.”248  
Here is yet another example from the life of Jesus of his awareness of the reality of God’s 
wrath. 
This fact in the teaching of Jesus cannot be ignored.  Whether it be in his interaction with 
the religious leaders of his day, or in his favourite form of teaching, the parable, or in his 
general discourses to the masses or his private teaching to his disciples, the judgment of God 
is at the forefront of Jesus’ mind.  It may, in fact, not be too far off the mark to say that it was 
the primary topic of his teachings.  Jesus was, after all, a messenger of the grace of God, and 
part of that message of grace involved warning of the impending judgment of God if sinners 
do not heed the warnings. 
Inclusivists such as Pinnock find the judgment statements of Jesus to be relatively 
unimportant.  “What kind of God would send large numbers of men, women, and children to 
hell without the remotest chance of responding to the truth?  This does not sound like the God 
whom Jesus called Father” (Wideness, 154).  From Pinnock’s numerous writings, one is led to 
believe that whenever statements of judgment fall from the lips of the Saviour, they should 
always somehow be excused away.  Such emotional appeals as “this does not sound like the 
God of Jesus” ignore the vast quantity of statements by Jesus that do speak of the Father’s 
wrath, judgment, and condemnation.  Inclusivists concentrate on the positive statements by 
Jesus while ignoring the negative ones.  
                                                 
247 A. W. Tozer, as quoted in Fernando, Hell, 128. 
248 Jerry Bridges, Discipleship Journal (May/June 2002) 20.  Examples of the metaphor of the cup as signifying 
the wrath of God are found in Psa. 75:8, Jer. 25:15, Isa. 51:17,22, and Rev. 14:9-10. 
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Far too often Jesus is portrayed as a messenger of God’s grace, which in turn is defined as 
God’s merciful forgiveness of everything sinners do, regardless of any other factors.  This 
message, however, blurs the line between tolerance and forgiveness.  God is most definitely 
not the former; he most certainly is the latter.  If God were only a tolerant God, then no matter 
what humans do, no matter how sinful they might be, no matter how rebellious they are 
toward God’s will, he will put up with it.  The fact that God is a forgiving God – and that that 
forgiveness is done on his terms and in his way – is a far different thing to say.  Sin has not 
been swept under the carpet, it has been dealt with justly and righteously.  Sin has not been 
tolerated, it has been forgiven.249 
Jesus spoke both about the grace and mercy of the Father, as well as his wrath and 
judgment.  The theologians, scholars, pastors, and church leaders who find it too distasteful or 
off-putting to speak about the wrath of God seemingly find Jesus too distasteful and off-
putting as well.  A diplomat or ambassador who only speaks the words which he deems 
attractive of the administration he is representing, while ignoring those things which he deems 
repellent, will quickly lose his job.  It behoves evangelicals to speak all the words of Jesus, 
not just the ones they like.250  If they do not, they cannot consider themselves to be his 
ambassadors. 
“As God hates all sin and all sinners, as he is not only holy but just, and as the 
Bible warns us that he ‘will not leave the guilty unpunished’ (Nahum 1:3), how 
can anyone blithely assume that ‘God is love’ will see them safe?  Those who 
imagine that they can live as they please because God is love, and are banking on 
God’s love to guarantee that they will never go to hell, are making a terrible and 
tragic mistake” (Blanchard, 1993:172). 
 
3.4 Is Inclusivism’s View of God Closer to the Biblical Model than Classical Theism? 
A Theological Reflection on Judgment 
The landscape of American, evangelical theism has dramatically changed over the past two 
decades.  Many books have chronicled this change, such as The Evangelical Left, Their God 
Is too Small, The Coming Evangelical Crisis, and The Remaking of Evangelical Theology, to 
name a few.  As noted in the Introduction, the Soteriology of inclusivism often blossoms into 
                                                 
249 “We have created a God so genially tolerant as to be morally indifferent” (William Temple, quoted in Baird, 
1963:13). 
250 After noting that one possible reason why some Christians tend to avoid attributing judgment and wrath to 
God is because they feel it is beneath their image of God to attribute such things to him, Jerry Bridges then notes 
“the more basic reason we avoid or ignore the idea of God’s wrath is that we simply don’t think our sinfulness 
warrants that degree of judgment,” Discipleship Journal, 20.  In other words, it is a deficient view of sin. 
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a view of God commonly referred to as Open Theism, which Clark Pinnock has labelled as 
“radical” in its departure from classical theism. 
This section will concentrate on Theology-proper, the view of God.  Continuing to use a 
hermeneutic of judgment, some of the boundaries of inclusivism will be tested to see if 
anything can be gained by adopting the radical Arminianism of Open Theism.  This will 
particularly impinge upon the two basic tenets of inclusivism and its adoption of Open 
Theism, the maintenance of the freewill of humans (apparently abandoned in Calvinist 
schemes), and the wider offer of salvation (as opposed to the typical limited or particular view 
of Calvinism often adopted by evangelicals). 
 
3.4.1 The Necessity of Change in Theology 
Theological systems abound.  New models and insights are created almost daily.  “There is 
nothing new under the sun” is not an apt statement of the state of Christian theology today.  In 
fact, unless you develop something new, you are almost entirely ignored.  Anyone attempting 
to write a doctoral dissertation can attest to that!  Indeed, probably the worst thing to be 
labelled in theology today is “unoriginal” or “uncreative.”  Theological dinosaurs are treated 
as extinct by being ignored.     
Traditional definitions of terms are discarded.  As with Schleiermacher, who redefined 
“God” to mean “the feeling of absolute dependence,” some evangelical theologians appear to 
be doing the same sort of thing.  In fact, Erickson bemoans this increasing trend of 
reinterpretation of theological terms in evangelicalism (1997:15).  Examples include 
“salvation,” which is no longer understood to mean “freedom from the consequences of one’s 
sins” but could simply mean freedom from oppression, be it male, or white, or western 
oppression.  “Sin” is rarely even spoken about, and then almost never in terms of offence 
against a holy God.  “Resurrection” is merely how a person feels about his or her beliefs when 
they are liberated from their old mindset.  The “gospel” is no longer the good news of God 
incarnating, but rather the good news that points to loving fellow humans and accepting them, 
no matter how strange their point of view may be.  “Heaven” is a peaceful state of mind, and 
“hell” is mental anguish in this life, but neither have anything to do with a life beyond this 
earthbound one. 
Broadly speaking, there are two camps when it comes to this idea of change.  The first is 
the conservative camp, which maintains that the basic truths of Christianity are no different 
today than they were two thousand years ago.  Major overhauls in Soteriology, Christology, 
and Theology-proper are not necessary, based mainly on the idea that God in his very nature 
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does not change, and that the revelation of God in Christ is complete and needs no additions 
or revisions. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum are those theologians commonly referred to as 
“liberal” (which is equated with “open-mindedness”).  These scholars are all too happy to 
make changes, even major ones, in Christian theology, with the assumption that truth – even 
God’s truth – needs change over time.  To be clear, “reform” is not a bad word in 
conservative circles, so long as it is understood as moving back to original truths which over 
time have been lost.  Normally, reform in evangelical circles means correcting errors which 
have crept into Christian theology over time, normally errors of the liberal variety. 
Clark Pinnock believes that major overhauls in Christian theology are necessary, 
especially given his claim that evangelicalism and its view of God is more influenced by 
philosophy than Scripture.  It would certainly prove advantageous to Pinnock if indeed he 
could prove that the theism of traditional evangelicalism is more concerned with pagan 
teachings than biblical ones, but there is simply too much against him to do so.  As many have 
countered, it seems that Open Theism’s view of God is more influenced by a modern love-
affair with tolerance than with an accurate biblical portrayal.  Norman Geisler notes, 
“Ironically, for those who claim classical theism was influenced by the (Greek) philosophy of 
its day, it turns out that their view arose in a climate dominated by the (process) philosophy of 
our day” (1997:97).251 
Geisler asks the key question in the title of his recent book, Creating God in the Image of 
Man?  For many evangelicals, this is precisely what is happening with Open Theism.  To 
them, the God of the open theist appears impotent (not only will he not override the freewill 
of humans, but for some he cannot), ignorant (God cannot know the future choices of free-
willed beings), and less than perfect (God is subject to change, both in mind and in nature).  
Although this study cannot possibly exhaust all of these issues now, it must at least be 
recognised that they exist and do influence every imaginable aspect of theism.252 
3.4.2 The Attributes of God 
In the following sections, the attributes of God will be covered as they directly relate to Open 
Theism’s inclusivist claims.  In some form or fashion all of these attributes will have some 
                                                 
251 Pinnock agrees that “we are all influenced by philosophy” (Most Moved Mover, 150), and that open theists 
and conventional evangelical scholars are “both indebted to philosophy, in their case ancient and in my case 
modern . . . . I believe that conventional theists are more influenced by Plato, who was a pagan, than I am by 
Whitehead, who was a Christian” (143). 
252 An excellent example of the response from the traditional evangelical camp concerning the basic tenets of 
Open Theism can be found in Bruce A. Ware, God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism 
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2000). 
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relationship to a hermeneutic of judgment.  Even though much more could be said about each, 
the discussion will be limited to the elements of each attribute which relate specifically to this 
hermeneutic.253 
 
3.4.2.1 The Two Testaments and God’s Immutability 
As already noted in the Christology section, the Father Jesus proclaimed is the very God of 
the Old Testament.  The God who commanded the Israelites to kill everyone in Jericho and 
Ai, men, women, children, infants; the God who wiped out both cities of Sodom and 
Gomorrah without warning its inhabitants; the God who approved of the slaying of the 450 
prophets of Baal on Mount Carmel; the God who sent a plague against his own chosen people, 
wiping out 24,000 of them because of their sexual immorality; the God who only preserved 
eight people from all of humanity, drowning the rest of them in a great flood because of their 
wickedness.  With most of these examples, they are used by Jesus and the New Testament 
authors to warn of the judgment that is yet to come against the ungodly. 
Why?  Traditionally, evangelicals would say because God’s character has not changed.  
They would ask, what do pluralists and inclusivists have to say about the Great Flood, which 
certainly wiped out the vast majority of humanity?  Why do they ask questions like, “How 
could a merciful God allow the vast majority of humanity to perish?” when that is precisely 
what he did in the time of Noah?254 
The God who did all these things is the same God Jesus worshipped and obeyed.  He is 
still a holy and righteous God.  It is for this reason that Jesus spoke so frequently about his 
wrath and judgment.  Jesus knew the nature of God intimately.  Jesus read his Holy Scriptures 
and believed them to be a true portrayal of the character and nature of the Father.  And, 
because Jesus loves humanity, he spoke the truth about the Father. 
The notion that the God of the Old Testament and the “God of Jesus” are somehow not 
the same Being is nothing more than the dualism of systems such as Gnosticism.  Granted, 
there are several scholars today (Pagels, Koester, etc.) who are attempting to portray 
                                                 
253 For an interesting study of whether or not the theology of Open Theism is properly considered a strain of 
Arminianism or a deviation from it, see Steven M. Studebaker, “The Mode of Divine Knowledge in Reformation 
Arminianism and Open Theism,” Journal of Evangelical Theological Society (September 2004) 469-480.  
Studebake sees “theological continuity” between the theism of Reformation Arminianism and that espoused by 
open theists. 
254 It is not too difficult to imagine that if Clark Pinnock or John Hick had been living during the time of Noah, 
they would have found numerous kind, good, decent people on the earth.  This makes good sense, given their 
definition of “good people,” but one is left to conclude either that the people at the time of Noah were decidedly 
different than people today (a view that does not jibe too well with pluralism’s positive view of human nature), 
or that how God views humanity and how humans view it can be decidedly different.  The latter option seems 
preferable. 
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Gnosticism as the true Christianity and proper teaching of Jesus that was subverted by 
politically power-hungry church fathers, but such arguments are based on flimsy reasoning 
and scant data.255  It is historically and theologically clear that one reason why Gnosticism 
was opposed in the early centuries of Christendom was because it did not properly portray the 
teaching of Jesus.  One such error of Gnosticism was to make a drastic distinction between the 
Creator God of the Old Testament and the Spirit God of the New Testament.256  Some 
evangelical inclusivists seem to be making the very same error when they speak about the 
“God of Jesus” and strongly imply that his God is not the same “vindictive, petty” God of the 
Old Testament.  The attempt is made to disparage the picture of the Old Testament God and 
to make the “God of Jesus” the true portrayal of the God of heaven.  This attempt, however, 
fails on several fronts. 
In the first place, the “God of Jesus” is also a God of wrath and judgment, not simply the 
“God of love” that the pluralists and inclusivists want to see.  The attempt to depict the “God 
of Jesus” as only loving and forgiving, at the exclusion of any ultimate or eternal judgment 
from him is entirely misplaced and does not do justice to the biblical data.  The God that Jesus 
revealed in the Gospels is the very same God that he worshiped as found in the Old 
Testament.  There is not a hint of a difference between the two, and to attempt to prove 
otherwise only reveals a misunderstanding of the doctrine of the Trinity and more precisely, 
the attribute of God known as his immutability.  To put this another way, if inclusivists want 
to portray the “God of Jesus” as only a God of love and forgiveness, they can only do that by 
butchering the New Testament text, chopping away the pieces that contradict their pre-
conceptions and conclusions. 
But is God as portrayed in the Old Testament not much more judgmental and angry than 
the “God of Jesus?”  This common misreading of Scripture needs to be addressed.  True, God 
as depicted in the Old Testament is vengeful, angry and full of wrath, but he is also loving and 
patient and kind.  In fact, the most common phrase used in the Old Testament to describe God 
                                                 
255 See my unpublished Master’s thesis, The Politics of Heresy, at the University of Stellenbosch, for a study of 
this very issue as it relates specifically to the time of Athanasius and the reigns of Constantine and Constantius, 
AD 325-361, and the battle with the Arian heresy. 
256 In brief, Christian Gnosticism made a radical dichotomy, as all dualistic systems do, between two opposing 
forces or substances, in this case specifically between the flesh and the spirit or soul.  The flesh was assumed to 
be evil and the soul the good part of a human.  Salvation involved the liberation of the soul from the prison of the 
body, and this liberation was enacted through gnosis, special knowledge of these truths.  The Christian Gnostic 
could then choose to live his life in one of two opposing ways.  He could either live a life of absolute asceticism, 
where he beat his body into submission, or by absolute licentiousness, where he did with his body whatever he 
wanted to do with it and in so doing portrayed that the body is nothing.  From this radical dichotomy between the 
material and the immaterial came the Christian Gnostic view of the radical dichotomy between the Old 
Testament Creator God (who is evil because he created the material world) and his opponent, the “God of Jesus” 
revealed to be pure Spirit and thus good. 
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is “slow to anger, abounding in love.”257  Recall that the Old Testament is four times as long 
as the New Testament.  More volume as it relates to the depiction of God in the Old 
Testament as a God of wrath would be expected than would be found in the New Testament.   
The Old Testament covers approximately 2000 years of history (from the time of 
Abraham; more if one were to consider since the time of creation), while the New Testament 
only covers less than one hundred years.  It seems misplaced to make the simplistic 
conclusion that God as depicted in the Old Testament is more of anything given this disparity 
between the two testaments. 
For example, the judgment of Ananias and Sapphira in Acts 5 could easily fit into the Old 
Testament accounts of God’s judgment.  The shocking swiftness of the judgment of this 
couple recalls similar accounts in the Old Testament.  Just because there are more of these 
incidents in the Old Testament historical record should not lead some to the false conclusion 
that God’s judgment is now no longer operative or as operative in the New Testament 
dispensation. 
The ultimate act of judgment in the New Testament is the cross.  Whereas today there is a 
tendency to emphasise the cross as God’s supreme act of love,  its importance concerning his 
wrath should not be ignored.  As Jesus was made sin for sinful humans (2 Cor. 5:21), he took 
upon himself the wrath of the Father.  This propitiatory act by God’s Son is the reason why 
his followers need not fear condemnation (Rom. 8:1).  If God’s wrath was not poured out on 
Jesus during the crucifixion, Christians would still have to dread its coming, but as such, they 
do not (1 Thes. 5:9). 
The historical events in the Old Testament must be understood as having spiritual 
significance, such that the New Testament need not provide a listing of similar historical acts 
of God’s judgment in order to maintain that his judgment is operative and imminent.  For 
example, the Exodus of Israel from Egyptian captivity is the quintessential act of salvation in 
the Old Testament, used time and time again by Old Testament authors as a reminder of 
God’s salvific relationship with his chosen people.  The physical Exodus foreshadowed a 
spiritual exodus that would come through God’s Son, the Messiah.  Manna which fell from 
heaven, for example, was a foreshadow of the true bread of heaven that came in the person of 
Jesus (John 6). 
Paul makes this argument clearer in 1 Cor. 10, where he speaks of spiritual food, spiritual 
drink, and even a spiritual rock that accompanied the Israelites through the desert during the 
                                                 
257 See Ex. 34:6; Num. 14:18; Neh. 9:17; Psa. 86:15, 103:8, 145:8; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2, Nah. 1:3. 
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time of Moses.  In other words, the temporal, physical events seen in the Old Testament are 
meant to foreshadow the eternal, spiritual aspects in the post-resurrection time as taught in the 
New Testament.  The author of Hebrews makes a similar argument when he speaks of Old 
Testament elements being a shadow of the spiritual substance that was to come later.  For 
example, he speaks this way concerning the tabernacle (9:11-12), the Sabbath (ch. 4), the 
sanctuary (8:5), and the Law (10:1).  Paul notes elsewhere, “These are a shadow of the things 
that were to come; the reality, however, is found in Christ” (Col. 2:17). 
The same can be said for the issue of judgment.  In fact, this is precisely how Paul uses 
the examples found in 1 Cor. 10.  He does not emphasise the salvific aspects of the 
foreshadowing, Old Testament events as much as he does their quality of judgment.  Old 
Testament judgment is also a foretaste or foreshadow of what is to come.  On the temporal 
plane, in the Old Testament the judgment of God is seen, which is meant to point ultimately to 
an eternal parallel.  In other words, this is how people should expect God to judge sin in the 
future as well.  There is continuity, then, between the Old and New Testaments when it comes 
to the judgment of God, not a discontinuity. 
In the second place, the attempt to make a distinction between the Old Testament 
portrayal of God and imply that it is somehow inferior to the “God of Jesus” fails by 
producing an inferior Theology-proper.  If the New Testament God is not the same as the Old 
Testament God in character and nature, then there exists a changing God.258  However, a 
Trinitarian doctrine must affirm that the Old Testament Jehovah is the exact same character as 
the “God of Jesus.”  Does God change for the better, from the Old Testament to the New 
Testament?  If this is maintained, is this not the error of Gnosticism?  Granted, Gnosticism 
posited two separate and distinct gods, but if some believe that the God as revealed in the Old 
Testament is of an inferior character to that revealed in the New, are they not treading on 
similar ground as that of Marcion, for example? 
Any being which can change and in fact does change implies one of two directions for 
that change.  Either the being becomes better than it was ante-change, or it becomes worse 
than it was before.  If the being remains exactly the same, then it cannot be said that the being 
is undergoing change.  Of course, positive change is always good, but the being can also 
change for the worse.  Concerning God as depicted in the Bible and commonly portrayed by 
pluralists and inclusivists, in two thousand years he went from petty and vindictive to 
                                                 
258 Or, of course, two entirely different gods, the heresy of Gnosticism in Christian garb. 
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forgiving and all-loving.  What about the next two thousand years?  Who is to say that now 
God has not changed from the loving God depicted by Jesus? 
Evangelicals do not endeavour to maintain the immutability of God only for the sake of 
the concept itself.  God’s immutability affects other areas of God’s nature which are taken for 
granted.  If God changes, so can either his promises or his will and/or ability to keep them.  
For example, if God does change, then Christians have no assurance that his promises will be 
fulfilled.   
This cuts both ways, both in regard to his positive promises (salvation) as well as the 
negative (judgment).  Negatively speaking, God promises to punish sin.  The martyrs who 
look for the Lord to avenge their blood (Rev. 6:9-11) can have no assurance that this will 
occur if God does indeed change.  Christians look forward to the day when God will 
ultimately overcome sin, death, and Satan, but these promises cannot be sure if God can 
change for the worse.  Because inclusivism posits a God who can change, all the typical 
arguments against Process Theology stick to Open Theism as well, despite their objections to 
the contrary (eg., Most Moved Mover, 142-150).  This most dramatically affects the ability to 
trust him, a most disappointing by-product of inclusivism’s altered view of God. 
Thirdly, there is a bibliological problem.  How is it even known that the “God of Jesus” is 
the correct God?  To put this another way, many liberal Christian scholars have disparaged 
the Bible, reducing it to nothing more than an error-filled, contradiction-infested, human-
made book of propaganda.  These same scholars also, as if with one voice, deny any notion 
that Jesus was the “God-man” and the incarnation of the Lord of glory.  Instead, any and all 
depictions of Jesus found in the Bible which give him supernatural qualities or abilities are 
completely ignored, “demythologised” via the scientific method, so that what is left is simply 
a man in touch with his inner spirit, a good teacher, or an itinerate rabbi.  Jesus is certainly not 
God incarnate, for such a notion is a priori excluded.  An historical quest for the real Jesus 
must be performed, not the one dressed up in the Bible with primitive notions of supernatural 
qualities by primitive people.259 
                                                 
259 A classic case in point of such liberal approaches and their conclusions is the popular Jesus Seminar, which 
has concluded that the only statement in the Gospel of Mark, considered to be the oldest of the Gospels, which 
can be certain was spoken by Jesus is, “Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s and unto God that which is 
God’s.”  The methodology of the Jesus Seminar in determining what sayings of Jesus are indeed genuine or not 
is well known for its creativity.  Voters place a red marble in the bucket if the saying was definitely spoken by 
Jesus, pink if it resembles something Jesus would say, grey signifying close but no, and black definitely no.  
None of the sayings of Jesus found in the Gospel of John were actually spoken by Jesus so says the Seminar, and 
82% of the sayings of Jesus found in all four Gospels were not actually spoken by him.  Such conclusions render 
the Scriptures effectively useless in making any claims about Jesus, his person and his ministry. 
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Given this picture – a Bible that is filled with errors and a Jesus that is nothing more than 
a man, albeit a good one – a question must be asked.  How sure can Christians be that the 
“God of Jesus” as found in the New Testament is even the right depiction of God?  Jesus 
certainly could have been wrong.  He was after all just another man like any religious person, 
albeit a very good man.  Who is to really say if the “God of Jesus” is the true depiction of the 
living God, or if the God of the Old Testament is the truer picture?260 
Fourthly, the inclusivist position confuses ontological change with progressive revelation.  
Clearly, more is learned about God in the New Testament than learned in the Old.  Abraham 
did not know as much about God as, say, the Apostle Paul post-Jesus.  Clearly believers know 
more about the love of God with the advent of the incarnation of the Son, but this should not 
falsely be made to imply ontological change in the very being of God.  God has progressively 
revealed himself through human history, ultimately culminating in Jesus Christ.  Knowledge 
of God has increased over the centuries.  What God has revealed has increased or deepened, 
but this need not imply that God himself has changed.  Just because Christians know and 
understand more about God’s attribute of love does not mean that he was less loving or 
unloving in the past. 
In conclusion, in order for the Soteriology of Open Theism (inclusivism) to be 
maintained, open theists must manipulate the classical view of God concerning his 
immutability.  However, despite the seeming benefits of a wider hope of salvation, the trade-
off is a net loss.  God may now appear to be friendlier and more appealing, but he is less 
trustworthy.  Attempts at creating a gap between the Old Testament portrayal of God and that 
found in the New also yields a faulty Trinitarianism and does not do justice to God as 
revealed in the person and character of Jesus. 
 
3.4.2.2 A Self-Limiting God? 
The radical Arminianism of many inclusivists has caused them to take the axe to another root 
of classical theism, the omniscience of God.  Space will be taken only to note its relationship 
to human freedom and the judgment of God.  More will be said about these matters in a later 
section. 
In order to create relatively autonomous humans, God must limit his own power.  Often 
this is expressed by reference to the omnipotence of God (“God voluntarily limits his power,” 
                                                 
260 Pinnock’s comments about Jesus and his mistaken prophecies appear to also minimise the inclusivist view of 
the Saviour, making him somewhat less than the portrayal accepted by traditional evangelicalism, and certainly 
less than the portrait of Jesus found in the New Testament. 
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Pinnock, Grace/Will, 21).  Because God is all-powerful, he is able to actually limit his power 
and knowledge, in order to allow humans real freedom.  It is normally argued that if God does 
know everything that will happen in the future, then those future events are already 
determined.  Thus, humans do not have real, determinative freedom in their choices. 
This has further flowed into a portrait of God whereby he may possibly be mistaken in 
some of his future predictions, despite the fact that he is “omni-competent.”  As regards the 
supreme event of God’s judgment, the cross, Sanders paraphrases God’s concern, “Will this 
gambit work?” (Risks, 119).  He can put these words into the mouth of God because Sanders 
has earlier maintained that God can make mistakes.  Not even the event of Christ’s crucifixion 
can be absolutely guaranteed by God beforehand, because it would involve God possessing 
prescience concerning the future choices of free-willed creatures, or it must resort to God 
coercing humans to do it, something he would not do.  One is left to wonder what would have 
happened had God’s “gambit” been unsuccessful, and without sounding too cynical, perhaps 
“omni-lucky” should also be a term applied to God. 
There are few options when it comes to the nature of God.  Either he is limited or he is 
not.  To say that because he is omnipotent he can hence limit his omniscience, yields a limited 
God, no matter how one slices it.  In any event, placing limits on the nature of God just 
creates new problems.  Should believers really put their faith and hope and trust in a God who 
does not know the future entirely?  Is it wise to put their future and their life in the hands of a 
being who is not almighty? 
Is it even philosophically possible for an omnipotent Being to make himself less than 
omnipotent?  Much like the understanding that the definition of omnipotence does not entail 
the ability to do absolutely anything no matter how illogical (like making a square circle), can 
an omnipotent being become less-than-omnipotent?  If the process is reversible, can a semi-
omnipotent being make himself omnipotent?  If the answer is yes, then it must already be 
omnipotent or it could not grant itself omnipotence.  If the answer is no, then there is no 
guarantee that God will ever again be omnipotent. 
Or is God just pretending to limit himself?  If this is truly the case, then he is a deceiver, 
appearing to be what he in reality is not.  There seems little good to be gained by creating an 
image of God that is less than omniscient and omnipotent.  Many of the same problems which 
arose from denying immutability to the nature of God also crop up when he is denied 
omniscience and omnipotence as well. 
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3.4.2.3 Is Love the Quintessential Attribute of God? 
Inclusivists cannot be faulted for wanting to find a wider hope in the salvation of humanity.  
Nor can they be chastised for their strong emphasis on the love of God.  If not for that love, 
humanity would have no hope of salvation.  And yet, at what point does hopefulness become 
unrealistic optimism?  Perhaps evangelicals do need to emphasise the love of God more than 
they traditionally have done, but should they become so pie-in-the-sky that they lose sight of 
other attributes of God, such as his justice and wrath?261  For example, Pinnock and Sanders 
downplay the attribute of wrath.  Obviously, this position must be maintained by inclusivists 
if their optimism concerning a wider hope is preserved, but how valid is it? 
In Wayne Grudem’s helpful discussion concerning the nature and attributes of God, he 
covers the matter of God’s simplicity or unity (1994:177-180).  Traditionally, the doctrine of 
God’s simplicity has maintained that God is not made into parts or pieces, such that part of 
him is loving, or part holy, and so on.  Such an understanding of God’s nature would yield the 
potential conclusion that some parts are bigger than others, or more important to God’s 
character.  Grudem notes: 
“When Scripture speaks about God’s attributes it never singles out one attribute of 
God as more important than all the rest.  There is an assumption that every 
attribute is completely true of God and is true of all of God’s character.  For 
example, John can say that God is light (1 John 1:5) and then a little later say also 
that “God is love” (1 John 4:8).  There is no suggestion that part of God is light 
and part of God is love, or that God is partly light and partly love.  Nor should we 
think that God is more light than love or more love than light.  Rather it is God 
himself who is light, and it is God himself who is also love” (178, emphasis 
original). 
All of God’s nature is involved in every action he performs.  To single out one attribute 
and make it more important or vital than the others reveals a faulty theism.  Inclusivists tend 
to pit God against himself.  They play one attribute of God against another.  In an attempt to 
give the attribute of love primacy, other attributes seem to be washed away.262  When Sanders 
                                                 
261 Part of the problem with Pinnock and other inclusivists, as viewed by exclusivists, is that they pick and 
choose which attributes of God to emphasise, while ignoring the rest.  For example, in Flame of Love, Pinnock 
covers three of the four “God is…” statements in the New Testament: “God is love,” “God is spirit,” and “God is 
life.”  However, he entirely ignores “God is a consuming fire,” and it is this type of selectivity that makes 
exclusivists uncomfortable (see Timothy George, “A Transcendence-Starved Deity,” Christianity Today 
(January 9, 1995) 35. 
262 Pinnock also intimates time and time again that the Calvinist understanding of election cannot correspond to 
the loving picture of God given by Jesus.  However, in the plethora of material Pinnock has produced, there is 
virtually no exegetical support for such a belief.  Rather, Pinnock’s understanding of God’s love and the doctrine 
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says that wrath should not be considered an integral part of the nature of God as love is, this is 
clearly the type of manoeuvre inclusivists make to bolster their position.  But as Baird notes, 
God’s wrath is “an indivisible part of his love” (1963:72); the two should not be played 
against each other. 
Former professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Stellenbosch, PF Theron, 
makes a similar point.  In his paper, The ‘God of War’ and his ‘Prince of Peace’,263 Theron 
speaks of “Marcion’s modern admirers.”  Looking at the apparent contradiction between the 
God of the Old Testament, seemingly involved in constant warfare, and his Son, the Prince of 
Peace, Theron recognises that false dichotomies between the portrayal of God in the two 
testaments has at its foundation a faulty view of God’s unity. 
“The simplicity of God implies that He is of one piece, i.e., that He is undivided, 
that there is no clash, no conflict, no duplicity in his being, that He is no 
composite of light and darkness (1 John 1:5), love and hate, compassion and 
malice and consequently a God of integrity (integritas = wholeness) and therefore 
absolutely trustworthy.”264 
He also notes that a faulty Bibliology often plays a part in this false dichotomy.265 
Evangelicals are obviously committed to the understanding that God is a loving God, best 
expressed in the sacrifice of his one and only Son.  There clearly is tension between the agape 
God of the cross and the God who commanded Israel to slaughter the Canaanites.  
Evangelical inclusivists are making an honest attempt at reconciling these apparently 
disparate pictures of God.   
The difficulty often rests, however, in the preconceived notions of what constitutes 
“love.”  Exclusivists complain that inclusivists (and certainly pluralists and universalists as 
well) use a cultural definition of love and then project it onto God, instead of allowing the 
biblical definition to reign supreme.  God’s love is then defined in wholly modern categories.  
“Wherever in the Old Testament one finds a reference to the love of God, his wrath is always 
in the background, either explicitly or implicitly, and we neglect this element to the 
impoverishment of the Hebrew concept of love” (Baird, 1963:46).  In essence, what Baird 
                                                                                                                                                        
of election is determined by theological assumptions, ones which obviously presume an inclusivist 
understanding of salvation, not hermeneutical ones. 
263  Paper read at the 5th Conference of the International Reformed Theological Institute, Indonesia 2003, on 
Faith and Violence. 
264 Theron then quotes the first article of the Belgic Confession: “We all believe with the heart and confess with 
the mouth that there is one simple and spiritual Being, which we call God.” 
265 Theron: “When one starts rejecting parts of the Bible it becomes exceedingly difficult to stop short of 
rejecting it all.  Sola Scriptura implies tota Scriptura.  You cannot reject the Old Testament and retain Paul the 
apostle; you cannot snub the “intolerant” Paul and hold on to Jesus the Jew.” 
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implies is that some scholars are missing the actual biblical, Hebrew understanding of God’s 
love.  Interestingly, the radical Arminianism of many inclusivists appears more in line with 
modern democratic ideals of “one person, one vote” than it does of the biblical picture of God 
as the potter and his creatures as the clay, to be moulded in the way he sees fit. 
Consider this question.  What would be more loving:  God offering salvation to every 
individual, with the result that none accept it, or God coercing, as it were, rebellious sinners 
for their own good, who later come to actually appreciate this coercion by God because they 
know that without it, they never would have been saved?  Inclusivists see God’s love 
supremely expressed in his offer of salvation to as wide a breadth of humanity as possible, 
while exclusivists tend to see God’s love expressed in actually obtaining that salvation, even 
if the offer is not as wide as inclusivists envision it.  Jesus said that he came to seek and to 
save the lost, not simply to seek and to offer salvation to them (Lk. 19:10).  In inclusivism’s 
sincere desire to see more people saved, they must sacrifice too much of the God of the Bible 
and replace him with the God of modern culture. 
“The tendency to describe Jesus wholly in terms of love is intimately connected 
with the disposition to identify God with love.  Fatherhood is regarded as almost 
the sole attribute of God, so that when God is loved it is the principle of 
fatherhood that is loved.”266   
An imbalanced view of the nature of God will necessarily lead to an imbalanced view of 
how he acts in the world, particularly in terms of his redemptive and retributive acts.267  Baird 
again notes, “Any doctrine that does not have a significant place for the wrath of God, that, in 
effect, does not recognize that justice is a more inclusive and more accurate description of 
God than love without wrath, is not true to the prophetic and Synoptic picture” (1963:230).  
Such an assessment seems fair. 
 
3.4.2.4 A Culture of Fairness and Tolerance 
It is important to recognise the role culture plays in determinations concerning God and his 
nature.  The typical, evangelical depiction of God’s wrath does not sit well with modern and 
postmodern humans.  For starters, it does not appear to be fair but rather arbitrary, this portrait 
                                                 
266 H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers, 1951) 16-17.  He then 
cites von Harnack and Reinhold Niebuhr as theologians who in his estimation have made this mistake. 
267 In fact, there is a growing dislike in Christian theology to even consider the judgment of God in retributive 
terms.  This has been popularised in large part by the work by Travis already alluded to, Christ and the Judgment 
of God.  Retribution is considered beneath God, mainly because it is becoming increasingly beneath human 
systems of punishment as well.  For a recent albeit brief treatment of this issue, see Garry J. Williams, “Penal 
Substitution: A Response to Recent Criticisms,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society (March 2007) 
71-86. 
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of God acting the way he sees fit, seemingly oblivious to the demands for autonomy by 
humankind.268 
In the first place, one must define “fairness” before one can expect more of it from one 
party than from another.  This is precisely where the problem lies.  The definition of 
“fairness” depends upon one’s source.  The biblical God can hardly be considered fair in the 
modern sense of the word.   
For example, consider the Parable of the Workers in the Vineyard (Matt. 20:1-16).  The 
vineyard owner hires groups of workers throughout the day, some working far less hours than 
others, yet he decides to pay all of them the same wage.  The first group of workers who have 
worked the entire day are outraged.  ‘This is unfair!  It is not right that the men who have only 
worked one hour get the same amount of pay as those who bore the full heat of the sun.’ 
The owner’s answer is telling.  In essence, he notes that the money is his money, and if he 
decides to be generous to the late-arriving workers and pay them a full day’s wage, that is his 
right.  After all, he is not being unfair but has paid the early-arriving workers exactly what 
they agreed to work for.  “Don’t I have a right to do what I want with my own money?  Or are 
you envious because I am generous?” (vs. 15). 
Now place this story in the modern world, where so much is said about personal rights, 
unions, equality, and justice in fair wages.  One can only imagine that the first group of 
workers, if they were from today, would have hired a lawyer and sued the owner of the 
vineyard.  Who cares if they received exactly what they agreed to work for?  It is not fair that 
others received the same amount. 
This is a parable about the character of the God of Jesus.  Certainly, it states that he is 
generous and merciful.  But it also notes that he will do what he wants to do, regardless of 
how often humans might cry “Unfair!”  From the point of view of the early-arriving workers, 
the owner is acting unfairly, and from a modern mindset, many would give the same verdict.  
However, Jesus does not allow such a verdict to stand.  The begrudged workers have no right 
to claim the owner is unfair.  The first workers received exactly what they agreed to work for 
and as such, were treated fairly and justly.  The last workers got more than they deserved and 
as such were treated generously or mercifully.  What is in the parable, then, is not fairness and 
unfairness, but rather fairness (or justice) and mercy.  There is no unfairness present. 
This issue of fairness is a crucial one.  Christian theologians can define the term using 
secular and humanistic categories and then project them onto God, or they can let God and his 
                                                 
268 Theron: “The language Jesus occasionally uses against the teachers of the law and the Pharisees (Matt 23 for 
instance) disqualifies Him as the epitome of tolerance in the modern sense of the word” (see footnote 125). 
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Son speak for themselves.  The universalist and pluralist clearly do the former; the inclusivist 
is not quite so guilty although still has a great tendency to speak only about God’s love.  Only 
the exclusivist provides a picture of the character of God that goes completely against the 
culturally acceptable depictions.   
Clark Pinnock notes that the opinion by evangelical theologian Carl Henry that God is 
perfectly within his rights to save whom he chooses to save is “shocking” (Four Views, 101).  
That is correct, it is shocking.  That the vineyard owner actually can do what he wants to do 
with his own vineyard is offensive to a sensitive, rights-oriented mindset.  Some prefer to be 
able to tell the vineyard owner what he can and cannot do with his vineyard.  In this age of 
political empowerment and personal rights, such ideas that God can do what God wants to do 
without consulting his creatures are anathema.  He must bend to their will, not vice-versa. 
This carries over to the offer of salvation.  For God to truly be “loving” in the inclusivist’s 
sense of the word, he must offer salvation to each and every individual.  However, this seems 
to water-down the biblical concept of grace.  Exclusivists counter that if salvation is indeed a 
free gift of God’s grace, then even the offer is a gracious offer.  In other words, if sinners do 
not even deserve salvation, then talk of them deserving the offer of salvation detracts from an 
understanding of grace.  Something given which is actually deserved by the receiver is no 
longer grace, but merit.  For all their talk about being evangelicals, inclusivists appear more 
like Catholics from the vantage point of exclusivists. 
An inclusivist like Pinnock speaks in glowing terms about the loving God of Jesus, but 
how special is Pinnock’s portrayal of God really?  For the inclusivist, the contradictory claims 
of the world’s religions about the nature and character of God are washed away in a sea of 
love and forgiveness.  The God of Pinnock is more indifferent than he is loving, more aloof 
than he is caring.  He does not really concern himself with the truth.  Those contradictory 
attributes credited to him by worshipers in the world’s religions are of no concern to him. 
He is a creation of modern culture, a God of complete tolerance.  The God of inclusivism 
looks strangely postmodern, not biblical. 
 
3.4.2.5 Human Freedom and the Wrath of God 
There is a fine line which Pinnock attempts to walk but which may not be possible to do.  
Pinnock’s inclusivism dangerously approaches universalism.  This is seen in his discussion 
about the wrath of God, a welcome matter to be seen in a Pinnock publication, since it is 
rarely covered by him.  Interestingly, it comes in a book almost entirely devoted to God’s 
loving grace through his Spirit, Flame of Love. 
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In the third chapter of this provocative book, Pinnock lays down his arguments for why 
evangelicals need a stronger Spirit Christology as opposed to the Logos Christology which 
has dominated Christian theology for many centuries.  While at times sounding dangerously 
close to Adoptionism,269 Pinnock rightly wants evangelicals to recognise the important role 
the Holy Spirit has played in the “theodrama” that involves God’s creation and re-creation in 
human history.  He proposes to view “Christ as an aspect of the Spirit’s mission, instead of (as 
is more usual) viewing Spirit as a function of Christ’s” (80).  This noble endeavour goes 
through some heady topics which include Irenaeus’ Theory of Recapitulation, the Orthodox 
emphasis on incarnation and resurrection as triumphs over death as opposed to the more 
Western emphasis on guilt and sin, and Anselm’s Satisfaction Theory of the atonement, which 
Pinnock believes has some major flaws.270  All said, Pinnock covers some good ground in a 
relatively short chapter and he does so admirably. 
It is from his discussions concerning the Satisfaction Theory that material which is of 
interest to the present study can be found.  Among the problems of this theory of the 
atonement Pinnock lists 1) it logically leads to a limited view of the atonement, 2) it appears 
to make the Father and the Son opposed to each other,271 and 3) it gives the impression that 
the Father actually hates sinners (106-108).  From these points Pinnock goes to a brief 
discussion about the wrath of the Father, which in Anselm’s theory must be appeased by the 
                                                 
269 Pinnock borrows some concepts from the heresy of Adoptionism while clearly stating that he does not intend 
to espouse its overall non-incarnational view of Christ (91). 
270 Despite the flaws, though, Pinnock does affirm some truth in the satisfaction theory.  “Family room cannot 
altogether displace courtroom in our theological analogies” (111). 
271 Pinnock believes that the traditional evangelical position pits God the Father against Jesus his Son.  Ignoring 
for the moment whether or not this is true, does Pinnock’s solution really alleviate this difficulty?  If there is 
such a thing as eternal punishment (which evangelical inclusivists certainly believe, even if they have modified 
the historical view of hell with ideas of post-mortem evangelism and annihilationism), from where does this 
punishment come if not from God?  It seems that the only way to eliminate any inkling of “God against himself” 
is to remove eternal punishment entirely and adopt universalism.  Even the attempts by inclusivists to make hell 
a place of its inhabitants’ own choosing do not solve this problem, since very clearly it is not human beings who 
have fashioned hell and its surroundings, but God.  Further, hell would have been made before any human beings 
made a decision to rebel against God, if the creation account of Genesis is taken seriously.  In an attempt to make 
the love of God supreme over all other attributes, inclusivists have unwittingly caused a division in the character 
of God that they thought they were eliminating. 
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Son.272  Despite some potential errors in his use of Scripture, Pinnock provides a good albeit 
brief focus on God’s wrath and what it means in the context of the atoning work of Jesus.273 
Pinnock rightly recognises that the satisfaction theory of the atonement logically leads to 
a limited atonement position.274  This is seen by reason of the fact that God does not “assault 
the same person twice” for sin (106).  Pinnock seems to be saying that it appears unjust that 
God would have Jesus pay for the sins of everybody, and then still have individuals suffer the 
penalty for their own sins anyway.  In fact, this is an argument commonly used in support of a 
limited atonement.  If Jesus truly did die for the sins of each and every individual human 
being, then it should logically lead to universalism rather than a salvation which is in some 
way limited. 
Combining the ideas of Christ’s representation of humanity with Irenaeus’ recapitulation 
theory, as contrasted with Anselm’s theory, Pinnock comes dangerously close to universalism 
and one wonders why he does not make the final leap to it.  Consider his view of the wrath of 
God at the cross.  Typically, evangelicals have envisioned this wrath as being taken by the 
Son, turned away from sinful humanity and placed squarely on the incarnate Lord instead.  
This they call propitiation.  But in Pinnock’s attempt to be more Trinitarian (93) and relational 
(see ch. 2) in his view of this event, and in the desire to not make it appear that the Father and 
Son had a breach in their relationship during the crucifixion, Pinnock looks to downplay this 
                                                 
272 Interestingly, Pinnock believes that Anselm’s theory of the atonement was more influenced by his own social 
environment of medieval feudalism than from the Bible, a claim not unique to Pinnock (107).  Ironically, many 
of Pinnock’s detractors claim that Pinnock is at times equally influenced by the anti-judgment environment of 
his own society than by Scripture, an opinion shared by the present author.  Commenting specifically on 
Pinnock’s Open Theism, Brent Kelly makes this concluding remark in his intriguing paper presented at the 2001 
annual conference of the Evangelical Theological Society:  “Trading God’s providence for a false belief in 
limited power demonstrates a desire for the Americanization of Christianity, and not a commitment to 
orthodoxy” (“Open Theism and Democratic Methodology”). 
273 Pinnock is a top-notch theologian but his exegesis often fails him.  For example, in his present work under 
consideration, Pinnock uses 1 Thes. 5:9 as a verse to support his claim that “humanity is not destined for wrath 
but for salvation” (109).  However, is Paul talking generally about humanity in this passage, or more specifically 
about those who have faith in Jesus?  Putting aside for the moment that the entire epistle is written to the “church 
of the Thessalonians” (1:1), the immediate context of chapter 5 is speaking to those who are “sons of light” (vs. 
5) and “belong to the day,” who have the “breastplate of faith and love,” and for a “helmet” the “hope of 
salvation” (vs. 8), hardly general references to humanity.  The “we” of verse 9, then, is referring specifically to 
believers, not to humans in general.  Unfortunately, this sort of hermeneutic by Pinnock often characterises his 
use of Scripture, and it necessarily skews his viewpoint and final conclusions.  Ironically, Pinnock chides others 
for supposedly making the same mistake, namely, “pluck[ing] texts out of context” (Most Moved Mover, 20). 
274 Interestingly, a debate is currently brewing in British evangelicalism over the atonement of Christ and 
whether or not the “penal substitution” model should be abandoned (see the website for Evangelicals Now, 
www.e-n.org.uk).  Steve Chalke is leading those who want to see the model discarded. 
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propitiatory notion.275  For Pinnock’s view, “participation” is a much better descriptor (102-
103). 
In a typically Orthodox take, Pinnock envisions humanity as already redeemed in the 
incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection of Christ as our representative.   
“God reconciled the world in Christ – God included everybody in it, without even 
asking.  The effectiveness of this reconciliation is not so much opting in as not 
opting out” (109, emphasis added).   
In other words, implied here is the fact that so long as an individual does not choose to reject 
this offer by God, it is already affected for that person.276 
In fact, Pinnock appears to go even further than this.  Not only is it affected for the 
individual, it is affected in that person.  This is where Pinnock’s flirtation with universalism 
becomes obvious.  It is not that Jesus turns away wrath from the humans he is representing.  
Rather, by taking on their humanity, they actually have already experienced that wrath.   
“The judgment did not fall on the beloved Son but on our representative and 
therefore on us.  Christ delivered sinful humanity up to a well-deserved 
destruction” (110, emphasis added).   
It can rightly be asked, then, if humanity has already experienced this well-deserved 
destruction, why is there any future destruction to be expected? 
Pinnock has an affinity for the theory of Annihilationism.277  Not worrying now about the 
pros and cons of that particular view, it need only be considered for the moment why Pinnock 
does not adopt universalism instead.  If indeed the wrath of God and the judgment for sins has 
already been dealt with at the cross, and even further, if this is not a propitiation by the Son as 
much as it is a participation by humanity in this destruction, why do is there not a universal 
salvation?  If the atonement is universal in its scope, should there not logically be a salvation 
that is universal as well?  If the cross is truly the consummation of God’s wrath on the sin of 
humanity, and not simply its propitiation, why not a universal salvation?278 
                                                 
275 It has already been recognised by others that “Pinnock rejects the propitiatory view of Christ’s atoning work” 
(Four Views, 26).  Addressing “My God, my God…” (Mk. 15:34), Pinnock can conclude that “Christ did not 
appease divine anger” (109), a most curious conclusion. 
276 However, see Jn. 3:36 contra this view.  Pinnock’s position can have radical consequences, especially when 
one considers those who have never heard the gospel, a matter at the heart of this dissertation.  If “opting out” is 
truly the only way to lose this salvation, it stands to reason that those who have never heard and hence never can 
opt out are indeed saved.  Such a belief, if adopted by the wider Christian community, could potentially have 
drastic consequences for the missions endeavour. 
277 See Roger E. Olson, 2002:329.  See also William Crockett, Four Views on Hell, 1992) and Ronald Nash, Is 
Jesus the Only Savior? 115. 
278 What is clearly excluded in Pinnock’s understanding of the wrath of God and what occurred at the cross is an 
eternal, conscious place of torment.  To his credit, Pinnock at least jettisons the notion that there can be an 
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As noted previously, a universal salvation would violate the freedom of humans to reject 
God’s offer.  This is the non-negotiable in Pinnock’s soteriological equation.  But is this truly 
the case?  Does Pinnock really need to hold in tension a universal atonement with a salvation 
that is less than universal, only for the sake of preserving human freedom?279  And even more 
pointedly, does he ultimately preserve human freedom in any event? 
Incredibly, as representational a model as Pinnock proposes, it fails in exactly the same 
way.  A universal salvation would not have to negate human freedom any more than a 
universal atonement would.  Pinnock makes good use of Paul’s analogy of the first and 
second Adams, but Pinnock seems to concentrate too much on the second Adam to the 
exclusion of the first.  If Christ’s representation and recapitulation is truly a participatory 
atoning work, as Pinnock proposes, then clearly the representation of the first Adam was also 
participatory.  If not, then Paul’s (and Pinnock’s) comparisons between the two Adams would 
fail.  Therefore, all of humanity rises with Christ and equally falls with Adam.  That being 
said, God is already faced with a world in which to bring about salvation, he must violate 
human freedom.  All of humanity had already chosen in the first representative to rebel 
against God.   
Ironically, if Pinnock’s participatory model of the atonement is accepted, it must be 
concluded that it actually violates human freedom.  Humanity already made the choice in 
Adam.  Christ in essence “forces” humanity into another role, one against which it had 
already strongly objected in the Garden.  This is actually implied in Pinnock’s comment 
quoted earlier:  “God reconciled the world in Christ – God included everybody in it, without 
even asking” (109, emphasis added).  Pinnock has unwittingly given up the non-negotiable of 
freewill in this statement. 
In fact, as will be argued in the next section, God must violate human freedom if he is 
able to save a willingly rebellious human race.  Pinnock’s Christology, then, is wanting due to 
its failure to maintain a solid Anthropology and more specifically, Hamartiology.  There is 
some good data to be mined from his representational, participatory model of the atonement, 
                                                                                                                                                        
eternal hell.  To have such a place would negate any idea of a universal atonement, as Pinnock rightly 
recognises.  To put it simply, if Jesus has already paid the penalty for the sins of humanity, it makes little sense 
that some humans would still have to spend time in hell paying the penalty for their sins.  A limited atonement 
makes much better sense of an eternal hell. 
279 It should be noted that this tension is not limited to an inclusivist of Pinnock’s ilk.  Many evangelicals can 
have a similar tension in their theology.  However, it seems that a Calvinist would have less of a problem than an 
Arminian in this regard.  It is much easier to logically maintain a universal fall--limited atonement--less than 
universal salvation scheme than a universal fall--universal atonement--less than universal salvation one, 
especially given Pinnock’s participatory atonement model.  It is made all the easier for the Calvinist who sees the 
will of humans as subject to the will of God, as opposed to an Arminian system where soteriologically the 
opposite is usually the case. 
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but unfortunately he does not consistently apply it across the systematic categories.  Pinnock’s 
inclusivism comes dangerously close to universalism and, in fact, should logically yield it if 
not for Pinnock’s misapplication of his own method.   
How does this fit into an overall study of the judgment of God?  By misconstruing how 
the wrath of God and the cross of Christ interact, Pinnock produces a Soteriology that is 
suspect.  Granted, there is still much to it that is appealing, but one is left wondering how 
much and at what cost.  Pinnock’s emphasis on human freedom and the love of God is 
certainly part of its appeal, but are his arguments even in these areas solid ones?  It is to these 
topics that attention is now given. 
 
3.4.2.6 Human Freedom and the Love of God 
As just seen, Pinnock’s understanding of the wrath of God pushes him to a position that seems 
untenable.  In an attempt to preserve human soteriological freedom, Pinnock has constructed a 
model of the atonement which supposedly does just that.  However, he does not take his own 
model to its logical conclusion and thus a needless tension is created.  As noted, he still does 
not preserve human freedom in the way he intended to preserve it. 
Put another way, all of humanity stood with Adam as its representative in the Fall, and 
similarly, all of humanity stood with Jesus as its representative in the atonement.  Given these 
facts, it makes little sense to reject a universal salvation for no other reason than the want to 
preserve human freedom.  Pinnock’s model produces a scenario in which God himself must 
become a human – and this solely by his own design and desire – and “undo” what humans 
had already willingly done, namely, rebel against God.  This can hardly be said to be a model 
which preserves human freedom. 
However, Pinnock should be given the benefit of the doubt.  Suppose that his model does 
preserve human freedom as he hopes it does.  Is Pinnock’s desire to preserve human 
soteriological freedom a noble endeavour?  Put another way, is Pinnock correct to contend 
that a superior soteriological system preserves human soteriological freedom, as opposed to 
one (typically Calvinism in Pinnock’s mind) which violates it? 
Inclusivists contend that true love cannot be coerced.  Arminianism makes the election of 
God conditional, i.e., on the basis of God’s foreknowledge of those who will choose to follow 
him.  Calvinism, on the other hand, makes the election unconditional, i.e., not on the basis of 
anything the creature will do or does, but solely according to the plan and good purpose of 
God.  This appears to be coercive and hence unloving, according to inclusivists and open 
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theists.  Related to this, two commonly held beliefs by open theists and by many Arminians in 
general will be considered. 
God respects human freedom280 and will not violate it. 
If the above presupposition is true, it would make sense of various portions of Scripture 
which might be difficult for Calvinists to handle.  For example, Scripture says that God wants 
all people to come to repentance and be saved (1 Tim. 2:4, 2 Pet. 3:9).  Those who hold to a 
Calvinist view of election will obviously have some difficulty, at least initially, with these 
passages.281  The difficulty is simple to recognise: if God wants all people to be saved, but 
God only elects some people to be saved, is this not a fundamental theological contradiction?  
If God wants to save all people but unconditionally elects to only save some of them, perhaps 
either he does not want all to be saved, or he does not unconditionally elect some to be saved.   
Open theists vehemently state the latter.  They posit that God does want all people to be 
saved, but there is actually something he wants even more.  He wants them to exercise their 
freedom of choice.  If he simply forced people against their will to trust in him, this would be 
a type of choice that would not reflect genuine, voluntary love.  Therefore, God is willing to 
lose the creature because he prefers to grant freedom of choice, even if it means that God does 
not get entirely what he wants, namely, the salvation of all people. 
Is this basic presupposition sound?  Does God truly respect human freedom so much that 
he will not violate it?  It seems like a tenuous presupposition simply because Scripture points 
to instances when God does violate human freedom. 
To this point in this study, the judgment which came at the time of Noah upon the entire 
human race in a worldwide deluge has served well, and it serves well again here.  Jesus says 
that during the time of Noah people were marrying and giving in marriage up until the day the 
doors of the ark were closed (Matt. 24:37-38).  In other words, they were enjoying life, happy 
with it, “eating and drinking” and doing all those things which humans do in the course of 
existence.  Supposedly living it to the fullest, they were entirely oblivious to the impending 
judgment, and Jesus uses this example to speak of the future coming of the Son of Man (vs. 
39-41). 
                                                 
280 Even the matter of “freedom” is not an easy one to clarify.  Open theists tend toward a view of libertarian 
freedom whereby an individual is able to choose between A or B without constraints (see Hasker, Openness, 
136-137), but is this really an adequate view of freedom?  If both A and B must be open for choosing, such that 
if they were not then the individual was not truly free, how does this definition of freedom apply to God?  If A is 
“must tell the truth” and B is “must not tell the truth,” clearly God is not free to choose between the two.  By his 
very nature God is constrained to choose A and hence, by this definition of freewill, is not actually free, which is 
hardly a satisfactory option. 
281 For a good Reformed answer to this dilemma, see Grudem, Systematic Theology, 683-684. 
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What is made of this when it comes to the freewill of humans?  It seems that the very 
existence of judgment would negate any idea that God does not violate their freedom of will.  
Those who lived at the time of Noah were seemingly happy with their lives.  They wanted 
nothing to do with God, and in an instant, God wiped them all out.  What can more clearly be 
a negation of human freedom than when there are people who want to continue to live but 
God terminates their lives?282 
As previously noted, inclusivists have an affinity for the understanding of hell that C. S. 
Lewis taught, one which seemingly kept in tension the freewill of humans and the judgment 
of God.  Unfortunately, Lewis’ comment has little biblical support, most notably from Jesus 
himself.  Jesus never depicts hell as a sit-in of happy yet rebellious people, anymore than he 
depicts the Great Flood as a welcome event.  The horrors of hell are foremost in the teaching 
of Jesus, but some open theists seem to believe that hell is not all that bad.283 
The only way to make the judgment of God not violate the freedom of humans is to make 
that judgment a welcome event.  This is why Lewis and others have a difficult time with a 
conscious place of eternal torment where the inhabitants are uncomfortable and unhappy.  If 
they are unhappy and uncomfortable, it would seem that they are forced to make hell their 
abode, and if they are forced, then their freedom of will is being violated, something open 
theists say God does not do.  However, if the view of hell is transformed into a place where its 
denizens would feel at home, where they actually want to reside, where the doors are locked 
from the inside and where they can be lords of their own lives, then the basic presupposition 
that God does not violate the will of free creatures has been maintained.284 
It seems that the common view of the open theists is less than airtight.  God does violate 
the freewill of humans whenever it is necessary for him to do so.  Arminians have always had 
a problem with the sovereignty of God, and here the Calvinists seem to be more solid.  A 
typical complaint a Calvinist would have with Arminians is that they seem to make God’s will 
subject to the will of his creatures.  If God’s election is conditional upon the choice of 
humans, then it seems that the individual’s will supersedes the will of God.  Calvinists, on the 
other hand, bend over backwards to ensure that God’s will is always supreme, and in the face 
                                                 
282 It appears that Pinnock recognises this weakness in his own formulation of inclusivism when he says the 
following:  “Though God does not normally overpower people, I do not deny that it sometimes seems that he 
does” (Flame, 161).  Yet despite this brief admission, Pinnock continues in his arguments with the understanding 
that God does not violate human freedom, and his very next argument is to point to the existence of hell as proof. 
283 To be fair, Pinnock adopts Annihilationism, but his favourable evaluation of Lewis’ view depicting hell as a 
welcome place seems to minimise the horrors of it as depicted in Scripture. 
284 Gregory Boyd claims that hell is a place where a rebellious sinner becomes “lord of nothingness” (Warfare 
Theodicy, 354-356). 
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of God’s judgment, that seems to be a wise tactic.285  The prophet Isaiah states that God’s 
purposes cannot be thwarted (14:27), and Job concurs (42:2).286  When Paul says that God 
“works out all things in conformity with the purpose of his will” (Eph. 1:11) this surely 
includes judgment, which clearly can and does violate the freedom of humans.   
There can be no clearer way to violate someone’s freedom of will than to take their life 
when they fully intend to and want to keep on living.  Yet God has done this in the past – as 
the flood teaches, along with other biblical examples such as the judgment of Sodom and 
Gomorrah, or the judgment of Ananias and Sapphira – and he will do it in the future, if the 
biblical teaching involving the future coming judgment is taken seriously. 
True love cannot be forced or coerced. 
The second prong of the Open Theism fork is the belief that true love cannot be forced or 
coerced.  A full-blown, psychological study of what constitutes true love is not necessary.  
Only a brief investigation of the basic idea that true love cannot come about by an act of force 
or violation of one’s will need be considered.  Perhaps an analogy will help. 
We have all seen a television programme or movie where someone is precariously 
perched upon a window sill scores of stories above the pavement, fully intending to destroy 
their life by hurling themselves downward.  Sometimes the police officer is able to “talk 
down” the person, but in some instances, a more drastic action is taken whereby the person is 
grabbed and forcibly removed from the dangerous predicament.  The question to ask here is, 
“Are any of those people who were saved against their will happy later that it was done?”  It 
is reasonable to suggest that there are some who are happy they were saved, despite the fact 
that at the time of their salvation they were forced against their will. 
There is little difference between this hypothetical situation and the one in which sinners 
find themselves.  Paul states that those who are controlled by the sinful mind are unwilling 
and unable to submit to God (Rom. 8:7-8).  There is both an inability and a wilful rebellion 
against God and his decrees.  If the will of humans is firmly planted in this lost state, it stands 
                                                 
285 Consider these two quotations as examples:  “Were there even one datum of knowledge, however small, 
unknown to God, His rule would break down at that point.  To be Lord over all the creation, He must possess all 
knowledge.  And were God lacking one infinitesimal modicum of power, that lack would end His reign and undo 
His kingdom; that one stray atom of power would belong to someone else and God would be a limited ruler and 
hence not sovereign” (A. W. Tozer, The Knowledge of the Holy [San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
1961] 108).  “If there is one single molecule in this universe running around loose, totally free of God’s 
sovereignty, then we have no guarantee that a single promise of God will ever be fulfilled” (RC Sproul, Chosen 
by God [Wheaton: Tyndale House Publishers, 1986] 26-27).  Referring to Sproul’s view, Pinnock retorts: “How 
boring it would be for God to have to reign over a creation project, each molecule of which has its predestined 
place!  There would be nothing for God to do” (Most Moved Mover, 100). 
286 “God is said to be absolutely free because no one and no thing can hinder Him or compel Him or stop Him.  
He is able to do as He pleases always, everywhere, forever" (Tozer, Knowledge, 109). 
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to reason that the only way people can be saved is if God violates their will to do it.  In 
another epistle, Paul says that this lost state is tantamount to a dead person (Eph. 2:1).  It is 
not difficult to understand that a corpse cannot save itself, yet this is the spiritual state of a 
person controlled by the sinful mind and nature. 
It seems that the very act of salvation involves, at least initially, a violation of the will of 
the individual.  Humans are willingly in active rebellion against God, controlled by the sinful 
mind and unable to please God – and they are completely content to continue doing so.  This 
will of rebellion must first be broken in order for fallen humans to come to faith in God. 
Even if one were to take an Arminian position on total depravity and posit a prevenient 
grace, which then frees the individual to make a choice to follow God, this still does not 
remove the violation of freewill.287  In fact, even prevenient grace must assume a violation of 
freewill.288 
Back to the issue of love, it can be seen that even love which is initially coerced can result 
in genuine love.289  Just like the person intending to jump to death from the window ledge, so 
too a sinner is snatched away from sure death by the grace of God, and despite this being 
initially against that person’s will, he or she comes to fully and completely appreciate God for 
doing it.  Recognising their own inability, they thank God for violating their freedom of will.  
It is hard to imagine any person in heaven who will complain that their will was violated 
when they were saved despite it. 
It makes little practical difference if humans go to an eternal hell by the preordained 
decree of God or by their own, personal choice.  Does the latter make God any more loving 
than the former, when he created humans either knowing that many would go to hell 
                                                 
287 Having said all this concerning freewill, the term itself is questionable.  The fallacy is that all the time open 
theists want to maintain the freewill of humans, as granted by God, they ignore that an unredeemed person’s will 
is in bondage to Satan and to sin.  The notion of “free” will seems biblically wrongheaded when speaking of 
unredeemed humans. 
288 Some might say that prevenient grace simply frees the individual, i.e., moves the person from a state of 
slavery to sin to one in which now there exists freedom to choose.  Previously, before prevenient grace, the 
individual was not actually free to choose, but now he is.  However, this seems to beg the question.  If people  
were asked before prevenient grace if they were happy to rebel against God, they would answer in the 
affirmative.  No one is forcing them to rebel.  They rebel of their own will and choice.  Even prevenient grace, 
then, must involve a violation of the will of humans.  This stands to reason when considering Paul’s argument 
that there are only two types of people, those controlled by the Spirit and those controlled by the sinful mind 
(Rom. 8:1-11).  Prevenient grace is normally placed before conversion, which means that even after the grace, 
the person would still be controlled by the sinful mind.  Someone can hardly be considered controlled by the 
Spirit of Christ before their conversion and profession of faith in Jesus. 
289 Even arranged marriages can result in relationships which are healthy, strong, and loving even if initially one 
or both of the parties did not want to enter the marriage. 
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(exhaustive divine foreknowledge), or having a reasonable idea that they would (“limited”290 
omniscience)? 
Suppose someone’s son has a propensity for jumping off bridges, a most perilous 
behavioural quirk.  As the child’s loving parent, there are several options that parent can take.  
The parent can take him to the first bridge available and push the son off before he has a 
chance to decide to do so himself.  The parent can take him to a bridge and allow him to 
exercise his freedom of will to either jump or not jump.  Or the parent can avoid taking him to 
bridges altogether.  Which option seems to be the most loving thing to do? 
Hopefully using such an analogy will begin to show how difficult it is to define “love” 
and then apply it to God.  The third option seems to be the most loving thing to do, but God 
has obviously not chosen that option in reality.  Open theists believe that God’s love is 
quintessentially displayed in his desire for humans to act freely, but that can hardly be 
determined to be loving given certain scenarios.  In the second option, is the parent really 
loving?  Once the son jumps off the bridge, is it right to conclude, “Well, at least the parent 
gave him a choice.  There was a reasonable notion that the son would kill himself, but the 
parent loved him enough to allow him that choice?”291 
 Does God love the individual’s freewill more than the individual?  This question also 
spawns another, equally difficult question:  If God created free-willed beings which in turn 
can destroy the freedom of other free-willed beings, does this negate the original premise that 
God wanted to create a world where humans are indeed free?  In other words, if God is so 
concerned to not violate or prohibit the freedom of humans, why create other beings (whether 
human or angelic) which do so?  It seems nearly impossible for God to create any world 
where the freedom of humans is never violated. 
Combining both of the original open theism presuppositions, a good question to ask is, 
“Which is the more loving thing for God to do, save a person against that person’s will, or 
allow that person to exercise it even if it means destroying himself or herself?”  Put another 
way, does God love the person more than he loves that person’s freedom of will?  Is God 
more interested in preserving individuals than preserving the concept of freewill?  Open 
theists seem to lean more toward the latter than the former.  They appear more concerned that 
                                                 
290 To claim that the adherents of Open Theism hold to a “limited” omniscience on the part of God is actually a 
misnomer.  From the conservative angle, it would certainly seem that way, but open theists are merely saying 
that God knows everything that can be known.  Because the free-willed actions of humans cannot be known 
beforehand, God cannot know them.  He has full omniscience, then, of those things which can be known.  Still, 
when compared to the traditional definition of omniscience, this does seem to be limiting the omniscience of 
God, no matter the semantics. 
291 The first option tends to be the caricatured position open theists use when describing Calvinism’s 
understanding of election, a most unfair characterisation to make. 
195  
the concept of freewill not be violated, even if this means the total destruction of the 
individual, than for the individual to be saved and his or her freewill violated in the process.  
They seem to love freewill more than the individual who supposedly possesses it, and they 
fashion God in their own image in this respect.292  But what is more loving, for God to allow 
people to destroy themselves, or to save them even if initially they do not want to be saved?293 
The following summarises the findings with these two fundamental presuppositions of 
open theists. 
God respects human freedom and will not violate it.  But God does in fact violate human 
freedom, and this is seen most clearly in his acts of judgment.  Therefore, it is a reasonable 
supposition to make that God also violates human freedom even when it comes to salvation. 
True love cannot be forced or coerced.  But true love can come out of a situation which 
initially involved coercion.  The universal attitude of Christians is that they are appreciative 
that, despite their active rebellion against God, God saved them anyway.  Even though this 
involved a violation of their will, they are grateful that God saved them, recognising their 
previous poverty of spirit and inability of fallen nature.  This issues in genuine appreciation 
and love for God and what he has done, realising that had God not violated their will, they 
would be eternally lost. 
 
3.4.3 Conclusion to Theological Evaluation 
Traditional evangelicalism can at times appear cold and harsh.  The teaching that salvation is 
only found in a personal proclamation of faith in Jesus Christ apparently shuts out the vast 
majority of humanity who have never heard about Jesus.  Evangelical inclusivists are 
attempting to make that salvation wider and more accessible than historically believed in 
evangelical circles.  One way to do that is to manipulate the classical theism of 
evangelicalism. 
                                                 
292 Boyd: “God’s love and wrath unite in allowing creatures to go their own way throughout eternity” 
(2001:354).  This Boyd calls “the dignity of eternally choosing against [God]” (343, n. 6). 
293 Sanders’ doctoral dissertation at UNISA, “Divine Providence as Risk-Taking” (1996), formed the basis of his 
well-known book, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1998).  
“God cannot prevent all the evil in the world and still maintain the conditions of fellowship intended by his first 
order desire” (304, emphasis original).  That desire is to grant humans freedom to choose in an environment 
which includes “the power of love” (36).  However, Sanders seems to hedge on this ideal of absolute human 
freedom, speaking of “freedom within limits” (44) and making this interesting comment: “God persuades, 
commands, gives comfort, and sometimes brings judgment in order to get humans to sign on to his project” (67, 
emphasis added).  But is this not simply a form of coercion?  Much like a parent punishes his child in order to 
change the child’s behaviour, is this not precisely what Sanders is saying God does?  Boyd admits something 
similar: “It is difficult to make sense of the biblical certainty that in the eschaton God will defeat all those who 
oppose him unless we assume that God possesses the power to unilaterally revoke the freedom of his opponents” 
(2001:184).  For all their talk of human freedom, it seems that even the open theists have some reservations on 
this score. 
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As noble as their desire may be, the final product must be soundly rejected.  For the 
Soteriology of inclusivism to stick, their Theology-proper must be altered in the following 
ways.  It must maintain a bifurcation between the Old and New Testament portraits of God, 
but this appears more Marcionite than biblical, and relies on a common misconception that 
God as portrayed in the Old Testament is decidedly less loving than the “God of Jesus.”  It 
must abandon classical attributes of God such as his immutability, eternity, and omniscience, 
but this has negative consequences on God’s ability to save and the believer’s ability to trust 
him fully for that salvation, and his ability to adequately judge sin.  And it overemphasises the 
love of God as the most important attribute to the apparent neglect of other attributes, namely, 
his wrath and justice. 
Even the primary goals of inclusivists and open theists are not attained by the above 
changes.  As noted, their desire to preserve human freedom is not achieved, nor their desire to 
preserve a truly loving picture of God.  By elevating human freedom to an abnormally high 
state, they have lowered God to a deficient level. 
 
3.5  What Effect Does Sin Have on Human Ability to Seek God? 
A Hamartiological Reflection on Judgment 
American evangelicals have by and large made the topic of sin a primary platform of their 
formulation of Christian doctrine.  World missions has benefited in no small part due to an 
American mindset which views humans as lost sinners in need of the message of hope and 
salvation in Christ Jesus.294  This has been such a strong tendency in American 
evangelicalism that any talk of salvation which does not make sin a major aspect is generally 
looked upon with great suspicion by the greater evangelical community. 
                                                
This is simply because sin has been verbalised as the primary problem of fallen humanity.  
Philanthropic concerns such as caring for one’s neighbour or helping the indigent or needy 
certainly are important in the life of a disciple of Jesus, but they are not the primary problem 
which needs to be addressed in a Christian formulation of salvation.  Sin is the problem.  An 
evangelical system of salvation which does not start with sin or speak at length about it is 
usually seen as suspect. 
Enter inclusivism and its formulation of salvation.  As noted in the Introduction, 
 
294 The quintessential source for demographic information concerning the evangelical world missions movement 
today is found in Patrick Johnstone’s and Jason Mandryk’s Operation World (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
2001).  Of the 201,260 total workforce of Protestant missionaries in the world, over half of these [110,466 or 
54.9%] originate from the United States (2001:4, 751).  The vast majority of these come from evangelically-
minded organisations (733). 
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inclusivism should be commended for its attempts at defining Christian salvation in as broad a 
scheme as possible within evangelical boundaries.  The problem rests in the paucity of 
discussion concerning sin and its effects on humanity.  The desire to see the effects of Christ’s 
atoning work spread to as wide a field of humanity as possible is admirable, but at what 
expense to a proper view of the effects of sin?  Why in a discussion about salvation is so little 
said about sin in inclusivist material?  Is it not right to wonder why, if looking to understand 
the fate of the unevangelised, sin does not play a more prominent role in the inclusivist’s 
formulations? 
This question must be particularly asked when evaluating inclusivism’s positivistic view 
of non-Christian religions and the morality of their adherents.  Evangelical critics of 
inclusivism have rightly asked how it can be determined that people apart from faith in Christ 
are morally good, when God’s Word seems to speak oppositely?  In this coverage of 
Hamartiology, these concerns will be addressed. 
For example, taking the six main books used so far in evaluating Pinnock’s views, there is  
relatively little discussion concerning sin and its effects.  In a book devoted to the mercy of 
God, A Wideness in God’s Mercy, Pinnock says surprisingly little at all about sin.  Would it 
not be right to argue that God’s mercy is made necessary due to the presence of humanity’s 
sin?  It would be preferable to see more discussion about it by him. 
In Flame, there are bits of comments which brush upon the topic, but the only substantive 
material addressing anything about sin and its effects on humanity are found in Pinnock’s 
disagreements with Anselm’s formulations (107-109).  In two books for which Pinnock 
provides chapters, Openness and Four Views, he makes no mention at all about sin and its 
effects.  Granted, in Openness the point is not salvation per se but the person of God, much 
like in Most Moved Mover, where Pinnock also says nothing about sin and how that affects 
humanity’s relationship with God.  Those two books concentrate more on Theology-proper 
than Soteriology.  But in Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World, it is disconcerting 
that an evangelical can talk about the fate of the unevangelised and not broach the topic of sin. 
There is more promise in The Grace of God and the Will of Man, for which Pinnock 
serves as general editor.  In the opening section where Pinnock summarises his theological 
pilgrimage, human sinfulness is dealt with.  This specifically comes in the material where 
Pinnock critiques his own Calvinist heritage which he ultimately abandoned, going through 
five main topics as commonly represented in American Calvinism by the acronym TULIP.  
Pinnock contrasts an Augustinian and Calvinist approach to human sinfulness versus that of 
Wesley (21-22).  It is also at this point that he introduces prevenient grace, another topic for 
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this section of the dissertation. 
Pinnock believes that the Calvinist understanding of sin does not properly allow for 
human freedom of choice.  Levelling his criticism at “total depravity,” Pinnock goes back to 
Jesus as he often does:  “Was there any evidence that Jesus, for example, regarded people as 
totally depraved?” (22).  A reworking of what it really means to be a sinner became necessary 
in Pinnock’s pilgrimage.  Despite the fact that human beings are sinners, it appears that sin 
does not hamper their ability to choose to follow God.  Note this key comment by Pinnock: 
“What became decisive for me was the simple fact that Scripture appeals to 
people as those who are able and responsible to answer to God (however we 
explain it) and not as those incapable of doing so, as Calvinian logic would 
suggest.  The gospel addresses them as free and responsible agents, and I must 
suppose it does so because that is what they are” (22). 
Unfortunately, Pinnock himself does not expand upon these few statements about sin and 
its effects on humans.  Some passing remarks concerning sin are made by others throughout 
the book, but the only real treatment of the subject comes by Bruce Reichenbach, professor of 
philosophy at Augsburg College in Minneapolis, in his chapter “Freedom, Justice, and Moral 
Responsibility.”295  However, even here the main point is human freedom and how that 
corresponds to divine sovereignty.  Reichenbach is more concerned that a view of sin and its 
effects not limit human freedom.   
“If we are to be free, not only must we be able to act according to our choices, but 
we must also be able to choose to act otherwise than we did” (286, emphasis 
original).   
All of this is interesting to consider, but any thorough treatment of it would take away from 
the main point of this dissertation. 
Returning to Pinnock, there are three main arguments he has used in defence of his notion 
that sinful human beings, apart from any special revelation from God (especially knowing 
about Jesus and what he did), may still turn to God and find themselves pleasing to him.  
These three arguments involve the salvific benefits of general revelation, God’s use of 
                                                 
295 The chapter just previous to this one by Jerry L. Walls, “Divine Commands, Predestination, and Moral 
Intuition,” lightly addresses the topic, but the main thrust of the chapter concerns unconditional predestination 
and how it is morally repugnant to most people.  Walls aims to show that the view of predestination typical to 
Luther, Calvin and their ilk has at its basis a misunderstanding of human moral intuition.  He notes that the 
doctrine is repugnant, not because sinners cannot rightly understand it as Luther and Calvin would conclude, but 
because it is in fact morally repugnant and as humans we implicitly recognise this.  “While I do not deny the 
corrupting influence of sin on our moral faculties, I would argue nevertheless that our moral faculties are part of 
the remaining image of God in man.  As such they are a basically reliable reflection of God’s love and justice” 
(274). 
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prevenient grace in drawing people to himself, and the existence of the image of God in 
humanity which naturally inclines humans to turn to God.  These same arguments are used by 
other inclusivists, as noted earlier, but Pinnock has the most organised presentation of them. 
 
3.5.1 An Evaluation of Inclusivism’s View of General Revelation 
As hinted in the Pneumatology section, discussions concerning the potential salvific benefits 
of general revelation often fall under one’s coverage of the Holy Spirit.  However, it has been 
placed here in the Hamartiology section for one basic reason.  The approach of the inclusivists 
(similar to that of the pluralists) often fails on their positive evaluation of general revelation 
because of their inadequate doctrine of sin and its effects on humanity.  In other words, they 
often divorce the topics of general revelation and sin, and this produces a faulty view of the 
salvific effects of general revelation most certainly possessed by pluralists, and flirted with by 
inclusivists.296  Placing the discussion here is a blatant attempt to not fall into that same 
mistake. 
The positive view inclusivists have for non-Christian religions has already extensively 
been covered.  The main reason why they have such a positive view is because of their 
Pneumatology.  However, they are also positive about non-Christian faiths via the reasoning 
that humanity’s religious sphere is part of God’s general revelation.  Hence, people will be 
judged by the amount of light they have been given.  In other words, even though for many 
people special revelation does not exist (eg., knowing Jesus by name), general revelation does 
exist for all people everywhere, and God positively uses it to draw people to himself.  This 
positive view of general revelation, when coupled with the universal ministry of God’s Spirit, 
makes for a powerful argument in the inclusivist’s favour. 
But the inclusivist understanding of “general revelation” itself needs defining, since they 
include human religion and culture in this category.  The following two comments by Pinnock 
on this score have already been noted: 
“Religions provide a window of opportunity for the Spirit to engage people, 
because . . . God is also mysteriously present and working” (Four Views, 116). 
“Revelation is embodied in other religions” (Four Views, 118). 
                                                 
296 It should be noted here that a distinct difference between different brands of inclusivism can be seen when it 
comes to the effects of general or natural revelation.  Because Catholics have historically been more favourable 
to natural theology than has typically been the case in evangelical circles, one would expect a difference when it 
comes to the views on natural theology between Catholic inclusivists and their evangelical counterparts.  
However, for the present purposes, since this study is concentrating on evangelical inclusivists, that difference 
will not be a cause for difficulty. 
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The choice is actually rather simple.  Do evangelicals side with a traditionally evangelical 
view of non-Christian religions as human-made products and thus “false,” or do they side 
with Pinnock’s understanding of these faiths as examples of general revelation through which 
God is wooing humankind to himself? 
General revelation has normally been understood as that which God does, through his 
works, to reveal himself.  It has not usually been understood in evangelical circles to mean 
something which is produced from the side of humanity, as appears to be the case in the 
inclusivist usage of the term.  Religion and culture appear to be human products and as such, 
would not normally be classified as examples of general revelation.   
The earlier evaluation of the biblical material concerning non-Judeo-Christian faiths 
seems to bear this out.  If religion truly were part of God’s general revelation of himself to 
humanity, one would not expect the vast amount of negative material said about the non-
Judeo-Christian traditions that is found in Scripture.  Nor would it be expected that such 
categories as idolatry and demon worship are used as appropriate terms for these religions, but 
again, Scripture does precisely this. 
Inclusivism’s positive portrayal of general revelation is intimately linked to its view 
concerning pagan saints.  But as has already been noted, each and every example of pagan 
saints that inclusivists produce has at its heart not general but special revelation (with the only 
possible exception being Melchizedek, since Scripture is silent on how he originally came to 
know of Jehovah). These “holy pagans” came to know of the one, true God, not through their 
pagan cultures or religions, but via special contact either with God, or God’s people, or the 
message about the one, true God. 
For the sake of clarity, consider Pinnock’s use of Melchizedek in this regard.  After 
arguing in Flame of Love that the Spirit does work through the religious realm, he moves to a 
more general observation: “It would be strange if the Spirit excused himself from the very 
arena of culture where people search for meaning” (203).  Pinnock further notes that “religion 
is an important segment of culture” (203), and he sandwiches the account of Melchizedek 
between these two propositions.  According to Pinnock, the story of Melchizedek teaches that 
God was “at work in Canaanite culture” (203).  His conclusion on the matter is found in the 
pages that follow and can be crystallised in the following two quotations: 
“Because of the Spirit’s ubiquitous inspiration, we do well to be open to people of 
other faiths” (205). 
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“Spirit, present in the whole world and at work among all peoples, is at work in the 
sphere of religious life . . .” (207).297 
Therefore, because Pinnock’s argument for the working of the Holy Spirit in the religious 
sphere is rooted in his understanding of pagan saints, and because as previously noted his 
arguments in this regard fail to satisfy, evangelicals must look with a wary eye at his broader 
conclusion concerning general revelation as well. 
 
3.5.1.1 Biblical Analysis 
A further difficulty emerges when evaluating this positive view of general revelation on 
biblical grounds.  It is one thing for evangelical inclusivists to view general revelation 
positively, but quite another to provide biblical support for such a position.  What should be 
known is if their positive conclusion concerning general revelation is a priori presupposed 
given the theological necessity of it which inheres in their inclusivism.  In other words, is 
their view of general revelation inductively gained from Scripture, or deductively, i.e., first 
assumed to be true given their inclusivist presuppositions, and then found to be true by 
selectively considering the biblical data. 
A typical complaint levelled against traditional evangelicalism from the inclusivist camp 
concerns the understanding of the first chapter of Romans.  Evangelicals have customarily 
understood Paul’s explanation in verses 18-20 as a passage against the salvific benefits of 
general revelation.  Put another way, God reveals enough of himself through creation to leave 
humankind ‘without excuse,’ yet not enough to save them.  This appears to inclusivists as 
unfair.  They argue that if general revelation is enough to condemn humans, it should be 
enough to save them as well. 
However, inclusivists seem to cut the argument short, dealing almost exclusively with the 
first two chapters of Romans, but not continuing on to chapter three.298  Paul’s argument 
which begins in the first chapter does not conclude until the third.  It would be helpful to 
                                                 
297 In his conclusion to this section, Pinnock supports his argument with an equally questionable proposition, 
namely, that just as the religion of the Jews prepared the way for Christ, so can other religions perform an equal 
task.  “Here [in Israel] God was at work apart from Jesus Christ but leading up to him.  By analogy with Israel, 
we watch for anticipations in other faiths to be fulfilled in Christ” (208).  Surely, however, this analogy is 
doomed to failure and makes one wonder why Pinnock would even include it.  How can the religion of the Jews, 
God’s chosen people and the ultimate generator of the Messiah, be compared to any other religion in this way? 
298 An example of this is found in Wideness, where Pinnock comments briefly on the general knowledge of God 
which is accessible to both Jews and Gentiles (33).  Here Pinnock ends with Romans 2:14-16, but he does not 
continue to follow Paul’s thoughts into chapter 3 on what was done with this general knowledge of God.  In 
essence Pinnock rips the more positive statements of Paul out of their context, which makes his immediate point 
appear stronger. 
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briefly trace his argument in these opening chapters, to see if indeed the inclusivist 
understanding can be maintained. 
The dominant theme of these three chapters is the judgment of God.  In fact, it is hard to 
maintain the positive inclusivist understanding of these chapters in light of this dominant 
theme.  Paul is not discussing how humans can be saved.  That discussion comes toward the 
end of chapter 3.  After a long introduction, Paul begins his discussion of the wrath of God in 
1:18 and this, along with the fallenness of humanity, dominates the discussion for 64 verses, 
up to 3:20.  The general tenor of this entire section is negative, not positive, and the 
condemnation of sinful humanity is clearly established, not a roadmap for their salvation 
through general revelation. 
Moving from the broader scope to the more specific, Paul speaks of several reasons why 
God’s wrath and judgment are being revealed against humanity.  The first is because 
humanity has suppressed the truth about God which is plainly known through his creation 
(1:18-20).  Rather than a positive portrayal of humanity’s response to natural theology, these 
verses form the heart of a diatribe against sinful humanity and its rejection of the Creator.  In 
fact, there appears to be enough revelation through creation for Paul to say that things have 
been “made plain” to humans, enough to condemn them for their rejection of it and to leave 
them “without excuse” (literally in the Greek, anapologētous, “without defence”). 
It should be noted that, although arguments from silence are never in and of themselves a 
wise way to approach Scripture, it is nonetheless striking that Paul does not use this 
opportunity to formulate a positive portrait of general revelation.  In fact, it would seem that 
he had a great opportunity to contrast those who have not positively responded to God’s 
revelation through creation with those who have.  However, juxtaposed with this rejection of 
natural revelation a positive response to it is not found, but rather an argument that those who 
respond in faith to the message of righteousness as revealed in Christ will be saved.  Put 
another way, there is not Group A as the people who reject natural revelation versus Group B 
as the people who do positively respond to it.  Rather, there is Group A as the people who 
reject natural revelation juxtaposed with Group C as the people who are justified by faith 
(3:22).  It is a real possibility that Group B does not exist as a category in Paul’s mind. 
Paul concludes the first chapter with three instances of God “giving over” sinful humans 
to their wicked designs, and this could be seen as one way in which God’s wrath is being 
revealed.  He allows them to go, as it were, their own way.  God gave them over to degrading 
their bodies (vss. 24-25), to “shameful lusts” (vss. 26-27), and to “depraved minds” (vs. 28).  
From this giving over, sinful humans spiralled further and further downward into a cesspool 
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of wickedness and depravity (vss. 29-32).  All of this was because they did not consider it 
“worthwhile to retain the knowledge of God” (vs. 28). 
A second reason why God’s wrath is being revealed against humanity concerns 
hypocritical judgment by humans who believe themselves to be in the position of judging 
their fellow humans.  Chapter 2 begins with what most commentators believe to be a 
condemnation of Paul’s Jewish brethren who stand in judgment of the Gentiles, yet also 
commit sins which deserve the condemnation of God. 
A third reason concerns unrepentance (2:5f).  Not only is God’s judgment being revealed, 
but so evidently is his kindness (2:4) which, unfortunately, has gone ignored.  It is in the next 
verses of this passage in chapter 2 that inclusivists find some hope for their position, as Paul 
lays out an apparent plan of salvation which appears to come apart from special knowledge of 
Jesus Christ.  Paul quotes the Old Testament in verse 6, in which it states that “God will give 
to each person according to what he has done.”   
The next verses continue in what appears to be major support for the inclusivist position, 
found both in its teaching about justification as coming through doing good, and the fact that 
God does not show favouritism (vs. 11).  This latter point is key, since traditional 
evangelicalism seems to say that God does show favouritism, at least to those who know 
about Jesus and confess him.  Whereas for the inclusivist, this lack of favouritism on the part 
of God must drive one to the conclusion that God allows others outside the scope of explicit 
knowledge of Jesus to nonetheless do works of righteousness commendable by God and 
which are, in some way, salvific. 
Romans 2:6 is therefore a key text for inclusivism, and inclusivists have not been shy in 
attempting to exploit it.  Pinnock, for example, notes that people who live outside the 
knowledge of Jesus Christ, what he calls “informationally premessianic” (Wideness, 161), can 
be saved by positively responding to the general revelation they have received.  Just like Job, 
who never knew about Jesus Christ, so too could a twentieth-century Mongolian be saved by 
acting in faith with the light he or she has received in general revelation.299  Sanders notes that 
this is a general conclusion and key point of inclusivism, that people can act in faith, perform 
works pleasing to God, and be saved, even if they do not have knowledge of Christ (No Other 
Name, 235). 
It is here that inclusivists appear to make a hermeneutical error, however.  Paul’s 
argument does not end in chapter 2 of Romans.  In fact, it is just heating up.  If the conclusion 
                                                 
299 Pinnock also uses the Parable of the Sheep and Goats from Matthew 25 as further proof of this (Wideness, 
163-164), something already dealt with in detail. 
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were made from these verses that Paul believed that people apart from the knowledge of Jesus 
could somehow be saved by their good works, not only would it be contradicting a vast body 
of writing from his other epistles, it would also be contradicting the more immediate context 
of Romans.   
In fact, there appears to be just such a contradiction in these opening chapters.  Consider 
the following two verses: 
Romans 2:13 – “For it is not those who hear the law who are righteous in God’s 
sight, but it is those who obey the law who will be declared righteous.” 
Romans 3:20 – “Therefore no one will be declared righteous in his sight by 
observing the law.” 
There appears to be a glaring inconsistency, to put it mildly, in Paul’s words in this two 
verses.  On the surface, what Paul says in 2:13 is flatly contradicted just 36 verses later.  How 
can Paul make such an obvious error?  Concerning the specific issue at hand, it appears that 
evangelical exclusivists concentrate on 3:20 to the neglect of 2:13, while evangelical 
inclusivists appear to do the exact opposite.  Is there no way to understand these two verses 
such that a harmony can be reached between them? 
The apparent contradiction may be simple to resolve once the topic of discussion in each 
passage is discovered.  Whereas in 2:13 Paul is moving through a discussion about God’s 
judgment begun in the previous chapter, in 3:20 Paul moves to the matter of salvation.  In 
between these two verses is a rather large section devoted to the sinfulness of humans.  It is 
here where inclusivism apparently stumbles. 
The key verse is 2:12: “All who sin apart from the law will also perish apart from the law, 
and all who sin under the law will be judged by the law.”  The phrase “all who sin” forms the 
heart of this verse, and in missing this point, one is most likely to miss the point of the entire 
passage.  “All who sin” condemns everyone.   
In the verses which follow 2:12, Paul provides two more reasons why God’s wrath has 
been revealed.  It is revealed against Jews who break the law, and against Gentiles who 
violate their own conscience.  Inclusivists see in Paul’s discussion about Gentile conscience a 
positive understanding, whereby those who have never heard about Jesus or who have never 
received the law may in fact stand justified before God so long as they obey their conscience.  
To be sure, Paul does say that sometimes Gentiles are commended by their conscience (vs. 
15), but he also says that it condemns them as well.  Put another way, at times Gentiles may in 
fact obey their conscience, but at other times they knowingly violate it. 
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Again, a positive reading of this passage which concludes that via conscience, Gentiles 
can stand commended before God, is not justified.  Just as surely as Paul is not saying that 
there are some Jews who, through perfect obedience to the law, stand justified before God, he 
is also not saying that there are some Gentiles who, through perfect obedience to their 
conscience, stand justified before God.  Paul’s overall conclusion concerning the law and 
conscience is negative, not positive.300 
Paul is not contradicting himself in these two passages.  Rather, he is making the point 
that God’s righteous judgment comes via the works of humans, while his salvation comes 
only through faith.  “While, for Paul, forgiveness and eternal life are utterly of God’s grace, 
divine judgment (as uniformly in the Bible) is always passed in accordance with what men 
and women have done” (Bruce, 1989:84).  “Since knowledge of God is mediated to all by 
general revelation, human accountability to God is firmly established.  Hence in practice, 
general revelation becomes a vehicle not for salvation but for divine judgment” (Demarest, 
1982:246). 
Paul’s “what shall we conclude then” (3:9) should be seen as the conclusion to his grand 
argument which began in 1:18.  And his “all who sin” of 2:12 should be seen as tied together 
with 3:9: “Jews and Gentiles alike are all under sin.”  Romans 3:10-18 is the grand conclusion 
of the matter, and a grand condemnation of sinful humanity.  It is hard once this entire section 
has been digested, to maintain that general revelation is a means through which humanity can 
be saved.  Rather, it is one of the ways God has plainly revealed himself to humanity yet, 
through its sinful and wilful suppression of the truth, humanity stands condemned, whether 
Jew or Gentile.  “All have turned away, they have together become worthless; there is no one 
who does good, not even one” (3:12). 
Only upon establishing a solid Hamartiology does Paul then move to Soteriology.  If the 
law could not bring righteousness (3:20; see also Gal. 2:16b, 21; 3:11, 21b, 24); if humanity 
through its wickedness has suppressed the truth found in natural revelation; if Gentiles are 
often accused by their consciences; and if “all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” 
(3:23), how then does salvation come?  It can come only through grace and faith in Jesus as a 
“sacrifice of atonement” (3:25).  For “all who sin,” there can be no other possibility. 
This is why Calvin made a dichotomy in his Institutes between knowledge of God as 
creator and knowledge of God as redeemer.  He understood general revelation in this way, as 
                                                 
300 Thus Nash can say, “Nowhere in Romans 1-3 does Paul give general revelation enhanced status as an 
instrument of salvation (Destiny of the Unevangelized, 111). 
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twisted by sinful humans and unable to save them (see Institutes, 1.4; 1.5.11-15; 1.6.1), 
something to which Pinnock vehemently objects (Four Views, 190-191).   
To be clear, it is not general revelation that is at fault.  Rather, it is sinful humanity which 
has so warped the revelation so as to make it worthless to save.  Humanity’s inability to know 
God stems not only from the infinite/finite divide, but also because human thinking has 
become twisted.  The Pharisees serve as an excellent example of those who, in the face of 
special revelation, were still hardened to it by their own sinful inclinations.  This being the 
case, it is not hard to understand sinful humanity acting similarly with general revelation, the 
content of which is not as salvifically clear as special revelation. 
Demarest gives a good summary of what humankind can discern about God from general 
revelation.  He includes the following (243): 
“God exists (Ps. 19:1; Rom. 1:19)          God is wise (Ps. 104:24) 
God is uncreated (Acts 17:24)          God is good (Acts 14:17) 
God is Creator (Acts 14:15)          God is righteous (Rom. 1:32) 
God is Sustainer (Acts 14:16; 17:25)      God has a sovereign will (Acts 17:26) 
God is universal Lord (Acts 17:24)         God has standards of right and wrong (Rom. 2:15) 
God is transcendent (Acts 17:24)          God should be worshiped (Acts 14:15; 17:23) 
God is immanent (Acts 17:26-27)          Man should perform the good (Rom. 2:15) 
God is eternal (Ps. 93:2)           God is majestic (Ps. 29:4) 
God is great (Ps. 8:3-4)           God is powerful (Ps. 29:4; Rom. 1:20)”301 
But as Paul has said, humanity has “suppressed the truth” and thus general revelation falls, as 
it were, on deaf ears.  For this reason, special revelation is necessary, a revelation that makes 
general revelation salvifically understandable.  It is noted that in Demarest’s list above, 
nothing is said about the how of worship, or what is the right way by which a sinner can have 
a relationship with this God revealed generally.  Special revelation is needed to overcome the 
damage done by the fall of humanity into sin and rebellion.  Without the special revelation of 
God’s Word, knowledge of Christ as Lord and Saviour, and the work of the Holy Spirit, 
general revelation is suppressed by humans.  “God must not only make Himself known to 
man, but He must make Himself known to man.”302 
                                                 
301 In this list, Acts 17 plays a major role in Demarest’s conclusions.  Inclusivists have also used this passage as 
further proof of their position.  However, Paul’s speech to the Athenians concludes with talk of the judgment of 
God (vs. 31).  This is yet another example of inclusivists missing something of importance in Scripture.  In their 
attempt to be highly positive, they tend to ignore the negative messages of Scripture. 
302 Robert E. Friedman, “Calvin’s Doctrine of General Revelation,” MA thesis, Wheaton Graduate School, 1963, 
emphasis original.  Calvin notes,  “… but as the whole world gained nothing in point of instruction from the 
circumstances, that God had exhibited his wisdom in his creatures, He then resorted to another method for 
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3.5.1.2 The Name of Jesus 
However, is not all of the above moot given the inclusivist understanding that the atoning 
work of Jesus is in fact the only means by which salvation can come?  In other words, 
inclusivists profess that salvation is only through Jesus Christ.  This being the case, they 
recognise the sinfulness of humanity and the need for Jesus to come into the world. 
In fact, in commenting on Romans 2, Pinnock makes this thoughtful observation: 
“Granted, Paul is stressing the failure of sinners to respond to God in order to 
show why Jesus had to come.  He is insisting that humanity cannot save itself 
apart from the work of God in redemption” (Wideness, 33). 
The disconnect in inclusivist thinking, though, comes with knowledge of this saving work 
in Jesus.  Individuals do not need to know what has been done in the incarnation.  All they 
need to know is that God exists, and they must act in faith given that knowledge.  The 
difficulty with such a view, though, is that it appears unsupported by Scripture.  There is little 
evidence in the Bible that salvation is available outside explicit knowledge of Jesus Christ, or 
is somehow mediated by culture and non-Christian traditions. 
Several New Testament passages bear this out.  Acts 4:12 is perhaps the most readily used 
verse to support the idea that the name of Jesus is important in the salvation process.  
“Salvation is found in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given to men by 
which we must be saved.”  It is difficult to accept the inclusivist interpretation of this verse to 
mean that just because salvation is in Jesus, this does not exclude its possibility elsewhere.  
The verse appears quite exclusivist in its declaration.  Therefore, it is hard to understand how 
Sanders can conclude that this passage does not state that explicit knowledge of Jesus is 
necessary.  As noted earlier, Sanders believes an individual can benefit from the exclusive 
salvation found in Christ, without actually knowing about it.  It is here that the name of Jesus 
is important to recognise in this passage.  Indeed, it is hard to envision a missionary enterprise 
in the early years of Christianity which did not have at its heart the urgency of spreading the 
knowledge of Jesus to those who formerly did not know about him. 
In fact, Paul makes this the backbone of his ministry to the Jews and Gentiles.  “This man 
is my chosen instrument to carry my name before the Gentiles and their kings and before the 
people of Israel” (Acts 9:15; also vs. 27).  Philip had earlier identified the gospel with the 
name of Jesus (Acts 8:12, 35), and in John’s short epistle he notes that it was “for the sake of 
                                                                                                                                                        
instructing men.  Thus it must be reckoned as our own fault, that we do not attain a saving acquaintance with 
God, before we have been emptied of our own understanding” (The Commentaries of John Calvin, various 
translators, 46 volumes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1946) commentary on 1 Cor. 1:21). 
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the Name” that early believers spread the good news (3 Jn. 7).  Paul addresses his letter to the 
church at Corinth “together with all those everywhere who call on the name of our Lord Jesus 
Christ” (1 Cor. 1:2).  Even those opposed to the gospel message recognised that the name of 
Jesus was the central focus of the early Christian missionaries (eg., Acts 4:17-30; 5:28, 40; 
Saul of Tarsus recognised this as well, 28:9).  The subjection of demons is further proof that 
the name of Jesus was of primary importance (eg., Acts 19:13).  This emphasis on the name 
of Jesus, then, appears to support an exclusivist contention that explicit knowledge of Christ is 
necessary for salvation. 
A statement from John’s Gospel makes a similar point.  “Whoever believes in him is not 
condemned, but whoever does not believe stands condemned already because he has not 
believed in the name of God’s one and only Son” (Jn. 3:18).  When coupled with John 14:6, it 
is hard to escape exclusivist conclusions.   
When observing what the faith is upon, this is even more remarkable.  Inclusivism 
appears to make faith rest upon God as known via general revelation, but Scripture lays the 
emphasis on Christ.  “And this is the testimony: God has given us eternal life, and this life is 
in his Son.  He who has the Son has life; he who does not have the Son of God does not have 
life” (1 John 5:11-12).  In the very next verse, John speaks of the name of the Son of God as 
the object of saving faith. 
The editors of Four Views note as problematic in inclusivism “the lack of a qualitative 
distinction between God’s personal action in Jesus Christ and his universal presence” (25).  
This is important to note.  Pinnock has made the universal activity of God’s Spirit a 
fundamental tenet of his Soteriology, thus supporting his notion that general revelation can 
indeed be salvific.  But has he not sacrificed the particularity of Jesus in the process?  If the 
content of general revelation is sufficient to save, and if people can enjoy the benefits of 
Christ’s atoning work without even knowing him or about him, at what point can it truly be 
said that Jesus is the only Saviour of the world?  When coupled with the inclusivist 
understanding about Saul of Tarsus or Cornelius, both supposedly saved whether or not they 
ever came to a knowledge of Christ, it is hard to believe inclusivists when they say that Jesus 
is the only means of salvation. 
Inclusivism appears to make a mistake that liberal Christianity has often made.  That 
mistake is to assume that it is the teaching of Jesus alone that matters, and not his person.  
This has led liberal scholars, and apparently inclusivist ones as well, to conclude that so long 
as a person is living a life in conformity with the teaching of Jesus, that person must be saved 
by Jesus as well.  But as noted above, as well as in the Christology section, the person of 
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Jesus is equally vital, and Scripture emphasises a relationship with Christ, not simply doing in 
accidental fashion what he taught. 
In conclusion, evangelicals should remain sceptical at best toward the inclusivist 
conclusion that general revelation can be salvific, and that explicit knowledge of Jesus Christ 
is not necessary for salvation.  As much as evangelicals may hope that the fate of the 
unevangelised can be positively portrayed via this inclusivist understanding of general 
revelation, it appears to be biblically weak.303 
 
3.5.2 An Evaluation of Inclusivism’s Understanding of the Image of God 
The image of God in humankind is a thorny theological area.  The competing views 
throughout the history of the church as to what precisely constitutes the image of God or 
imago Dei are multifold.  It is not within the scope of this dissertation to delineate all these 
views.  However, the inclusivist understanding of the imago Dei must be evaluated 
nonetheless, because it impinges directly upon their understanding of non-Christian religions.  
Recall, this is one reason why Pinnock noted that nobility and truth can be found in non-
Christian faiths, because of the existence of the image of God in all people. 
Much is made by pluralists and inclusivists that many if not all of the world’s religions 
have truth.  One prominent argument used to bolster their position that these religions are 
salvific (pluralist) or at least used by God to draw people to Christ (inclusivist) is to note the 
morality of many of the adherents of these religions.  From this, it is argued, Christianity and 
its followers look little different.  Therefore, these non-Christian religions must stand on equal 
footing or at least be granted a better hearing than has traditionally been the case in 
evangelicalism.304 
On the surface this argument seems at first compelling.  However, one would expect to 
find some truth in any given religion, or else it would probably not stand as a religion.  But 
just because a beast has two hands, two legs, two arms, two ears, and a mouth does not make 
it a human being, no matter what similarities to humans it might have otherwise.  The same 
can be said about religions which are at odds with Christianity.  If they were devoid of 
absolutely all truth, it is doubted that such religions could woo members. 
                                                 
303 Many other passages could be covered in this section, such as Rom. 10:9-15, but the above should suffice.  
Exclusivists have also noted that there are even biblical cases of people who had received special revelation, yet 
still needed to know Jesus in an explicit way in order to be saved (eg., the Samaritans, or the disciples of John 
the Baptist).  Cornelius was noted as such an example.  See Four Views, 238, for other examples. 
304 Both the pluralist John Hick and the inclusivist Clark Pinnock use this argument in their discussions found in 
Four Views.  Inclusivist Gerald McDermott brings this matter decidedly to the fore in his book Can Evangelicals 
Learn from World Religions? 
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In fact, is it not the characteristic of counterfeits to have some similarities to the real 
thing?  If non-Christian religions are inspired by Satan, as exclusivists normally claim (and as 
was seen in an earlier section does have some substantial biblical support), then should some 
elements of truth in those religions be expected?  Recall, when Satan tempted Jesus, he quoted 
Scripture.  Someone who counterfeits currency attempts to make the money appear as close as 
possible to the real thing.  He does not just take any old piece of paper, scribble some figures 
on it, and attempt to pawn it off as legal tender.  He crafts the counterfeit carefully, until it 
looks like the real thing.  If Satan indeed “masquerades as an angel of light” (2 Cor. 11:14), 
there can be an expectation of at least some non-Christian religions to have elements of truth 
in them.  How else could Satan masquerade as an angel of light if this did not include 
possessing similar characteristics of one?305 
Similarly, Jesus warns in the Olivet Discourse that “false Christs and false prophets will 
appear and perform great signs and miracles to deceive even the elect, if that were possible” 
(Matt. 24:24).  Evidently, these signs and wonders will appear similar to the legitimate signs 
performed by Christ’s disciples, otherwise they would have no deceptive quality. 
Compounding this problem is the “image of God factor.”  Scripture says that humans are 
created in God’s image, and as such form the pinnacle of his creative activity (Gen. 1:26-27).  
However, what does this mean exactly, to be created in God’s image? 
In the fact that humans are in the image of God lay the essence and distinctiveness of 
human beings.  Humans were created in the image of God and now are the image of God.  
Traces of this truth are found even in secular literature.  Paul pointed out to the Athenians that 
some of their own poets have spoken of humans as the offspring of God (Acts 17:28). 
If a survey throughout the Church’s history were provided of how this term has been 
viewed, no end to the competing categories would be seen.306  From these competing 
viewpoints, though, six general characteristics commonly attributed to the “image of God” 
could be gleaned.  These six attributes are rational ability, bodily traits, moral characteristics, 
freedom or freewill, rulership and creativity, and immortality.  Despite their differences, all of 
the schools of thought are in virtual agreement, be they Patristic Fathers or Orthodox Fathers, 
Reformers or Catholic scholars, liberal or conservative theologians, that the image of God 
constitutes at least in part a spiritual component that is not found in any other earthly creature.  
                                                 
305 It is recognised that Paul’s passage about Satan masquerading as an angel of light comes in the context of 
false apostles in the church, but it does not appear unjustified that Satan could also do this in other religious 
contexts outside the church as well. 
306 For a thorough historical survey, see Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth 
Trust, 1984)  202f. 
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In other words, the image of God is that part of humans which yearns for fellowship with 
God. 
There are different ways in which this may be worked out.  Calvin, for example, spoke of 
the “semen religionis” within all humans (Institutes, 1.3.1-2).  Barnes speaks of the “universal 
human religiosity” (1989:21) and Kraemer spoke of the “universal religious consciousness of 
humanity” (1938:114).  Demarest speaks of this knowledge of God in three categories, 
“reminiscent knowledge,” “intuitional knowledge,” and via “rational inference” (1982:227-
232).  “All men by reminiscence vaguely know that God exists, that He is all-powerful, just, 
and good, and that He is to be worshiped” (228).  Examples can be multiplied, ones which cut 
across all denominational and ecclesiastical distinctions.307 
The problem comes with the Fall and its effects on that image, and whether or not that 
desire for fellowship has been vitiated.  It is one thing to point to the imago Dei as a reason 
for why so many religions exist.  It is quite another to use it as proof that these religions must 
be viewed positively. 
It must be determined what, if any, effect the Fall had on the image of God in humanity.  
Three broad options are available, either the image was not affected by the Fall, or part of the 
image was lost in the Fall, or all of the image was lost in the Fall.  The first option is of no 
consequence here because inclusivists do not allow it.  Clearly, the third option is also not 
applicable to inclusivists, since they allow for the image to remain and thus produce in non-
Christian religions certain positive attributes.  Therefore, the second option, that the image 
was damaged by the Fall, is where evangelicals must concentrate their attention as both 
evangelical exclusivists and inclusivists would fall under this categorisation. 
It seems reasonable to agree with inclusivism’s contention that honourable attributes 
found in non-Christian faiths are at least in part a vestige of the image of God.  However, it 
could equally be contended that some of these positive attributes are only there because of the 
counterfeiting work of Satan.  Regardless, there appears to be no reason to argue the point 
further, because another more promising avenue exists to be investigated. 
The question to be asked is, “Is the image of God the only thing with which we should 
allocate our thinking?”  What of the image of Christ that is often spoken of in the New 
Testament?  Put another way, is fallen humanity attempting to make its way back to that 
original, pristine state found in Eden, a human nature found in pre-Fall Adam, or are believers 
                                                 
307 Other classic statements of this truth could include Blaise Pascal’s “God-shaped vacuum” which exists in 
each human soul, and Augustine’s “Our hearts are restless until they find their rest in Thee.”  Biblically, 
Ecclesiastes 3:11 echoes this truth, wherein it says that God has “set eternity in the hearts of men.” 
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moving toward something greater? 
There are several passages in the New Testament which refer to an image or likeness in 
connection with what believers are becoming through the process of salvation.  Romans 8:29 
notes that believers are being conformed to the image of the Son:   "For those whom he 
foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might 
be the first-born among many brethren."  Second Corinthians 3:18 speaks similarly, and both 
Eph. 4:23-24 and Col. 3:10 speak of a “new nature” which apparently is not referring to the 
pre-Fall state. 
Christ is the image of God as indicated in 2 Cor. 4:4 and Col. 1:15.  Together with Heb. 
1:3 it may be seen that this involves the idea that the incarnate Christ is the visible 
manifestation of God.  Since the believer is being conformed to the image of Christ who is the 
image of God; and since this is described in Col. 3:10 and Eph. 4:24 as being related to the 
areas of true righteousness, holiness and full-knowledge; and since 1 John 3:2-7 teaches that it 
is in the future that believers will be like him (glorified; that is, pure, without sin and 
righteous as he is), it appears that they will be in Christ more than what they would have been 
in Adam.  In other words, the image of God as taught in Genesis is not the final word.  
Something greater is to be expected for believers.  This being the case, evangelicals should 
not be inclined to lay a great deal of emphasis upon the image of God as originally found in 
Adam and Eve.  Perhaps inclusivism does this.308 
This is further attested when considering human ability to sin.  Adam had the ability to sin 
or not to sin (Latin: posse non peccare), but in a glorified state, believers will no longer 
possess the ability to sin (Latin: non posse peccare).  It appears that to be made into the image 
of Christ is far better than that image which originally existed in pre-Fall Adam. 
This relates to the present debate concerning non-Christian religions in the following way.  
Given the image of God in humans, and given the fact that it has been affected by sin, there 
should be expected a great degree of diversity and creativity in world religions, while still 
maintaining some similarities between them.  The image of God causes humans to seek some 
spiritual aspect to their lives and, given the constitution of humans as both material and non-
material (or spiritual), this can be expected.  God created humankind to desire fellowship with 
him in the spiritual realm.  Atheism, then, is a classic portrayal of humanity against its very 
                                                 
308 For an article dealing in some respect with this issue, see Stanley Grenz, “Jesus as the Imago Dei: Image-of-
God Christology and the Non-Linear Linearity of Theology,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 
(Dec 2004) 617-628. 
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nature, and stands as an example of the stark reality that exists from the effects of sin.309 
But the effects of the Fall are not only seen in atheism, but possibly in the variety of 
religions in the world as well.  People have a propensity to create what they want to believe, 
and an even greater propensity to take that which is good and turn it into evil.  According to 
many evangelicals, Satan may use this inclination in sinners for his own purposes.  As he 
attempts to counterfeit God’s truth, humans may also work alongside him, possibly creating 
their own false religions.  Satan’s lie in the Garden, “you will be like God,” would not have 
worked if Adam and Eve did not believe it.  It would seem remiss to not at least consider the 
possibility that in the religious realm, Satan is misleading humans, as he has attempted to do 
since the beginning. 
The pluralist and inclusivist positions suffer from a faulty Hamartiology which does not 
take into account the fallenness of humans and their ability to warp the truth for their own 
purposes.  As noted in the discussion of pagan saints, the pagan religion of people like 
Melchizedek, Abimelech, and Rahab were not the reason why these saints of old were drawn 
to God.  If anything, those religions served as stumbling blocks to true faith.  Rather, these 
holy pagans were “evangelised” much like people are today.  Once they heard about the one, 
true God, they turned from their pagan religion and placed their faith in him.310 
The existence of a variety of world religions, then, does not necessarily serve as a 
reminder of God’s desire to draw all people to himself.  Rather, for evangelicals they may 
also serve as a reminder that Satan is at work in the world, counterfeiting the truth of God in 
order to deceive humankind, and that humanity is fallen and will itself devise ways to follow 
God which are human-made, sinful, and deceitful.  The imago Dei causes people to seek a 
spiritual relationship, but the Fall ensures that such endeavours, apart from the work of God’s 
Spirit, will only be warped and unacceptable.  It is only when God’s Spirit is at work 
overcoming the affects of the Fall that religion can be pure.  As noted earlier, that work by the 
Spirit must correspond to God’s Word, also a work of the same Spirit, with the name of Jesus 
as its focus. 
                                                 
309 It is for this reason that it must be concluded that the inclusivism found in the Vatican II notion of “holy 
atheist” is untenable, as noted earlier.  Tord Fornberg goes in detail through the various Vatican II papers dealing 
with the statements about those outside Christianity in The Problem of Christianity in Multi-Religious Societies 
of Today: The Bible in a World of Many Faiths (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995) 15-21. 
310 A specific study of the world’s religions and each one’s concept of sin, although beyond the scope of this 
present study, would be fascinating nonetheless.  The Christian understanding of sin is vastly different than that 
found in religions which admit to such (eg., Islam), let alone with those religions which barely at all have any 
developed Hamartiology (eg., Buddhism, Hinduism). 
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3.5.3 An Evaluation of Inclusivism’s Understanding of Prevenient Grace 
Coupled with his view of general revelation and the religious sphere of humanity’s culture as 
seen as a product of the imago Dei, Pinnock brings to bear his Wesleyan understanding of 
prevenient grace.  In Wideness, he asks why there exists the variety of religions in the world 
today.  His first response, and rightly so, is a recognition of the image of God in humanity.  “It 
is our nature, made in the image of God, to seek him” (102).311 
The Arminian, and especially Wesleyan understanding, of prevenient grace is also 
brought into Pinnock’s arguments.  “World religions reflect to some degree general revelation 
and prevenient grace” (Wideness, 104).  It is this prevenient grace that frees up sinners to 
respond to the offer of salvation from God (103). 
The first concern involving this understanding of prevenient grace is if it is biblically 
founded.  Interestingly, Pinnock himself recognises a weakness in this area.  In recounting his 
theological pilgrimage from Calvinism to Wesleyan Arminianism, he makes this intriguing 
comment:  “But I also knew that the Bible has no developed doctrine of universal prevenient 
grace, however convenient it would be for us if it did” (Grace/Will, 22).  Yet he still manages 
to make it a major tenet of his position on general revelation and its salvific benefits.  It 
appears that prevenient grace is a theological and not a biblical necessity in Pinnock’s 
inclusivism. 
However, there seems to be an even greater problem with the idea of universal, 
prevenient grace than the paucity of biblical support, and that is the theological problems.  
The idea of preparatory grace does not seem to do what Arminian inclusivists expect it to do.  
They posit that it frees an individual from the effects of sin, thus allowing that person to freely 
choose to follow God.  Envisioned is the recapitulation that Christ underwent in which he 
brings humans back to a position of freedom. 
But can prevenient grace as envisioned by Arminian inclusivists really be said to do this?  
Before his Fall, Adam was sinless and immortal.  This can hardly be said to be the case for 
people today, even if prevenient grace is operative.  Something more in line with Pelagius’ 
                                                 
311 Pinnock graciously attempts as much as possible to grant a positive portrayal of the views of others, 
especially if they are adherents to non-Christian faiths.  In this section, though, he makes a nod for atheists as 
well.  “. . . Religions flow out of human aspiration, that is, from the center of our religious human nature.  Here, 
atheists have a good point.  If there were no God, there would still be religions. The need for God is so great 
within us that we would project gods even if none existed.  God created humankind as naturally, inherently, and 
incurably religious.  It is our nature, made in the image of God, to seek him” (102).  Apparently, in bending over 
backward to compliment atheists, Pinnock has made a major error of reasoning.  It does not stand to reason that 
if God did not exist, humanity would have created gods anyway.  And it especially does not make sense to 
appeal to the image of God as a point for the atheist’s position.  If no god existed, there would be no image and 
no innate desire to seek God.  Unfortunately, such weak reasoning by Pinnock on incidental points causes his 
major conclusions to appear suspect. 
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elimination of original sin and the negation of the effects of Adam’s sin for all subsequent 
human beings would be necessary for true, individual freedom. 
Also worth noting is that prevenient grace, although appearing on the surface to be a 
gentle, non-coercive force, actually works against human freedom.  It was argued earlier in 
the Theology-proper section that the inclusivist desire to preserve human freedom is actually 
lost when God determines to forego the human decision to rebel in the Garden by sending his 
Son to undo the decision made by Adam.  There is simply no way around it.  If God wants to 
save fallen humanity, he must to some degree violate human freedom in order to do it.  
Prevenient grace, as understood by Arminian inclusivists, appears to be one way of doing that. 
Prevenient grace appears to be a means by which the objectionable tenet of certain strains 
of Calvinism, limited atonement, can be eliminated.  To Pinnock and his ilk, Calvinism in 
virtually any form is too limiting.  In it God appears stingy with his grace.  The Arminian 
understanding of prevenient grace, especially as found in John Wesley’s teaching, makes the 
offer of salvation and its effectiveness much wider. 
As noble as this goal may be, one wonders how biblically and theologically trustworthy it 
is.  Pinnock consistently speaks negatively about the “fewness doctrine” that he perceives in 
traditional Calvinistic and evangelical Christianity.  In fact, he notes that it encourages people 
toward pluralism, using John Hick’s own comments in that respect as proof (Wideness, 17, 
19, 186).  He believes that God does not want to “rescue a few brands plucked from the 
burning” (23); thus inclusivism is far superior to exclusivism in its wider hope of salvation. 
The difficulty with this position is that Scripture often does speak in terms of fewness.  It 
was already noted the several teachings from Jesus in this regard and how inclusivists tend to 
avoid them or attempt to reinterpret them in less than satisfactory ways.  But Scripture is 
replete with examples of fewness, such as Rahab and her household being saved while the 
entire city of Jericho was destroyed, or Noah and his family of eight while the remainder of 
humanity was lost.  Peter uses the Great Flood as a pattern of eschatological judgment (1 Pet. 
3:20-21; 2 Pet. 3:6-7). 
In the early chapters of Genesis, the story of the arrogance of the entire population of 
Babel is juxtaposed with the faithfulness of one man, Abraham, and Enoch stands as a lone 
example of a truly godly man in the midst of generations which became increasingly evil and 
in need of universal judgment in the Flood.  Elijah bemoans his solitary stance against Ahab 
and Jezebel, but is told that God has reserved 7000 who have not bowed the knee to Baal (1 
Kings 19:18).  Yet 7000 is certainly a small percentage of the overall population of Israel at 
that time.  Paul uses this as an example for his “remnant” teaching concerning Israel (Rom. 
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11:5).  Even the election of Israel as God’s chosen people is seen as a fewness in light of the 
hundreds of other nations which existed at that time.312  As objectionable as the “fewness 
doctrine” may appear to inclusivists, it is not for want of biblical support. 
The idea of fewness is also attacked based on the notion of geographical and 
chronological “accidents.”  Often the argument is used by pluralists and inclusivists that one’s 
place of birth, and hence one’s religious affiliation, are “accidents” of history.  In other words, 
if a person is born in the Middle East, chances are very good that that person will become a 
Muslim; if in Asia, a Buddhist; if in India, Hindu; if in Europe, Christian, and so on.  It is then 
reasoned that such “accidents” are not the fault of the people in question and as such, God 
would not hold it against them.313 
This topic is particularly breeched when speaking about Christian missions and whether 
or not a person needs to consciously acknowledge Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour before 
that person can be saved.  The argument usually follows that God would not be so mean or 
callous as to hold such accidents of history against people.  If they have not heard about Jesus, 
through no fault of their own, how then can God hold it against them if they have not 
confessed Jesus as Lord?  Reason and sheer fairness dictate he cannot do so. 
Pinnock speaks of “accidents of time and geography” (Four Views, 255; also 116), as 
does pluralist John Hick when he speaks about the “luck” of being born in a Christian part of 
the world (250).  Inclusivists believe that salvation must be universally accessible regardless 
of limits of geography and time (24). 
At what point, though, must arguments concerning God’s grace be brought to the fore?  If  
grace is desired, is this not speaking of things which are undeserved?  Inclusivists rightly 
speak of God’s grace, but to then conclude that sinful humans deserve access to this grace 
undermines the entire understanding of grace itself. 
Even further, can they truly appeal to “accidents” of birthplace?  Is a Chinese woman 
born in the fifteenth century “accidentally” born there, as if God has no control over the 
matter?  When God revealed himself specially to the Israelites, were the Babylonians just 
unfortunate that they did not receive equal treatment?  Or is God not sovereign in the 
movements of peoples? 
                                                 
312 Paul can say, “Not all Israel is Israel” (Rom. 9:6) which further hints that even among God’s chosen nation, 
there was a remnant or a fewness to the number being saved. 
313 This is the question tackled in the book, Through No Fault of Their Own? The Fate of Those Who Have Never 
Heard, (Crockett and Sigountos, eds., Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1991) and is also expressed 
explicitly in the chapter written by David Clark (35). 
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In Paul’s speech to the Athenians, he appears to not subscribe to this accidental notion of 
people and their historical placement.  “From one man he made every nation of men, that they 
should inhabit the whole earth; and he determined the times set for them and the exact places 
where they should live” (Acts 17:26).  Some evangelicals rightly question the inclusivist and 
pluralist contention that people are accidents of geography and time in light of this very 
specific statement by Paul to the contrary.  A recent Reformed scholar makes an observation 
which may bear some light on this topic: 
“We will not expand here upon the question of how people in remote portions of 
the world got there in the first place.  We simply observe that, if biblical history is 
correct, the migration to a pocket of the world beyond contact with outside 
civilization originally would have had to involve a conscientious rebellion against 
Yahweh by the ancestors of persons in that “unreached” pocket now (Genesis 11).  
That being the case, these rebellious ancestors’ progeny being beyond the reach of 
– let us be candid – truly vast missions efforts to get to them could be a 
manifestation of the very sort of judgment God has warned human beings about in 
his Word (Exod. 20:4-5).”314 
In short, the reasons why inclusivists posit the need for prevenient grace do not stand up 
to close scrutiny, nor is prevenient grace able to do what inclusivists propose that it does. 
 
3.5.4 Pelagian Leanings? 
There is one further hesitation when it comes to the Hamartiology of inclusivism.  At what 
point will inclusivists discard the notion of original sin and embrace Pelagianism?  Is it not a 
logical next step given their understanding of fairness and God’s love? 
This is no idle speculation either.  Pinnock hints at such things in his discussion about 
humans and the image of God, when he breaches the topic of death.  There he suggests that a 
“new way of thinking” is necessary for evangelicals, one which views death as something 
always existing.  “It suggests that Adam, had he not sinned, would still have reached the end 
of life” (Flame, 72).  This apparently harmless statement should send up warning signs for 
those familiar with the views of Pelagius.  He believed that death was a natural attribute of 
human nature, not something that only came after the Fall.  In other words, death was not the 
result of sin. 
                                                 
314 R. Todd Mangum, “Is There a Reformed Way to Get the Benefits of the Atonement to ‘Those Who Have 
Never Heard?’” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society (March 2004) 126, n. 13. 
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Pinnock’s leanings toward Eastern Orthodox thought on the matter of sin are also cause 
for alarm, since Orthodoxy has adopted the Pelagian understanding that humans are not born 
sinners (Flame, 159-160).  And Pinnock opposes Augustine’s formulations against Pelagius 
concerning the effects of sin. 
The idea that it is not fair that God would judge people who have not heard the message 
of Jesus appears to support the notion that people have an intrinsic right to salvation.  The 
idea that sinners can, through their good works, somehow be seen as pleasing to God and 
worthy of salvation, also smacks of Pelagianism.  However, these matters are better dealt with 
in the next section on Soteriology.315 
 
3.5.5 Conclusion to Hamartiological Evaluation 
As has been the tendency when looking at their doctrine of Scripture and their doctrine of 
God, here too inclusivists have moved away from a typical evangelical doctrine of sin.  There 
are troubling indicators in the positive view of non-Christian religions found in the theology 
of Pinnock. 
Consider these two competing statements from evangelicals today: 
“We recognize that all men have some knowledge of God through general 
revelation in nature.  But we deny that this can save, for men suppress the truth by 
their unrighteousness.”316 
“The religions of man are not the artistry of demonic beings or the corrupted 
projections of man’s natural bent for philosophizing.”317 
The first statement is a typical evangelical approach to general revelation and why it is not 
salvific.  Human depravity has made the clear voice of general revelation muddled.  For this 
reason, it speaks against humankind as seen in Paul’s eloquent argument in the opening 
chapters of Romans. 
The second statement is more in line with pluralist and inclusivist leanings.  The various 
world religions serve as examples not of fallen humanity or demonic activity, but of the image 
of God and God’s prevenient grace.  As such, these non-Christian religions should be 
embraced to some degree. 
                                                 
315 Others have recognised these Pelagian leanings, eg., Nash, 1994:134, 139, 170, and Sanders, No Other Name, 
265, who notes it as well even though he is an inclusivist. 
316 Lausanne Covenant, as quoted in Meiring, 56. 
317 Thomas O’Meara, “Toward a Subjective Theology of Revelation,” Theological Studies 36 (Summer, 1975) 
421 (quoted in Demarest, 18). 
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Exclusivists have rightly opposed this inclusivist understanding.  In terms of 
Hamartiology, it does not properly take into consideration the biblical data concerning the 
fallenness of humanity.  Pinnock seems ready to use the universality of religion to bolster his 
point, but he appears to disregard the universality of sin as a point against his inclusivism. 
Inclusivists take too positive a position on non-Christian religions, and although in 
principle they speak against a Catholic inclusivism which views these religions as salvific, it 
is difficult to discern little difference in their own view in this regard.  The editors of Four 
Views note that inclusivists, in attempting to walk the precarious edge between exclusivism’s 
rejection of non-Christian religions as false without adopting pluralism’s view of all religions 
as salvific, have taken up an apparently impossible task.  “If every culture is distinctively 
religious at its core, can Pinnock escape the implication that other religions are salvific?” (25).  
It does not appear so. 
The question is not whether knowledge of God innately exists in humans, but to what 
extent that knowledge can truly be known in a salvific manner.  Suppression of the truth and 
active rebellion is endemic to the entire human race.  It is a universal problem unlimited in 
scope and application.  The existence of the religions of the world do not serve as a positive 
marker for prevenient grace, the salvific benefits of general revelation, and the imago Dei, but 
as a negative sign that fallen humanity is still devising ways of turning from the one, true God 
and his only means of salvation, his Son Jesus.  Rightly so, exclusivists are more inclined 
toward a Calvinist understanding of human depravity.  “Why do we presume so much on 
ability of human nature?  It is wounded, battered, troubled, lost.  What we need is true 
confession, not false defense” (Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.11). 
In Paul’s difficult discussion in chapters 9-11 of Romans, he laments the decision of his 
Jewish compatriots to not place their faith in Christ.  However, he recognises their zeal for 
God.  Obviously, this is a zeal for the one, true God, not a zeal misplaced in some false deity.  
But Paul also recognises that their zeal is misplaced nonetheless.  “I can testify about them 
that they are zealous for God, but their zeal is not based on knowledge” (10:2). 
His hope is that Israel would be saved (10:1).  This strongly implies that in his mind, they 
are currently not saved.  This sentiment echoes what Paul says elsewhere about his own 
spiritual situation before he came to faith in Jesus Christ (Phil. 3:8).  Evangelicals should 
strongly protest those inclusivists who believe that, before coming to faith in Christ, Paul’s 
zeal for God would have saved him anyway.  If this is the position of the Jews, the ones 
whom Paul can describe in such powerful language - “Theirs is the adoption as sons; theirs 
the divine glory, the covenants, the receiving of the law, the temple worship and the promises.  
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Theirs are the patriarchs, and from them is traced the human ancestry of Christ” (9:4b-5) - 
what can be said about those of other faiths?  Clearly the God Jesus worshiped is the God of 
Christianity, but evangelicals dare not rashly conclude that the gods worshiped in other 
religions are equal. 
What is the remedy for Paul’s Jewish brethren?  It is none other than confession of the 
name of Jesus.  “That if you confess with your mouth, ‘Jesus is Lord,’ and believe in your 
heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved” (10:9).  But what should 
evangelicals make of the adherents of other religions, those moral followers whom Pinnock 
and other inclusivists believe have godly faith, yet who do not know Jesus?  Can evangelicals 
be as positive about their fate as inclusivists want them to be?  Paul continues to say that true 
faith comes from “the word of Christ” (10:17), not by some other means. 
Inclusivism suffers from a faulty Hamartiology, which in turn drives it to faulty 
soteriological conclusions.  Evangelicals should not be inclined to accept their positive 
portrayal of general revelation, especially as it relates to non-Christian religions, nor should 
they find their arguments concerning the imago Dei and prevenient grace compelling.  
Perhaps Scripture often speaks of a “remnant” with good reason, because it recognises the 
universal plight of humanity under sin, and does not allow for such positive hopes for those 
who are outside of faith in Jesus Christ.  The wider hope of inclusivism appears misplaced. 
 
3.6 What Is the Fate of the Unevangelised? 
A Soteriological Reflection on Judgment 
The point has come in this dissertation where some substantive summaries of the inclusivist 
teaching concerning the fate of the unevangelized can be made. 
For centuries a question on the hearts and minds of many Christians was, “What happens 
to people who die never hearing the gospel or even the name of Jesus?”  Picture an eleventh-
century Mongolian who dies and is standing before God.  God asks this person, “Did you 
place your faith in my son, Jesus Christ?”  And the Mongolian politely answers, “Jesus who?”  
This scenario has plagued many Christians through the years because Christianity has been 
strongly of the “exclusivist” variety.  Certainly, there have been some voices here and there 
for whom the question was not as problematic, but they have been an occasional gull chirping 
in the roaring sea of exclusivism.  That tide, however, has changed.  What used to be only a 
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small trickle of voices against the flow of exclusivism has now, according to some, become a 
deafening torrent.318  Now the shore is full of chirping gulls.   
While working in the United States in the late 1980s, my business took me to British 
Columbia, Canada, and specifically Vancouver.  This eclectic city has the full range of 
religious adherents.  My taxi driver from the airport to my hotel wore a turban, and so I asked 
him why.  He was a Sikh he explained, and for the next twenty-five minutes we discussed 
religion.  I told him my views about Jesus Christ and he told me his beliefs.   
Upon dropping me off at the hotel, he got out of the taxi to retrieve my luggage from 
the boot, and then told me these words.  “Life is like a river.  Some people come to the river 
to wash their clothes, some come to water their cattle, and others come to bathe.  All of them 
come for different reasons, but they all come to the same river.  The same is true about God.  
Don’t let anyone tell you there is only one way.”  And with that, he got back in his taxi and 
left.  He had obviously heard little that I had said during the drive, since I was telling him the 
entire time that Jesus Christ is the only way. 
This “all roads lead to heaven” mentality is growing in what traditionally have been 
Christian or Christianised nations throughout the world.  People are all finding their own way, 
as it were, with the ultimate hope that this way leads to God.  In fact, the growing notion is 
that indeed all roads do lead to God, no matter how different or diverse or internally 
contradictory or inconsistent these roads may be.  It is why Carl Braaten can say, “To 
continue to be christocentric today is about as anachronistic as to believe that the earth is 
flat.”319   
As noted in the Introduction, this brand of pluralism is gaining popularity in the Western 
world.  It is a pluralism that inclusivists such as Clark Pinnock are adamantly opposed to, yet 
there are similarities nonetheless between many of the methodologies and conclusions of 
inclusivism and pluralism. 
A simple survey of some of the Christian books produced in just the last two decades on 
this topic shows how hot this issue is.  Jesus, a Savior or the Savior?, More than One Way?, 
No Other Name? and Through No Fault of Their Own? are all titles which ask a question, and 
at the heart lies the ultimate question of Christianity, “How can you really believe that Jesus is 
the only way for salvation?”  Such a view is intolerant and exclusivistic and as such does not 
foster dialogue between the religions.  As already noted, Sanders identifies the question, 
                                                 
318 “Exclusivism strikes more and more Christians as immoral.” (Wilfred Cantwell Smith in Gerald H. Anderson 
and Thomas F. Stransky, (eds.) Christ’s Lordship and Religious Pluralism (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981) 
202. 
319 No Other Gospel (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992) 66. 
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“What happens to people who have never heard the Gospel?” as “far and away . . . the most-
asked apologetic question on United States college campuses.”320   
Most books on this topic naturally deal with the fate of those who do not hear the gospel, 
but the matter by no means ends there.  The only reason why evangelicals are concerned with 
the fate of the ones who do not hear about Jesus is because for them, Jesus is the only Saviour.  
However, for many others, this issue is a non-issue.  For the universalist, for example, a 
person can hear about Jesus, reject him, and still obtain eternal life.  The fate of those who do 
not hear is a relatively easy matter to handle for the universalist, since it really does not matter 
whether a person hears or not, or even believes or not. 
The fate of all humanity is the real issue, not simply the fate of those who have not heard 
about Jesus or who have faith in some other “god” or mediator other than the biblical one.  
‘What will happen to humanity?’ is the ultimate question. 
As already noted, four main views vie for the right to answer this question.  Three of them 
– universalism, pluralism, and inclusivism – concentrate on the love of God and his desire that 
all people be saved, while only one, exclusivism, seems to take the “dark side” of God’s 
nature seriously, namely, that he is also Righteous Judge as well as Loving Father.  As was 
seen through the study of the teaching of Jesus, scholars from the first three groups should not 
be allowed to just speak about the love of Jesus without looking at his judgment, a topic that 
takes up a considerable amount of the entire teaching of Jesus. 
As some of the soteriological implications of inclusivism are considered, three distinct 
areas will be addressed: their view of hell, their disdain for the “fewness doctrine,” and how 
these can potentially affect Christian world missions. 
 
3.6.1 Taking the Hell out of Hell321 
It is not within the scope of this dissertation to go into a full-blown debate over the traditional 
view of hell and the various options chosen by some inclusivists which contradict this view.  
Rather, the reasons why inclusivists opt for one of the alternatives will be considered to see if 
their reasons are tenable. 
For example, Pinnock consistently refers to the “Father of Jesus” in his argumentation 
against the traditional view of hell as eternal, conscious torment.322  This “sadistic” view of 
                                                 
320 Sanders, Three Views, 7. 
321 This phrase is taken from Pinnock’s rebuttal of the metaphorical view of hell (Four Views on Hell, 87). 
322 He uses it at least half a dozen times in his chapter devoted to the topic in Four Views on Hell. 
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God cannot be maintained.  Rather, annihilationism323 accords more closely to the nature of 
the Father claims Pinnock.  But why?  Would it not be better to say that universalism accords 
more closely to “God is love” than does annihilationism?  Wiping out people from existence 
does not appear to be the most loving thing to do.  Forgiving all of them without regard for 
what they did, that appears much more loving. 
In fact, as the two main prongs of the inclusivist system are evaluated – the love of God 
and the freedom for humanity to choose – it is here that one presupposition gains prominence 
over the other, and it is not what might have first been expected.  “God is love” takes a 
backseat to human freedom in this argument at least.  Given the inclusivist understanding of 
God as love, it would appear that the more loving thing to do would be to grant salvation to as 
many people as possible.  This is in fact one of the objections used by inclusivists against 
exclusivism.  A “wider hope” accords much better with the biblical picture of the Father of 
Jesus, so say the inclusivists, than the “fewness doctrine” of traditional evangelicalism. 
Why, then, does this not apply to universalism when comparing it with inclusivism?  The 
reason is immediately obvious, because in universalism, human freedom is compromised.  
The controlling element of inclusivism, then, is human freedom, a most curious turn of 
events, since Pinnock especially has consistently thumped liberalism for its views on human 
autonomy.  Apparently all things must succumb to the non-negotiable of human freedom, 
even when the love of God is at stake. 
Another difficulty for annihilationism is that the very earliest Christians believed in the 
traditional view of hell.  Pinnock attempts to somehow attach this to the Hellenisation of 
Christianity, something he does frequently when a doctrine appears that he is unwilling to 
accept.  In fact, he has used this argument so often that it has lost any credibility.  Time and 
time again he lays the blame either on a pagan influence on early Christian thought (such as 
with classical theism) or squarely at the feet of one individual, almost always Augustine or 
someone with Calvinist leanings.  The thought that the view he is opposing was widely held 
because it may actually have some biblical merit appears to escape his thinking.324 
Yet, Pinnock and other inclusivists are faced with the historical fact that annihilationism 
just was not taught in the early centuries of Christianity.  This historical paucity of support is 
considerable and should cause evangelicals to pause before adopting the inclusivist 
                                                 
323 Interested readers are referred to Blanchard’s excellent treatment of annihilationism, Whatever Happened 
to Hell? (Durham, NC: Evangelical Press, 1993) 209-249.  Many inclusivists opt for this position. 
324 Virtually every historical example that Pinnock chooses who believed in the traditional view of hell was a 
Calvinist.  But surely there are countless Arminians who also held to the traditional view?  Why does Pinnock 
not cite some of them as well?  At times, Pinnock is so rabidly anti-Calvinist that it appears to cloud his 
judgment. 
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understanding of the fate of unbelievers. Outside the New Testament and the first century, 
besides Origen one is hard-pressed to find any Christian theologian in the first several 
centuries who denied the literal understanding of hell (and Origen did not adopt 
annihilationism, but rather a form of universalism).  Are the relatively new formulations for 
hell not more a product of a modern-day milieu and cultural love-affair with tolerance than 
the result of serious scrutiny of the teaching of Jesus? 325 
Annihilationism may be spun as a horrible punishment by inclusivists, but is it really?  
Does it not blunt the full force of the biblical picture of God’s judgment?  Does the traditional 
view not accord better with the biblical bleakness?  “To be rejected by God, to miss the 
purpose for which one was created, to pass into oblivion while others enter into bliss, to enter 
nonbeing – this will mean weeping and gnashing of teeth” (Pinnock, Four Views on Hell, 
165).  But can it truly be said that an unconscious being will experience such weeping and 
gnashing?  If annihilationism were correct, would the biblical language not better be written 
as “everlasting non-existence” than “everlasting torment?” 
Pinnock believes that the traditional view allows for a cosmic dualism and a “lurking 
sense of metaphysical disquiet” (154).  In other words, a hell of eternal, conscious torment 
will stand alongside heavenly bliss.  Will this not be a blot on the universe?  But this is not a 
proper understanding of the traditional view of hell.  Traditionally, hell is believed to be an 
eternal reminder of the justice and judgment of God.  In this way, such a place will actually 
bring him glory, not shame.326  It is not a place where at least Satan reigns as Pinnock states 
(154), but a place where Satan is also eternally punished. 
Non-existence actually appears to be a better option for rebellious sinners.  Once they 
cease to exist, who really cares if they do not enjoy the bliss of heaven and the purpose for 
which they were created?  Because they do not exist, they will not know any better.  
Annihilationism allows sinners to thumb their nose at God and in some sense, to get away 
with it.327 
Pinnock’s view of hell is “oriented to human freedom” (151) and this is the key point.  
The traditional view of hell must be discarded not because it does not fit properly with the 
biblical data, but because it does not accord with the Arminian preconceptions Pinnock has 
                                                 
325 Ajith Fernando develops the idea of hell as culturally unacceptable in the West, influenced by pluralism, the 
human potential movement, the "feel good" generation, and the growth of eastern religious thinking (Crucial 
Questions About Hell, Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1991) 22-23. 
326 Therefore, when Pinnock says that “eternal torment serves no purpose at all” (153), it is understandable that 
many evangelicals disagree. 
327 Walvoord sees a connection between holding to annihilationism and rejecting biblical inerrancy (Four Views 
on Hell, 167-168). 
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concerning human freedom.  The numerous warnings found in Scripture concerning hell and 
God’s judgment are effectively meaningless if hell is actually a place of one’s own choosing, 
somewhere a person would rather be than under the rule of God, as inclusivists contend.328 
In short, it does not stand to reason that annihilationism accords better with God as love, 
nor does it maintain human freedom in the strictest sense of that term.  Just as much as 
Pinnock can assume that in a universalist understanding there must be some people who did 
not want to be saved, the same applies to annihilationism.  Surely there will be some people 
who did not want to cease to exist, yet God violated their will anyway.329 
 
3.6.2 Missiological Considerations 
The possible implications for Christian missions cannot be ignored.  Pinnock believes that 
mission agencies will be among those most opposed to annihilationism, because then they 
will lose their “huge stick” in promoting their cause (Four Views on Hell, 164; also 39).  This 
revision in the traditional view of hell is therefore needed by evangelicals, along with a 
broadening of “the evangelical view of other religions” (164, n. 60).  He even posits that if 
Christians do not adopt annihilationism, in time the Christian concept of hell will vanish 
(137).  Ironically, Pinnock is suggesting that by adopting the view that hell really does not 
exist, Christians will save the existence of the doctrine of hell!  The bottom line is still the 
same.  The traditional view of hell must be discarded, “dumped in the name of credible 
doctrine,” says Pinnock (163).  Again, the issue of judgment must somehow be tinkered with 
by inclusivists. 
How does this affect evangelical missions?  If annihilationism is the only consideration, 
inclusivists may have a point that it does not detract from missions as much as exclusivists 
fear.  But can they honestly state that it encourages missions?  Probably not.  If given two 
options, everlasting, conscious punishment where your skin is burned non-stop for all eternity, 
and non-existence, which would you choose?  The choice seems fairly obvious.  No one 
                                                 
328 One difficulty with considering all references to hell as figurative is that Jesus also speaks of heaven, 
sometimes in the same sentence.  To have him speak of hell and heaven in the same sentence or passage, yet to 
be considering one to be figurative and the other literal, is not exegetically consistent or accurate.  This is 
expressed quite succinctly in the words of a nineteenth-century theologian: “We must either admit the endless 
misery of Hell, or give up the endless happiness of Heaven” (Moses Stuart, Exegetical Essays on Several Words 
Relating to Future Punishment (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Publication Committee, 1867) 62. 
329 And what of the biblical passages which hint at degrees of hell?  Pinnock actually finds the Catholic idea of 
Purgatory enticing on this score (Four Views on Hell, 127-131).  Hendrikus Berkhof sounds a similar tone when 
he speaks of hell as a form of purification.  “God is serious about the responsibility of our decision, but he is 
even more serious about the responsibility of his love.  The darkness of rejection and God-forsakenness cannot 
and may not be argued away, but no more can and may it be eternalized.  For God’s sake we hope that hell will 
be a form of purification,” Christian Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1979) 532.  
However, Berkhof’s plea sounds more like wishful thinking than anything else. 
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would think that non-existence is worse than eternal torment.  Annihilationism may indeed be 
right, but it can hardly be said to encourage missions more than the traditional view of hell. 
However, the main issue concerning missions more generally concerns inclusivism itself.  
If inclusivists truly believe that non-Christian religions draw people to God, that the content 
of general revelation is salvific (because all revelation from God is, according to inclusivists), 
and that God offers salvation to all people and judges them on the “light” they have received, 
regardless of whether or not they hear about Jesus, do they really need missions?  Loraine 
Boettner’s comment is instructive here: 
“The belief that the heathens without the Gospel are lost has been one of the 
strongest arguments in favor of foreign missions.  If we believe that their own 
religions contain enough light and truth to save them, the importance of 
preaching the Gospel to them is greatly lessened.  Our attitude toward foreign 
missions is determined pretty largely by the answer which we give to this 
question.”330 
Often, the inclusivist answer concerning the importance of missions is found in the notion 
that Christian missionaries are not so much telling the unreached about God as they are giving 
them a fuller understanding of him.  However, this idea of “full-strength salvation” reveals a 
deeper problem with inclusivism.  It is not that missionaries are bringing salvation, because 
the people they are bringing the gospel to are already saved.  Given earlier comments made by 
inclusivists about the pre-conversion status of Saul of Tarsus and Cornelius, this observation 
is entirely justified.  It leaves one wondering what exactly the difference is between 
evangelical inclusivism and the Catholic variety, or inclusivism and pluralism in general.  
Despite the many objections Pinnock and others have made that they do not subscribe to 
pluralism (or the inclusivism of Rahner, for example), their conclusions are nonetheless 
virtually identical. 
How are these adherents of other faiths justified if not by faith in Jesus?  Apparently via 
their good works.  As already seen the Parable of the Sheep and Goats is used by inclusivists 
to hint at the possibility that people can be saved by what they do.  This Pinnock calls the 
‘ethical criteria’ that God will use to determine who should be saved.  When even an atheist 
can be saved in this way, it appears that many inclusivists are less evangelical then they state. 
It is here that Ronald Nash finds a “drift toward Pelagianism” in inclusivism (1994:170).  
As noted in the hamartiological section, this is not an idle concern.  At least in the inclusivism 
                                                 
330 The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1948) 119. 
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of Pinnock, there are strong hints of Pelagian thought, such as the idea that death is intrinsic to 
human nature and not the result of the Fall, and that the doctrine of original or inherited sin 
may not be correct.  Is Pinnock so anti-Augustine that he finds himself leaning more and more 
toward Pelagius?  When the above concerns are coupled with the current observation that 
inclusivism basically espouses salvation by good works, fears of liberalism are even 
increased.  One’s Soteriology is always driven by one’s Hamartiology.  A doctrine of sin that 
is less than evangelical will yield a doctrine of salvation that is equally beneath 
evangelicalism’s.  Missions no longer involves bringing people into God’s kingdom, because 
they are already there before the gospel even reaches them.  There is only a hair’s breadth of a 
difference here between inclusivism and pluralism. 
In fact, the missionary endeavour may very well be discarded on pragmatic grounds.  If a 
person of another faith is already saved, then bringing the message of Jesus may even result in 
bad consequences.  What if this person then makes a conscious choice to reject Jesus?  Has 
this person now moved from being saved to being lost?  Recall, Pinnock opted to take an 
agnostic view on this important question, which appears to skirt the issue entirely.  Sharing 
the gospel with someone already in a state of salvation via a non-Christian faith could 
potentially have disastrous effects. 
Concerning the matter of dialogue, evangelicals can agree with Pinnock when he says that 
dialogue cannot sacrifice truth, yet the need for dialogue is a bit unclear in an inclusivist 
system.  With exclusivism, there is a clear need.  In the presence of potential judgment, 
dialogue is necessary.  With pluralism, inclusivists rightly note that dialogue is not really 
needed, since neither side lacks any truth. 
But with inclusivism, one gets the sense that they are being secretly arrogant.  They 
believe that Jesus is the only Saviour, yet claim to be open to dialogue.  About what exactly?  
Is inclusivism in a middle ground where neither the truth claims of exclusivism nor the 
relativism of pluralism are operative?  Put another way, if someone has nothing new to offer, 
where is the need for dialogue? 
The inclusivist counters that there is something new to offer, a relationship with Jesus as 
the only Son of God.  But as has already been established, there really is no need for this.  It is 
not as if we are dealing with a man dying of thirst in the desert.  In that case, the exclusivist 
takes him water and saves him from death.  In the pluralist scenario, there really are no people 
dying in the desert.  So what is it in the inclusivist system?  Is there a man dying in the desert 
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who only has a glass of water, and someone brings him a bucketful?331  Is this truly the New 
Testament ethos of missions, giving someone a little more of what they already possess? 
One need look no further than to the evangelistic zeal found in the New Testament and 
early Church.  The Apostle Paul, for instance, has numerous “universalistic” passages in his 
writings as already seen.  However, to understand what the man meant by his writings, one 
must look at what the man did with his life.  If Paul truly believed that “all roads lead to 
heaven” or that, so long as one sincerely followed his religious convictions, that person would 
be approved by God no matter what his belief system, would Paul have strived so desperately 
to spread the gospel throughout the Roman Empire?   
This question becomes all the more poignant when one considers the great persecution 
Paul endured to carry out this very task.  “What happens to people who have not heard the 
gospel?” may be easier to answer than at first thought, at least from the perspective of Paul.  If 
Paul’s answer were, “Well, they go to heaven because there are several ways to get there, and 
every religion has enough good in it to warrant the approval of God,” then Paul should be 
considered a madman for striving so dreadfully to take the message of Christ to people who 
would attain salvation anyway without hearing such a message.  It seems more preferable to 
consider Paul to be an exclusivist in the sense defined in this study.  According to Paul, there 
could be no other way than through the “one mediator between God and men, the man Christ 
Jesus” (I Tim. 2:5). 
But could it not be concluded that Paul believed Jesus to be the sole mediator, yet he still 
could hold a certain level of “common grace” to exist in the other religions, much as Pinnock 
believes?  Or could an appeal be made to Paul’s views concerning “general revelation” as a 
sufficient ground for people to come to God, regardless of whether or not they heard about the 
message of Christ’s atonement?  Both questions can be answered in the same way.   
Arguably the religion closest in kinship to the teaching of Jesus would be Judaism.  Paul 
maintained a positive view of his people and their heritage despite his conversion, and he held 
out great hope for their eventual acknowledgment of Jesus as the long-awaited Messiah.332  
Still, Paul believed his brothers to be lost, separated from the grace of God by reason of their 
                                                 
331 Sanders uses the analogy of people who live on dirty drinking water.  They may suffer from diarrhea and 
dehydration, but they can still live in such circumstances.  Whereas bringing the gospel to such people is like 
bringing clean, drinkable water (Destiny of the Unevangelized, 54).  Of course, this is an entirely unacceptable 
and even offensive analogy to make from a pluralist perspective, but it certainly does not communicate well an 
inclusivist understanding of the “richness” found in non-Christian religions that inclusivism attempts to portray. 
332 “Theirs is the adoption as sons; theirs the divine glory, the covenants, the receiving of the law, the temple 
worship and the promises.  Theirs are the patriarchs, and from them is traced the human ancestry of Christ…” 
(Rom. 9:4b-5a).  Note that Paul is speaking in the present tense; these blessings had not been lost or nullified 
despite the rejection of the Messiah by the Jews.  Such things could not be said about any other religion. 
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rejection of God’s chosen Messiah.  If Judaism were judged by Paul to have fallen short, how 
can inclusivists possibly conclude that Paul believed the other religions to have greater 
influence? 
As for the matter of general revelation, much has been made of Paul’s early chapters of 
Romans and his appeal to creation and conscience.  However, does Paul really make an 
appeal for the salvific effect of creation and conscience, or rather their condemning aspect 
when it comes to individuals and their salvation?  As already argued in detail, he speaks of 
their ability to condemn sinners, never to save them.333 It is far more consistent to conclude 
that Paul believed there to be no other hope of salvation for people outside of their knowledge 
and trust in the atoning work of Jesus Christ (and his discussion in Romans 10:13-15 strongly 
suggests that people will be lost if they do not hear the gospel). 
Much the same can be said for the other apostles, most of whom went to their death for 
the message of hope in Jesus.  The first several centuries of the history of the Church (before 
Constantine) is further proof of a strong exclusivism in their beliefs.  In the face of 
persecutions such as those under emperors Domitian, Decius, and the “Great Persecution” of 
Diocletian, as well as smaller, localised persecutions such as under Nero or Marcus Aurelius, 
the early Christians refused to buckle.  Is this the behaviour of people who believed there are 
many ways to God, or who believed that other religions offer acceptable worship to the 
Creator? 
Is it not more plausible that modern theologians and scholars, faced with an increasingly 
pluralistic society and worldview, are apt to read Scripture through their pluralist-coloured 
glasses and ignore facts that contradict their worldview, than to conclude that the New 
Testament authors and the early church did not understand fully what modern theologians are 
so quick to say they understand, namely, the effect of the atoning work of Christ? 
Many inclusivists claim that there is much that Christians can learn from other religions.  
But what exactly?  Do Christians lack a certain ethical awareness that followers of other faiths 
have?  Evangelicals would have to be shown this.  The biblical ethic founded in the lordship 
of Christ lacks nothing when it comes to concern for godly things, philanthropic love for  
fellow humans, and caring for the creation God has given humanity to maintain.  If it is said 
that other religions can teach Christians something of value, what precisely is it then that the 
Scriptures lack? 
                                                 
333 Netland notes in Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism and the Question of Truth that despite the fact that 
people will be held accountable for the light they have received, no one lives or completely follows the light they 
have received.  Hence, no one can be saved by this light (Leicester: Apollos, 1991) 266. 
230  
McDermott provides four reasons why Christians should interact with other faiths in the 
hope of learning (2000:216-219).  The first is to become more sensitive evangelists, 
recognising that non-Christian faiths are not demonic or entirely false.  Then evangelicals can 
share the gospel with more respect and sensitivity.  This is a noble goal, but if other faiths 
already have truth-bearing revelation from God, what business do Christians have of sharing 
the gospel with them?  For all the talk inclusivists use about the imperialistic attitude of 
exclusivists, there appears little difference in their understanding.  “We inclusivists have the 
full truth, and you need to hear it.”  Whether the missionary admits to little or no truth in the 
other religious tradition is of little practical consequence. 
McDermott’s second reason is that evangelicals can become better disciples.  He speaks 
of his reading Taoist and Buddhist works and how that has opened up for him a better 
understanding of mystery.  This implies that the Christian Scriptures are inadequate in this 
area.  If an evangelical can actually learn from the holy writings of other religions, that 
implies that these things cannot equally be learned from the Christian Scriptures.  This is a 
most curious position for an evangelical to take, especially in light of 2 Tim. 3:15-17. 
The third reason is to enhance “ecumenical social action” (218).  This appears to be well-
placed, so long as the goals are the same.  If the views on social action themselves are polar 
opposites (eg., the western view of women and their rights versus those found in many Arab 
lands), such “ecumenical” action will not materialise.  In essence, then, there really is nothing 
to learn here from other faiths, only that Christians and non-Christians should work together 
on shared social concerns. 
The last reason is doxological.  “The God of most evangelicals has been too small” (219).  
McDermott states that once Christians recognise that God has revealed truths to other 
adherents of other religions, they will come to praise him better.  But this is circular 
reasoning.  It is not self-evident that non-Christian faiths either come from God or are God-
honouring.  The earlier discussion on the biblical material concerning other faiths bears this 
out, and the faulty way in which inclusivists utilise the biblical category of “pagan saints” 
leads them to wrong conclusions.  In short, God the Father cannot be honoured by religious 
traditions which do not honour Jesus his Son.334 
                                                 
334 In his comparison of the Christian understanding of God with that of Islam, Timothy George makes this 
insightful observation about the matter of the resurrection of Jesus:  “There can be no Christianity without this 
event.  There can be no Islam with it,” in Is the Father of Jesus the God of Muhammad? (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 2002) 97.  This just serves to illustrate that the contradictions which exist between Christianity and 
the non-Christian faiths are so extreme, that it would be disingenuous to suggest that all religions basically teach 
the same thing (pluralism) or that Christian missions is really going to people who already know the truth of God 
and are saved regardless of whether or not they hear the gospel (inclusivism).  Harold Netland spends 
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3.6.3 God’s Grace and the Fewness Doctrine 
The last area of consideration is what Pinnock has called the “fewness doctrine.”  As already 
seen, Pinnock as well as other inclusivists often appeal to sheer numbers in their 
argumentation that inclusivism more properly displays God’s love than exclusivism.  But a 
sword this sharp can cut both ways.  Consider this statement: 
“What kind of God would send large numbers of men, women, and children to 
hell without the remotest chance of responding to his truth?  This does not sound 
like the God whom Jesus called Father” (Pinnock, Wideness, 154, emphasis 
added). 
It seems that Pinnock’s objection stems largely from the fact that he sees exclusivism as 
teaching “large numbers” of the lost.  What, though, would he say if only a small percentage 
of humanity were lost?  Would this sound more like the God whom Jesus called Father?   
Relative numbers are meaningless.  If God were to determine to save only one person 
from all of humanity, that would make him as gracious as if he had chosen to save one 
million.  Because God is not obligated to save anyone, even the salvation of one individual 
would display his grace. 
During the time of Noah, was God gracious?  He only chose to preserve eight people from 
all of humanity.  Was this not gracious?  The universalist claims that God cannot be 
considered gracious unless he saves everybody, and the pluralist comes very close to the same 
thing.  Even the inclusivist defines God’s graciousness as being reflected in a vast majority of 
individuals being saved.  But this only serves to place an external influence on the 
determination of God’s nature.  In other words, God’s character cannot be defined by the 
relative numbers of people who live or perish.  God’s character is determined in and of itself.  
No external constraints or measures can exist which somehow define or determine his nature. 
All of this is to say that God is gracious.  Why?  Because he is gracious.  Because he has 
exercised his grace upon humanity.  Must he exercise it upon all of humanity in order to be 
gracious?  No, God is free to do what he chooses to do, and his character is determined by 
who he is.  Certainly, he will always act according to his character and nature, but external 
                                                                                                                                                        
considerable space dealing with the very issue of “conflicting truth claims” among religious traditions in 
Dissonant Voices and he concludes, “The common assumption that all religions are ultimately teaching the same 
things in their own culturally conditioned ways is prima facie untenable,” 111.  However, consider pluralist 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s contention that no such contradictions exist, in John Hick (ed.), Truth and Dialogue: 
The Relationship between the World’s Religions (London: Sheldon, 1974) 156-162.  He was so adamant about 
his point-of-view that he insisted the editor allow him an addendum to the book voicing his opinion that 
“conflicting truth claims” is a misnomer. 
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factor such as the relative number of humans saved cannot be taken as a measure or plumb 
line for God’s character. 
But does this beg the question, someone may ask.  Would God be proven to be more 
gracious or more merciful if he chose to save the majority of humanity, as opposed to 
allowing the vast majority to perish?  Exclusivists would respond that gracious is gracious.  It 
would be an error to attempt to quantify grace. 
Suppose five men break into my home and attempt to steal my possessions.  I catch the 
men and am able to detain them until the police arrive.  However, I decide to allow two of 
them to go free, while I detain the other three.  Further, I tell one of the remaining three men 
that he may work in my garden for the next several weeks and I will accept that as payment 
for his attempted thievery, and then I will not report him to the police.  The other two men, 
though, are turned over to the police as soon as they arrive. 
Have I been gracious to any of the robbers?  To the one who I have allowed to work in my 
garden, one could say that I have been gracious.  However, all that man is doing is working to 
pay the penalty.  In other words, the man ultimately goes free because of his own merit.  
There is really no grace exercised here.  Someone may object to this, though, and say, “But by 
reason of the fact that you allowed the man to pay back his debt, you have shown the man 
grace.”  I disagree.  I set the man free because of the merit he has achieved in working in my 
garden.  Merit and grace are antithetical.  Either he earns his freedom or he does not.  If he 
earns it by working in my garden, he is set free on the basis of his own merit.  The penalty has 
been paid.  No grace is exercised on my part. 
The two men that I turned over to the police were shown no grace.  They attempted to 
steal from me, and I turned them over to the authorities to be punished.  However, the two 
men I automatically let go have been shown unmerited favour, in other words, grace.  They 
did not deserve to be set free.  They were caught committing a crime and deserved to be 
turned over to the authorities, but I let them go.  Their freedom from punishment has 
absolutely nothing to do with them. 
Because grace by definition means unmerited favour, or the giving of something 
undeserved, if I choose to show grace to one of the thieves I can be called gracious.  It is the 
fact that none of the thieves deserves grace that makes my act of freeing two of the men 
gracious.  Had I turned all five over to the police, I certainly could not have been called 
gracious.  But whether I allow one, two, three, four, or all five of them free from arrest, I can 
be deemed gracious.  There is no “more gracious” or “less gracious.”  I am either gracious or I 
am not. 
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The same applies to God.  He is by his very nature a gracious God, but it would be an 
error to attempt to quantify that attribute.  Still, someone might object and say, “But really, if 
you allowed four of the five thieves to be set free from arrest, instead of just two, you would 
be shown to be more gracious would you not?”  But if such reasoning is used when it comes 
to the character of God, a trap is created.  Someone can always claim a higher and higher 
number of the saved, thus claiming that God is “more gracious” than he would have been had 
he not saved as many people as an increasing scale dictates.  In other words, the further the 
number of the saved is ratcheted up, the greater is God’s grace. 
The trap of such faulty reasoning is that ultimately one must conclude with Universalism, 
otherwise it is determined that God is not as gracious as he could have been.  Restated, if God 
saved every single individual except one person, it could be concluded that he was not as 
gracious as he could have been had he saved everybody.  Thus the problem with attempting to 
define God’s nature and character through mathematics.  It must inevitably end up with 
Universalism, else God is not as gracious as he could have been.335 
“But is not the God of the inclusivist more gracious than the God of the exclusivist?”  
Again, attempting to quantify God’s character by counting the number of the saved is faulty 
theology.  If this were indeed possible to do, a gradation concerning the grace of God could be 
developed as such: 
Universalism > Pluralism > Inclusivism > Exclusivism 
The God of the universalist is more gracious than the God of the pluralist, and so on down 
the line.  It is far more reasonable, though, to simply say that because God saves some people, 
he is gracious.  Obviously, had he saved no one, grace could not be considered to be one of 
this attributes, anymore than had he chosen to save everybody, wrath or righteousness could 
not be considered to be one of his attributes. 
                                                 
335 In other words, has sin not ultimately won the battle if God only saves a minority of humanity from its 
effects?  However, such an argument based on mathematical conjecturing 1) ignores the statement of Jesus that 
many walk the road that leads to destruction and few travel the road that leads to life, and 2) is not consistent.  
For the latter, one could argue that even if only one person dies in his sins and spends an eternity separated from 
God’s mercy sin has still won the battle, that God’s grace is limited in this sense.  And a 51%/49% scenario still 
only proves that God’s grace won by a small margin, which is ultimately what the universalist argues anyway.  If 
all people are not saved, so says the universalist, then God’s grace in the cross of Christ is seemingly 
insufficient.  In short, theological statements cannot be made based on mathematics any more than mathematical 
statements can be made based on theology.  At what point is it concluded that God is not “loving” or “infinitely 
merciful?”  Does God need to save 51% of humanity in order to be considered loving?  Just so long as there are 
more people saved than lost, does that make God merciful?  Or does God need to make the salvation at least 
available to every individual in order to be considered loving?  Must God actually save absolutely every 
individual in order to be considered loving?  What if God saves all but one person, who then spends an eternity 
in torment.  Could it then be concluded that God is not infinitely benevolent? 
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Why has so much time been taken to discuss this matter?  For the exclusivist, the fact that 
God shows grace to sinners is good enough to say that God is a gracious God.  For the other 
categories, though, such a conclusion is unsatisfactory and is usually tied to numbers, an 
apparently faulty way of making theological conclusions about the nature of God. 
 
3.6.4 Conclusion to Soteriological Evaluation 
In the Parable of the Unmerciful Servant, the character of the king in the parable exudes 
mercy – up to a point.  Upon hearing about the actions of the unmerciful servant, he seizes 
him and has him thrown into prison to be tortured and until he can pay back everything he 
owed.  Of course, once in prison, the man will not be able to pay back anything, and that is 
the point.  He was forgiven a debt he could never have paid back and now, due to his own 
unforgiving heart, he will experience first hand just how much he had been forgiven. 
When sharing the gospel, which is the message of forgiveness, these two factors should 
not be ignored.  Far too often, the gospel is portrayed as only a message of God’s forgiveness, 
which in turn is meant to motivate sinners to accept this gift of forgiveness (what inclusivists 
often mean when they speak of God “wooing” sinners).  But the message of God’s judgment 
is also a motivating influence.  Jesus has given two reasons why Christians should be people 
of forgiveness, because God has shown forgiveness, and because God will not tolerate 
unforgiving people in his kingdom.  There is both a positive and a negative motivation 
presented in this parable.  Similarly, in sharing the ultimate message of forgiveness, 
evangelicals should present both of these motivations 
Inclusivists like Pinnock believe that speaking of God’s judgment is just a “big stick” 
used to get people into churches.  But was that the motivation of Jesus, because he certainly 
spoke often about the judgment of his Father?  Rather, are exclusivists accustomed to 
speaking about judgment because, as Jesus commanded, they are supposed to teach 
everything that he taught? 
Inclusivists apparently want to mute the judgment of God.  Jesus says that few will be 
saved, but inclusivists insist that many will be.  Time and time again Scripture speaks of 
God’s electing, choosing, and predestining, but inclusivists consistently denigrate the 
Calvinist notion that God does precisely these things.  The biblical depiction of non-Judeo-
Christian faiths is virtually always negative, but inclusivists have practically nothing bad to 
say about them.  Exclusivists are mocked for their understanding that relatively few people 
will be saved, and yet, is this not precisely what happened at the time of Noah and the Great 
Flood, a flood that was used by Jesus as a type of the eschatological judgment to come?  
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Inclusivists claim that honest, sincere adherents of non-Christian faiths will be saved by their 
good deeds, but is this truly what Scripture says? 
Inclusivists say that a “wider hope” is necessary in evangelical theology, as opposed to the 
“fewness” doctrine that has pervaded it, but are they not holding out a false hope?  As this 
study moves toward its conclusion, this will be the main question that needs to be answer. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Muted Judgment:  
The Conclusion to this Study 
 
“The first doctrine to be denied is judgment.”336 
 
The end of this study of inclusivism and its impact on contemporary American evangelicalism 
has come.  Although observations, evaluations, and criticisms have already been made in the 
concluding portions of each previous section, a summarisation of those findings and some 
broader conclusions will be made.  It is not intended to recount every difficulty or problem; 
the previous sections can be consulted for that. 
First, some of the positive contributions inclusivists have made to American evangelical 
theology will be provided. 
 
4.1 Positive Contributions to American Evangelicalism 
On the positive side, inclusivists like Pinnock have exposed evangelicals to areas of theology 
they have generally ignored.  Pinnock’s desire for evangelicals to appreciate Eastern 
Orthodoxy and what it can contribute to an overall understanding of God’s salvific plan in the 
world should be applauded.  Western Christianity’s concentration on the unity of the Trinity 
must be counterbalanced by Orthodoxy’s emphasis on the diversity of the Persons.  Western 
Christianity’s fixation on sin as humanity’s sole plight must be compensated for by 
Orthodoxy’s stress on death and the mortality of humankind.  Pinnock is correct when he says 
that evangelicals have concentrated so much on the atonement (which deals with the problem 
of sin) that they have lost sight of the importance of the resurrection (which addresses 
mortality). 
When Pinnock turns to the Cappadocian Fathers for their greater consideration of the role 
of the Holy Spirit, he should be applauded.  Salvation is not simply embodied in mental assent 
to propositional truths, but it is also a participation in the life of Jesus through the Spirit.  
When Pinnock states that Luther’s emphasis on justification by faith has since the 
Reformation caused Protestants to concentrate on the legal aspects of salvation as opposed to 
the relational ones as embodied in Orthodoxy’s notion of theosis, evangelicals should give 
thoughtful consideration to his point-of-view. There is much to learn from Pinnock (and 
inclusivists in general) in these areas. 
                                                 
336 Derek Kidner, Genesis (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1967) 68. 
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Further, evangelicals cannot help but cheer whenever Pinnock rightly calls to task 
pluralism and its embrace of liberalism.  When he turns a critical eye toward the deficient 
views liberalism maintains concerning Christ’s person, the incarnation and Trinity, and the 
authority of Scripture, evangelicals should express their approval.  There are simply too many 
flaws in the pluralism of Hick and others for evangelicals to adopt it. 
In any theological movement, there is always a need for balance.  American 
evangelicalism represents a huge Protestant block of believers encompassing a wide variety of 
churches and denominations.  It has been a movement characterised by vibrant missions, 
social (and political) activism, and churches which have by and large been growing while 
mainline Protestant denominations have been shrinking.  There is much to say that is positive 
about the movement. 
But in such movements, there is always the potential for stagnation.  Inclusivists believe 
themselves to not only recognise this stagnation, but to also offer powerful correctives for 
it.337  They rightly note, for example, that a Calvinist variety of evangelicalism has the 
potential for fatalistic views with respect to missions and evangelism.  Although this is 
certainly not automatic (the father of the modern missions movement, William Carey, was a 
Calvinist), there can be a tendency where people outside the faith are all but forgotten.  An 
apathy can result when God’s predestining will is pushed to the fore at the expense of any 
human responsibility. 
Add to this the potential for a “holy huddle” mentality.  American evangelicals have large 
churches, large publishing houses, large colleges, seminaries and universities, and large 
corporations.  It is possible for an evangelical believer to spend his or her entire life from birth 
until death with little interaction outside evangelical structures, whether that be in the 
religious, vocational, or educational arenas.  If this is coupled with a general American 
attitude that overlooks the rest of the world, the potential difficulties are only accentuated. 
Inclusivists see all of this and they rightly warn the greater evangelical community of 
impending disaster.  In fact, they believe that some of the disaster has already hit Christianity 
in the fewness doctrine and the widespread belief in a conscious, eternal hell.  Although the 
finer points can be debated, the broader observation is not without substance.  Evangelical 
inclusivism can serve as a wake-up call for the wider evangelical community which may have 
                                                 
337 Inclusivists see their brand of theology in the ascendancy and they take comfort in this.  Yet, as Erickson 
sarcastically notes, “the most rapidly growing human body cells are malignant cells” (1997:14).  In other words, 
just because a movement is apparently growing, this does not mean it is healthy. 
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the tendency to become harsh, insensitive, and apathetic.  Any system which calls for a 
greater love of God and fellow humanity should be applauded. 
There is much that is appealing in the inclusivism of Clark Pinnock, John Sanders, and 
the like.  It must be recognised at bare minimum that their desire to envision the gracious love 
of God in as wide a range as possible is a noble goal.  They have a very strong yearning to see 
the glory of God through Jesus Christ revealed in the fullest way possible, without 
succumbing to pluralist liberalism.  The objective truth of Jesus Christ rings loud and clear, 
and their hopefulness in the missions endeavour is contagious.  However, a hard question 
must be asked:  At what expense are they willing to pursue this wider hope, and do they really 
avoid the pluralism they attempt to shun? 
Inclusivism is the ethos which drives Open Theism.  In the desire to see God’s plan of 
salvation envisioned in a wider arena than the typical exclusivism which has dominated 
American evangelicalism has done, inclusivists have been driven to radical aberrations from 
traditional tenets of the faith in all areas of their theology.  It is to these that attention is now 
given. 
 
4.2 Are Evangelical Inclusivists Really Evangelical? 
It appears at times that inclusivism suffers from too much of a good thing.  For example, 
Pinnock has made it clear his desire for theological change and greater theological movement 
within the evangelical fold.  But at what point does one move so far as to be unable to 
honestly declare oneself an evangelical?  Certainly evangelicals should be looking for ways to 
present Christian theology in ways understandable and culturally relevant to the current 
generation, but at what point has cultural relevance superseded biblical truth? 
Inclusivists and particularly Pinnock have an obvious axe to grind with Augustinian 
and Calvinist theology.  They are certainly free to do so within evangelical bounds.  And yet, 
it appears too convenient that Pinnock consistently lays all of the problems with evangelical 
theology at the feet of the bishop of Hippo and the reformer at Geneva.  A rabid dislike of 
Calvinism, while embracing a radical Arminianism, has almost made some inclusivists blind 
to the fact that many doctrines they currently oppose are not strictly Calvinist doctrines at all.  
In fact, there are many doctrines which the inclusivists attack which were firmly held by 
Arminians.  Certainly, Augustine looms large when it comes to the doctrine of predestination, 
but must blame be laid at his feet for the view of hell as eternal, conscious torment, or for the 
fewness doctrine, or for the inerrancy of Scripture, just to name a few?  Such a methodology 
of blame appears too sloppy and historically inaccurate. 
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Their caricature of Calvin’s theology and that of Calvinism in general is not often fair.  
Gerrish argues quite forcefully that such a caricature of Calvinism, one devoid of any sense of 
God’s love but rather overcome with the vengeance and judgment of God, is not a fair 
representation of Calvin’s thought.338  There appears to be a desire among inclusivists, and 
particularly Pinnock, to demonise Calvinism at all costs.  Perhaps he is just theologically 
practising what personally happened to him.  Once the gap vacated by his abandonment of 
Calvinism was created, he had to fill it with something.  Perhaps Pinnock believes that he can 
create that vacancy in others as well by demonising Calvinism.  Whatever the case, it serves 
his purpose to caricature the theology of Calvin (and Augustine) as dismal, cruel, unloving, 
abysmal views of God, but all this really is is a caricature and nothing more. 
Inclusivists believe that typical evangelical systems which espouse the fewness doctrine, 
claim that salvation is only found in explicit knowledge of Jesus, and posit a literal hell are 
the kinds of systems which breed pluralists and atheists.  However, once you have lessened 
the glory of God to a level where, as Barth once said, he is tantamount to “speaking of man 
with a loud voice,” could this not equally create pluralists and atheists?  A God stripped of 
claws and teeth looks decidedly post-modern, not biblical.339  Regardless, it does not stand to 
reason that atheists are created by Christian theology, whether it be good or bad, biblical or 
non-biblical. 
Is it true that traditional evangelicalism has made pluralists and atheists, as Pinnock is 
wont to claim?  It would be hard to test his theory in this regard.  However, one could equally 
say that the evangelical understanding of salvation by faith and not by works could produce 
licentiousness in Christians, or that the Christian belief that certain behaviour is sinful could 
produce legalism.  It appears to be misguided to choose one’s theological persuasion based on 
whether or not it has a greater likelihood of producing atheists, even if such a thing were 
possible.  Besides, even solid theology can be abused by those determined to do so. 
Pinnock believes that Arminianism is superior to Calvinism for this very reason, and that 
the radical Arminianism of Open Theism is even superior to traditional Arminianism.  
However, Pinnock appears to be stacking the deck against Calvinism based on little more than 
his own experience and preconceptions.  Because Pinnock finds Calvinism so distasteful, he 
                                                 
338 Gerrish, B. A. Grace and Gratitude: The Eucharistic Theology of John Calvin (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock 
Publishers, 2002). 
339 Dirkie Smit, Systematic Theology professor at the University of Stellenbosch, in his unpublished article 
“Justification and Divine Justice?”, notes that certain theological points-of-view which sometimes involve “the 
complete rejection of all language of wrath and judgment” are “clearly appeasing contemporary cultural 
sensibilities.” 
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assumes that others will to.  But there are plenty of atheists, one would assume, who find any 
belief in God equally distasteful. 
At times inclusivists appear more generous to atheists than they do to exclusivists.  While 
exclusivists are frequently compared to Pharisees, with all of the attending condemnations 
from Jesus, atheists can actually be saved according to inclusivism, even when they go to the 
grave denying the very existence of God.  There is a venomous dislike for traditional, 
Calvinistic evangelicalism which oozes from inclusivist scholars, to the point that it 
apparently skews even their own thinking. 
Pinnock claims that old theological systems no longer speak to the new generation, but 
should he be allowed to just assume this?  Certainly, it depends to whom one is speaking.  
There are plenty of evangelicals who find the old ways perfectly adequate.  The Patristic 
Fathers spoke of the Word of God as without error, and that doctrine has held up quite nicely 
for many centuries.  Just because something is old does not make it irrelevant.  Arminianism 
is not all that younger than Calvinism for that matter.  Still, inclusivists at least are consistent 
in this area.  They are not subscribing to an Arminianism that is four hundred years old.  
Rather, they are tweaking that Arminianism to fit the times as well, even to the point where 
many Arminians are not all that happy with the revised edition.   
Change within limits can be good, but unlimited change can be misleading and potentially 
damaging, especially when the meaning of terms is changed while retaining the same terms in 
popular usage.  Inclusivism (and especially Open Theism) appears to move so far away from 
traditional evangelical doctrine that to use the word “evangelical” to label the movement 
appears disingenuous, if not sinister. 
Although labels can always be misconstrued, there is a certain safety in using them.  If 
someone were to invite a guest speaker to preach at church, there should be a certain security 
when that guest uses the word “evangelical” to describe himself or herself.  They should not 
have to ask fifty questions just to be sure, only to find out at question number 49 that this 
person really is not an evangelical as the term has come to be widely understood. 
However, even that is not an entirely accurate representation of what is wrong with 
inclusivism calling itself evangelical.  The real problem is that of the fifty questions to be 
addressed, less and less are answered in evangelical ways.  Certainly there is overlapping in 
some major areas, but in many more areas the divergence is increasing at an alarming rate. 
Perhaps a better term than inclusivism is to call the movement “evangelical pluralism.”  
However, even that distinction is not accurate, because the theology they appear to be 
espousing is much closer to pluralism than to traditional evangelicalism.  When some 
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exclusivists claim that inclusivists have no business calling themselves evangelicals, they may 
have a point. 
Inclusivists have taken a via media between pluralism and exclusivism.  In their opinion, 
this means that they can share in the benefits of both, but to their detractors, the inclusivists 
suffer from attacks coming from either side.  To the pluralist, inclusivists still appear too 
narrow-minded and focused on salvation coming via only one avenue.  To the exclusivist, 
inclusivists appear too open-minded and positive toward religious traditions which do not take 
Jesus into account, or who have a faulty view of him. 
The inclusivist desire, then, to strike a balance between particularity and universality has 
caused some to object that inclusivism really has no benefit.  Sitting on the fence as it were 
makes them appear to have not committed either way. 
In defence of inclusivists, one could say they are clearly not pluralists.  Yet, can they 
properly be considered evangelicals?  As key doctrinal differences between inclusivism and 
traditional evangelicalism are considered, that question must eventually be answered in the 
negative. 
 
4.3 Systematic Failures 
Traditional American evangelicalism has been strongly biblical.  Since the 
modernist/fundamentalist debates that plagued Protestantism in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, evangelicalism has been bred out of a biblical doctrine that strongly 
favours inerrancy.  In fact, it would not be inaccurate to place biblical inerrancy as one of the 
top three if not the single most important factor in determining one’s evangelical stance. 
Put another way, if someone were to discard inerrancy, the entire evangelical house of 
cards would come crashing down.  For right or wrong, traditional evangelicalism has held that 
once biblical inerrancy is eradicated, so eventually will all other cardinal doctrines of the 
faith.  And when Pinnock and Sanders suggest theistic systems which question the biblical 
portrayal of God, perhaps such fears are all-too-real.  Once it is admitted that the Bible has 
errors, even if this is only intended to allow “minor” ones, will such a view not inevitably 
move to major issues? 
Inclusivists seem more concerned that they maintain certain philosophical axioms (eg., 
love must not be coerced, the freewill of humans must not be violated, salvation must be 
universally accessible) than remain biblical.  For example, Pinnock makes this telling 
statement:  “The Bible has no developed doctrine of universal prevenient grace, however 
convenient it would be for us if it did” (Grace/Will, 22), yet universal prevenient grace plays a 
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huge role in his Pneumatology.  To be clear, if one were to remove Pinnock’s reliance on 
prevenient grace, his entire inclusivism would begin to crumble.  This makes one wonder how 
biblically appealing his inclusivism should be to evangelicals. 
For all of their talk against liberalism’s esteem of human autonomy, it appears that 
inclusivists behave similarly.  The judgment of God is difficult to maintain in any biblical 
sense when human autonomy is placed at such a premium as is done in inclusivism.  This love 
for human freedom has resulted in inclusivism’s utter contempt for an evangelicalism which 
smells of Augustine or Calvin, in a refashioned hell where its inhabits want to be there, or 
where hell does not even exist, and where God’s nature is so dissimilar to that of traditional 
theism that he is hardly recognisable.  It is unfair for God to judge individuals who honestly 
follow a non-Christian religion, and much of Scripture and specifically the teaching of Jesus 
is swept away because a hermeneutic of hope is preferred to the exclusion of a hermeneutic of 
judgment. 
Ironically, inclusivists have unwittingly abandoned human autonomy by forcing upon 
humanity a salvation already decided against by Adam in the Garden.  Pinnock’s participatory 
model of the atonement has God become a human to undo what humanity precisely chose.  
This can hardly be said to preserve human freedom.  In this way, even prevenient grace can be 
said to violate human autonomy. 
It must be maintained that any act of salvation on the part of God must violate human 
freedom, if the biblical teaching on humanity’s sin is taken seriously.  The only way to save a 
rebel is to violate that rebel’s will.  No amount of wooing will do it if the person is truly dead 
in sin.  In an inclusivist model, God appears more interested in preserving human freedom 
than in actually saving humans.  But as already seen, God indeed does violate human 
autonomy, both in his acts of judgment and salvation. 
In their concentration on God’s desire to preserve human freedom, and his self-limiting to 
make this possible, inclusivists appear to have forgotten that a world filled with free humans – 
no matter how much self-limiting God may do – still does not create a free world.  Humans 
are violating the freewill of other humans all the time.  Even the popular annihilationist view 
of hell does not entirely preserve human freedom, for it can be assumed that there will be 
some humans who do not want to be annihilated.  In virtually every way, inclusivism fails to 
produce what it so vigorously endeavours to produce, a Christian soteriological system which 
preserves human autonomy. 
A secular understanding which equates love with tolerance has also apparently infiltrated 
inclusivism, with drastic consequences.  Apparently God will not judge the sincere idolater, or 
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the honest pagan, or even the hardworking atheist, so long as they unwittingly perform some 
of the good works Jesus commanded of his disciples.  This refashioned God appears less and 
less to be the “God of Jesus,” a phrase which inclusivists so much like to utilise, but which in 
the end appears pointless, since individuals do not even need to know about the God of Jesus.   
Inclusivists work hard to reconfigure the biblical portrait of God, especially via their 
selective usage of the teaching of Jesus.  But then they turn around and state that knowledge 
of this God is not even necessary for salvation.  Real knowledge has been replaced by no 
knowledge at all.  They have unwittingly cut themselves off at the knees.  If no knowledge of 
the biblical God is necessary (or knowledge of his Son for that matter), it appears pointless to 
spend so much time attempting to change the traditional theism of evangelicalism.  The fear 
of traditional evangelicals has now been realised: inclusivists have effectively discarded the 
Bible. 
What happens to someone who has never heard the gospel?  Inclusivists make it clear that 
universalism is not an option because it violates human freedom, and they have also equally 
taken to task the traditional evangelicalism which has tended to answer that question in the 
negative, namely, that those who die apart from knowledge of Jesus Christ are eternally lost.  
But they have also expressed dislike for pluralism’s option and the inclusivism of Catholics 
like Rahner, yet inclusivists are only a hairbreadth’s away from both.  The non-Christian who 
has died can still be saved via works that are deemed pleasing to God.  After all, this is the 
most loving thing for a Creator to do. 
Perhaps the most unappealing aspect of inclusivism’s Soteriology for someone coming 
from a traditional evangelical point-of-view is its apparent works righteousness.  Paul says 
throughout most of his epistles (most powerfully in Galatians, Romans, and Second 
Corinthians) that the letter of the Law kills, but the Spirit brings life.  The old covenant was 
unable to save 
Special pleading for a “faith principle” falls short.  Faith in what?  A polytheistic 
Buddhist who has faith in nothingness can hardly be equated with pagan saints like Job and 
Melchizedek who worshiped the one true God, Maker of heaven and earth, let alone an atheist 
who does not even believe such a Maker exists.  “Faith” in an inclusivist scheme basically 
boils down to belief in whatever the individual chooses to believe in, a relativism all too 
common in pluralistic systems. 
Even with a monotheistic Muslim inclusivists are on an uphill battle.  Can they honestly 
maintain that someone who denies the incarnation, atonement, and resurrection of Jesus, let 
alone the Trinity, is going to be saved because that individual brings a cup of water to 
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someone in prison?  It certainly appears that the faith principle of inclusivism boils down to a 
Soteriology of works, even for a monotheist who believes in a Creator God. 
In essence, God became a human in Jesus Christ to make the way possible for humans, 
via their good works, to be saved.  An incarnation does not even appear necessary in an 
inclusivist system, especially if all that is really needed for salvation is performing good 
deeds.  What was a broad line between traditional evangelicalism and the other world 
religions has been thinned to the point of invisibility in inclusivism’s formulation.  Traditional 
evangelicals are right to cry foul when inclusivists endeavour to use the term “evangelical” to 
describe their movement. 
A serious deficiency with inclusivism, at least from an evangelical perspective, is in its 
understanding of salvation for non-Christians and even atheists.  There is a sense where 
inclusivists have given up all the ground won by the Protestant reformers five hundred years 
ago.  In their appreciation for Catholicism and specifically Vatican II, they appear to have 
become too Catholic.  The battle cry of sola fide and the struggles over justification by faith 
have been swept away when an atheist can now do good works meriting salvation.  The “faith 
principle” espoused by inclusivists might work with adherents of other religions, but it can 
hardly be said to be present in a person who does not even believe in God.340 
The Soteriology of inclusivism (whether evangelical or Catholic) boils down to a works-
righteousness that bears remarkable resemblance to pluralistic systems.  Exclusivists would 
possibly expect this from semi-Pelagian Catholics, but not evangelicals in the tradition of 
Martin Luther and John Calvin (or Jacobus Arminius or John Wesley for that matter).  When 
debating whether or not inclusivists should be allowed to call themselves evangelicals, 
perhaps even asking if they should be properly considered Protestants is not too far out of 
line. 
Perhaps this is an inherent problem in all soteriological systems which place such a 
premium on the love of God.  Once “God is love” supersedes all other biblical formulas 
describing God’s character, it is a small step to “God will basically accept or tolerate 
anybody.”  Unfortunately, inclusivism tends toward pluralism’s salvific view of non-Christian 
religions.  Carl Henry makes a cogent, and typically evangelical, point in this regard. 
“The notion that God’s historical covenants embrace all world religions as part of 
the church that finds fulfillment in Christ, and that Christ is present in nonbiblical 
                                                 
340 In the Old Testament, when people approached God on their own terms it meant judgment, death and 
discipline. This process is seen in Cain's offering (Gen. 4:5), Nadab's strange fire (Lev. 10:1-2) and Saul's 
sacrifice (1 Sam. 15:22-23). 
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religious history from the beginning, is alien to biblical teaching and arbitrarily 
correlates religion in general with redemptive religion.  The New Testament does 
indeed represent the whole cosmos and all history as finding its final reconciliation 
in Christ.  But from this emphasis we cannot logically infer that nonbiblical 
religious writings point to Christ in some hidden way.  While God’s saving design 
in the Bible has certain universal implications, it does not welcome the world’s 
works-religions as prefatory to the propitiatory work of the Redeemer.  The 
nonbiblical religions and religious writings are not oriented to Christ.”341 
There is a sense where inclusivists have missed the primary purpose of Jesus coming into 
the world.  Jesus did not come to make salvation possible, he came to make it certain.  As 
Pinnock notes, “Christ’s death on behalf of the race evidently did not automatically secure for 
anyone an actual reconciled relationship with God, but made it possible for people to enter 
into such a relationship by faith” (Grace & Will, 23).  But how does this compare with Jesus’ 
own description of his mission?  “For the Son of Man came to seek and to save what was 
lost” (Lk. 19:10).  Jesus’ mission makes salvation actual, not just possible.  However, because 
of their revulsion for limited atonement, inclusivists need to refashion the mission of Jesus 
along these lines. 
The person of the Son of God has been lost in inclusivism’s attempt for a wider hope.  
They have sacrificed Christian particularity for a modern universality that is akin to pluralism.  
They have driven a Gnostic wedge between the God of the Old Testament and his Son as 
revealed in the New, and by selectively picking and choosing which of the Son’s teachings to 
emphasise, they have violated the very Great Commission they want so much to make more 
open.  In fact, is it not this very desire, to create a wider hope where none biblically exists, 
that is the downfall of inclusivism?  It appears difficult if not impossible to maintain the 
particularity of Christ in inclusivist theology, and once that particularity is erased, inclusivism 
naturally blends into pluralism. 
There appears to be a problem in inclusivist teaching, one which confuses God’s 
personal action in Jesus Christ with his universal presence.  This lack of qualitative distinction 
confuses inclusivist Soteriology, where a pre-conversion Saul of Tarsus or a pagan Cornelius 
or even an atheist can be saved.  Exclusivists are rightly concerned, then, when inclusivists 
claim that salvation is only through Jesus.  Once again, the universal presence of God and his 
                                                 
341 Carl Henry at His Best (Portland, OR: Multnomah Press, 1989) (no author or editor cited) 209. 
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Spirit supplants the particularity of Christ, making such exclusivist sounding claims to ring 
hollow. 
Inclusivists make it a point that Bibliology should not be divorced from Pneumatology, 
and they cite traditional evangelicalism’s error in this regard.  And yet, is this not precisely 
what inclusivists do in the final analysis?  By having the Spirit move in ways contrary to the 
Word he inspired, inclusivists are creating a bifurcation between Spirit and Word. 
The positive view of the universality of religion and the imago Dei has erased any 
consideration of the universality of sin.  This is why inclusivists can speak positively about 
the Covenant of Noah as still applying and even granting salvific benefits, while ignoring the 
fact that the vast majority of humanity was wiped out in Noah’s flood, an eloquent statement 
for the fewness doctrine.  Further, inclusivists can read Paul’s arguments in the first three 
chapters of Romans and come away with positive feelings about humanity’s potential, while 
ignoring all the damning statements about humanity’s sin and its effects.  In short, 
inclusivism’s positive views of the imago Dei, general revelation, and prevenient grace all fail 
to take into account the universal problem of sin. 
The negative biblical portrayal of non-Judeo-Christian religions has already been 
addressed.  The selective usage by inclusivists of “pagan saints” is wanting, in that they have 
not adequately proven that such individuals were actually drawn to the one, true God via their 
pagan religions.  Rather, as already noted in detail, virtually every one of them had some 
content of special revelation which made Jehovah known to them.  The exclusivist position 
that these other faiths are false appears to make the stronger biblical case.  God is not using 
these religions to draw people to himself.  Rather, these religions are drawing people away 
from God. 
What is the soteriological picture inclusivism paints?  When expressed in full-blown 
Open Theism, the picture is rather disconcerting for traditional evangelicals, and with good 
reason.  Picture a God who does not know the future choices of his creatures, who learns as 
time moves forward and who can change, and who is so consumed with human freedom to 
choose that he will not violate it.  Further consider that this God will grant salvation not only 
to those people holding views entirely contrary to the revelation he has given in the Bible, but 
he will even save an atheist so long as that atheist does some of the things Jesus expected his 
disciples to do. 
The practical outworking of inclusivism is best seen in its effect on world missions.  It is 
difficult to believe that, given a group of inclusivists and an equal number of exclusivists, that 
the inclusivists will ultimately have a more vibrant view of missions.  Perhaps if one were to 
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compare a group of Arminians to a group of Calvinists, the Arminians would win the day.  
However, inclusivists are not simply Arminians, they are much more (or less) than that.  It is 
all of the extra-Arminian trimmings of inclusivism (and Open Theism) which makes its view 
of missions suspect.  Indeed, if Pinnock is correct in assuming that salvation is already 
possessed by humanity and can only be lost if a person opts out, it stands to reason that the 
best thing for evangelicals to do is not jeopardise that standing and share the gospel with 
people who may then reject it.  Rather, it is better to not speak about Jesus at all and avoid the 
risk of individuals opting out.  This can hardly be said to be a better alternative than the 
traditional evangelical view of missions. 
An inclusivist optimism to a wider extent of salvation or greater access to its possibility 
appears biblically unfounded.  When Jesus speaks of few, it would be wrong to condemn a 
fewness doctrine.  When Jesus talks of a narrow road that leads to salvation, Christians would 
be remiss to widen that road because broader paths appeal to them.  A faulty inclusivism has 
resulted from a faulty hermeneutic. 
Thus the systematic theology of inclusivism fails in multiform aspects.  But where is the 
initial misstep from which all other missteps ensue?  In answering this question, the judgment 
of God must be considered. 
 
4.4 Where Is God’s Judgment? 
What have inclusivists compromised in their evangelicalism in order to maintain their wider 
hope?  Here are the key positions they have adopted as a result of their inclusivism: 
 A positive view of non-Christian religions and their potentially salvific benefits 
 An understanding of salvation which appears to be works-based, not faith-based 
 A view of God who cannot know the future choices of free-willed creatures 
 A God who has limited power 
 A God who can change 
 A less-than-evangelical view of the inerrancy of Scripture which borders on neo-
orthodoxy 
 A view of Jesus in which he made mistakes in his future predictions 
 Views of the afterlife (annihilationism and post-mortem evangelism) which are 
tenuous at best342 
                                                 
342 It has also been characterised by Pelagian and even Gnostic tendencies. 
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They have not compromised their belief in the Trinity or the incarnation, which is good 
news, but can such cardinal doctrines be far behind?  It would be unfair to answer in the 
affirmative, but it is also understandable why many evangelicals would answer that way.  In 
fact, have there not already been cracks appearing in their Trinitarian doctrine?  Already given 
the large drift that has occurred among inclusivists from the traditional evangelical position, 
many surmise that it is only a matter of time that the drift continues until a full-blown 
liberalism is adopted by these scholars.  Only time will tell. 
All of the above is driven by a movement away from the judgment of God.  Historic 
exclusivism continues to take seriously the judgment of God as taught in Scripture and 
evangelical theology.  As seen in the case of Pinnock, the drift away from biblical inerrancy 
was precipitated by his belief that the judgment of God, at least as characterised in the Old 
Testament, was simply mistaken.  But if Jesus could be wrong in some of his predictions, 
could he not also be wrong in his view of the character of God? 
As surprising as that question might be, especially when asked of an evangelical by an 
evangelical, it is not that far out of line.  Twenty years ago if someone were to ask 
evangelicals if they thought the Bible contained errors, God was less than omnipotent, could 
change in his very nature, and did not know the future, and non-Christian religions could be 
used by God to save people, that person would have received a very puzzled if not crazy look.  
“Are you insane?” might very well have been the retort.  But today that is exactly what 
evangelicals are expressing, and even a vote in the largest evangelical, theological society in 
North America (and perhaps the world) will not deny them their right to remain “evangelical.” 
One wonders how long the inclusivists can maintain the tension between their high 
Christology and their seemingly liberal tendencies in other areas of theology.  Are there too 
many balls in the air for the inclusivists to juggle? 
This is why a hermeneutic of judgment is needed.  Reiser is correct when he observes the 
general trend within Christianity that “judgment . . . silently dropped from consideration” 
(1997:3).  Inclusivists seem to encourage this drop further.  It is not too far off base to say that 
a revulsion for the traditional, exclusivist view of the judgment of God has precipitated a slide 
by evangelical inclusivists from many other important theological positions.343 
Pinnock rightly calls evangelicals to an emphasis on the love of God.  Without it, they are 
not proclaiming the divine plan of salvation properly.  However, the proclamation of divine 
love must not be allowed to overshadow or even cast out the proclamation of divine 
                                                 
343 “There is irony in the way careless talk about love, compassion, and universal accessibility can quickly 
produce shaky theological thinking” (Nash, 1994:134). 
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judgment.  “God is love” must not be quoted to the exclusion of “God is a consuming fire.”  
Both need to be in the gospel proclamation.  One does not automatically take precedent over 
the other.  Both have a legitimate part to play in the salvation message.  A hermeneutic of 
hope must be coupled with a hermeneutic of judgment.  “Salvation” only makes sense in the 
context of danger. 
There are real, eternal consequences to sin.  That is the message Jesus teaches.  The 
consequences are so drastic and dramatic that it would be better for a person to cut off a hand 
or gouge out an eye if in so doing that person was able to escape such consequences.  Like a 
meteorologist who warns of an impending hurricane or monsoon, so Jesus stands before 
humankind and warns of the disaster that is to come to those who do not repent of their sins 
and follow him. 
For Jesus, it seems, had no problem speaking about the love of the Father as well as his 
judgment and wrath.  He did not play one attribute of God against another, so as to make one 
entirely operative in his theology and the other inconsequential, something many inclusivists 
do.344  Their revulsion toward a hermeneutic of judgment causes them to downplay or 
outright ignore the judgment sayings and actions of Jesus.  It causes them to recast the biblical 
view of hell, making it more “user friendly.”  It also causes them to reconfigure their doctrine 
of God, a God who respects human autonomy to painful degrees, and whose love overrides 
virtually all notions of wrath and judgment. 
                                                
All of this would obviously yield a wider hope and an optimism when considering non-
Christian religions.  But is the cost too high?  What has evangelical theology lost when it 
gains a wider hope, but apparently distances itself from much traditional Christian thought?  
Is an omni-competent God better than the classic omniscient one?  Are inclusivists truly able 
to call themselves evangelicals while they consider parts of the Old Testament portrayal of 
God’s character to be inaccurate? 
Lastly, for all of their talk against pluralism, inclusivists appear strangely pluralistic.  
Perhaps this is just a natural product of the modern mindset.  “Pluralistic society inclines to 
cultural and religious relativism as water runs downhill.”345  Much of the inclusivist 
methodology mimics that of pluralism.  They question biblical inerrancy, they look at the 
 
344 In the Parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, there is a clear teaching on the conscious torment, regret and 
remorse that accompanies hell.  In fact, the entire story is given as an illustration of the coming judgment.  The 
parable would make little sense in a universalist or annihilationist scheme, and certainly would not have been 
told by Jesus had he been either of these. 
345 McGavran, Donald. The Clash Between Christianity and Cultures (Washington, D.C.: Canon Press, 1974). 
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morality of adherents of non-Christian faiths and conclude that God must approve of them, 
and their emphasis on the love of God could be easily confused with pluralistic tolerance.   
And yet, it would be unfair to call inclusivists pluralists, despite the many similarities.  
Inclusivists do not attempt to scrub Christianity clean of the particularity of the cross, nor of 
the doctrines of Trinity and incarnation.  They most certainly cannot be labelled liberals in the 
anti-supernatural sense that term often implies.  And despite evangelical fears that 
inclusivists, so long as they hold true to the basic assumptions they have adopted, will 
eventually go to these liberal extremes, the fact of the matter is they have not done so at 
present. 
Yet, for the many reasons given throughout this dissertation, inclusivism is not an 
appealing biblical or theological alternative to exclusivism.  As much as the latter still leaves 
many hard, unanswered questions, inclusivism does not provide an alternative which 
adequately answers them.  In fact, it creates even greater problems than it alleviates. 
In seeking a wider hope, inclusivism has excised the judgment of God.  In doing so, it 
remains a hopeless theological system that can only be judged as inadequate in its portrayal of 
the Christian God and his plan of salvation. 
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